JUDGMENT - Bhairavia V.H., J.:—This Revision Application has been filed against the order dated 27th April, 1989, passed by the learned Addl. Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, 9th Court, Esplanade, Bombay in Case No. 168/N of 1986 under section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. The said proceedings are alleged to have been initiated against the present applicants. 2. The facts leading to the said proceedings under section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code, in brief, are as under :- The applicants Mr. F.M.C. D'Costa (dead) and Mrs. F.M.C. D'Costa have been jointly owned Flat No. 61, situated at 6th floor of “Shangrilla”, Opp. Colaba Post Office, Bombay. (Hereinafter referred to as the said flat). The respondent No. 1 Rallis India Limited is the original complainant and the applicants are the original respondents. The respondent No. 1 Rallis India Limited (hereinafter referred to as the said Company or the respondent-Company) is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956, having its registered office at Rallis House, 21, Dr. D.N. Road, Bombay-400 001. It is submitted that the respondent-Company had taken the said flat from the applicants on leave and licence basis at a monthly compensation of Rs. 900/- on 15-1-1971. The agreement of leave and licence was executed on 15-1-1971 in favour of the respondent-Company by the applicants. The said flat was taken on leave and licence basis by the respondent-Company for providing residential accommodation to its officers. It also reveals that the respondent-Company had taken about 76 flats on leave and licence basis for its officers. It is submitted that according to the terms of leave and licence agreement dated 15-1-1971, the term came to an end on 7th September, 1979 and thereafter, there was no renewal of the leave and licence agreement or no fresh leave and licence agreement was executed between the parties. It is submitted that the respondent-Company did not hand over the possession of the said flat to the applicants but it is alleged that respondent-Company have been continued to be in possession of the said flat. It also reveals that one Mr. Yusuf Hussein was the last officer of the respondent-Company who occupied the said flat and stayed therein till he vacated the flat in the month of December, 1985. It also reveals that one Mr. Yusuf Hussein was the last officer of the respondent-Company who occupied the said flat and stayed therein till he vacated the flat in the month of December, 1985. It also reveals that said Yusuf Hussein had resigned from the respondent-Company in the month of September, 1984 but he did not vacate the said flat and the company did not bother to get the flat vacated from him. The glaring fact reveals from the record that though the said flat alleged to be in possession of the respondent-Company; it is an admitted fact that one partnership firm viz. International Export Limited was carrying on its business in the said flat and it was in actual possession of the said firm since 1979. Therefore, it was submitted that the said flat was not in possession of the respondent-Company but undoubtedly, it was in possession of the third party i.e. International Export Limited, a partnership firm. The said partnership firm was a registered firm and its registered address was shown as Flat No. 61, 6th floor, “Shangrilla”, Opp. Colaba Post Office, Bombay, i.e. the said flat. Not only that but the telephone connection was also installed in the name of this partnership firm in the said flat. It is submitted that this fact was within the knowledge of the respondent-Company. It is also submitted that though Mr. Yusuf Hussein had resigned and ceased to be the officer of the respondent-Company since September, 1984, the respondent-Company did not bother to get the possession from him. This fact came to the notice of the applicants-owner of the said flat, so they thought it fit to stay in their own flats as the applicants couple was very old, aged about 75 years and particularly the first applicant was suffering from Parkinson's disease and paralise, unable to move and bed ridden. It reveals that as the said partnership firm International Export Limited shifted to another place and said Yusuf Hussein also vacated the said flat in the month of December, 1985, the said flat remained vacant. Therefore, the applicant No. 1 by letter dated 4th January, 1986, requested the respondent-Company to hand over the possession of the said flat to him as it was not in use of the respondent-Company and the terms of leave and licence agreement already had come to an end in 1979. Therefore, the applicant No. 1 by letter dated 4th January, 1986, requested the respondent-Company to hand over the possession of the said flat to him as it was not in use of the respondent-Company and the terms of leave and licence agreement already had come to an end in 1979. However, the respondent-Company refused to hand over the possession of the said flat and thereafter, it is alleged that the respondent-Company carried out the renovation work in the said flat. It is pertinent to note here that in the meantime, one Mr. Murzello, complainant, the officer of the respondent-Company who was looking after the maintenance of the said flat approached the applicants and told them to take over the possession of the said flat on condition that the applicants be agreed to pay him sum of Rs. 2 lakhs for himself and for his superiors and a duplicate key of the lock of the said flat was given by Mr. Murzello to the applicants. It reveals from the record that before the payment of amount could be settled, the applicants entered into the said flat by opening the lock with the key and started staying in the said flat in the month of August 1986. It also reveals from the record that as a Courtesy of the old couple, they expressed their gratitude in their letter addressed to the respondent-Company on 25th August, 1986 for handing over peaceful possession of the said flat. However, it reveals that on receiving the letter, it was immediately informed telegraphically to the applicants that the respondent-Company has not given the possession to the applicants and it is alleged that Mr. Murzello went to the said flat on 28th August, 1986 and rang the call bell but nobody replied. Therefore, it is alleged that he opened the lock of the flat with the original key which he had with him and entered into the flat. He found the applicants (husband and wife) in the said flat. It is also submitted that Mr. Murzello demanded money from the applicants but the applicants were not in a position to oblige him and they shown their inability to pay that much amount i.e. Rs. 1.50 lakhs. Therefore, Mr. He found the applicants (husband and wife) in the said flat. It is also submitted that Mr. Murzello demanded money from the applicants but the applicants were not in a position to oblige him and they shown their inability to pay that much amount i.e. Rs. 1.50 lakhs. Therefore, Mr. Murzello filed a complaint at the Police Station against the applicants but on enquiry, police was not satisfied with the complaint and found that there was no question of commission of any breach of peace. Thereafter, failing in taking police action against the applicants under the frustration and to save his own skin after obtaining a legal advice from Advocate Mr. Vashi, Mr. Murzello filed criminal complaint being Case No. 168/N of 1986 under section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code in the Court of Addl. Chief Metropolitan Magistrate and obtained interim order against the applicants. Thereafter, the applicants filed their reply and denied all the allegations made in the complaint. However, the learned Magistrate rejected the plea of the applicants by order dated 15-10-1986. Against the order dated 15-10-1986, the applicants filed Criminal Revision Application being No. 10/87 but that was came to be rejected. It is submitted that thereafter, the learned Magistrate was pleased to pass the order under section 145(4) of the Criminal Procedure Code, on 27-4-1989 (Exhibit 'N'). Under the said order, it is declared that M/s Rallis India Ltd. is entitled to the possession of the flat No. 61 of the 6th floor of Shangrilla Building, Colaba, Bombay-5 and possession of the flat to be restored. The Colaba Police is directed to restore the possession of the said flat to the respondent-Company. Hence this revision application is filed by the applicants and challenged the order dated 27-4-1989 (Exhibit 'N'). 3. It is pertinent to note here that pending this revision application in this Court, the original applicant No. 1 F.M.C. D'Costa died on 25-12-1993 in the said flat. It also reveals that his son (Arvind) D'Costa as legal nominee and heir brought on record as applicant No. 1 in place of deceased F.M.C. D'Costa, he did not choose to appear before this Court. It is submitted that son of the applicant No. 1 (Mr. Arvind) D'Costa was staying at Iraq-Dubai and doing some business but because of Iraq war in 1993, he lost everything and had to come back to India penniless. It is submitted that son of the applicant No. 1 (Mr. Arvind) D'Costa was staying at Iraq-Dubai and doing some business but because of Iraq war in 1993, he lost everything and had to come back to India penniless. It also reveals that his son was the nominee of the deceased applicant No. 1 and step in as the owner of the said flat, so after the death of applicant No. 1, the said flat was sold under a registered sale deed to respondents Nos. 3 and 4 for Rs. 88 lacs and handed over the possession to respondent Nos. 3 and 4. It is also submitted that respondents Nos. 3 and 4 were not aware about the proceedings under section 145 of Criminal Procedure Code and on coming to know that the revision application was pending against 145 proceedings, the respondents Nos. 3 and 4 filed an application being Criminal Application No. 354 of 1995 and intervened the proceedings by joining as respondents by order of this Court as they are the directly interested and affected party. It also reveals that after selling away the said flat, applicant left India. 4. Heard the learned Counsel Mr. Gomes for the applicants. It is submitted by the learned Counsel that the order under section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code was unwarranted. The ingredients for invoking power under section 145 were not existed on the date of passing the preliminary order. There is no evidence on record to show that there was imminent apprehension of breach of peace. On the contrary, it is an admitted fact that the respondent-complainant had filed a complaint with the Police Station and on enquiry, it was found that there was not any possibility of breach of peace and therefore, Mr. Murzello's application was ordered to be filed. It is the case of the complainant Mr. Murzello's that he came to know about the forcible and wrongful possession of the said flat only on 26th August, 1985 when the office of the respondent-Company received a letter of the applicants expressing their thanks for handing over the applicants. It is an admitted fact that he drew a report of the situation and in his report submitted to the management of the company, he has not mentioned anything regarding the forcible and wrongful possession taken by the applicants and anything regarding the apprehension of breach of peace. It is an admitted fact that he drew a report of the situation and in his report submitted to the management of the company, he has not mentioned anything regarding the forcible and wrongful possession taken by the applicants and anything regarding the apprehension of breach of peace. The complainant has not produced the report in the Court. Therefore, it is submitted that Mr. Murzello has made out a false case against the applicants for saving his own skin that he himself had handed over the duplicate key to the applicants. It is submitted that if at all, the applicants intended to take the possession of the said flat forcibly and wrongfully by taking law in their hands, they would not have waited till August, 1986 as the said flat fallen vacant since last 9 months nor they would have requested for handing over the possession by letter dated 4th January, 1986. The learned Counsel Mr. Gomes further submitted that as the applicants were very old and sick persons, incapable to walk and speak, they could not enter into the witness box. The applicant No. 1 was almost handicapped man, suffering from paralysis and No. 2 was a sick lady and could not able to speak and therefore, they could not enter into the witness box which should not defeat the right of the applicants. It is the specific case of the applicants that a duplicate key was handed over to them by Mr. Murzello and in lieu of that, he demanded huge amount for which applicants were incapable to pay and they were also ready to pay some reasonable amount to Mr. Murzello for handing over the key of the said flat. It is submitted that as Mr. Murzello failed in his efforts to get money as per his demand from old couple i.e. the applicants, he became annoyed and as the company came to know by letter dated 28th August, 1986, he woke up and filed complaint for saving his own skin. The learned Counsel submitted that the ingredients for attracting the application of sub-section (4) of section 145, the forcibly and wrongfully dispossessed from the flat, is not fulfilled. The learned Counsel in support of his arguments cited following authorities : 1. (V.K. Rao v. Chandappa Appa Devadiga)1, 79 Bom.L.R. 16. 2. (Smt. S.R. Mirchandani v. Ramesh Kalwani)2, 81 Bom.L.R. 20. 3. The learned Counsel in support of his arguments cited following authorities : 1. (V.K. Rao v. Chandappa Appa Devadiga)1, 79 Bom.L.R. 16. 2. (Smt. S.R. Mirchandani v. Ramesh Kalwani)2, 81 Bom.L.R. 20. 3. (Mathuralal v. Bhanwarlal)3, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 242. 4. (A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 18)4 5. (R.H. Bhutani v. Ms. Desai)5, A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 1444. 6. (A.I.R. 1958 All. 803)6. 7. (Hari Ram v. Banwarilal)7, A.I.R. 1967 Punjab 378. 8. (Ratanlal Gupta v. Dist. Magistrate Ganjam)8, A.I.R. 1952 Orissa 26. 9. (Francis D'Souza v. E.A.L. Gameiro)9, A.I.R. 1960 Bom. 139). 10. (Chandu Naik and others v. Sitaram B. Naik)10, A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 333. 11. (Ganga Bux Singh v. Sukhdin)11, A.I.R. 1959 All. 141. 12. (A.I.R. 1966 Punjab 246)12. 13. (Ballram Singh v. Budho Devi)13, A.I.R. 1965 Patna 261. 14. (Jaikrt Singh v. Sohan Raj)14, A.I.R. 1959 Raj. 63. 15. (Ram Krishna v. M.T. Tetri Sahun)15, A.I.R. 1959 Patna 476. As against this, the learned Counsel Mr. Vashi for the respondent No, 1 submitted that once the preliminary order under section 145 of Criminal Procedure Code is passed and confirmed by the trial Court, the order under section 145(4) must follow. It has been submitted by Mr. Vashi that the applicants had taken possession by using force i.e. by breaking the lock and putting up the new lock. Mr. Vashi submitted that this Court cannot interfere in the revision application with the findings of the learned Magistrate. The learned Counsel Mr. Vashi has also cited some authorities on the scope of power under section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code. 1. (Ghafoor Bhai v. Motiram Keshaorao)16, 1978 Cri.L.J. 405, 2. (Rajaram Gupta v. Dharamchand)17, 1983 Cri.L.J. 612, 3. (1974(44) Company Cases 1)18, 4. ( 1989(4) S.C.C. 514 )19, 5. A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 1444, 6. (Bhinka v. Charansingh)20, A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 960, 7. A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 18, 8. (1980 Cri.L.J. 1276)21, 9. (48 Cri.L.J. 435)22, 10. 79 Bom.L.R. 16, 11. (Southern Roadways Ltd., Madurai v. S.M. Krishnan)23, A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 673, 12. (Smt. Chandrakantaben v. Vadilal Bapalal Modi)24, A.I.R. 1989 S.C. 1269 and 13. (1978 C.L.J. N.O.C. 1)25. 5. Mr. Pradhan, learned Counsel appearing for the newly added parties i.e. respondents Nos. 3 and 4 who are the bona fide purchasers of the said flat without notice, submitted that no public notice was affixed by the respondent-Company as required under section 145(3) and 145(6)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Code. (1978 C.L.J. N.O.C. 1)25. 5. Mr. Pradhan, learned Counsel appearing for the newly added parties i.e. respondents Nos. 3 and 4 who are the bona fide purchasers of the said flat without notice, submitted that no public notice was affixed by the respondent-Company as required under section 145(3) and 145(6)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Code. Therefore, the order is not binding on them. In support of his submission, the learned Counsel Mr. Pradhan has relied on the following authorities :— 1. 1909 (Vol-10) Cri.L.J. 64, (Nathubhai Brijlal v. Emperor)26. 2. A.I.R. 1952 Cal. 713, (Khudiram Mandal v. Jitendra Nath)27. 3. 1905(2) Cri.L.J. 618, (Sukhlal Shaikh v. Tarachand Ta.)28. 4. A.I.R. 1958 Punjab 47, (Sri Ram and others v. The State and others)29 5. 1976 Cri.L.J. Page 1204, (Sukhdeo Yadav v. Shankarlal)30. 6. A.I.R. 1918 Nag. 46(1), (Tukaram Kunbi v. Punjabrao)31. 7. A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 1444, R.H. Bhutani v. Ms. Desai. 8. A.I.R. 1954 Orissa Page 183, (Subarna v. Kartika)32 9. 81 Bom.L.R. Page 20, Smt. S. R. Mirchandani v. Ramesh Kalwani. 10. A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 333, Chandu Naik v. Sitaram S. Naik. 11. A.I.R. 1965 Patna 261 (Bahram Singh v. Budho Devi)33. 6. Having regard to the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, this Court should exercise its revisional power in the interest of fair and equitable justice, must interfere with the order passed by the Executive Magistrate under section 145 of Criminal Procedure Code. So far as the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court is concerned, in the case of Smt. S.R. Mirchandani v. Ramesh Harasha Kalwani, 81 Bom.L.R. 20, it has been observed that— “ There is no bar against the High Court or the Court exercising a revisional jurisdiction to consider the evidence afresh under any circumstances. If a patent error found from the record, it can be shown to the revisional Court that the lower Court was in error in ignoring the provisions of law, it would be open to the revisional Court to consider for itself whether the order should be set aside merely because the provisions of law were ignored or on considering the facts before it to come to its own conclusions. The proviso to section 145(4) provides that if it appears to the Magistrate that if any party has been forcibly or wrongfully dispossessed…….before his order under sub-section (1) he may treat the party so dispossessed as if that party had been in possession on the date of his order under sub-section (1). Forcible entry means entry against the occupant's will, without authority of law, by actual force or with such an array of force and apparent intent to apply for the purpose of overcoming resistance, that the occupant in yielding and permitting possession to be taken from him, must be regarded as acting from a well founded apprehension that resistance by him would be perilous and unavailing.” It has been observed in the case of Chandu Naik and others v. Sitaram B. Naik and another, A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 333 that— “In substance and in effect a proceeding under section 145 of the Code is not for the purpose of evicting any person from any land but is primarily concerned with the prevention of the breach of the peace by declaring the party found in possession to be entitled to remain in possession until evicted therefrom in due course of law.” Further, it has been observed in the case of Balram Singh v. Budho Devi, A.I.R. 1965 Patna 261 that — “The second proviso to sub-section (4) of section 145 is discretionary and the Magistrate is not bound to treat the party, which has been wrongfully dispossessed, to be in possession under the proviso. Therefore, even if it be held that the dispossession of one party by another party having legal right to possession was wrongful in the eye of law, it cannot be said that the Magistrate exercised his discretion wrongly in declining to pass an order in favour of the dispossessed party under the second proviso to sub-section (4) of section 145.” We would say in other words that the Magistrate is under no legal obligation to pass order under sub-section (4) of section 145 regarding the restoration of the possession to dispossessed party. Keeping in view the legal position, if we go through the facts stated above, the prima facie case regarding the apprehension of breach of peace, apart from forcible and wrongful dispossession must be manifestly proved. Keeping in view the legal position, if we go through the facts stated above, the prima facie case regarding the apprehension of breach of peace, apart from forcible and wrongful dispossession must be manifestly proved. In the instant case, it is an admitted fact that there was no hirelings in the flat kept by the applicants. It is also an admitted fact that the applicants being old and sick persons and particularly, the applicant No. 1 (dead) was paralysed and invalid person who was not able to move. Applicant No. 2 was also sick woman and was not able to walk and stand without the assistance of other. It is an admitted fact that the present applicants were appeared before the Magistrates Court in the wheel chair and they were not able to speak; though this being the admitted physical condition of these applicants, apparently, they were not in a position to create any breach of peace, nor they had kept any hireling, The complainant Mr. Murzello had admitted that firstly he approached to Police Station and filed complaint but the police did not find any such apprehension on enquiry. The police department did not take any action. Further, it is an admitted fact that in the report submitted to the respondent-Company by the complainant Mr. Murzello after visiting the place, he did not mention anything regarding the apprehension of breach of peace. The Executive Magistrate is at liberty to exercise the discretionary power under section 145 judiciously. There is a clear provision that the Magistrate has to give reasons for passing the preliminary order under section 145(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code by recording the grounds. No doubt, the learned Judge has given reasons but according to me, are fictitious and had no basis of legal evidence. That as the applicants were physically invalid persons, they were not capable to resist. It is an admitted fact that there was no resistance by the applicants against the complainant. The complainant has not even bothered to talk with the applicants. Even the applicants had not abused the complainant but merely after seeing the lock, he immediately rushed to the Police Station; police did not find any substance in his complaint and therefore, no action was taken. Therefore, the first ingredient regarding the apprehension of breach of peace did not exist. Even the applicants had not abused the complainant but merely after seeing the lock, he immediately rushed to the Police Station; police did not find any substance in his complaint and therefore, no action was taken. Therefore, the first ingredient regarding the apprehension of breach of peace did not exist. This Court should not go into the finding of fact as the Supreme Court observed in case of R.H. Bhutani v. Ms. Desai, A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 1444 thus — “The satisfaction under sub-section (1) of section 145 is of the Magistrate. The question whether on the materials before him, he should initiate proceedings or not is therefore, in his discretion which no doubt has to be exercised in accordance with the well recognized Rules of law in that behalf. High Court in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction would not go into the question of sufficiency of material which has satisfied the Magistrate.” 7. If Court finds that whatever material placed before the Magistrate for invoking the jurisdiction under section 145 of Criminal Procedure Code is exaggerated and contrary to the factual alleged position, which may result into miscarriage of justice, in such case, the ratio of this judgment will not be applicable. Now, the question regarding forcible and wrongful possession comes into picture. It is an admitted fact that the leave and licence agreement came to an end in the year 1979 and thereafter, it was not renewed. However, it is alleged that the respondent-company continued to be in possession till December, 1985. It is an admitted fact that after December, 1985, the cheque which was sent to the applicant No. 1 being the compensation amount, was not accepted and returned back to the complainant. It shows that after December, 1984, applicants have not accepted the compensation. It is pertinent to note here that the term of leave and licence agreement already expired on 1979 and thereafter there was no renewal of the leave and licence agreement. However, the officer of the respondent-Company Yusuf Hussein was staying in the said flat and though he had resigned in September, 1984 and ceased to be the officer of the respondent-Company; the company did not take the possession of the said flat from said Yusuf Hussein but it is alleged that in the month of December, 1985, said Yusuf Hussein himself had handed over the key of the said flat to Mr. Murzello. It is not the case of the respondent-Company that the vacant possession of the said flat was handed over by Yusuf Hussein. One more important proved fact is that, since 1979, M/s. International Export Ltd. was carrying on its business from the said flat and the partners of the said firm i.e. in all 6 members were also staying in the said flat. Though the complainant Mr. Murzello denied this fact in his evidence but he has been falsified by the documentary evidence. It shows that complainant has no respect for truth and he could go to the extent of creating false evidence that the respondent-Company was in actual possession of the said flat. For the purpose of invoking section 145 of Criminal Procedure Code, it must be proved that the complainant party must be in actual possession of the property and then the question of forcible or wrongful dispossession arise. The complainant speaks lie but the records show that the respondent-Company was not in possession since 1979. It is an admitted fact that respondent-Company had no connection with the firm i.e. International Export Limited but the said firm was very much there since 1979. It is established by the documentary evidence that the said firm was registered firm and the official registered address was shown as “Flat No. 61, 6th Floor, 'Shangrilla' Building, Colaba, Bombay-5". The Income-tax returns were also filled up in the said firm. The Chartered Accountant was also examined and he has also supported that the address was shown as above. The telephone connections were also installed in the said flat in the name of the partnership firm i.e. International Export Ltd. and he deposed this fact though without the knowledge of the respondents. These circumstances create doubt about the credibility of the evidence of the complainant. Further, the said Yusuf Hussein who was alleged to be the last officer of the respondent-Company, had resigned in September, 1984 but he did not surrender the said flat occupied by him on behalf of the company and the respondent-Company has also not taken any action against him. There is no evidence to show that the company had asked any point of time to said Mr. Yusuf Hussein for vacating the said flat. There is no evidence to show that the company had asked any point of time to said Mr. Yusuf Hussein for vacating the said flat. However, it is alleged that he handed over the key of the flat in the month of December, 1985 and no explanation has been given by the complainant or the senior officer Mr. Lashkari that under what circumstances said Yusuf Hussein was allowed to stay in the said flat after his resignation came to be accepted. Therefore, the crucial question lost the sight of the learned Executive Magistrate that whether the respondent-Company was entitled for restoration of the possession of the said flat? The consequences of events regarding the occupation of the said flat and vacating the said flat upto December, 1985, it reveals from the record that said Yusuf Hussein continued to stay in the said flat even after his resignation. It also reveals from the record that the applicants refused to accept the cheque right from January, 1986 and the respondent-Company did not make any enquiry regarding the reason for not accepting the cheque. The applicants were entitled to occupy the said flat immediately after the said Yusuf vacated the flat in December, 1985 and they were not under the legal obligation to take permission from the respondent-Company but because of their goodness and helplessness, ignorancy and physical inability, they did not do it, but being honest and fair, they requested the respondent-Company by letter dated 4th January, 1986 for handing over the possession of the said flat. If they had any such intention to take forcible and wrongful possession, they would not have waited till August, 1985. The respondent-Company treated the letter dated 4th January, 1986 and 26th August, 1985 as if the respondent-Company was in actual possession and they have not surrendered the said flat to the applicants wilfully. Under the above facts and circumstances, the fact emerged that the respondent-Company was not in actual and legal possession right from 1979 and if the respondent-company claims their right of protected tenancy under the Bombay Rent Act that is not accepted by the applicants nor it is established by any documentary or oral evidence. It could not be presumed merely that the officer of the company continued to occupy this flat. It could not be presumed merely that the officer of the company continued to occupy this flat. In other words, it is said that after the expiry of the term of leave and licence, the status of respondent-Company during that period cannot be deemed to be a protected tenant under the Bombay Rent Act. Therefore, the order under sub-section (4) of section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code is not attracted and it is bad-in-law. Further, the law of equity is also applicable in the instant case. It is an admitted fact that the respondent-Company is in habit of hiring the flats on leave and licence basis and does not release the said flat even if leave and licence agreement came to an end. The company had already hired 75 flats on leave and licence basis and the complainant Mr. Murzello has categorically stated in para 18 of his evidence that there is not a single case where the company has returned the flat on expiry of leave and licence agreement. If this is the conduct of the respondent-Company, how the landlord should resist against the mighty millionaire company. Hundreds year ago, Plato rightly said that “Justice is nothing other than the interest of the stronger”. “The weaker the man, as a dispenser of justice, that more the Rule is exalted and stiffer its bonds become. Justice should not only be done, it must seems to be done”. John Henry Wigryone. 8. Having regard to the provisions of section 145, we bear in mind what may call the equity of the case, the parties whom the Magistrate has to deal with are not merely the actual parties to, but all persons who may be concerned in the dispute, the object being to prevent a breach of peace. Therefore, it is held that the provision of sub-section (4) of section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code is not affected in this case and in the absence of compliance of sub-section (3) of section 145 and sub-section (6-A) of section 145 the impugned order is not binding to the respondents Nos. 3 and 4 who are the bona fide purchasers. It is to be noted here that it would be necessary to take note of the melody of the applicants. 3 and 4 who are the bona fide purchasers. It is to be noted here that it would be necessary to take note of the melody of the applicants. The landlord who might have purchased the said flat out of their saving and might have desired to stay rest of their life in their flat but under the compelling circumstances, they might have leased the flat for a compensation of Rs. 900/- per month but it does not mean that a flat once leased remains leased forever. Therefore, law of equity is applicable in the instant case. The respondent-Company is a very big company should not be allowed to grab the property of the original owner under the pretext that they have purchased the right of possession from the landlord. In the result, the application is allowed. The order dated 27th April, 1988 passed by the learned Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, 19th Court, Esplanade, Bombay in Case No. 168/N of 1986 is quashed and set aside. Application allowed. -----