JUDGMENT - A.V. SAVANT, J.:---Heard all the learned Counsel. 2. This appeal was heard for admission in the month of June 1995 and notice before admission was issued. Thereafter when the matter came up before me, I thought that it was necessary to hear the matter on a priority basis having regard to the consequences which would follow if the impugned order passed by the M.A.C.T. Kolhapur (for short "Tribunal") was allowed to remain in force with the possibility of similar view being taken by the learned Judges in a number of matters. Hence, I had indicated to both the learned Counsel appearing for the respondents that I would like to hear the appeal itself finally. Hence, appeal admitted. 3. By consent appeal taken up for hearing and final disposal forthwith. Paper book and printing dispensed with. Heard all the learned Counsel. 4. The order impugned in this appeal is dated 9th December, 1994 passed by the Tribunal below Exh. 5 in M.A.C. Application No. 48 of 1994. The result of the said order is that despite the specific provisions contained in section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 a claim for "No Fault Liability" has been defeated on the ground that the claimant himself may have been responsible for the accident since a criminal case was pending against him in respect of the said accident. Few facts relevant for the disposal of the appeal are as under : 5. The appellant-Raphik Mehbub Pakhali was riding his own scooter bearing No. MH-10-7000 on 10th May, 1993 at about 9.30 p.m. and was proceeding from Kolhapur to Sangli. He was on the correct side of the road, namely, left hand side of the road. The truck owned by respondent No. 1 Anantkumar Pravinkumar bearing No. MXL-7762 was parking on the road facing Sangli direction and its lights were switched off. At about the time when the appellant approached the said parked truck from behind, it is alleged that the driver of the truck who was original respondent No. 3 in the Tribunal, namely, Bhimrao Ramu Kamble suddenly started the truck, put it is the reverse gear without switching the lights on and as a result of the truck, travelling in the reverse direction, it hit the appellant who was seriously injured resulting in permanent disablement, within the meaning of section 142 of the Motor Vehicles Act. There is no dispute before me that the injuries suffered by the appellant amount to permanent disablement within the meaning of section 142 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 for which he had claimed a sum of Rs. 12,000/- on account of permanent disablement suffered by him. The appellant contended that he was injured in the accident which occurred on 10th May, 1993 at about 9.30 p.m. as a result of the negligence of the driver of the vehicle owned by the first respondent. The said vehicle seems to have been insured with the second respondent Insurance Company. The appellant contended that he had suffered a permanent disablement and was, therefore, entitled to claim Rs. 12,000/- on the Principle of No Fault Liability embodied in section 140 of the said Act. 6. The first respondent opposed the claim of the appellant and in so far as the relevant pleadings in the written statement of the first respondent are concerned, they appear in para 7 of the written statement which is at Ex. 20 dated 27th September, 1994. It reads as under: "The opponent No. 3 was driving the truck in question very cautiously and by his left side, he was never taking the reverse of the said truck as per the allegation made by the petitioner in the petition. The petitioner was driving his vehicle at a very high speed, negligently and carelessly. The petitioner himself has given dash to the truck in question and sustained the alleged injury to himself". In short it was contended that the appellant was in fault since he was driving in his speed negligently and carelessly and was, therefore, not entitled to claim any compensation. 7. The insurance company also opposed the claim on the ground that the owner of the vehicle was not at fault and it was the claimant himself who was at fault. 8. The learned trial Judge by his order dated 9th December, 1994 came to the conclusion that there was a criminal case pending against the appellant which was the subject matter of C.R. No. 18 of 1993 of Shirol Police Station and a case was registered against the appellant for the offence punishable under sections 279,337 and 427 of I.P.C. read with section 184 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Admittedly, there is no decision arrived at in the said criminal case holding the appellant guilty and only a case is pending in the Criminal Court. That apart, the learned trial Judge came to the conclusion that since an offence is registered against the appellant it prima facie shows that the appellant himself was at fault. Therefore, it was not possible to blame the owner of the truck and compel him to pay the amount of No Fault Liability. The relevant observations in the judgment are as under: "There is no scope for doubt that the Court cannot go so deep into the merits of the case at this stage without putting the case on trial. At the same time, one cannot ignore the fact that the offence was registered against the applicant himself. It prima facie shows that the applicant himself was at fault. Therefore, there is no reason to blame the truck driver and to compel him to pay the amount of no fault liability. For all these reasons the application under section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 cannot lie". 9. In view of the above, the application under section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act has been rejected. It is against this order which in my view appears to be some what extra ordinary that the appeal has been filed. 10. Shri Ingale appearing for the appellant has invited my attention to the pleadings on record and contended that the order is un-sustainable in view of the clear provisions of section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act. My attention has been invited to certain decisions, to which I will make a brief reference. In reply Smt. Bosamia for the first respondent owner contended that since a criminal case was pending against the appellant, he was himself at fault and this was enough to dismiss his application under section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act. It must be stated in fairness to Shri Singh appearing for the second respondent Insurance Company that he expressed his inability to support the reasoning of the learned trial Judge which has been quoted above. 11. It is necessary to consider the scheme of Chapter X of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 dealing with the liability in certain cases on the Principle of No fault liability. 11. It is necessary to consider the scheme of Chapter X of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 dealing with the liability in certain cases on the Principle of No fault liability. Section 140 reads as under : 140: Liability to pay compensation in certain cases on the Principle of no fault:- (1) Where death or permanent disablement of any person has resulted from an accident arising out of the use of a motor vehicle or motor vehicles, the owner of the vehicle shall, or, as the case may be, the owners of the vehicles shall, jointly and severally, liable to pay compensation in respect of such death or disablement in accordance with provisions of this section. (2) The amount of compensation which shall be payable under sub-section (1) in respect of any person shall be a fixed sum of twenty five thousand rupees and the amount of compensation payable under that sub-section in respect of the permanent disablement of any person shall be a fixed sum of twelve thousand rupees. (3) In any claim for compensation under sub-section (1), the claimant shall not be required to plead and establish that the death or permanent disablement in respect of which the claim has been made was due to any wrongful act, neglect or default of the owner or owners of the vehicle or vehicles concerned or of any other person. (4) A claim for compensation under sub-section (1) shall not be defeated by reason of any wrongful act, neglect or default of the person in respect of whose death or permanent disablement the claim has been made nor shall the quantum of compensation recoverable in respect of such death or permanent disablement be reduced on the basis of the share of such person in the responsibility for such death or permanent disablement." Sub-section (3) of section 140 makes it clear that the claimant will not be required to establish that the death or disablement was due to any unlawful act of the owner of the vehicle or of any other person. Sub-section (4) makes it abundantly clear that such a claim cannot be defeated on the ground of negligence of the claimant himself or even in the face of any contributory negligence on the claimants part. Sub-section (4) makes it abundantly clear that such a claim cannot be defeated on the ground of negligence of the claimant himself or even in the face of any contributory negligence on the claimants part. Section 141 makes it clear that right to claim compensation under section 140 was in addition to any other right to claim the compensation in respect thereof under any provisions of the Act or on any other law for the time being in force. Sub-section (2) of section 141 enjoins a duty to dispose of the claim under section 140 as expeditiously as possible. Section 142 defines what is permanent disability about which there is no dispute before me in the facts of this case. Section 143 makes the provisions of Chapter X applicable in relation to other claim for compensation under the Workmens Compensation Act, 1923 with necessary modifications. I am not concerned with that provision. Section 144 reads as unders: 144. Over riding effect. The provisions of this Chapter shall have effect now withstanding anything contained in any other provision of this Act or any other law for the time being in force." 12. Section 144, therefore, gives a over-riding effect to the provisions of Chapter X. It must be come in mind that under the unamended Act of 1939 similar provisions were contained in section 92-A to 92-E. The provisions are undoubtedly of a beneficial nature meant to provide for immediate relief to the accident victim either in case of death or permanent disability. Legislature has very clearly provided in sub-section (3) of section 140 that it is not necessary for the claimant to plead or establish any negligence on the part of the owner of the vehicle or of any other person. Sub-section (4) of section 140 makes the matter beyond doubt by providing that even if the claimant himself was at fault or had contributed to the fault of somebody else, this cannot defeat his claim for compensation. In the face of such mandatory provisions, it is difficult to appreciate the reasoning of the learned trial Judge in paras 4 and 5 of his judgment which, I have reproduced in para 8 above. The learned trial Judge has come to the conclusion that merely because a criminal case was pending against the appellant, it prima facie showed that the appellant was at fault. This is an astonishing proposition of law. The learned trial Judge has come to the conclusion that merely because a criminal case was pending against the appellant, it prima facie showed that the appellant was at fault. This is an astonishing proposition of law. A criminal case may be filed against a person who may be entirely innocent or who may be partially at fault alongwith some other persons who may have a major share in the negligence or the fault. Merely because a criminal case is pending, it is impermissible to come to the conclusion that the appellant is at fault and that the owner of the vehicle or its driver is not at fault. That apart, the learned Judge has totally ignored the provisions of section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. 13. In a series of judgments, it has been consistently held that the scope of enquiry in an application under section 140 is extremely limited. One has to only ascertain as to whether (i) the accident has arisen out of the use of the motor vehicle (ii) the said accident has resulted in a permanent disablement of the person who is making the claim or the death of a person whose legal representatives are making the claim and (iii) the claim is made against the owner and insurer of the motor vehicle involved in the accident. Once these three factors are established prima facie, in my view, the claimant is entitled to succeed in an application under section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act. I may now briefly refer to some of the judgments in this behalf. 14. In the case of (Shivaji Dayanu Patil and another v. Smt. Vatschala Uttam More)1, reported at A.I.R. 1991 Supreme Court 1769, the Supreme Court has discussed the object underlying the enactment of the old section 92-A in the following words: "The object underlying the enactment of section 92-A is to make available to the claimant compensation amount to the extent of Rs. 15,000/- in case of death and Rs. 78,500/- in case of permanent disablement as expeditiously as possible and the said award has to be made before adjudication of the claim under section 110-A of the Act. 15,000/- in case of death and Rs. 78,500/- in case of permanent disablement as expeditiously as possible and the said award has to be made before adjudication of the claim under section 110-A of the Act. With a view to give effect to the directive contained in section 92-B the Maharashtra Government has amended the Rules and has inserted special provisions in respect of claims under section 92-A in Rules 291-A, 291-B, 297(2), 306-A, 306-B, 306-C and 306-D of the Rules. The object underlying the said provisions is to enable expeditious disposal of a claim petition under section 92-A of the Act. The said object would be defeated if the claims Tribunal is required to hold a regular trial in the same manner as for adjudicating a claim petition under section 110-A of the Act. Rules 291-A, 306-A and 306-B contain adequate provisions which would enable the Claims Tribunal to satisfy itself in respect of the matters necessary for awarding compensation under section 92-A of the Act and in view of these special provisions, the claims Tribunal is not required to follow the normal procedure prescribed under the Act and the Rules with regard to adjudication of a claim under section 110-A for the purpose of making an order on a claim petition under section 92-A." 15. In (New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Minguel Lourenco Correia and others)2, reported at 1986 Mah.L.J. page 242 G.F.Couto, J., considered the provisions of section 92-A and observed that : "Section 92-A of the Motor Vehicles Act is a beneficial legislation and provides for liability to pay compensation in certain cases on the Principle of no fault. Section 92-(2) lays down that the amount of compensation which shall be payable under sub-section (1) in respect of death of any person shall be fixed sum of fifteen thousand rupees and the amount of compensation payable in respect of permanent disablement of any person shall be a fixed sum of rupees seven thousand five hundred. The scope and nature of enquiry under section 92-A is very limited and the question as to whether or not the Insurance Company is liable to pay compensation for different reasons is to be dealt with and decided in the course of the hearing of the main application for compensation under section 110 of the Act. The scope and nature of enquiry under section 92-A is very limited and the question as to whether or not the Insurance Company is liable to pay compensation for different reasons is to be dealt with and decided in the course of the hearing of the main application for compensation under section 110 of the Act. The requirements under section 92-A are only whether (a) a vehicle has been involved in an accident; (b) a person died or sustained permanent disablement as a result of such accident; and (c) with whom the vehicle was insured. This is so because irrespective of any fault, the legal representatives of the dead persons or the person who had suffered a permanent disablement are to be given a quick and effective temporary relief. It is open to the Insurance Company to raise any or all the defences which are available to it under the Act, particularly that under the terms and conditions of the Insurance Policy, the Insurance Company is not liable to pay any compensation. But this aspect of the case is to be dealt with in the course of the proceedings for compensation under section 110 of the Act and if ultimately the company succeeds in establishing that under the terms and conditions of the Insurance Policy, it is not liable to compensation then the Insurance Company will be entitled to get money paid under section 92-A of the Act repaid to it by the owner of the vehicle. A direction to this effect necessarily to be made by the Tribunal itself while disposing of the application under section 110 of the Act so as to avoid the Insurance company to be dragged in further litigation." 16. In (Oriental Fire and General Insurance Co. Ltd. Goa v. Aleixo Fernandes and others)3, reported at 1989 Mah.L.J. 468 G.D. Kamat, J., observed that section 92-A has to be interpreted as a beneficial provision and construction must be adopted on that basis. Even the defence of the driver having no licence cannot be raised at the stage of making order under section 92-A and it was held in that case that this will be a issue in the main petition. Relevant observations are to be found in paras 11 and 12 at pages 474-475 of the report. 17. Even the defence of the driver having no licence cannot be raised at the stage of making order under section 92-A and it was held in that case that this will be a issue in the main petition. Relevant observations are to be found in paras 11 and 12 at pages 474-475 of the report. 17. A Division Bench of this Court Dharmadhikari, J., and Smt. Sujata Manohar, J., (as she then was) had occasion to consider the scheme of section 92-A in the case of (Pandurang Narayandas Sarda v. Subhash Gopal Changale and others)4, reported at 1989 Mah.L.J. 488. Relying upon the Supreme Court decision in the case of (Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation, Ahmedabad v. Ramnabhai Prabhathbhai and another)5, reported at A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 1690 and in the case of (Guru Govekar v. Miss Filomena F. Lobo and others )6, reported at A.I.R. 1988 Supreme Court 1332 the Division Bench observed as under : "However, we find some substance in the contention of Shri Kurdoli that so far as the compensation payable under section 92-A of the Act is concerned, the Insurance Company will be liable. To say the least this position is conceded by Shri Chaphekar. This concession of Shri Chaphekar is based on the decisions of the Supreme Court in A.I.R 1987 S.C. 1960, Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation, Ahmedabad v. Ramnabhai Prabhathbai and another and Guru Govekar v. Miss Filomena F. Lobo and others. In Guru Govekars case the Supreme Court has observed "while it may be true, as we have observed earlier, that under the Law of Torts, the owner may not be liable on the Principle of vicarious liability, the insurer would be liable to pay the compensation by virtue of the provisions of section 94 and section 95 of the Act, referred to above." Therefore, we hold that the Insurance Company will be liable to indemnify the Vehicles Act is concerned. Similar view seems to have been taken by the Rajasthan High Court in A.I.R. 1987 Rajasthan 77, (Narendra Singh v. Oriental Fire and General Insurance Co. Ltd. Delhi, and others)7, and A.I.R. 1987 Rajasthan 106 (Mohanlal v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. and others)8." 18. Similar view seems to have been taken by the Rajasthan High Court in A.I.R. 1987 Rajasthan 77, (Narendra Singh v. Oriental Fire and General Insurance Co. Ltd. Delhi, and others)7, and A.I.R. 1987 Rajasthan 106 (Mohanlal v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. and others)8." 18. In view of the above pronouncements of the Supreme Court and of this Court, with respect, it is difficult to agree with the view expressed by the Madras High Court in the case of (K. Nandkumar v. Managing Director, Thanthai Periyar Transport Corporation Ltd. Villupuram)9, reported at 1992 A.C.J. 1095. The learned Judges of the Madras High Court have made a distinction between the claimant or any other person being required to establish the negligence on the part of the owner or driver of the motor vehicle before claiming any compensation under section 92-A of the Act. The learned Judges have restricted the distinction to the question as to who should establish the negligence on the part of the owner or driver of the motor vehicle and have concluded that though under the common law, the claimant would normally be required to establish such negligence, under section 92-A the claimant is not required to establish such negligence. It has been observed that "only to that extent" substantive law stood modified and that where the claimant himself is negligent there is no scope at all for him to claim the compensation from any other party for his own fault. This being the substantive law of the country, the learned Judges in Nandkumars case opined that the law was not modified. The only modification was as to who is required to prove negligence, meaning thereby that negligence had to be established whether it is established by the claimant or by some other evidence is a different question and that was the only matter of difference between the ordinary law and section 92-A of the Motor Vehicles Act. 19. With respect, I find it difficult to persuade myself to agree with the view expressed by the learned Judges of Madras High Court in Nandkumars case. Having considered the scheme of the provisions of Chapter X and particularly section 140 and section 144 appearing therein, it is not possible for me to hold that unless negligence or fault was established the claimant cannot succeed in his application under section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Having considered the scheme of the provisions of Chapter X and particularly section 140 and section 144 appearing therein, it is not possible for me to hold that unless negligence or fault was established the claimant cannot succeed in his application under section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act. It is also not possible for me to hold that the only departure in either section 92-A of the 1939 Act or section 140 of the 1988 Act is on the question as to who should prove negligence and that the substantive law that negligence had to be established has remained unaffected. I am of the view, that in the light of the decisions referred to above section 140 has to be clearly understood as dispensing with the requirement of proof of negligence of the owner of the vehicle and further that even if claimant himself was at fault or had contributed to the fault his application under section 140 cannot be defeated. 20. In view of the above, the appeal must succeed. The impugned order dated 9th December, 1994 is quashed and set aside. At this stage Shri Singh for the insurance company prays for four weeks time to deposit the amount of Rs. 12,000/-. Prayer being reasonable is granted. Hence order: 21. Impugned order dated 9th December, 1994 below Ex. 5 in M.A.C. Application No. 48 of 1994 is set aside. The application dated 9th November, 1993 for claim of Rs. 12,000/- under section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 is hereby granted. Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 are jointly and severally held responsible and liable to pay the total amount of Rs. 12,000/- to the claimant. The amount of Rs. 12,000/- should be deposited in the trial Court within four weeks from today. On the said amount being deposited, the appellant claimant is free to withdraw the same. 22. Appeal allowed as above. There will be no order as to costs. Appeal allowed. *****