( 1 ) THE petitioner in both these petitions is the same and so also are the respondents. I need to mention at the very outset that the petitioner who was a Senior Officer employed by the Indian telephone Industries (hereinafter referred to as "the ITI") was aggrieved by certain developments culminating with a transfer order dated June 14, 1990 whereby he was sought to be transferred from Bangalore to Rai Barel. The petitioner moved this Court through W. P. No. 6340 of 1991 and the effective relief as I can gather from the pleadings is that the transfer order in question ought to be quashed and the petitioner be awarded consequential benefits. ( 2 ) THE petitioner had not complied with the transfer order in question as a result of which the ITI instituted certain disciplinary proceedings against him. I shall have occasion to mention those proceedings, but suffice it to say at this stage that the enquiry that was instituted ended with a report that was adverse to the petitioner. Thereafter, the Disciplinary Authority passed an order terminating the services of the petitioner and this was followed by an appeal filed by the petitioner which came to be rejected. ( 3 ) THE second writ petition, viz. , W. P. No. 26208 of 1993, basically challenges the order of termination from service and the rejection of the petitioners appeal. The cause of action as I see it, is a continuous one, even though the two writ petitions were filed at two different points of time. The first of these petitions has been pending since the year 1991 and the second one since the year 1993. The petitioner admittedly is not an employee and an application came to be made in August of this year requesting the Court to hear these matters. What was impressed upon me on that occasion was, that the petitioner was appearing in person and he stated that he has had very severe health problems. He had further stated that as a result of intensive treatment taken by him, particularly, for a serious ailment like high blood pressure, his condition has slightly improved and he made a strong plea to the Court to take up the petitions for hearing out of turn. This Court acceded to the request and made a special concession for the reasons indicated by me. This Court acceded to the request and made a special concession for the reasons indicated by me. The matter was accordingly set down for final hearing and as the order sheet will show, the arguments were continued over a reasonably long period of time. I have experienced considerable difficulty in dealing with this case because the petitioner has indiscriminately attached an abnormally large number of documents, numerous applications are made from time to time supplementing them and to further complicate the matters, the narrations in the pleadings are extremely long-winded and there are references to numerous facts, instances, grievances, etc. , the majority of which are totally irrelevant to the subject-matter of this dispute. ( 4 ) THE respondents have produced certain records before me and in order to ensure fair decision in these petitions, I have carefully perused the files relating to the petitioner's confidential reports as also records relating to the enquiry and all other documents that have been tendered. Though, as indicated by me, the issues before the Court are relatively narrow and are clear-cut. I did go through the entire record purely in order to avoid the possibility of any aspect of the matter being overlooked. I need to also record here, that as indicated by me, the petitioner appeared in person and, therefore, I have permitted him to make submissions on his side for a much longer period than I would have normally given to any advocate to argue. The respondents are represented by their learned advocate who has made his submission in the matter on all the points which the respondents desired to record which I shall deal with. At the conclusion of the arguments, the petitioner raised a submission that according to him, the Court has heard only one of the petitions, viz. , W. P. No. 6340 of 1991, and he, therefore, contended the judgment must be confined to this petition only and that the connected petition should be placed before some other learned judge. This objection is baseless in so far as both the petitions were listed. Both parties have dealt with the subject-matter of both these petitions. , W. P. No. 6340 of 1991, and he, therefore, contended the judgment must be confined to this petition only and that the connected petition should be placed before some other learned judge. This objection is baseless in so far as both the petitions were listed. Both parties have dealt with the subject-matter of both these petitions. There is an earlier order of my brother judge who has very clearly recorded that one of the reasons why he released the petition from being part heard was because both the petitions have to be heard and disposed of together since they are inter-connected and in these circumstances, this judgment that is being delivered is a common judgment dealing with both the petitions. ( 5 ) I need to also point out, that perhaps because of the fact that the petitioner is a layman, he has taken several liberties with the Court including the fact that indiscriminate prayers have been attached to the petitions. As far as these are concerned, I propose to deal with them only to a limited extent. The first petition shall be confined to the legality, propriety and fairness or otherwise of the transfer order and the second petition is, according to the petitioner, confined to the correctness or otherwise of the proceedings that took place thereafter, viz. , the findings passed by the Enquiry Officer, the orders passed by the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate authority. ( 6 ) A few of the facts that are relevant for the disposal of these petitions are being dealt with. There is no dispute about the fact that the petitioner joined the services of the ITI in the year 2 1983. The letter of appointment is on record and it is an admitted fact that in June, 1990, the petitioner had put in about six years of service and was holding the post of Additional General manager (Transfer and Administration) Grade-8. This was relatively a senior and responsible position in. The petitioner who had a distinguished academic back ground is also very well accomplished as a professor and as a manager - (administration) particularly, in the field of personnel management. He has some publications to his credit and as emerges from the record, the petitioner is well accomplished not only technically but also professionally. The petitioner who had a distinguished academic back ground is also very well accomplished as a professor and as a manager - (administration) particularly, in the field of personnel management. He has some publications to his credit and as emerges from the record, the petitioner is well accomplished not only technically but also professionally. A scrutiny of his personal records indicates that he was a good and competent Officer and this position is not in dispute. In the course of arguments, the petitioner did emphasise this aspect of the matter because it is his contention that for a variety of reasons including the fact that he was not only competent but honest and upright, differences arose between him and some of the senior Officers of the ITI and that these differences have resulted in relative hostility in respect of several areas. The petitioner has set out a large number of letters, documents, etc. in support of this contention, that this, background of hostility had taken a serious turn by the year 1990 and that, therefore, the top executives of the ITI who were ill disposed towards him decided to harass and victimize him by abruptly transferring him virtually to the other end of the country, viz. , to Rae Barcl. The petitioner's allegation is that because of this hostile and super-charged background an order of transfer came to be served on him and that he was unjustifiably and abruptly relieved from his duty on June 16, 1990, without giving him any opportunity to even represent against that order. The petitioner's case is that he submitted a representation on June 21, 1990, addressed to the chairman setting out in detail the background to the order of transfer and demonstrating conclusively that the order in question was vindictive and mala fide. He has also referred to a large number of incidents which according to him were directed towards attacking and harassing him in his duties as a result of which, according to the petitioner, he had suffered immensely both physically and mentally. There are references to the fact that the petitioner has not been keeping good health and that he has developed serious health complications. According to the petitioner, he was abruptly relieved of his duties and was thereby prevented from attending office. There are references to the fact that the petitioner has not been keeping good health and that he has developed serious health complications. According to the petitioner, he was abruptly relieved of his duties and was thereby prevented from attending office. He has made out a case that he was handicapped and further more that he has justifiably protested and resisted against what he terms as an illegal and capricious order and he has, therefore, submitted that not only the order of transfer be quashed but further more that he should be afforded all the consequential benefits which would naturally accrue to him. If this court were to accept this view, the order in question would be rendered non est. ( 7 ) THE dispute does not rest there because the petitioner states that he could not attend to his duties in Bangalore and that it was not possible for him to join his duties in Rae Barel. In this background, the petitioner was not attending office though he contends that he was effectively in a position of having been suspended from work and the ITI after waiting for a considerable time decided to institute disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner. The petitioner was accordingly charge-sheeted on the ground that he has committed misconduct, the graveman of the charge being that he has disobeyed and defied the lawful order of transfer and rendered himself liable to be punished for the same. An enquiry was ordered and one Sri Padmanabha lyer was designated as the Enquiry Officer. The enquiry commenced at Bangalore and the petitioner attended a few bearings, after which the venue was shifted to Madras and the petitioner did not attend the remaining bearings. He has challenged the correctness of this action on the part of the enquiry Officer and has taken up the plea that he was not in a position to attend the hearings in madras on the ground of security problems and health problems. The Enquiry Officer recorded the fact that he was rendered helpless in the situation whereby the petitioner refused to participate in the enquiry and he, therefore, submitted his report. Briefly stated that the Enquiry officer has taken the view that the petitioner was an Officer employed by the ITI and that in this capacity the management was empowered to post the petitioner at any of its various installations in the country. Briefly stated that the Enquiry officer has taken the view that the petitioner was an Officer employed by the ITI and that in this capacity the management was empowered to post the petitioner at any of its various installations in the country. The Enquiry Officer has held that the order of transfer dated June 14, 1990, was a competent order in so far as the ITI had the power to transfer the petitioner. He has also held that it was a valid order in so far as the ITI has justified the need to transfer the petitioner to Rae barcli and the Enquiry Officer has consequently come to the conclusion that by not complying with that order, the petitioner has committed an act of misconduct. The Enquiry Officer has concluded his report with the observation that the petitioner is a very senior and responsible officer of the ITI, that he has not been able to give any justification for the refusal to comply with the transfer order and he has also observed that having regard to the status of the petitioner, it was essential for the management to take a very serious view of the misconduct which according to him, was held to have been established. ( 8 ) THE Disciplinary Authority after notice to the petitioner considered the Enquiry Officer's report and accepted the findings in question. The Disciplinary Authority held that the misconduct had been proved that the same was of sufficient gravity and seriousness as to warrant a major punishment and accordingly, passed an order of termination from service. ( 9 ) THE petitioner thereafter filed an appeal against the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority after considering the merits of the case held that there was no ground to interfere with either of the findings or for that matter, the punishment awarded to the petitioner and consequently dismissed the appeal. ( 10 ) AS indicated by me earlier, the first of these writ petitions challenges the order of suspension and all that preceded that order and the second petition deals with the subsequent situation, viz. , the enquiry and the order of punishment culminating in the rejection of the appeal. ( 10 ) AS indicated by me earlier, the first of these writ petitions challenges the order of suspension and all that preceded that order and the second petition deals with the subsequent situation, viz. , the enquiry and the order of punishment culminating in the rejection of the appeal. These petitions had come up before the Court as the order sheet indicates, on different occasions and it was finally in the month of August, 1995, at the special request of the petitioner, that I listed them for hearing out of turn. I need to record that apart, from the pleadings which are voluminous that the petitioner has also placed on record various written submissions apart from the applications filed from time to time, all of which have been taken cognizance of. ( 11 ) THE petitions have been very hotly contested. The ITI has filed its replies along with which a large number of relevant documents have been produced and the learned Advocate has made his submissions both on facts as also on law. I shall briefly recount the defence that has been pleaded in relation to these two petitions. The management has very fairly and to my mind very rightly conceded the position that the petitioner is very well qualified, that he had a good service and academic background and also that he was generally a very good officer. The petitioner has pointed out to me that he was the recipient of the prestigious Indira Gandhi award in the year 1989 and this is one of his outstanding accomplishments. The management does not contend that there was any background of misconduct as far as the petitioner is concerned. Though various allegations made by the petitioner particularly against different senior executives of the ITI have been denied, I shall deliberately refrain from a mention of a single name in this judgment, the reason for it being even though the petitioner has named different executives from time to time and has submitted that they had acted in a hostile and vindictive manner, to my mind since they are not parties to this petition and since the majority of them or all of them have either retired or left those positions, it would not be fair to mention them by name. If the petitioner has made out in the course of the material placed before the Court a case to substantiate his charges, I shall indicate my findings thereon but even as regards this aspect of the matter, it is unnecessary to go into the aspect of personalities because they were all functioning in their capacity of officers and employees of the. They were discharging their various managerial functions and consequently, and even if they had disputes and disagreements, I do not believe these were on a personal level. ( 12 ) WHAT is contended in the first instance is that the petitioner being an Officer of the company was liable to be posted wherever the management required his services. Though it is conceded that he worked for a period of six years in Bangalore except for one break when he had been on one assignment, the defence is that if the services of the petitioner were genuinely required in any other office or branch of ITI in different parts of the country that the management had the power to transfer him there. It is sought to be demonstrated that by virtue of the movement of a senior Officer by the name of Narasimhan from Rai Bareli and the non-availability of another officer by name Oja whom the ITI has desired to recruit but in whose case some problem has come up, a void had to be filled and that the petitioner was the only suitable and sufficiently senior officer whose services were required at Rai Barel. Different documents have been produced in order to substantiate the plea that this was a real and pressing need and it is contended by the ITI that the order of transfer was a genuine one, that it was a simple administrative order, that it is false to contend that it was either motivated or vindictive and that it was a perfectly legal order which the petitioner was obliged to obey. The further submission is that in view of the urgency of the need the petitioner was relieved from his duty in Bangalore and that he was duty bound to have reported at the place to which he was transferred. In not having done so, it is contended that he has disobeyed or defied a lawful order and has rendered himself liable to disciplinary action. In not having done so, it is contended that he has disobeyed or defied a lawful order and has rendered himself liable to disciplinary action. I need to mention here that a specific plea that has been taken up on behalf of the ITI that even though the petitioner has made some references to health problems he did not produce adequate records before the authorities concerned to substantiate the plea that he was seriously handicapped due to various ailments. It is contended that even though at one stage the petitioner was directed to appear before the Medical Board he did not do this and that cumulatively, as regards the serious handicap that he is pleading with regard to his health and this was not established by the petitioner at any stage of the proceedings. ( 13 ) THE ITI has also pointed out in its defence that when the petitioner adamantly refused to comply with the transfer order, that the management was left with no option except to institute a disciplinary enquiry. It is further contended that the petitioner did not participate in this enquiry at the earliest stage and that he not having done so, the management cannot be faulted. The basic plea is that it is the responsibility and duty of the management to act in consonance with the provisions of law and that there has been due compliance at all stages in so far as an enquiry was set up, the petitioner was afforded an opportunity of defending himself and that thereafter, after scrutinising the Enquiry Officer's report and the record, the Disciplinary Authority has passed an order and further more, the appellate authority has reconsidered the case and found it fit not to interfere with the order of the appellate authority as regards the transfer order which was defied for an abnormal long period of time. It is further contended that the petitioner virtually invited the disciplinary action and the last submission was that having regard to the gravity of misconduct that the punishment order was perfectly justified. ( 14 ) IT is in this background that an interesting aspect of law has arisen which will have to be lecided on the facts of this case. As I first pointed out, there are certain unusual angles that have emerged in his proceeding but in essence the dispute rests only on the question, viz. ( 14 ) IT is in this background that an interesting aspect of law has arisen which will have to be lecided on the facts of this case. As I first pointed out, there are certain unusual angles that have emerged in his proceeding but in essence the dispute rests only on the question, viz. , as to whether the petitioner did have the right to resist the transfer order in question which according to him, was in unfair and capricious order. It is a rather un-conventional situation because under normal cirumstances an order of transfer will have to be either challenged or stayed and it is almost un-heard of to accept a situation whereby an employee or an officer may take up the plea that he vas justified in law in having resisted the order because it was inherently bad. Undoubtedly, an employee who takes up such a contention runs a risk in so far as if that plea of the petitioner were to fail, he would automatically open himself to the consequences of having committed an act of misconduct. The same is the situation here and I need to record that this is virtually the only issue that is dominant in the present proceeding and the petitioner has argued at considerable length with the assistance of a lot of material on the basis of which it is his contention that the order of transfer cannot withstand judicial scrutiny. It is his further contention that if the order of transfer is inherently bad, he can never be punished for not having complied with such an order and that, therefore, the consequential punishment awarded to him must necessarily fail. The fate of the two writ petitions will essentially be determined on an answer to this question. ( 15 ) THE petitioner who appears in person has initially taken up the contention that on an over all perusal of his letter of appointment and other attendant circumstances, he was specifically posted in Bangalore and that for all intents and purposes his job was not transferable. ( 15 ) THE petitioner who appears in person has initially taken up the contention that on an over all perusal of his letter of appointment and other attendant circumstances, he was specifically posted in Bangalore and that for all intents and purposes his job was not transferable. The petitioner's contention was that at his level of management, as also having regard to the professional skills on the basis of which he had joined the company, the Court will have to hold that he was recruited and appointed specifically for looking after these functions in Bangalore and that, therefore, there was absolutely no warrant to transfer his services to another State. The petitioner dealt on this aspect of the matter at some length and did illustrate to me many aspects of the job functions that he was performing in support of this plea. Among other things, what is sought to be demonstrated is that in addition to all other factors that the Court will also have to take cognizance of the regional language issue and come to the conclusion that this was not a transferable post. This position has been seriously contested by the respondent's learned advocate who first of all submitted that there was no such condition either directly or indirectly emanating from the contract of employment nor was there any under standing to that effect. Mr. Ramdas even demonstrated that quite apart from the basic principle that transfer is an exigency of service, when the need arose even the senior officers of the company were posted at its different centres in various parts of the country. It is his submission that unless there was a specific assurance in writing to the effect that the services of the petitioner would be utilised in bangalore alone, it was not possible or permissible for him to take up this plea. He also submitted that even in the case of the petitioner himself his earlier service record indicates that he had done assignments in different offices and that, therefore, this plea is totally devoid of substance. He also submitted that even in the case of the petitioner himself his earlier service record indicates that he had done assignments in different offices and that, therefore, this plea is totally devoid of substance. As far as this aspect of the case is concerned, I do not need to elaborate on it because, barring very exceptional situations where the contract of service itself may circumscribe or limit the area of activity of an employee it is a well-established principle of law that if the exigency was demonstrated it is within the discretion of the management to use the services of the employee officer wherever the same becomes necessary. I do concede that over a period of time certain well defined principles have emerged such as the fact that merely because transfer is an exigency of service and, therefore, theoretically the power to transfer vests with the ernployer/management that power is not to be indiscriminately used and the Courts have been able to point out that if the exigency does not appear to be genuine or if the transfer is motivated or in other cases where an employee is sought to be repeatedly transferred or transferred at an untimely basis judicial interference is necessary because these situations do not indicate bonafide use of power. As far as the contention of the petitioner that the respondents had no power to transfer him out of Bangalore is concerned, on a careful consideration of the material placed before the Court and all that has been pointed out by either side I am unable to uphold the contention because the record would indicate that for valid reasons and on genuine grounds, the respondents did have the power to utilise his services in all places other than Bangalore. It does, however, appear to be pertinent on a scrutiny of the record, that there is some substance in the petitioner's basic plea in so far as he was a very highly qualified and a very efficient officer and his services had been well used by the ITI at its training centre and other establishments in bangalore and the petitioner had distinguished himself in the course of the duties. It is presumed in this background, therefore, that where you have an outstandingly good officer there have to be very strong and compelling reasons for shifting him to some other venue and if that venue appears to be a smaller or less important one where his skills, experience and potentialities would not be fully utilised to the extent that was done in Bangalore the question would seriously arise in the mind of the Court as to whether the exercise was a genuine one in that case. ( 16 ) THE second ground raised by the petitioner was that some of the documents and records on the basis of which the respondents seek to justify their action have been fabricated and that some others have been ante-dated. The petitioner contends that the order transferring him is vitiated by mala fides because of the background of inter se hostility which some of the senior officers harboured against him and that when the petitioner resisted these efforts the respondents in order to justify their action started creating various documents and records which have now been used against the petitioner in support of the respondents' case. As indicated by me, these petitions have been argued in great detail and the petitioner has produced the bulk of the documents that are before the Court but the respondents have also produced the original files and particularly the relevant ones for my perusal. I did apply my mind to the facts of this case because on the one hand we are dealing with the case of a very senior, qualified professional who had been visited with an order of extreme seriousness and on the other hand the respondents contend that his conduct was grave enough to impart the punishment which has been imposed upon him. I did, therefore, very carefully scrutinise, check and cross-check this material because it was necessary to ascertain as to whether there was justification in this head of charge. The result of the scrutiny, however, is to the effect that I cannot hold that there has been any fabrication or tampering of the record. The charge is a serious one and Mr. The result of the scrutiny, however, is to the effect that I cannot hold that there has been any fabrication or tampering of the record. The charge is a serious one and Mr. Ramadas on behalf of the respondents did spend considerable time and effort in not only dealing with the pleadings but produced the relevant xerox copies of the original documents because he submitted that regardless of the merits of the case under other heads, that it is a serious allegation against the respondents which is to the effect that highly improper acts have been committed by them and he, therefore, did produce before me everyone of the letters, orders, etc. , that are relevant to this head of charge. This material, on a scrutiny, does not indicate that there has been any unfair or improper or irregular act in relation to what has transpired. ( 17 ) THE petitioner has produced before the Court voluminous material in support of his plea that his health was virtually in a position of break-down in June, 1990, when the transfer order came to be passed. Apart from the various references in the correspondence, the petitioner has also produced before the Court, the medical record relating to his health condition through the years. This is basically in two parts and as of now, what is really relevant is the petitioners health condition prior to June, 1990, and in the month of June, 1990, when the order of transfer was passed. As far as this aspect of the matter is concerned, the respondents have contended that there was nothing seriously wrong with the petitioner. Mr. Ramadas submitted that if the petitioner's heatth condition was in fact grave as he makes out, he should have substantiated the statements made by him which he could have easily done by filing with the company copies of his medical reports, doctors certificates, records of treatment, etc. He submits that in the absence of this material the plea of the petitioner that his health was extremely bad at that point of time will have to be looked upon by the Court as a belated justification for his not having complied with the order of transfer. Mr. He submits that in the absence of this material the plea of the petitioner that his health was extremely bad at that point of time will have to be looked upon by the Court as a belated justification for his not having complied with the order of transfer. Mr. Ramadas submitted that once the order of transfer had been passed, it was obligatory on the part of the petitioner to comply with it whether, he agreed with the order or not because not only the principles of law but the canons of justice required it. In his submission, therefore, the petitioner who admittedly did not comply with that order is specifically seeking to justify his conduct on the ground of his health problems. He submits that in this background, the plea of inability to comply with the transfer order on the ground of the petitioner's health must be rejected outright. The subsidiary plea canvassed by Mr. Ramadas is that when the respondents instituted an enquiry which was essentially a fact-finding exercise, at this point of time the petitioner ought to have substantiated his plea that his health condition precluded him from complying with the transfer order which he has not done. The petitioner in turn has sought to contend that it was for the respondents to call upon him to substantiate what he had pointed out, that they had not disputed the correctness of the statements made by him and that, therefore, he was not obliged to produce any additional material. As far as what transpired in the course of the enquiry is concerned, I shall deal with it briefly while evaluating the enquiry proceedings but at this stage, I need to record that there is considerable medical evidence which the petitioner has referred to and produced before this Court in support of his plea that his health was in not only bad but precarious condition in June, 1990. One needs to brush aside technicalities in serious situations and the fact does remain that the petitioner was a senior executive working at Bangalore and that record does justify his plea that his health had taken a turn for the worse in the two years that preceded June, 1990, and that it was steadily deteriorating. I cannot accept the contention of the respondents that they were unaware of this fact. I cannot accept the contention of the respondents that they were unaware of this fact. The principal reason for it is that the petitioner who was a good officer of the company and a specialist in his field was entitled to higher assignments and the record does indicate that he had waived his right in the preceding months from applying and being considered for higher posting and particularly the one from Mankapur. It is quite clear to the Court that as far as the health aspect was concerned, the plea taken by the petitioner was more than fully justified. I have examined this aspect of the matter in some detail because the petitioner has set it out specifically in his representation dated June 21, 1990, wherein he has applied to the respondents to revoke the transfer order. The petitioner has, however, linked up his health condition with what is contended as acts of harassment, torture, etc. , at the hands of other personnel alleging that his health deteriorated because of this situation, but the cases are not something which the Court needs to go into. The fact remains that the petitioner had made this as one of the strongest planks on the basis of which he had applied for revocation of the order. To my mind, an authority which claims to exercise powers and which is obliged to act fairly and impartially is equally obliged to give due cognizance to all the relevant factors and it is well-settled law that if a situation of some seriousness occurs such as the one where an employee points out that his health is in a bad condition, and that he is not in a position to accept the transfer, this aspect of the matter must be very carefully gone into and if the plea is to be overruled, there should be extremely good ground for doing so which is not the case here. ( 18 ) THE main head of challenge as presented by the petitioner proceeds on the footing that there were differences of opinion between him and some of his senior colleagues with regard to various decisions that were taken on situations that arose from time to time and that as a fall out thereof, he incurred the displeasure and wrath of some of the Officers. Since the petitioner was in charge of personnel and administration he states that one area of discord was with regard to handling of matters with regard to SC and ST at various points of time and he has also given various indications not only in his representation but in the material produced before the Court of how the problem started and how it thereafter took a rather unpleasant turn. I need to refer here to one aspect of the matter which does appear to be of some significance. It has emerged that the petitioner was residing in the. T.. Colony and that his wife is a professional in her own area and was running an organisation by name CONOD. According to the petitioner, this was in the nature of professional and consultancy services and he states that within the framework of the service regulations applicable to him, he was permitted to assist and contribute academically as far as that organisation was concerned. The petitioner has also brought to my notice the fact that he is the author of some publications and he submitted that in so far as there was no conflict with his official duties and more so in so far as he was competent as a professional to assist this organisation, he was entitled to do so. It does appear from the record that this activity of the petitioner was objected to by some persons in the management and that this issue also took a rather serious turn to the extent that the petitioner was even directed not to have anything to do with that organisation and, secondly, that he should also instruct his wife to discontinue that activity. The petitioner pointed out that these objections and interferences were wholly and completely unjustified and on a careful perusal of the record, to my mind, the stand taken by the petitioner was absolutely justified. The petitioner had pointed out that whatever activity was being carried out was one of a perfectly legitimate and professional nature and that there was absolutely no ground on which what his wife was doing could be objected to that this was un-justified interference and that the same position held good as far as his connection with conod was concerned. The petitioner had pointed out that whatever activity was being carried out was one of a perfectly legitimate and professional nature and that there was absolutely no ground on which what his wife was doing could be objected to that this was un-justified interference and that the same position held good as far as his connection with conod was concerned. I refer to this otherwise insignificant aspect of the case for two reasons the first of them being that it is very clear from what had happened that the officers concerned had absolutely no business to interfere with what the petitioner's wife was doing and more importantly, that it was also clear that these executives were downright wrong in having interfered with the petitioner's association with the professional services which his wife was running in so far as there is is absolutely nothing to indicate that this was in any way interfering with professionally or undermining the petitioner's normal job functions. This material, therefore, lends much support to the plea of the petitioner that there were positive efforts to interfere with his activity and to harass him. ( 19 ) THE main plea, however, is with regard to differences that arose in relation to his various job functions. The petitioner is given to the habit of recording in detail whatever happens. He was also in the habit of writing long letters, submissions, etc. , and unfortunately used rather strong language at times. This last aspect of the matter has been commented upon by Sri Ramadas, learned Advocate for the respondents because it is his submission that it was precisely this habit of the petitioner that led to friction between him and other persons in the company. Be that as it may, a careful perusal of the several documents that had been produced on record will indicate that the petitioner did make much of all these incidents and situations and that it was very clear by the time we come to the month of June, 1990, that all these factors had given rise to a virtually domestic war within the. T.. with the petitioner on the one side and his immediate superiors on the other. ( 20 ) THE respondents' learned Advocate with the assistance of the relevant documents and files demonstrated to the Court that one Mr. T.. with the petitioner on the one side and his immediate superiors on the other. ( 20 ) THE respondents' learned Advocate with the assistance of the relevant documents and files demonstrated to the Court that one Mr. Narasimhan was required to be shifted from Rac Bareli to mankapur and that one Mr. Ojha was to have replaced him at Rae Barel. The record indicates that some difficulties had arisen with regard to Ojha joining service with. T.. as a result of which there was a void created at Rae Bareii and Mr. Ramadas demonstrated from the documents on record that due to certain industrial unrest problems at Mankapur it was impossible for the management to shift Mr. Narasimhan back to Rae Bareli as he could not leave mankapur and that there was no other Officer of sufficient capacity and seniority other than the petitioner who was required to be placed at Rae Barel. He submits that the matter was considered over a period of time as was evident from the file produced and that ultimately a considered decision was taken to transfer the petitioner to Rae Barel. The petitioner on the other hand seriously disputed the correctness of this situation. His basic contention is that the job functions at Rae Bareli effectively relate to an officer in Grade-VI and that he was far above this in Grade-VIII and that this ground alone would indicate to the Court that the petitioner could never have been justifiably transferred there as it would tantamount virtually to a demotion. The petitioner has submitted that even if it is accepted that Mr. Narasimhan could not have been sent back from Mankapur, the subsequent events clearly establish the mala fides of the respondents. He contends on the basis of the record that even though he did not go to Rae Bareli the post came to be filled in November of that year after which the respondents still did not revoke the transfer order but they persisted in taking action against the petitioner. He, therefore, maintains that even though the transfer order is sought to be justified on the basis of this material the Court ought to strike it down on the ground that it was motivated and that it was vitiated by personal mala fides. ( 21 ) AS far as this aspect of the matter is concerned, Mr. He, therefore, maintains that even though the transfer order is sought to be justified on the basis of this material the Court ought to strike it down on the ground that it was motivated and that it was vitiated by personal mala fides. ( 21 ) AS far as this aspect of the matter is concerned, Mr. Ramadas was at pains to demonstrate to the Court that regardless of what hostile background the petitioner was referring to, that this was a simple, clear cut administrative order necessitated by the circumstances and that nobody had at any level any motive or ill-intention. The fact remains that after the movement of Narasimhan the vacancy at Rae Bareli had continued for something like one year. It is during that time that it is pointed out that some high level consideration did take place culminating with the decision in may, 1991. The material on record, however, falls short of one or two factors the most important of them being the question as to what was the immediate necessity of transferring the petitioner to Rae Bareli even though that post had remained vacant for many months, but the real question to which the record does not present any answer arises is the second aspect of the matter, namely, what was the compelling necessity on June 14, 1990, to pass an order that the petitioner was relieved from his duties in Bangalore with immediate effect. There was a degree of abrupt and undue hurry that was displayed in this order. It did not indicate as to what position the petitioner was transferred to and it was almost in the nature of an order whereby the concerned officer was told that he was being relieved with immediate effect. The petitioner was doing an important job. There was no tearing hurry that he should be relieved at a moment's notice and that too in the middle of the month. There is no desperate urgency demonstrated from the record that required that he should leave everything that he was doing at Bangalore at that very point of time and immediately proceed to Rae Bareli and these circumstances, to my mind, very clearly indicate that regardless of the justification pleaded the manner in which the power was exercised cannot pass the test of fairness. I am reinforced in these views by two aspects of the matter which are of some significance. Undoubtedly, the petitioner was holding an important assignment and barring an order of dismissal, one cannot conceive of a situation whereby an officer of that rank would be served with an order to take immediate effect which in other words meant that whatever he was doing could not be even completed and that it was virtually to be left in that condition and he was to hand over charge. The fact that the respondents were not acting fairly is again established from the second circumstance, namely, that the petitioner was immediately relieved of his duties which is something very unusual. I could have understood if the record indicated some grave crisis or emergency at Rae Bareli which required the petitioner to rush there but as indicated by me, the situation at Rae Bareli was virtually one year old and there was no grave emergency or even urgency of any type. The matter thereafter compounded because the petitioner was immediately relieved of his duties which virtually means that he was thrown out of that office and even though he sent a detailed representation on June 21, 1990, the management refused to accept anything that he had pointed out. It is at this juncture that I need to refer to another aspect of the matter. ( 22 ) UNDOUBTEDLY, the respondents' learned Advocate is right when he states that transfer orders do involve some degree of dislocation and hardships but that this is inevitable. There are times when transfer orders do involve very serious consequences to the family but the law still takes this into account because the job exigencies being what they are, such hardships have to be put up with. There are, however, over riding circumstances and factors which to my mind cannot be bypassed and one of these is the human or humanitarian angle. Invariably principles have been crystallised which required that a transfer should not come as a bolt from the blue, that it should be timely and, secondly that the manner in which the transfer is done should try to minimise the hardship to the extent possible. Normally, transfers should not be made during the academic year because of the difficulties in relation to the children's education, etc. Normally, transfers should not be made during the academic year because of the difficulties in relation to the children's education, etc. , and similarly, if there are overriding factors such as serious health considerations it is absolutely incumbent for the management to take note of this aspect. If the ground pleaded is false or if it is exaggerated, an authority is entitled to overrule it, but if the ground pleaded is a genuine one, it is expected that the authority which acts fairly will take cognizance of it and if necessary, give due weight to it. I have already held that the health condition of the petitioner was quite bad at that point of time and even if for any reason this aspect I had been overlooked by the authorities when they passed the transfer order, if they were acting fairly and bona fidely they would have examined this aspect of the matter when the petitioner represented in writing on June 21, 1990. This was not done and to my mind, therefore, it would lead to an adverse inference against the respondents in so far as coupled with the background of this case and to all the other circumstances that I have referred to, the irresistible conclusion is that the action of the respondents in passing the abrupt order of transfer and immediately relieving the petitioner pursuant thereto cannot be upheld. ( 23 ) THE second aspect of the case relates to the serving of the charge-sheet against the petitioner, holding of the enquiry and all that followed. Mr. Ramadas submitted that the order passed was done in exercise of legal authority and he submitted that if the petitioner desired to challenge that order that it was open to him to approach a competent forum. He further submitted that the petitioner did not approach any such competent forum but on the other hand, that he merely defied that order by stating that he is unable to comply with it. He, therefore, submitted that the non-observance or disobedience of the transfer order ex facie constituted misconduct within the service regulations, and that the respondents were left with no option except to proceed against the petitioner through a departmental enquiry. He, therefore, submitted that the non-observance or disobedience of the transfer order ex facie constituted misconduct within the service regulations, and that the respondents were left with no option except to proceed against the petitioner through a departmental enquiry. He contended that the company waited for virtually seven months and that the respondents were left with no option except to take action against the petitioner who had even in June, 1991, not complied with that order. He further submitted that the petitioner was an officer holding a responsible position which was why the respondents resisted having to take the extreme step of charge-sheeting him, but when the aforesaid situation arose, in the interest of maintaining discipline in the. T.. an enquiry had to be instituted. Under normal circumstances these arguments which are faultless would have been fully justified. Had the transfer in question been a fair, correct, valid and lawful transfer order there could have been absolutely no fault to be found with regard to the course of action adopted by the respondents. Mr. Ramdas also submitted that the petitioner had neither joined his duties at rae Bareli nor for that matter was he on leave and that in this background he was clearly open to disciplinary action. The respondents had appointed Sri J. Padmanabha lyer as the Enquiry officer. The petitioner has challenged this appointment on certain technical grounds which I do not need to record here because within the frame work of the regulations I see nothing wrong in the appointment of Sri J. Padmanabha lyer as the Enquiry Officer. The enquiry proceeded for some time at Bangalore and thereafter at Madras. The petitioner took part in the enquiry when it was held in Bangalore and thereafter declined to do so on grounds of health and security. Much has been made by Mr. Ramdas with regard to his conduct at this point of time. The learned advocate submits that assuming for purposes of argument that the petitioner had valid grounds, it was incumbent on him to plead these as his defence during the enquiry proceedings and not having done so he must face the consequences. Much has been made by Mr. Ramdas with regard to his conduct at this point of time. The learned advocate submits that assuming for purposes of argument that the petitioner had valid grounds, it was incumbent on him to plead these as his defence during the enquiry proceedings and not having done so he must face the consequences. Secondly, he submits that the petitioner's apprehension on the ground of security were absolutely imaginary objections and that as far as the health ground was concerned it has come on record that he was well enough to travel to his native place and if so that he could have certainly gone to Madras which was much closer. There is considerable justification in what Mr. Ramdas has pointed out because to my mind the petitioner ought to have pointed out before the Enquiry Officer as to what was his defence. It was open to him to attack the validity of the transfer order and to even justify his conduct. I need to further record here that when the petitioner took up the health ground he was instructed to appear before the medical board which he declined to do so. The respondents have pointed out that in these circumstances the petitioner cannot find fault with the Enquiry Officer who was extremely patient with him, waited for a long period of time and thereafter submitted his report. I do concede that at this stage of the proceedings if the petitioner had genuine apprehension or difficulties for appearing before the Enquiry Officer in Madras he ought to have established that. I scrutinised and rescrutinised the enquiry record which Mr. Ramdas very fairly placed before the Court for purpose of ascertaining as to why the sittings were held at Madras and there does not appear to be valid justification for this except that it suited the Enquiry Officer. This shifting of venue does not appear to be fully justified but regardless of that fact, I would have had no hesitation in holding that the petitioner was wrong in not having established his defence in not having appeared before the Enquiry Officer except for one ground which to my mind is of some consequence. This shifting of venue does not appear to be fully justified but regardless of that fact, I would have had no hesitation in holding that the petitioner was wrong in not having established his defence in not having appeared before the Enquiry Officer except for one ground which to my mind is of some consequence. ( 24 ) THE record of this case indicates that when matters took a serious turn the petitioner filed the first of these writ petitions, namely, W. P. No. 6340 of 1991 on March 15, 1991. The respondents had notice of this proceeding and despite this fact, they proceeded with the enquiry. I am conscious of the fact that there was no stay order nor was there any legal bar to the holding of the enquiry, but the situation that results is one of some consequence. If one scrutinises this prayer clause of W. F. No. 6340 of 1991, it will be seen that in fact the petitioner has prayed for an order quashing the order of transfer. In other words, the legality of the action was subjudice before the high Court and barring a situation where the respondents were held bent on harassing the petitioner I cannot conceive of any justification in their having proceeded with the enquiry in respect of the very same subject-matter of that writ petition. Between the High Court and the enquiry Officer, it was the High Court which was the most competent forum to decide on the fairness and legality of the order of transfer and in this situation, to my mind, there can be no two views about the fact that the respondents were wrong in having continued with the enquiry proceedings even if the charge-sheet had been issued prior to the filing of the writ petition. It is because of this aspect of the matter which militates very heavily in favour of the mala fides of the respondents that the defaults committed by the petitioner in the course of enquiry will virtually have to be ignored. ( 25 ) I do not need to deal in great detail with subsequent aspects of the case because the Enquiry officer has submitted a detailed report in which he has upheld the validity of the transfer order and has consequently concluded that the petitioner has misconducted himself in having disobeyed that order. ( 25 ) I do not need to deal in great detail with subsequent aspects of the case because the Enquiry officer has submitted a detailed report in which he has upheld the validity of the transfer order and has consequently concluded that the petitioner has misconducted himself in having disobeyed that order. In the circumstances of this case, having embarked upon a detailed consideration of the record and held that the transfer order is liable to be quashed, it would be impossible to uphold any of the conclusions or findings of the Enquiry Officer. Both the parties have argued in great detail about the validity of the order of termination from service passed by the disciplinary authority but to my mind that aspect of the matter will also be rendered academic. Detailed submissions were made with regard to the duties or defaults on the part of the appellate authority on several grounds. To my mind one does not require to examine or do an elaborate scrutiny of this order, the reason being that the cornerstone of the entire action, namely the transfer order if held to be invalid can then never support a situation whereby misconduct can be alleged on the basis of an invalid transfer order. Everything that proceeded thereafter would, therefore, naturally have to fail. ( 26 ) I do need to record that in the course of submissions that were canvassed with regard to the conduct of the enquiry, the role of the disciplinary authority and the role of the appellate authority, Mr. Ramdas in particular drew my attention to a series of decisions of the Supreme court wherein different principles in relation to the law governing this aspect of the matter are discussed and the law has been clarified. He also drew my attention to the service regulations and he submitted that no fault can be found with the procedure adopted by the disciplinary and appellate authority as also with the quality of the decision. Normally, I would have reproduced those decisions which effectively laid down the correct law on the point. He also drew my attention to the service regulations and he submitted that no fault can be found with the procedure adopted by the disciplinary and appellate authority as also with the quality of the decision. Normally, I would have reproduced those decisions which effectively laid down the correct law on the point. 1 had indicated in the earlier part of this judgment that in those exceptional cases where an employee takes the risk of resisting a transfer order on the ground that the same is illegal or unjustified that he is in an extremely vulnerable position for the reason that if he fails in the challenge that the consequence would be grave. The same position applies here and to my mind, the petitioner would have had virtually no defence had he failed in his challenge to the transfer order. The disciplinary authority in this case held that on a consideration of the material before him an order of termination from service was warranted and it is true that there was some delay in the disposal of the appeal. The petitioner had pointed out that the findings of the Enquiry Officer had not been furnished to him and that this ground alone would vitiate the final orders that have been passed. Mr. Ramdas on the other hand demonstrated to me that the Supreme Court has in the decision in managing Director, E. C.. L. v. B. Karunakar, (1994-I-LLJ-162), clarified that the mere non-furnishing of the report will not ipso facto vitiate the orders that are subsequently passed unless it can be demonstrated that prejudice has resulted. Mr. Ramdas argued that on the facts of this case where the petitioner has refused to take part in a greater part of the enquiry and where he has made detailed submissions in each stage thereafter absolutely no prejudice can either be alleged or demonstrated and that, therefore, this technical ground is not available to the petitioner. I do not really need to examine that ground for the reason that as indicated by me the logical conclusion of the findings that have been arrived at by this Court would result in a situation whereby it will have to be held that the petitioner could not have been removed from service on the ground of misconduct, on a charge of having disobeyed a transfer order that itself is non est. In the present instance, the stand of the petitioner was a two-fold one. He challenged the validity of the transfer order on the ground that it was unfair, unjust, capricious and in his representation he has virtually used the word "punishment". It is well-settled law that, however, bad the conduct of the employee had been, transfer cannot be used as a means of punishment. In this case, after a scrutiny of the petitioner's confidential records which are produced, it is indicated to me that there was nothing wrong with his conduct at any earlier point of time and that, therefore, the action taken against him emanated only on the basis of the allegation that he had defied the transfer order. As far as this goes, the petitioner's contention was that his health condition was such that he would not have disobeyed the transfer order but that he was in a position of helplessness as far as compliance was concerned. I have upheld the contentions of the petitioner under both beads and, therefore, the logical conclusion is that there could be no charge of misconduct emanating therefrom. ( 27 ) AS a necessary consequence of the findings of this Court, the petitioner would be entitled to succeed in both the petitions. Rule is made absolute to the extent that the transfer order dated june 14, 1990, stands quashed and the subsequent enquiry proceedings which to my mind were unjustified, findings of the Enquiry Officer and the orders passed by the disciplinary authority and the appellate authority are quashed in the facts and circumstances of this case. ( 28 ) IN the result, under normal circumstances, the petitioner would have been entitled to an order of reinstatement, however, having regard to the passage of time and his age it is no longer possible for such an order to be passed. The law however, will have to make the necessary adjustments to restore the petitioner to the position in which he was as on June 14, 1990, when the impugned order came to be passed. In the exceptional circumstances of this case, this Court is required to uphold the right of the petitioner to protest of against and to stand up to an order of transfer that was capricious and which fails to pass the test of judicial scrutiny. In the exceptional circumstances of this case, this Court is required to uphold the right of the petitioner to protest of against and to stand up to an order of transfer that was capricious and which fails to pass the test of judicial scrutiny. It is an inherent right which vests in every citizen or in every employee, and this is one of the rare and exceptional cases where the Court has upheld the exercise of that right. The petitioner will, therefore, have to be treated as though he had continued in service from June 14, 1990, and since it was the wrongful act on the part of the respondents who have relieved him from services at that point of time he cannot be held responsible for his not having attended to his duties thereafter. Consequently, the petitioner will have to be treated as having continued as an officer of the respondent-Company and will be entitled to not only to his emoluments, allowances and other service benefits which would include any promotion that he would have been entitled to under normal circumstances. The respondents will have to treat the petitioner as having continued with the company in service up to the point of time at which he would have normally retired or been superannuated. The respondents shall accordingly compute the arrears that the petitioner is entitled to under these heads and shall pay the same to him as quickly as possible. I, however take note of the fact that this would involve several computations and consequently it is necessary to set a reasonable dead line. The payment shall be computed and made to the petitioner latest by March 31, 1996. If there is any default with regard to the clearing of arrears on this date for whatsoever reason, the respondents shall be liable to pay to the petitioner interest compounded at the rate of 18 per cent per annum. Under these circumstances, the only other direction is that the terminal benefits to which the petitioner is entitled to would have to be computed and paid to him in the light of the directions issued by this Court. It is also clarified that by virtue of the orders passed, the petitioner will be deemed to have retired from services under normal circumstances with effect from the date on which he would otherwise have done so. It is also clarified that by virtue of the orders passed, the petitioner will be deemed to have retired from services under normal circumstances with effect from the date on which he would otherwise have done so. ( 29 ) BOTH the petitions are accordingly disposed of Rule is made absolute to this extent. This court has not gone into several of the other issues raised by the petitioner and several of the other prayers made by him because the Court considers that it is improper and unnecessary to do. ( 30 ) HAVING regard to the findings that have been recorded by the Court, particularly, the findings that the action at all stages were unjustified the petitioner shall be entitled to costs in the two suits as far as both the petitions are concerned. ( 31 ) THE original records which have been produced by the respondents' learned Advocate are returned to him as they are required to be restored to the custody of the respondents.