Mr. Vijender Jain, J. ( 1 ) OBJECTIONS to the award dated 31. 8. 90 made by thearbitrator, Shri Prakash Narain, former Chief Justice, inrelation to a contract dated5. 5. 80 had been filed by respondent. The respondent has challenged the award onmany grounds. Shri V. R-Reddy, learned Additional Solicitor General who appearedfor respondent, at the outset argued that the award was a non-speaking award andrespondent is a Public Sector Undertaking and, therefore, learned Arbitrator wasunder a bonded legal obligation to make a speaking award. Mr. Reddy has furthercontended that the Arbitrator has committed legal misconduct by giving a lumpsum award and not giving claim-wise award. ( 2 ). Mr. Reddy vehemently contended that the award in favour of the petitioneris disporprotionately high having regard to the totality of the circumstances. He hassubmitted that petitioner had claimed large amount towards actual expensesalleged to have been incurred by the petitioner in foreign currency and there was noevidence before the Arbitrator as to how petitioner received such foreign exchange. Moreover, in the absence of any law permitting the petitioner to incur suchexpenditure without obtaining permission from the Reserve Bank of India. Petitioner has based its claims on such expenses and in spite of being pointed out to thelearned Arbitrator the award. of such amount makes the award bad on account oflegal misconduct as well as error of jurisdiction. Mr. Reddy has argued thatdisproportionate nature of award is evident as the value of work admittedly doneby the petitioner was approximately Iraqi Dinar (in short "i. D. ") 6,93,971. 862 andthe amount payable as per the contract on executed work was I. D. 6,53,799. 563 butthe total amount paid to the petitioner had been I. D-12,33,136. 690. Interest onborrowed sum has also been paid by the respondent and award has further made therespondent to pay a sum of I. D-2,96,403. 260. The total claim of the petitioner beforethe Arbitrator was I. D-15,57,169. 980. Mr. Reddy has argued that claim No. 6 was theclaim payable by the respondent on account of revision of rates for the work donebeyond the contractual date of completion i. e. 14. 5. 1981 for I. D-5,15,338 and claimno. 8 of the petitioner being claim for damages on account of estimated loss of profitsat the rate of I. D-6,500 per month beyond the contractual date i. e-14. 5. 1981 for aperiod of 5 years for I. D. I. D. 3,90,000. 5. 1981 for I. D-5,15,338 and claimno. 8 of the petitioner being claim for damages on account of estimated loss of profitsat the rate of I. D-6,500 per month beyond the contractual date i. e-14. 5. 1981 for aperiod of 5 years for I. D. I. D. 3,90,000. 00 in fact amounts to duplication and can alsobe in aleternative. Mr. Reddy has argued that the claim No. 6 on account of revisionof rates was beyond the contract agreement and as such learned Arbitrator had nojurisdiction to adjudicate upon the said claim. More so, in view of the fact that thecontract with the petitioner was a labour contract and as such the question ofrevision of rates would not apply. In support of his arguments he has cited the caseof M/s. Alopi Parshad and Sons v. UOI AIR1960 SC 588 and Dhandasi Sahu v. Stateof Orissa (1990) I SCC 214 in which the Supreme Court held that - "the Arbitrator, in the case of a reference to him in pursuance of an arbitrationagreement between the parties, being a person chosen by parties, is constitutedas the sole and final judge of all the questions and the parties bind themselvesas a rule to accept the award as final and conclusive. The Arbitrator need notgive any reason and even if he commits a mistake either in law or in fact indeterming the matter REFERRED TO to him, where such mistake does not appear onthe face of the award, the same could not be assailed. The award could beinterfered with only in limited circumstances as provided under Sections 16and 30 of the Arbitration Act. In this situation the court has to test the awardwith circumspection. Even with all these limitations on the powers of Courtand probably because of these limitations it must be held that if the amountawarded was disporportionately high having regard to the original claimmade and the totality of the circumstances, it would certinly be a case wherethe arbitrator could be said to have not applied his mind amounting to legalmisconduct. In this case the total value of the work not paid, according to theappellant, was Rs-12,15,653. As against this claim the arbitrator has awardeda lump sum of Rs-25,00,156. The appellant had asked for payment of interestand including interest his claim was Rs. 31,44,437. In this case the total value of the work not paid, according to theappellant, was Rs-12,15,653. As against this claim the arbitrator has awardeda lump sum of Rs-25,00,156. The appellant had asked for payment of interestand including interest his claim was Rs. 31,44,437. However, where a referenceto arbitration was made prior to the commencement of the Interest Act, 1978 (which Act came into force on 19/08/1981) the arbitrator is not empoweredto grant interest for the period up to the date of submission of the claim or theperiod during which the dispute was pending before the arbitrator and wherethe award granted a lump sum amount it shall deem to have included theinterest also if interest had been claimed before the arbitrator and the inclusionof such interest rendered that part of award invalid. If, therefore, the interestportion is excluded then award of Rs. 25,00,156. 00 suffers from the vice of givingdisproportionately high amount. " ( 3 ). Mr. Reddy has further contended that the claim for the loss of profit couldalso not have been given to the petitioner as admittedly the petitioner had completed92% of the work by June, 1982, therefore, if there was any loss at best that could befor one year and in any eventuality on this account the claim for I. D. 78. 000. 00 couldhave been the amount though the same was not admitted. Mr. Reddy has taken greatpains to argue that award of any claim based on claim No. 6 suffers from serious errorof jurisdiction as it is beyond the contract agreement and in support of his argumentshe has cited 1990 (2) Delhi Lawyer 238, Hyderabad Municipal Corporation v. M. Mrishnaswami Mudaliar and Mudaliar and Anr. (1985) 2 SCC 9 , M/s. Chahal Enginerring and Construction Co. v. Irrigation Department, Punjab, Sirsa (1993) 4 SCC 186 and the case of PM. Paul v. UOI 1989 Supple. (1) SCC 368. Mr. Reddy has invitedthe attention of this Court to the minutes of the meeting attended by the parties dated2. 5. 1984 and has argued that in view of these minutes, the petitioner had agreed todo the remaining work at the rates as agreed to in the contract and, therefore, noamount could have been awarded on the basis of claim No. 6. In support of hisarguments, he has cited the case of Associated Engineering Co. v. Government ofandhra Pradesh and Ors. 1984 and has argued that in view of these minutes, the petitioner had agreed todo the remaining work at the rates as agreed to in the contract and, therefore, noamount could have been awarded on the basis of claim No. 6. In support of hisarguments, he has cited the case of Associated Engineering Co. v. Government ofandhra Pradesh and Ors. (1991) 4 SCC 93 in which the Supreme Court held that - the Arbitrator cannot act arbitrarily, irrationally, capriciously or independently of the contract. His sole function is to arbitrate in terms of the contract. His authority is derived from the contract and is governed by the Arbitrationact which embodies principles derived from a specialised branch of the law ofagency. If he has remained inside the parameters of the contract and hasconstrued the provisions of the contract, his award cannot be interfered withunless he has given reasons for the award disclosing an error apparent on theface of it. An Arbitrator who acts in manifest disregard of the contract acts withoutjurisdiction. His authority is derived from the contract and is governed by thearbitration Act which embodies principles derived from a specialised branchof the law of agency (see Mustill and Boyd s Commercial Arbitration, 2nd edn. ,p. 641 ). He commits misconduct if by his award he decides matters excludedby the agreement (see Halsbury s Laws of England, Volume II, 4th edn. , para622 ). A deliberate departure from contract amounts to not only manifestdisregard of his authority or a misconduct on his part, but it may tantamountto a mala fide action. A conscious disregard of the law or the provisions of thecontract from which he has derived his authority vitiates the award. " ( 4 ). Mr. Reddy has also contended that no weightage seems to have been givento the affidavit filed by Mr. Moorjani although the said witness was a high rankingofficer of Finance Department, who was dealing with the record in the saiddepartment, and his evidence could not have been ignored as he was person ofknowledge on the controversy. The learned Counsel for the respondent has arguedthat the Arbitrator has not applied his mind and award is vitiated on that accountalso. ( 5 ). The learned Counsel for the respondent has arguedthat the Arbitrator has not applied his mind and award is vitiated on that accountalso. ( 5 ). Another point raised by learned Additional Solicitor General appearing forthe respondent is that the Arbitrator has committed a grave error in converting theaward in US dollars giving the award on the basis of the rate of dollar on the date ofaward though fixed the amount in terms of rupees and this conversion is erroneousand illegal. Mr. Reddy has contended that the Arbitrator ought to have taken theconversion with reference to the date on which the claim arose and that too in Iraqicurrency to be directly converted to the Indian currency. He has contended that thearbitrator had to give the award in the Indian rupees after determining the value ofi. D. on the date of award. In support of his submissions, Mr. Reddy has cited UOIv. M/s. Jain Associates and Am. 1994 (2) Scale 604 to substantiate his arguments :- "arbitrator has not applied his mind in the judicious manner. Yet the questionis whether the Arbitrator had applied his mind in a judicious manner so as tobind the parties by his award made on various claims. In law of Arbitration,by Justice Bachawat, a former judge of this Court at Page 316, it is stated that"an arbitrator is not a concilliator. His duty is to decide the question submittedto him according to the legal rights of the parties and not according to what he may consider fair and reasonable. mr. Reddy has also argued that the award suffers from other infirmities ascertain wrong consideration had been taken into account while awarding the awardin favour of the petitioner and has argued that the outbreak of war did not adverselyaffect the construction activities the work was not required to be suspended and thepetitioner was not required to demobilise and in fact the petitioner demobilised onits own. The main thrust of the arguments of Mr. Reddy is that admittedly the Iraqipresident visited the site in October, 1982 and the petitioner had already executed92% of the work by June, 1982 and, therefore, the award is disproportionate and beset-aside. Mr. The main thrust of the arguments of Mr. Reddy is that admittedly the Iraqipresident visited the site in October, 1982 and the petitioner had already executed92% of the work by June, 1982 and, therefore, the award is disproportionate and beset-aside. Mr. Reddy has also argued that there are errors which are apparent on theface of the award inasmuch as the Arbitrator has held that there was partialdemobilisation and as a matter of fact there was no mobilisation done by thepetitioner after the demobilisation in 1982-83. ( 6 ). Mr. Reddy has also argued that the award is vitiated and liable to be set asideon account of being unintelligible, uncertain and vague. Mr. Reddy has specificallymentioned that in view of Clause-45 of the contract, the award is bad. Clause-45 ofthe agreement is as follows :- "outbreak OF WARIf during the currency of the Subcontract there shall be an outbreak of war (declared or not) the Associate shall unless notified in writing by the Contractor to the effect of termination of the Sub-Contract use his best endeavours tocomplete the execution of the works. " ( 7 ). Another clause which is important as submitted by learned Counsel for respondent is Clause-14. 5. "if at any time during the continuance of the contract the performance in wholeor in part by either party of any obligation under the Sub-Contract shall beprevented or delayed by reason of expected risks given above then providednotice of the happening of any such event given by either party to the otherwithin 7 (seven) days from the date of occurrence thereof, neither party shallby reason of such event, be entitled to terminate the Sub-Contract nor shalleither party have any claim for damages against the other in respect of suchnon-performance or delay in performance. Performance under the Subcontract shall beresumed as soon as practicable after such event has come toan end or ceased to exist. However, if the performance in whole or in part ofany obligation under the Sub-Contract is prevented or delayed by reasons ofany such event for a period exceeding 60 (sixty) days, the Contractor may haveoption to terminate the Sub-Contract with mutual consent. However, if the performance in whole or in part ofany obligation under the Sub-Contract is prevented or delayed by reasons ofany such event for a period exceeding 60 (sixty) days, the Contractor may haveoption to terminate the Sub-Contract with mutual consent. In case of such atermination of Sub-Contract the Contractor shall be at liberty to take over fromthe Associate at a mutually agreed price of unused, undamaged and acceptable materials, bought or components and stores in course of manufacture inthe possession of the Associate or such portion thereof as the Contractor maydeem fit. " ( 8 ). In view of the aforesaid clauses, Mr. Reddy has argued that no such notice,as required under Clause-14. 5 of the Agreement, has been issued by the petitionerand, therefore, the petitioner is not entitled to any sum on this account. He has also vehemently argued that admittedly the work was to be completed by 14. 5. 1981pursuant to the Agreement dated 5. 3. 1980 and, therefore, in terms of the contract thepetitioner was neither entitled for any sum nor damages in view of Clause-14. 5 of theagreement and there is no provision for escalation in the said contract. Respondenthas also argued that in any event the claim of the petitioner on account of estimatedloss of profits cannot be attributed to the respondent. The argument of the learnedcounsel for the respondent is that in case the respondent had imposed liquidateddamages on the petitioner then at best the petitioner could have taken the shelter ofwar but in the circumstances of the case, no damages could be awarded in favour ofthe petitioner. In any event he has argued that in view of Ex. D-1/38 and Ex. D-1/39the petitioner could not maintain its claim, as in terms of the request of the petitioner,the petitioner was to achieve total demobilisation by January, 1983. Therefore, therewas no question of granting any damages for a period of five years till 1986. Mr. Reddy has pointed out that letter written by the petitioner dated 17. 3. 1993 itselfacknowledges that a few staff workers were retained by the petitioner for finalmeasurement/material handing over and not many workers or staff were engagedby the petitioner so as to entitle them for damages as has been mentioned by them. Whatever staff was at site was for rectification of the work for which the petitionerin any case is not entitled to be paid. Mr. Whatever staff was at site was for rectification of the work for which the petitionerin any case is not entitled to be paid. Mr. Reddy has further stated that vide letterdated 4. 11. 1986 the respondent had informed the petitioner that at site in Iraq therewere only workers without supervisor, engineer and there was no use of these worksas they lacked experience in the kind of work requiring rectification. On the basis ofthese arguments, Mr. Reddy has argued that what the Arbitrator has awarded underthis head is absolutely whimsical, arbitrary and without any basis as nothing was tobe paid for rectification of the work which they undertook from 1982 till 1986. ( 9 ). Learned Counsel has invited the attention of this Court to Ex. D-41, which isa letter written by the respondent dated 30/10/1980 inter alia stating that theworkers, who had opted to return to India, who were working with the petitioner,had been repatriated by the petitioner on his own risk and cost and it was entirelypetitioner s organisational matter. In the said letter, the respondent had requestedthe petitioner to use its best endeavour to complete the execution of the work andfurther requested the petitioner to carry out the critical items of work. He has alsoinvited the attention of this Court to the minutes dated 2. 5. 1984 which was attendedby the representatives of the parties. Both the parties have relied upon the minutes,therefore, it is proper to reproduce its content below I - MINUTES OF THE MEETING HELD BETWEEN EIP AND ACCPL ON 2/05/1984 AT EPI, NEW DELHI OFFICE REGARDING CMBP MAIN ANDMODIFICATION WORKSPRESENTE. P. I. ACC (P)LShri A. S. Bhandarishri J. L. Zutshishri A. N. Jhashri G. D. Moorjanishri B. P. JAINFollowing were discussed and agreed to :at the outset EPI informed ACC (P)L about the status on CMBP modificationworks. According to the item rates generally discussed with the two civil associates,the value of corresponding modification works for ACC (P)L felt that the valueof the LD. 86,000 APPROX. ACC (P)L felt that the value of the modificationworks is too small for them to carry out economically. ACC (P)L confirmed that they will have no objection if the modification worksof CMBP in their portion of work is given in some other agency by EPI. M/s. ACC (P)L confirmed that they will complete the balance works andrectification works of their portion of work covered in the existing contractdt. ACC (P)L confirmed that they will have no objection if the modification worksof CMBP in their portion of work is given in some other agency by EPI. M/s. ACC (P)L confirmed that they will complete the balance works andrectification works of their portion of work covered in the existing contractdt. 5th March for main works as per the terms and conditions of the agreement. (A S Bhandari) (B P Jain)M/s, Engineering Projects M/s. Arvind Const. (1) Ltd. Co. (P) Limited. ( 10 ). In view of these documents learned Counsel for the respondent has arguedthat the learned Arbitrator lost sight of these two important piece of documents. Learned Counsel for the respondent has also argued that the Arbitrator has gonewrong in giving the finding that encashment of bank guarantee by the respondentwas illegal. Respondent has also argued that the Arbitrator lost sight of Ex. D-107,a letter dated 25/01/1992 wherein it was inter alia mentioned that ad hocadvances were paid to the petitioner over and above their running bills and forwhich the respondent was paying interest from 18% to 22%. and Ex. D-140, a letterdated 1. 7. 1980. Mr. Reddy has also placed reliance on the minutes of 5. 12. 1986 insupport of his contention that the bank guarantee was encashed after the workinggroup, wherein the petitioner was also a party, agreed for the same. When theworking group had agreed that it had no objection to the respondent invoking theunconditional guarantee. He has stated that in view of the undertaking that therespondent will not invoke the guarantee without obtaining the approval oftheworking group the respondent had invoked the guarantee after the working groupagreed in principle as stated above and, therefore, the finding of the Arbitrator onthis part is contrary to the documents filed on record and thereby the Arbitrator hascommitted a legal misconduct. In support of his arguments he has cited the cases ofuoi v. M/s. Mehta Teja Singh and Co. AIR 1983 Delhi 297, M/s. Bombay Ammoniapvt. Ltd. v. UOI AIR 1987 Delhi 148 and K. P. Poulose v. State of Kerala and Am. AIR1975 SC 1259 wherein the Supreme Court held that :- " misconduct under Section 30 (a) has not a connotation of moral lapse. AIR 1983 Delhi 297, M/s. Bombay Ammoniapvt. Ltd. v. UOI AIR 1987 Delhi 148 and K. P. Poulose v. State of Kerala and Am. AIR1975 SC 1259 wherein the Supreme Court held that :- " misconduct under Section 30 (a) has not a connotation of moral lapse. Itcomprises legal misconduct which is complete if the Arbitrator on the face ofthe award arrives at an inconsistent conclusion even on his own finding orarrives at a decision by ignoring very material documents which throwabundant light on the controversy to help a just and fair decision. " ( 11 ). On the other hand, Mr. Arun Jaitely, learned Counsel for the petitioner hasargued that the original contract was for the period of 14 months starting from May,1980 but because of out break of war between Iraq and Iran and because of changein the design, concept and modification of the ministerial building after the visit ofiraqi President at the site in October, 1982, the petitioner had to continue on the sitetill 1986. Relying on the minutes of the meeting dated 2. 5. 1984 Mr. Jaitely has pointedout that what had been comtemplated in the said minutes was that the petitioner willhave no objection if the modification work of the Council of Ministers buildingproject in the portion of work of the petitioner is given to some other agency by therespondent and petitioner undertook to complete the balance work and the rectification work of its portion as per the terms and conditions of the Agreement. Mr. Jaitely has at the outset argued that what the petitioner is claiming is not onaccount of the work which the petitioner has carried out till June, 1982 but rectification resulting because of modification for which expenses equivalent to I. D. 50,000/- had been incurred by way of manpower expenses by claimant after April, 1984 forthe project. He has stated that when the respondent did not pay for the claim norsettled the matter, the petitioner initiated proceedings before this Court undersection 20 of the Arbitration Act being Suit No. 2696-A/1986 pursuant to whichrespondent appointed Shri Prakash Narain, a former Chief Justice of this Court, asarbitrator. Mr. Jaitely has also conteded that in relation to claim Nos. 3,8,9,10and II,counsel for respondent had frankly conceded that he was not pressing the same forthe time before the Arbitrator and this was so recorded in the minutes of themeetings held on 12. 7. Mr. Jaitely has also conteded that in relation to claim Nos. 3,8,9,10and II,counsel for respondent had frankly conceded that he was not pressing the same forthe time before the Arbitrator and this was so recorded in the minutes of themeetings held on 12. 7. 1990 and 13. 7. 1990 by the Arbitrator, wherein it was furthernoted that the parties have nothing further to say and the Arbitrator reserved hisaward. Mr. Jaitely has argued that keeping in view the nature of the claims, thearbitrator has awarded a lump sum award taking into consideration ad hocadvances and other payments made by the respondent to the petitioner and afteradjustment thereof, the Arbitrator has considered the claims of the parties, voluminous documentary records in hundreds of pages, oral evidence led by the partiesand arguments of counsel for the parties. Mr. Jaitely has further argued that nodirection was given by this Court while making the order of the reference that thearbitrator was to give award separately on each claim. Counsel for the petitionerhas argued that it is fallacious to suggest that award is disproportionately high. Heargued that these allegations are raised for the first time in these proceedings andwere not raised before the Arbitrator. In any event, Mr. Jaitely has argued that theseclaims are based on extra items of work, execution of temporary work and the itemsarising out of payment against petty bills besides expenses incurred in connectionwith the work. In this regard he has also stated that in fact it is admitted by therespondent that the petitioner had given a correct amount of I. D. 59609. 533 whileworking out the ad hoc advances provided by the respondent to the petitioner in theavailable foreign currency for the purpose of the work. Therefore, most of claims arerelated to items of work executed under the contract and for which, there were norates originally agreed and as such, work being undisputably completed on instructions and within the knowledge of the respondent, the petitioner claimed the ratesfor such items. Mr. Jaitely has argued that the petitioner had other running contractsin Iraq like the project known as Samawa Railway Project and construction of 270houses for the cement factory and the petitioner earned moneys in Iraqi Dinars fromthe said project and same were also spent for the work under the contract in question. Mr. Mr. Jaitely has argued that the petitioner had other running contractsin Iraq like the project known as Samawa Railway Project and construction of 270houses for the cement factory and the petitioner earned moneys in Iraqi Dinars fromthe said project and same were also spent for the work under the contract in question. Mr. Jaitely has contended that no permission was required from the Reserve Bankof India in this relation and the petitioner had the authority to spend by virtue ofletter entered into between the parties dated 12. 2. 1980 as it was the duty of therespondent to provide funds in the available foreign currency to the petitioner forthe work under the contract. On the basis of these arguments, he has stressed thatthere is no error of jurisdiction and award is proportionate to the claims raised by thepetitioner. ( 12 ). Repelling the arguments of learned Additional Solicitor General, Mr. Jaitelyhas contended that revision of rates had to apply to the contract in question. He hasargued that as per the contract work ought to have been completed in May, 1981 andit is admitted that the petitioner worked for the respondent upto May, 1986. Thecontention of Mr. Jaitely is that higher rates were given to one Mr. K-P. R. Reddy at therelevant time and at least same rates must bemade applicable to the petitioner. Themain thrust of the arguments of learned Counsel for the petitioner is that althoughin terms of the contract the work was to be finished within 14 months but on accountof delays attributable to the respondent, the work was continued for a period of 82months and there is no duplication in the claims of the petitioner as suggested by therespondent. Mr. Jaitely has denied that claim Nos. 6 and 8 are in duplication. He hasfurther contended that claim No. 6 is neither arbitrary nor beyond the contractagreement. Mr. Jaitely has contended that claim of the petitioner was more thani. D. 15 lacs whereas the Arbitrator has awarded less than I. D. 3 lacs. Mr. Jaitely has denied that claim Nos. 6 and 8 are in duplication. He hasfurther contended that claim No. 6 is neither arbitrary nor beyond the contractagreement. Mr. Jaitely has contended that claim of the petitioner was more thani. D. 15 lacs whereas the Arbitrator has awarded less than I. D. 3 lacs. Learned Counselfor the petitioner argued that the bank guarantee in question had been furnishedunder and/or in pursuance of the contract and, therefore, the dispute and differencearising between the parties that had been REFERRED TO for arbitration would also includethe disputes concerning the legality and validity of the encashment of the bankguarantee and consequential relief to the petitioner to be entitled to return/refundof amount recovered under the bank guarantee including interest and, therefore, theaward in this regard made by the Arbitrator is perfectly legal and valid. Counsel forpetitioner has contended that Chairman-cum-Managing Director of the respondentappointed Shri Prakash Narain, sole Arbitrator, and all disputes were REFERRED TO to thearbitration of the Arbitrator and there was no clause which could put restrictions onthe right of parties to bring forward the dispute of money realised by encashing bankguarantee by the respondent. In any event there was no erroneous proposition oflaw when the Arbitrator held that the encashment of the bank guarantee wasunjustified. Mr. Jaitely has further repelled the contention of the respondent andargued that vide letter dated 10. 5. 1982 written by the respondent in reply to thepetitioner s letter dated 16. 4. 1982 for enhancement of rate in which they hadmentioned payment should be on the basis of cost plus 10% profit basis for the worksbeyond original stipulation for completion, respondent requested the petitioner asthe project is prestigious one, it should be completed at the earliest leaving mattersfor discussions at a later date. On the basis of this reply Mr. Jaitely has contended thatat this stage the respondent cannot turn round and assail the finding of thearbitrator as voluminous record was filed before the Arbitrator and on the basis ofrecords, the Arbitrator has made the award. Mr. Jaitely has also argued thatexclusion or inclusion clauses cease to exist and are of no relevance if fundamentalchanges are made in the contract. In support of his contention he has cited the caseof M/s. Salwan Construction Co. Mr. Jaitely has also argued thatexclusion or inclusion clauses cease to exist and are of no relevance if fundamentalchanges are made in the contract. In support of his contention he has cited the caseof M/s. Salwan Construction Co. v. UOI ILR (1977) II 748 that firstly it is not openfor the Court to probe the mental process on which the Arbitrator has reached hisconclusion where it is not disclosed by the terms of his award and secondly for theproposition that the escalator is an index. It can be a convenient measure ofdamages. When contracct does not provide for escalation in case of breach o fcontratthe escalator can be adopted by the Court as a true measure of damages if it isavailable at hand. He has cited the case of Charterhouse Credit Company Ltd. v. Tolly (1963) 2 All England Law Reports 432 in which it was held - "if a party to a contract had broken a fundamental term, an election by the otherparty to affirm the contract and sue fordamages, does not of itself re-entitle theparty in breach to rely on an exemption clause which he has disentitled himselffrom relying on by his breach of the fundamental term of the contract. " ( 13 ). Repelling the contention of the respondent regarding claim of demobilisation being wrong on the face of it Mr. Jaitley contended that the respondent repatriated its own employees to India because of hostility between Iraq and Iran. In anycase Mr. Jaitely argued that this objection was not taken by the respondent and hecannot be permitted to argue if the same had not been taken or pleaded. In supportof his submissions, he has cited Madan Lalv. Sunder Lal andanr. AIR 1967 SC 1233 . Mr. Jaitely argued with emphasis that nothing turned on the minutes dated 2. 5. 84 asit only reflected that the petitioner in right earnest agreed to complete the balancework and rectification work covered under existing contract dated 15. 3. 1980 as perthe terms and conditions of the Agreement. But that does not follow that by signingthat minutes the petitioner had given up his rights regarding recovery of priceswhich petitioner has paid on account of work being carried out for a period beyondwhat was contemplated vide Agreement dated 5. 3. 1980. As a matter of fact, till14. 5. 3. 1980 as perthe terms and conditions of the Agreement. But that does not follow that by signingthat minutes the petitioner had given up his rights regarding recovery of priceswhich petitioner has paid on account of work being carried out for a period beyondwhat was contemplated vide Agreement dated 5. 3. 1980. As a matter of fact, till14. 5. 1981 only 34% of the work was done when the contract period was over andwork had not been completed and admittedly on the assurance of the respondent,the petitioner carried on the work and completed approximately 92% work by June,1982 and thereafter kept office for rectification of the modified works till 1986 andspent on establishment and on such modification. Mr. Jaitely has also argued that injuly, 1981 for a similar work one Mr. K. P. R. Reddy was given contract and what thepetitioner had demanded from the respondent that at least same rate be given to thepetitioner as has been given to said Mr. K. P. R. Reddy. In this regard he has reliedupon the affidavit filed by the petitioner before the Arbitrator particularly paragraph-7 of the said affidavit that the petitioner carried out the work after 14. 5. 1981on specific assurance given to the petitioner by the then Chairman-cum-Managingdirector, Shri O. P. Narula, and it was contended that that work has not progressedas it ought to have been and it was not possible for the petitioner or for therespondent to anticipate any completion date. The petitioner only demanded actualcost plus 10% vide their letter dated 16/04/1982 addressed to Chairman-cum-Managing Director of the respondent and they had specifically mentioned that itwas not possible for claimant to continue at the project if payment of cost plus 10%profit basis for the work beyond 14. 5. 1981 was not approved and it is too late in theday for the respondent to plead that the Arbitrator has wrongly awarded the awardin favour of the petitioner in view of the reply of the respondent dated 10. 5. 1982. Mr. Jaitely has also contended from the letter dated 29/11/1980 Ex. C-114makes it clear that work was suspended and respondent had allowed the suspensionof the work from 31st 0ctober, 1980 and as a matter of fact has absorbed the availablewilling workers, who stayed on at Baghdad. Mr. Jaitely has invited the attention ofthis Court to Ex. 5. 1982. Mr. Jaitely has also contended from the letter dated 29/11/1980 Ex. C-114makes it clear that work was suspended and respondent had allowed the suspensionof the work from 31st 0ctober, 1980 and as a matter of fact has absorbed the availablewilling workers, who stayed on at Baghdad. Mr. Jaitely has invited the attention ofthis Court to Ex. C-93 letter written by the petitioner to the respondent dated 8/10/1980 in which it has been specifically mentioned that since the outbreak ofwar between Iraq and Iran, work was completely paralysed and was at standstill. The letter further stated that due to the insecure and unsafe conditions prevailing atthe site on account of frequent air-raids, petitioner s workers represented to therespondent as well as to the Indian Embassy for repatriation with one monthadditional wages and their request was acceeded to on September 30,1980. Mr. Jaitelyhas further contended that the repatriation of Indian workers from Baghdad wasmade by the Indian Embassy and respondent s office at Baghdad and in this relationhas shown Ex. C-104 a letter written by the petitioner dated 31. 10. 1980 to therespondent mentioning inter alia that in accordance with the decision taken by theindian Embassy and respondent s office in Baghdad, workers were paid onemonth s additional wages and repatriated back to India. He has further invited theattention of this Court to Ex. C-106, a letter written by the petitioner to the respondentdated 3. 11. 1980 incorporating the Telex message received by the petitioner from itsbaghdad office:- "work AT CMB PROJECT SUSPENDED BY EPI FROM BT NOVEMBER,1980 STOP THEY HAVE ASKED US TO SEND ALL LABOUR TO SAAD-3project BUT ABOUT SIXTY LABOURS ARE UNWILLING TO GO TOTHAT PROJECT BEING DEFENCE AREA STOP WE ARE REPATRIATINGTHEM TO INDIA IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS STOP FURTHER DEVELOP-MENT WILL BE COMMUNICATED STOP" ( 14 ). Mr. Jaitely has further stressed that the respondent has never attributed thedelay of the project to the claimant and had quoted the relevant information givenby the respondent in its Annual Report to share-holders which was placed on thetable of the Parliament :- "11thannual REPORT FOR THE YEAR 1980-81 DATED 30th SEPTEM-BER, 1981a. "set BACK IN THE PROGRESS OF WORK ON IRAQI PROJECTS"due to continued efforts on the part of management to accelerate the progressof work on Iraqi projects an output of Rs. 6. 9 crores was achieved in August,1980, as against an amount of Rs-1. "set BACK IN THE PROGRESS OF WORK ON IRAQI PROJECTS"due to continued efforts on the part of management to accelerate the progressof work on Iraqi projects an output of Rs. 6. 9 crores was achieved in August,1980, as against an amount of Rs-1. 65 crores at the beginning of that year. However, due to hostilities between Iraq and Iran, thereafter, there was a setback for about 6 months in the progress of work on Iraqi projects. During thisperiod, keeping in view the safety of the personnel and workers posted at someof the sites, workers and the families of EPI employees were brought back toindia and on the restoration of near normal conditions, workers have beenrepositioned at the sites. Scarcity of power and difficulties in the procurementand transportation of materials are still being experienced at sites. Yourdirectors hope to overcome these obstacles and obtain adequate progress ofwork at the sites in the remaining period of the current year. "then later on a further report of the respondent dated 29. 9. 1983 whichacknowledges that the work was stopped on account of certain modifications to bedesired by the Iraqis after the visit of their President at the site. Mr. Jaitely has furthertaken me to Ex. C-337 a letter dated 4. 12. 1983 to show the basis of the claims of thepetitioner, the respondent had preferred TO war claims on the employer and theyassured the petitioner that they are pursuing the claims. On the basis of thesevoluminous evidence, Mr. Jaitely argued that the theory of the respondent that thearbitrator has given disproportionate award in favour of the petitioner is whollyunjustified and without any basis. He has argued that the Arbitrator has based hisaward on the basis of the voluminous records, made available before the Arbitrator,filed by the parties. Petitioner further contended that once the Arbitrator held thatencashment of bank guarantee was wrong, refund of bank guarantee amountequivalent to Rs. 38 lacs cannot be termed misconduct nor arbitrary. He has argued that the Arbitrator has based hisaward on the basis of the voluminous records, made available before the Arbitrator,filed by the parties. Petitioner further contended that once the Arbitrator held thatencashment of bank guarantee was wrong, refund of bank guarantee amountequivalent to Rs. 38 lacs cannot be termed misconduct nor arbitrary. He furtherargued that contention of respondent that the contract was in Iraqi Dinar and takinginto consideration the prevalent rate of dollar and then converting into Indianrupees was an exercise which ought not to have been done by the Arbitrator, hascontended that at the relevant time there was no Iraqi Dinar and Rupee parity and,therefore, in international trade it was the convertibility of Iraqi Dinar to a dollarwhich has to be taken into account for awarding the sum in Indian Rupee as therewas no determined value of Iraqi Dinar vis-a-vis Indian Rupee. In this connection,mr. Jaitely has REFERRED TO to the claim of respondent in which the respondent itself hadshown US dollar vis-a-vis Iraqi Dinar giving the price of one Iraqi Dinar equal to USdollar 3. 37 in the statement of claim filed by the respondent. Counsel has contendedthat even otherwise the Court has merely to see whether the date on which the rateof exchange is awarded by the Arbitrator, is reasonable. If the award is made inforeign currency then the Court can direct its payment in Indian currency as on thedate of the passing of the decree. In his support he has cited Torasol v. Oil and Natural Gas Commission AIR 1984 SC 241 . ( 15 ). Repelling the contention of the respondent that Mr. G. D. Moorjani s evidence was totally ignored, Mr. Jaitely has argued that the Arbitrator has only heldthat said Mr. G. D. Moorjani did not have any personal knowledge of the project as therecords were maintained in the Baghdad office and Mr. Moorjani was in Delhi. Thearbitrator has taken into consideration the affidavit of Mr. Moorjani also. Mr. Jaitleyhas contended that once the Arbitrator has stated that he has considered theevidence of all the witnesses and documents then there is no presumption that anywitness or evidence has been ignored. In support of his submissions, he has cited thecase of Secretary to Government of Orissa, Irrigation Dept. and Ors. v. Raghunathmohapatra AIR 1985 Ori 182 . Moorjani also. Mr. Jaitleyhas contended that once the Arbitrator has stated that he has considered theevidence of all the witnesses and documents then there is no presumption that anywitness or evidence has been ignored. In support of his submissions, he has cited thecase of Secretary to Government of Orissa, Irrigation Dept. and Ors. v. Raghunathmohapatra AIR 1985 Ori 182 . I would like to mention what Lord Denning saidabout evaluating of evidence by the Arbitrator :- "the weight of evidence and the inferences from it are essentially matters forthe arbitrator. I do not think that the award of arbitrators should be challengedor upset on the ground that there was not sufficient evidence or that it was tootenuous or the like. One of the very reasons for going to arbitration is to get ridof technical rules of evidence and so forth. . . . . Questions of evidence are essen-tially matters for the arbitrator and not matters for the court. " (G. K. N. Centrax Gears Ltd. v. Matbro Ltd. (1976) 2 Lloyod s Rep. 555 (575)1 ( 16 ). Adverting on the next submission of learned counsel for the respondent,counsel for the petitioner argued that the theory that the Arbitrator has givendisproportionately large amount is wrong as the total work awarded was for a valueof about I. D. 8. 92 lacs and admittedly the petitioner has received I. D. I 1. 9 lacs and thecertified work was for I. D. 6. 93 lacs, therefore, from June, 1981 till 1986 the claim ofthe petitioner has been for payment of more than I. D. I 6 lacs and what the petitionerhas stated in the claims filed before the Arbitrator that from 1981 onwards the ratesgiven to Mr. K. P. R. Reddy be taken as the prevailing rates and on the same basisdetailed claims were presented before the Arbitrator. Broadly stating Mr. Jaitelyargued that on account of revision of rates I. D. 5 lacs were claimed on account ofescalation in cost of material and rectification work, I. D. I. 84 lacs were claimed onaccount of extra item of work, expenses incurred in the execution of extra item ofworks not included in the Contract with EPI amounted to I. D-1,18,85. 375, expensesincurred on execution of temporary works, enabling works etc. not included in thecontract I. D-2,00,668. 433, amount payable by EPI towards deviation in petty billsi. D-26,965. 375, expensesincurred on execution of temporary works, enabling works etc. not included in thecontract I. D-2,00,668. 433, amount payable by EPI towards deviation in petty billsi. D-26,965. 183, reimbursement of expenses incurred due to demobilisation andremobilisation etc. due to war I. D. I,84,154. 000, expenses incurred on renewal ofbank guarantee and other charges from time to time Rs. 2,45,950. 00, claim payably byepi on account of revision of rates for the work done beyond contractual date ofcompletion i. e. 14. 5. 1981 I. D. 5,15,338/", amount of claim for suspension of work byepi I. D. 30,000. 00, claim for damages on account of estimated loss of profit @i. D. 6,500. 00 per month beyond the contractual date of 15. 5. 1981 for a period of 5 yearsi. D-3,90,000, refund of amount received by encashment of bank guarantees plusinterest @ 18% p. a. Rs. 38,25,000. 00with interest 18% p. a. on unpaid amounts statedhereinabove. Thus, it will be seen for claim of over I. D. 15 lacs, the Arbitrator has onlyawarded I. D. 2,10,000 equivalent in Indian currency in favour of the petitioner andby no stretch of imagination it can be said that the award is disproportionate. Tosupplement his submissions, Mr. Jaitely has argued that large amount has not beenawarded by the Arbitrator. In support of his contention, he has cited State of Orissa v. Dhandasi Sahu (1988) 4 SCC 12 in which Supreme Court held - "it is well settled that when the parties choose their own arbitrator to be thejudge in dispute between them, they cannot, when the award is good on theface of it, object to the decision either upon law or on facts. Therefore, whenarbitrator commits a mistake either in law or in fact in determining the mattersreferred TO to him, where such mistake does not appear on the face of the awardand the document and the documents appended to or incorporated so as toform part of it, the award will neither be remitted nor set-aside. . . . . . . . . . . . The fact that merely the award amount is quite high as commented by the Highcourt or that a large amount has been awarded, does not vitiate the award assuch. . . . . . . . . . . " ( 17 ). Learned counsel repelling the arguments of Mr. . . . . . . . . . . The fact that merely the award amount is quite high as commented by the Highcourt or that a large amount has been awarded, does not vitiate the award assuch. . . . . . . . . . . " ( 17 ). Learned counsel repelling the arguments of Mr. Reddy that the Arbitratorcould not have awarded the amount under the award as there was no clause in theagreement, has argued that if the award is a non-speaking award, as the one inchallenge before this Court, and does not make any reference to the clauses of theagreement, the Court is not entitled to go to the clauses of the Agreement in orderto determine the error. In support of his arguments, he has cited the case of M/s. Desraj and Sons v. UOI AIR 1984 Delhi 365 in which this Court held- "in a non-speaking award where the arbitrator neither has made any particular reference to any clause of the contract nor has incorporated the contract inthe award in the sense that he has invited those reading the award to read thecontract. Court is not entitled to look at the contract and search it in order tosee whether there is an error of law, the Court has no means to enter his mindand to explore his thought processes. " ( 18 ). And further cited the case of Calcutta Metropolitan Development Authority v. Haripada Mitra AIR 1990 Cal 175 incorporating the law laid down on the pointby the Supreme Court in the case of State of Orissa v. Mis. Lall Brothers AIR 1988sc 2018 in which the Supreme Court held that - " it is not open to the Court to speculate, where no reasons are given by thearbitrator, as to what impelled him to arrive at his conclusions. See in this connectionthe observations of the Judicial Committee in Champsey Bhara and Co. v. Jivrajballoo Spinning and Weaving Co. Ltd. 50 Ind App 324 : (AIR 1923 PC 66) and of thiscourt in Jivarajbhai Ujamshi Seth v. Chintamanrao Balaji, (1964) 5 SCR 480 "mr. Jaitely has contended that it is not necessary for the Arbitrator to givereasons. The non-speaking award is a valid award and the same is not liable to be set-aside merely on the ground that no grounds have been given by the Arbitrator whilemaking the award. Jaitely has contended that it is not necessary for the Arbitrator to givereasons. The non-speaking award is a valid award and the same is not liable to be set-aside merely on the ground that no grounds have been given by the Arbitrator whilemaking the award. In his support he has cited the case of Raipur Developmentauthority and Ors. v. Mis. Chokhamal Contractors and Ors. (1989) 2 SCC 721 . Moreover, when admittedly it is a non-speaking award, the Court cannot probe intothe mental process of the Arbitrator and determine as to what impelled thearbitrator to arrive at his conclusion. In his support he has cited 1990 (1) JT 57 , 1988 (4) SCC 353 , 1988 (4) SCC 153 , 1989 (2) SCC 38 , 1994 (5) JT 195 . He has contendedthat it is only when both the parties by a bilateral consent request the Arbitrator togive reasons that he is obliged to give reasons. In his support he has relied on the caseof Food Corporation of India v. fagdish Chandra Saha 1992 (3) Scale 253 . On thebasis of the above submissions learned counsel for the petitioner has stated that thereis no error apparent on the face of the award and award be made a rule of the Courtand a decree in terms of the award be passed. ( 19 ). After hearing learned counsel for the parties, arguments spanning for anumber of days, I must advert to the award now filed by the Arbitrator. Thearbitrator has mentioned that parties filed large number of documents and both theparties agreed that the same may be read as evidence without formal proof. Partiesfiled affidavit of the witnesses and witnesses were cross-examined. Lengthyarguments were advanced on behalf of both the parties. It has been specificallymentioned that respondent-EPI did not press its claim Nos-3,8,9,10 and II reservingits right to do so at some future date and stage. Thereafter the Arbitrator hasrecorded that after having considered the pleadings claims of the parties, voluminous documentary records, oral evidence led by the parties and arguments ofcounsel for the parties, the Arbitrator awarded the lump sum award directing therespondent to pay back to the petitioner an amount of Rs. 38,25,000. 00 and interestthereon @ 15% p. a. from 6. 12. 1986, the date of encashment of bank guarantee, up to23. 6. 1988, the date of reference amounting to Rs. 8,84,500. 38,25,000. 00 and interestthereon @ 15% p. a. from 6. 12. 1986, the date of encashment of bank guarantee, up to23. 6. 1988, the date of reference amounting to Rs. 8,84,500. 00 holding that the encashment of bank guarantee by the respondent is unjustified. Thereafter the Arbitratorhas further taking into consideration the ad hoc advances and other payments madeby the respondent to the petitioner and giving adjustment of the same, directed therespondent to pay to the petitioner a further sum of I. D. 2,10,000. 00 equal to Indiancurrency (taking the conversion rate of one Iraqi Dinar at US$ 3. 377778, this amountof I. D. 2,10,000. 00 held payable by EPI comes to US$ 7,09,333. 38, which in turnconverted to Indian currency works out to Rs. 1,23,56,587. 00) as per exchange rate @17. 42 per dollar prevailing on the date of the award. Accordingly the Arbitrator heldthe respondent to pay a sum of Rs. 1,23,56,587. 00 to the petitioner-ACCL. Respondent was further to pay interest @ 15% p. a. on the aforesaid amounts from the dateof the award till the date of payment. The award is in a nature of lump sum award. The Arbitrator has not given the award claim-wise. If it is a lump sum award, is thereany need for me to go and adjudicate upon various contentions raised by the learnedcounsel for both the parties. If the award is lump sum as in the present case and therewas nothing in the order of reference which made it mandatory for the Arbitratorto give a speaking award or an award claim-wise as has been sought to be arguedby the learned Counsel for the respondent, I need not go into the various objectionsraised by the respondent. The award before me is a lump sum award. Now I haveto decide whether it is proper and appropriate for the Court to probe into the mentalprocess of the Arbitrator in the absence of any stipulation in the reference thatreasons be given by the Arbitrator or that the award must be a speaking award. Inmy opinion Court cannot fault in the award and Arbitrator cannot be said to havecommitted error apparent on the face of the award if the award is a lump sum award. Following the reasoning of the case of Firm Madanlal Roshanlal Mahajan v. Hukumchand Mills Ltd. indore 1967 (1) SCR 105 - "the arbitrator could give a lump sum award. Inmy opinion Court cannot fault in the award and Arbitrator cannot be said to havecommitted error apparent on the face of the award if the award is a lump sum award. Following the reasoning of the case of Firm Madanlal Roshanlal Mahajan v. Hukumchand Mills Ltd. indore 1967 (1) SCR 105 - "the arbitrator could give a lump sum award. He was not bound to give aseparate award for each claim. His award on both fact and law is final. Thereis no appeal from his verdict. The Court cannot review his award and correctany mistake in his adjudication, unless an objection to the legality of the awardis apparent on the face of it. ( 20 ). Quoting from Champsey Bhara and Co. v. Jimaj Balloo Spinning and Weaving Co. Ltd. (Supra) the Privy Council stated : "an error in law on the face of the award means, in their Lordships view, thatyou can find in the award or a document actually incorporated thereto, as forinstance a note appended by the arbitrator, stating the reasons for his judgment, some legal proposition which is the basis of the award and which you canthen say is erroenous. In the present case, the Arbitrator gave no reason for the award. We do not findany legal proposition which is the basis of the award far less a legal propositionwhich is erroneous. It is not possible to say from the award that the arbitratorwas under a misconception of law. The contention that there are errors of lawon the face of the award is rejected. " ( 21 ). Similar is the situation before me, I have broadly reproduced the award inpreceding paragraphs, no reason cogent or otherwise has been given by thearbitrator. After reading the award, nobody could say that it is based on any legalproposition. The Arbitrator is the sole arbiter of disputes inter se the parties takinginto consideration all the relevant material, documents, evidence and after hearingthe arguments of learned counsel for the parties came to certain conclusion andgranted lump sum award by no stretch of imagination it can be said that thearbitrator was under mis-conception of law or has based the award on the basis oflegal proposition which is erroneous, therefore, on this ground also the awardcannot be rejected. Order Preference was made by the Court directing themanaging Director of the respondent to appoint the Arbitrator the respondent chosenot to have an explicit order of reference that the Arbitrator must give a speakingaward or reasons for the award though it was within the power of the parties to insistthat the reasons must be given and only then the Arbitrator was under an obligationto give reasons. Now the respondent cannot turn back and argue because Arbitratorhas awarded a lump sum award and no reason has been given, the award should beset-aside. ( 22 ). In the facts and circumstances of the case, in the absence of any specificorder of reference regarding award to be a speaking award, the Arbitrator was thesole judge of the facts and law involved in the case before him and his decision is notbound for review by the Court unless the objection to the legality of the award isapparent on the face of it. In the present case no legal proposition much lesserroneous legal proposition has been made the basis of the award and the awarddoes not reveal that the Arbitrator was under any mis-conception of law. Therefore,the objection of the respondent that there are errors of law apparent on the face of theaward must be rejected. The objection that the award is liable to be set-aside on theground of non-consideration of the evidence and submissions of the parties must berejected as the Arbitrator has specifically recorded in the award that he hadconsidered the claims and counter-claims, evidence adduced by the parties, submissions and documents filed by the parties and the arguments advanced by the partiesnor can the award be set-aside merely on the ground that the Arbitrator has notspecifically REFERRED TO to any evidence of Mr. G. D. Moorjani or someone else. Thesupreme Court in the case of Bijendra Nath Smastava v. Mayank Srivastava andors. JT 1994 (5) SC 195 has held so. Even otherwise once the parties have selectedtheir own forum then the deciding forum must be given the power of appraisementof the evidence. Once the Arbitrator has chosen to give a lump sum award, theaward cannot be challenged on the ground which has been sought to be convassedbefore me by the respondent. The Arbitrator is the sole judge of the quality as wellas quantity of the evidence and Court will not substitute its own judgment even ifit arrived at a different conclusion. Once the Arbitrator has chosen to give a lump sum award, theaward cannot be challenged on the ground which has been sought to be convassedbefore me by the respondent. The Arbitrator is the sole judge of the quality as wellas quantity of the evidence and Court will not substitute its own judgment even ifit arrived at a different conclusion. I am also supported by the decision of thesupreme Court in the case of Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Mls. jagan Nathashok Kumar and Am. AIR 1987 SC 2316 , held - "in this case, there was no violation of any principles of natural justice. It is nota case where the arbitrator has refused cogent and material factors to be takeninto consideration. The-award cannot be said to be vitiated by non-receptionof material or non-consideration of the relevant aspects of the matter. Appraisement of evidence by the arbitrator is ordinarily never a matter which thecourt questions and considers. The parties have selected their own forum andthe deciding forum must be conceded the power of appraisement of theevidence. In. the instant case, there was no evidence of violation of anyprinciple of natural justice. The Arbitrator in our opinion is the sole judge ofthe quality as well as quantity of evidence and it will not be for this Court totake upon itself the task of being a judge of the evidence before the arbitrator. It may be possible that on the same evidence the Court might have arrived ata different conclusion than the one arrived at by the arbitrator but that by itselfis no ground in our view for setting-aside the award of an arbitrator. "in view of the above discussions, I dismiss the objections application. Suit No. 2994-A/94in view of the objections application, which has been dismissed vide myabove order, the award is made rule of the Court. A decree in terms of the awardis passed. The petitioner will be entitled to interest @ 12% p. a. from the date of decree till its realisation. Suit stands disposed of accordingly.