JUDGMENT : J.N. Bhatt, J. In this appeal under Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (the Code for short), the appellant State has questioned the legality and validity of the acquittal order recorded by the learned JMFC, Dehgam passed on 31-1-1983 in criminal case No. 141 of 1982. 2. This appeal has arisen out of prosecution launched against the accused for the offences punishable under Sections 3 and 7 of the Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955 (the Act for short). 3. Having examined the facts and circumstances and the evidence on record, the trial Magistrate recorded acquittal on 31-1-1983 as he found the accused not guilty. 4. The State of Gujarat has now questioned the legality and validity of the acquittal order recorded by the trial court in this appeal. 5. The prosecution case was that the respondent-accused was working at the relevant time as a station master at Dehgam railway station. The complainant Ambalal Parmar was the Secretary of Railway Passengers Association of Rajkot division at the relevant time. On 4-1 -1982, the accused was questioned as to why dirt was not cleared by the railway officers. The accused replied that he had no sufficient staff. Thereafter, on the next day, the complainant came in the railway train No. 58 down at Dehgama and was taking a cup of tea on the railway platform. At that time, the accused came and shouted and abused the complainant who is a Harijan. It is alleged by the prosecution that the accused keeping in view the incident preceded on the previous day, started accusing and abusing the complainant and thereafter the cup of tea was snatched and was thrown by the accused from the hands of the complainant. He also stated to the complainant that he had spoiled the whole society like that. Therefore, criminal complaint Ex 15 was filed at Dabhoda police. 6. The prosecution relied on evidence of five witnesses. The accused relied on two defence witnesses. On appreciation of the facts and circumstances and the evidence of the witnesses, the trial court found the accused not guilty and, therefore, he recorded acquittal of the accused from the charges under Sections 3 and 7 of the Act. 7. 6. The prosecution relied on evidence of five witnesses. The accused relied on two defence witnesses. On appreciation of the facts and circumstances and the evidence of the witnesses, the trial court found the accused not guilty and, therefore, he recorded acquittal of the accused from the charges under Sections 3 and 7 of the Act. 7. The Act is designed to prevent preaching and practise of untouchability and also prescribe punishment for enforcement of any disability arising out of preaching and practise of untouchability Section 2(a) itself clarifies that civil rights means any right accruing to a person by reason of the abolition of untouchability by Article 17 of the Constitution. Section 3 prescribes punishment for enforcing religious disabilities. Section provides punishment for enforcing social-disabilities; whereas, Section 5 prescribes punishment for refusing to admit persons to public institutions maintained for the benefit of general public. Section 6 makes provisions for punishment for refusing to sell goods or render services. Section 7 provides punishment for other offences arising out of 'untouchability. 8. The accused came to be charged for the offences punishable under Sections 3 and 7 of the Act. Section 3, as observed above, makes provisions for punishment for enforcing religious disabilities. It reads as under: "Whoever on the ground of untouchability prevents any person - (a) from entering any place of public worship which is open to other persons professing the same religion of any section thereof, as such person; (b) from worshipping or off ring prayers or performing any religious service in any place of public worship or bathing in, or using the waters of, any sacred tank, well, spring or water course, river or lake or bathing at any ghat of such tank, water course, river or lake in the same manner and to the same extent as is permissible to the other persons professing the same religion or any section thereof, as such person; shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term of not less than one month and not more than six months and also with fine which shall be not less than hundred rupees and not more than five hundred rupees. Explanation : For the purposes of this section and section 4, persons professing the Bhuddhist, Sikh or Jaina religion or persons profession the HINDU religion in any of its forms or developments including Virashaivas, Lingayats, Adivasis, followers of Brahmo, Prarthana, Arya Samaj and the Swaminarayan Sampraday shall be deemed to be Hindus." 9. Section 7 also prescribes punishment for other offences arising out of untouchability. If reads as under: "(1) Whoever - (a) prevents any person from exercising any right accruing to him by reason of the abolition of untouchability under Article 17 of the Constitution; or (b) molests, injures, annoys, obstructs or causes or attempts to cause obstruction to any person in the exercise of any such right or molest, injures, annoys or boycotts any person by reason of his having exercised any such right; or (c) by words, either spoken or written, or by signs or by visible representations or otherwise, incites or encourages any person or class of persons or the public generally to practise untouchability in any form whatsoever; or (d) insults or attempts to insult, on the ground of untouchability a member of a scheduled caste. shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term of not less than one month and not more than six months, and also with fine which shall be not less than one hundred rupees and not more than five hundred rupees...." 10. The learned APP has taken me through the relevant evidence on relied on by the prosecution. However, he has not been able to persuade this court to interfere with the impugned order of acquittal recorded against the respondent-accused. In order to attract the rigours of the provisions of Sections 3 and 7 of the Act, the material ingredients of both the offences should be established strictly beyond any reason of doubt. The learned Magistrate has considered all the facts and circumstances and the evidence on record including the factum that the complaint came to be filed three days after the alleged incident and arrived at the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, the conclusion recorded by the trial court and the reasons on which the same is based cannot be said to be unreasonable, perverse or erroneous. Thus, the conclusion recorded by the trial court and the reasons on which the same is based cannot be said to be unreasonable, perverse or erroneous. The impugned order of acquittal recorded by the trial court cannot be said to be unjustified in the circumstances of the case and the evidence on record. Interference is not permissible even on the ground that other view is possible. Where two views or conclusions are possible, the assessment of evidence on record made by the trial court in the impugned order while acquitting the accused should not be disturbed. This proposition is very well established in the decision of the apex court in Chiman Uka v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1983 SC 484 . In this decision, reliance is placed on two other following decisions of the Supreme Court which are: S. H. Hemkar v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1974 SC 1153 ; and Bhimsingh v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1974 SC 288 (sic). It is also held by the Supreme Court in Babu v. State of U.P., AIR 1983 SC 308 that in appeal against acquittal, the findings reached by the trial court should not be disturbed merely because another view is plausible. 11. Since this court broadly agrees with the views and reasons assigned by the trial court, it would not be necessary to refer to and reiterate the evidence of each witness. No detailed reasons in appeal confirming the views of the trial court are required. This view is supported by the decision of the apex court in State of Karnataka v. Hemareddy, AIR 1981 SC 1417 . It is also held by the apex court in Girja Nandini Devi v. Bigendra Nandini Choudhary, AIR 1967 SC 1124 that when the appellate court agrees generally with the view of the trial court, there is no necessity to reiterate the reasons given by the trial court. 12. Having regard to the facts and circumstances emerging from the record of the case and the views and findings recorded in the acquittal order and the relevant provisions of the Act and the case law, this court has no hesitation in finding that the present acquittal appeal under Section 378 of the Code Is meritless and is required to be dismissed. Accordingly, it is dismissed. Appeal dismissed.