Honble TIBREWAL, J. - The petitioner, who is Chief Editor of Weekly Magazine "The Week" has moved this Court under Section 482, of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 for quashing and setting aside the complaint, as well as the order dated May 11, 1989 summoning him to face criminal charge under Sec. 500 of the Indian Penal Code passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate No.2, Jaipur City, Jaipur. (2). M/s. Malayala Manorama Publications carries the business of printing and publishing daily newspaper, magazines, periodicals and weeklies. One of its English weekly is "The Week" which is published from Kochin and printed at the Malayala Manorama Press, Kottayam in Kerala. The Editorial Officer is situated at Malyala Manorama building at Kochin in Kerala. The daily newspaper Malayala Manorama is claimed by the aforesaid Publication to have the largest circulation in the country. Similarly, the English weekly "The Week" is also claimed to have wide circulation throughout the country. The non-petitioner filed a complaint under section 500 of the Indian Penal Code against three persons for publication of a story under the caption "Rajasthan C.M.s God father" in English weekly "The Week" of February 28, March 5, 1988 issue on the ground that it was defamatory to him. Presently, I need not go with the facts of that articles or gravamen of the charge of defamation as they are not necessary for decision of the present petition. The petitioner was impleaded as one of the accused for his being "Chief Editor of "The Week". The other two persons who were made accused in the complaint are Surendra Verma. The Senior Editor and Shri Vinod Sharma the correspondent of "The Week". (3). At the out-set it may be stated that in the complaint there is no averment at all that the petitioner controlled the selection of matter that was published in "The Week". He was impleaded as an accused simply on the ground of his being Chief Editor of the weekly without describing in the complaint the nature of duties performed or responsibilities shouldered by him in that capacity. He was impleaded as an accused simply on the ground of his being Chief Editor of the weekly without describing in the complaint the nature of duties performed or responsibilities shouldered by him in that capacity. Before issuing [process in the case, the learned Magistrate recorded the statement of the complainant under Sec. 200 Cr.P.C. and the statements of two witnesses, namely, Raft Alam and Rajendra Kumar Yadav under Section 202 Cr.P.C. There is no factual dispute that non of the aforesaid witnesses has claimed any personal knowledge about the publication of defamatory article. The petitioner was thus, being prosecuted for publication of the defamatory article merely for his being the Chief Editor of "The Week" in which the Article was published. (4). The Main contention of Mr. S.C. Agrawal, appearing for the petitioner, was that there was no basis for prosecution of the petitioner and continuation of criminal proceedings against him would amount to abuse of process of Court. Learned counsel contended that in the complaint or in statements on oath of the complainant and the witnesses recorded during the inquiry there is nothing to show that petitioner controlled selection of the matter that was published in "The Week" which contained the defamatory article and in absence of any material or evidence to that effect the Magistrate committed serious error in issuing process against him. According to the learned counsel, the materials which are published in the daily newspaper and weeklies are neither brought to petitioners notice before their publication nor he controls selection of the matters that are published. That, as a Chief Editor he was not required to attend the day to day administration of all publications. It was also contended that each publication has got separate Editors and news Editors who are concerned with selection of the materials and their publication and no presumption could be raised against the petitioner to be connected with the article in question merely for his being Chief Editor of the weekly. It was, then, submitted that the petitioner, who resided at Kottayam about 300 K. Mtrs. from the place of publication, was not responsible for the article and he had nothing to do with its publication. It was, then, submitted that the petitioner, who resided at Kottayam about 300 K. Mtrs. from the place of publication, was not responsible for the article and he had nothing to do with its publication. According to the learned counsel there must beat least some allegation that the petitioner was responsible for selecting the material or that he had the necessary intention or knowledge in order to make him criminally liable. (5). On the other hand, Mr. N.C. Choudhary appearing for the complainant-, non-petitioner seriously contended that Sec. 7 of the Press and Registration of Books Act, 1867 (hereinafter to be referred to as the "Press Act) raises a presumption against the petitioner as a Chief Editor that he was responsible for publication of the article and there was no need to allege or prove that he selected the material or that he was performing the functions of an Editor. Thus, the emphasis of the arguments of the learned counsel is that petitioner being the Chief Editor of the weekly was liable for the publication of defamatory article and it was for him to establish that he was not responsible for selecting the material and publication of the same. (6). The critical question which requires consideration in this petition is: whether the petitioner as a Chief Editor of the weekly could be presumed to be responsible for selection of the defamatory article that was published in it. In order to appreciate this controversy, it is necessary to look into the provisions of the Press Act. (7). The Press Act was enacted to regulate printing presses and newspapers in order to preserve copies of newspapers and books. In order to appreciate this controversy, it is necessary to look into the provisions of the Press Act. (7). The Press Act was enacted to regulate printing presses and newspapers in order to preserve copies of newspapers and books. The Statement, Object and Reasons accompanying the Press Act may be extracted as under: — "Whereas it is expedient to repeal the Indian Press Act, 1910 and the Newspapers (Incitements to Offences) Act, 1908 and to make further provision in the Press and Registration of Books Act, 1867 for the liability of editors of newspapers in civil and criminal proceedings and to make certain amendments in that Act in order to facilitate the registration of printers and publishers, and to provide in the Sea Customs Act, 1878 the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1890, and the Indian Post Office Act, 1898, for the seizure and disposal of certain documents; it is hereby enacted as follows." Section — 1(1) of the Press Act defines the Editor: "Editor" means the person who controls the selection of the matters that is published in the newspaper, Section — 3 of the Press Act requires disclosure of the name of the printer and the place of printing, and (if the book or paper be published) the name of the publisher and the place of publication. Section — 5 of the Act provides that no newspaper shall be published in India except in conformity with the rules, hereinafter laid down. Section — 5(1) runs as under — "Without prejudice to the provisions of Section 3, every copy of every such newspaper shall contain the names of the owner and editor thereof printed clearly on such copy and also the date of its publication." Sub-section (2) of Sec. 5 of the Act makes it incumbent on the printer and the publisher to appear before the authorities mentioned in that section and make a declaration. Then, Sec. 6 provides authentication of every such declaration. Then, Sec. 6 provides authentication of every such declaration. Section — 7 provides that office copy of declaration to be prima-facie evidence, runs as under — "In any legal proceeding whatever, as well civil as criminal, the production of a copy of such declaration as is aforesaid, attested by the seal of some court empowered by this Act to have the custody of such declaration, or, in the case of the editor, a copy of the newspaper containing his name printed on it as that of the editor shall be held (unless the contrary to be proved) to be sufficient evidence, as against the person (whose name shall be subscribed to such declaration) or printed on such newspaper, as the case may be, that the said person was printer or publisher, or printer and publisher (according as the words of the said declaration may be) of every portion of every newspaper whereof the title shall correspond with the title of the newspaper mentioned in the declaration or the editor of every portion of that issue of the newspaper of which a copy is produced.") Section-8 provides the procedure for new declaration by persons who have signed declaration and subsequently ceased to be printers or publishers of the newspapers. Then Section-8A provides that where any persons name has appeared as an Editor in a paper, although he was not an editor, he shall within two weeks of his becoming aware that his name has been so published, appear before a District, Presidency or Sub-Divisional Magistrate and make a declaration that his name has been incorrectly published and get a certificate from the Magistrate that the provisions of Sec. 7 shall not apply to him. (8). A perusal of the provisions of the Press Act would, thus, show that the Legislature took into account the inconvenience and hardship to which a person aggrieved from a publication would be put if he is required to make a fishing or roving enquiry about the persons who personally would be responsible for the making or publishing of an offending matter, particularly where the paper is owned by a big Company employing numerous persons. In order to avoid multiplicity of suits and uncertainties of liabilities, it was considered necessary to choose one of the persons from the staff and make him liable for all articles or matters published in the paper so that any person aggrieved may sue only the person so named under the provisions of the Press Act and is relieved from the necessity of making a fishing or roving inquiry about the persons who may be individually responsible for the offending matters published in the paper. In the Press Act, the person who is declared as Editor is presumed to be responsible to control the selection of the matter published in a newspaper. The word "Chief Editor" is conspicuously absent from the Press Act and it appears for the obvious reasons as the Act has selected only one person who has a special status and he is the "Editor" who can be sued or prosecuted. A presumption under Sec. 7 of the Press Act can be drawn against him along and none else. (9). In the case of State of Maharashtra vs. Dr. R.B. Choudhary (1), the Apex Court of the country has observed as under : — "The term "Editor" is defined in the Act to mean a person who controls the selection of the matter that is published in a newspaper. Where there is mentioned an Editor as a person who is responsible for selection of the material. S.7 raises presumption in respect of such a person. The name of that person has to be printed on the copy of the newspaper and in the present case the name of Madane admittedly was Printed as the Editor of the Maharashtra in the copy of the Maharashtra which contains the defamatory article. The declaration in Form-1 which has been produced before us shows the name of Madane not only as the printer and publisher but also as the Editor. In our opinion, the presumption will attach to Madane as having selected the material for publication in the newspaper ..........In the circumstances not only the presumption cannot be drawn against the others who had not declared themselves as Editors of the newspapers but it is also fair to leave them out because they had no concern with the publishing of the article in question." (10). Similar view was expressed by the Apex Court in the case of D.P. Mishra vs. Kamal Narayan Sharma (2). (11). It is significant to note that the presumption as to the person responsible for selection of the matter that is published in a newspaper is only against an Editor and not against the Chief Editor. The reason being that the expression "Chief Editor" does not find place in the Press Act. (12). In Haji C.H. Mohammad Koya vs. T.K.S.M.A. Muthukoya (3), at P. 160, the Supreme Court has observed: — "The word "Chief Editor" is clearly absent from the Press Act and in fact foreign to it because, the Press Act has selected only one person who has a special status i.e. the Editor who can be sued if necessary or can sue and against whom alone a presumption under Sec. 7 of the Press Act . can be drawn." Then at page 162 it was observed: "Secondly, the Press Act does not recognize any other legal entity except the Editor insofar as the responsibilities of that offence are concerned. Therefore, mere mention of the name of the Chief Editor is neither here nor there, nor does it in any way attract the provisions of the Press Act particularly Sec. 7. Thirdly, it is not even pleaded in the petitioner much less proved, that the appellant being the Chief Editor, it was part of his duty to edit the paper and control the selection of the matter that was published in the newspaper which in fact has been demonstrably disproved by the appellant. Thus, we are unable to accept the finding of the High Court that any presumption under Sec. 7 of the Press Act can be drawn against the appellant." (13). From the foregoing discussions the legal position boils out that the petitioner as a "Chief Editor" of the Week did not fall within the expression Editor in the Press Act and no presumption under Section-7 of the Press Act could be raised that he was responsible to control selection of the matter that was published in the said weekly containing defamatory article. If no such presumption could be raised, then there remains no evidence or basis for criminal prosecution of the petitioner as stated earlier. If no such presumption could be raised, then there remains no evidence or basis for criminal prosecution of the petitioner as stated earlier. The petitioner was impleaded as an accused merely on the ground of his being Chief Editor of the weekly, without any other averments in the complaint that he controlled selection of the matter that was published in the weekly. (14). That being so, the order of the learned Magistrate summoning the petitioner to face trial under Sec. 500 IPC and continuation of criminal proceedings against him would amount to an abuse of process of the Court. The test to decide whether a complaint should be quashed has been indicated by the Supreme Court in Municipal Board of Delhi vs. Ram Kishan (4). The test is that taking the allegations in the complaint as they are without adding or substracting anything if no offence is made out then the High Court will be justified in quashing the complaint. (15). In Nagawwa vs. Veeranna (5) after referring to the earlier decisions the Supreme Court has laid down that the scope of inquiry under Section 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is extremely limited only to the ascertainment of the truth or falsehood of the allegations made in the complaint on the materials placed by the complainant before the Court for the limited purpose of finding out whether a prima-facie case for issue of process has been made out. It was then pointed out that in the following cases an order of the Magistrate issuing process against the accused can be set-aside: "(1) where the allegations made in the complaint or the statement of the witnesses recorded in support of the same taken at their face value make out absolutely no case against the accused or the complaint does not disclose the essential ingredients of an offence which is alleged against the accused: (2) Where the allegations made in the complaint are patently absurd and inherently improbable so that no prudent person can ever reach a conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused; (3) Where the discretion exercised by the Magistrate in issuing process is capricious and arbitrary having been based either on no evidence or on materials which are wholly irrelevant or inadmissible; and (4). Where the complaint suffers from fundamental legal defects, such as, want of sanction, or absence of a complaint by legally competent authority and the like." In the instant case if the petitioner is asked to stand the trial when there is no basis, it would be highly distressing. It could even lead to loss of faith in the institution as Courts of justice cannot be allowed to turn out to be instruments of harassment and vengeance. (16). In the result, I am of the considered view that it is a fit case for exercising inherent jurisdiction under section 482, Cr.P.C. Accordingly, the complaint, so far it relates to the petitioner herein, as well as the impugned order summoning the petitioner, are quashed and set aside. The learned Magistrate will proceed with the case against other accused. The revision petition is allowed as indicated above.