JUDGMENT : B.N. Srikrishna, J. 1. This writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India highlights the tribulation to which a litigating workman is subjected when the Industrial Court hearing his complaint chooses to short-circuit the complaint and dismisses it on a hypothetical probability by non-application of mind to the facts of the case. The facts of this case speak for themselves. 2. The First Respondent is the Municipal Council, Bhagur, District Nasik. The petitioner joined the service of the First Respondent on 26.10.1972 as a Clerk. On 20.11.1985 the Petitioner was served with a show cause notice levelling charges about non-compliance with working procedure, misappropriation of certain funds of the Municipality and also over-writing of the accounts. The petitioner replied the show cause notice on 9th December, 1985 and requested for supply of the particulars of the charges. On 7.1.1986 the Petitioner was suspended pending an enquiry. On 4.10.1989 the Petitioner applied to the First Respondent to allow him to join duties and pay him his salary. On 22.11.1989 a Resolution was passed by the Joint Board to allow the Petitioner to join his duties. Thereafter, the Petitioner sent letters dated 8.3.1990, 31.5.1991 and 12.1.1992 to the First Responded requesting that he be allowed to join his duties and be paid his salary, pursuant to the Resolution dated 22.11.1989, but nothing happened in that behalf and the Petitioner was not allowed to join his duties. Even the Collector of Nasik directed the First respondent to allow the Petitioner to join his duties, but the said direction was not complied with. On 21.9.1992 the Petitioner moved the Industrial Court, Nasik, by his Complaint (ULP) No. 781 of 1992 under Section. 28 read with Items 5, 9 and 10 of Schedule IV of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). 3. It is the grievance of the Petitioner that, by the impugned order dated 12.1.1993 his complaint has been dismissed brusquely and cavalierly. After having perused the impugned order in the complaint and having heard Mr. Kochar, the learned Advocate for the petitioner, it appears to me that the grievance of the Petitioner is legitimate. In paragraph 6 of the order the Industrial Court proceeded on a series of hypotheses and assumptions. After having perused the impugned order in the complaint and having heard Mr. Kochar, the learned Advocate for the petitioner, it appears to me that the grievance of the Petitioner is legitimate. In paragraph 6 of the order the Industrial Court proceeded on a series of hypotheses and assumptions. Referring to the averment in the complaint that the Division Commissioner, Nasik had given an order in July 1982 to the First Respondent Municipal Council, to take back the Petitioner in service, the Industrial Court says : "It is quite possible that certain other directions regarding regularizing absence or paying the wages might have been given. If that be so, then the question of maintainability of the present complaint assumes more importance and is another dimension to the question. Time and again, it has been laid down by our own Honourable High Court that if there are no service rules or certified Standing Orders in force, then Model Standing Orders would prevail for any establishment which is an industry. It was also been laid down that if there is anything inconsistent with the Model Standing Orders, either in service rules or certified orders of an industry, the Model Standing Orders would prevail. In this light of the position, receiving subsistence allowance either as per Model Standing Orders, certain Standing Orders or Service Rules becomes an existing right computable in terms of money. Consequently it goes without say that a claim for such benefit has to be preferred u/s. 33-C(2) of the I. D. Act, 1947. In this light of the situation, I hold that invoking Items 5 and 9 of Schedule IV of the U. L. P. Act, 1971 is totally misconception of law and therefore, the complaint becomes not maintainable". This is the only reasoning on which the complaint has been dismissed. It is at once apparent that there are no findings made in the order, though it is replete with conjectures and surmises without basis. I am surprised that a serious complaint of the Petitioner, that he was indefinitely suspended without payment of wages, has been dismissed in a summary manner without serious application of mind. To say the least, the reasoning of the Industrial Court that the application could fall u/s 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act and, therefore, the complaint is not maintainable under the Act, displays anxiety to avoid the exercise of application of mind. To say the least, the reasoning of the Industrial Court that the application could fall u/s 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act and, therefore, the complaint is not maintainable under the Act, displays anxiety to avoid the exercise of application of mind. Irrespective of whether the Petitioner had a remedy u/s 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act or not, (It is highly doubtful!), it was the duty of the Industrial Court to examine whether the complainant had proved his case so as to attract Items 5 and 9 of Schedule IV of the Act. This the Industrial Court has squarely failed to do. Result - one more round of litigation causing avoidable expenditure of time, talent and money for all concerned. 4. In the premises, the writ petition is allowed. Rule is made absolute. The impugned order dated 12.1.1993 made in Complaint (ULP) No. 781 of 1992 is hereby quashed and set aside. The complaint is restored to the file of Industrial Court, Nasik and the Industrial Court is directed to hear and dispose it of in accordance with law, as expeditiously as possible, after proper application of mind. 5. Writ to go immediately. Certified copy expedited.