Judgment :- 1. The unsuccessful tenant before the learned Appellate Authority in R.C.A. No. 2 of 1990 by its order dated 4-2-1991, confirming the order of eviction passed by the learned Rent Controller, Coimbatore in R.C.O.P. No. 354 of 1986 dated 16-11-1989, is the Revision Petitioner herein, canvassing the impugned order passed by the Rent Control Appellate Authority for want of its legality, propriety and correctness. 2. The non-residential premises bearing Door Nos. 67, 68 situate in Variety Hall Road, Coimbatore Town is being owned by respondents herein who are the mother and son, living as one family in the rear side of the same, and among them, respondents 4 and 5 are jobless, but, however, manufacturing ready-made petty coats and dresses by engaging more than six sewing machines therein. Besides the said buildings in question, they do not own any other building anywhere in the town at any point of time. The said b uilding consists of upstairs portion. In the ground floor, in the front side, facing the Main Road, there are number of tenants in occupation for their commercial purposes. As such, in the ground floor, in the front side of the said building, a portion consisting of 16 12? feet was let out to the tenant who is the Revision petitioner herein for a monthly rent of Rs. 800/-for a period of 5 years with an advance of Rs. 20,000/-. Out of the said advance amount, a sum of Rs. 10,000/- was adjusted towards the rent and the balance of Rs. 10,000/- remains with the respondents herein. Besides, a sum of Rs. 5,000/- was paid to them subsequently on 25-2-1984 and thus, a total sum of Rs. 15,000/- is still in the hands of the respondents herein. The 2nd respondent is employed in Railways and the 3rd respondent is working as Assistant in a concern which manufactures readymade garments known as ‘Best Shop’. 3. Since the respondents 1 and 4 are without any job, engaged in manufacturing pettycoats and other readymade garments by engaging six sewing machines in their residential portion situate in the rear side of the building in question and since they do not own any other building in the said town, they require the rental premises now in the occupation of the tenant, the Revision Petitioner herein, for their own use and occupation. Their requirement according to them is bonafide and as their demand made to the tenant/Revision Petitioner, to vacate and hand over the possession has not since been complied with, petition for an order of eviction under Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Bent Control) Act was filed. 4. The claim of the petitioners/landlords was resisted by the first respondent, the Revision petitioner herein by filing a counter statement in which it was contended inter-alia that the premises was rented out for a monthly rent of Rs. 800/- for non-residential purposes, and there was an advance of Rs. 15,000/- paid in all by the tenant. A further contention was made that the Revision Petitioner has paid huge amount for the purpose of constructing the building, that therefore, there was an agreement for a period of 25 years and the respondents agreed not to interfere or ask for eviction of the rental premises within that period and so, before, the expiry of the said period, demanding her to vacate is a contradiction to the agreement and the rental agreement contains the period for its enforceability and it was agreed therein that the said period was to be extended and that rental agreement was dated 9-2-1981. It was also contended that besides the advance made, the landlords obtained further sum of Rs. 20,000/- by way of loan agreed to be repaid with interest at the rate of 24 per cent per annum and that amount has been repaid as evident from the receipts convered under Exhibits P-8 to P. 27. The other documentary evidence shows that besides the loan amount above referred to, the landlords viz., the respondents herein had availed loans from other sources also. It was further contended that the requirement of the rental premises by the respondents is not genuine and bonafide, but, however intended for evicting the tenant/Revision petitioner with every motive. 5. On recording the oral evidence, let in on behalf of the respondents herein, as P.Ws. 1 and 2, being the respondents 5 and 4 respectively, and P.W. 3 by name one Nagesh on behalf of the Revision Petitioner and of P.W. 1 by name Duraisami and the documentary evidence, Exs. P1 to P36 on behalf of the respondents and Ex. On recording the oral evidence, let in on behalf of the respondents herein, as P.Ws. 1 and 2, being the respondents 5 and 4 respectively, and P.W. 3 by name one Nagesh on behalf of the Revision Petitioner and of P.W. 1 by name Duraisami and the documentary evidence, Exs. P1 to P36 on behalf of the respondents and Ex. R1 on behalf of the Revision petitioner and on a careful consideration of the whole matter, in its every depth and breadth, the learned Rent Controller upheld the claim of the respondents that the rental premises is required for their own occupation, and accordingly passed an order of eviction against the tenant/Revision petitioner. Aggrieved at this, the tenant/Revision petitioner preferred the Rent Control Appeal before the learned Appellate Authority in R.C.A. No. 2 of 1990 which also ended in confirming with order of eviction passed by the learned Rent Controller and against that, the present Revision is being directed by the tenant who is the Revision petitioner herein. 6. I have heard the Bar for the respective parties for and against the impugned order under this revision. 7. Mr. Chinnasami, learned senior counsel appearing for and on behalf of the Revision petitioner brought to my notice that subsequent events which could be taken judicial notice of by this Court, under the settled principles of law, had taken place and it is the very question to be decided. Learned senior counsel would point out that among the various tenaments found in the said building, both in the ground floor and in the first floor, the portion occupied by one tenant by name Ananthavalli Chit Funds was vacated subsequently and that was rented out by the respondents to one Micky Traders and that therefore, the requirement of the respondents/landlords, if at all, is true and genuine for the purpose of their own occupatioon to cater to their need of space or accommodation for manufacturing readymade garments, they could have occupied the said portion, instead of letting it out for rent to some other tenant and therefore, the only ground on which the eviction is sought for is tainted with every mala fide intention and so, this revision can be allowed and the impugned order has to be interfered with. To substantiate the said contention, the learned senior counsel filed the sworn affidavit given by one of the so-called partners of the said Ananthavalli Chit Funds to the said effect. But, however, it was resiled by the other partner of the said firm by means of a similar sworn affidavit coupled with an affidavit given on behalf of the respondents denying the said fact in toto. 8. In the context of the above rival position, the only question that arises for consideration in this Revision is, whether the concurrent findings recorded by both the courts below are tainted with any illegality or impropriety so as to make this court to interfere with the impugned order passed by the Rent Control Appellate Authority? 9. The very fact that the rental premises in question was let out to the Revision Petitioner herein under rent deed dated 9-2-1981 for a period of five years and the rent agreed to be paid is Rs. 800/-per month by the revision petitioner to the respondents with an advance of Rs. 15,000, that for the construction of the said rental premises the respondents had obtained loan of Rs. 20,000/- payable with interest at the rate of 24 percent per annum from the Revision petitioner, that they have repaid the same under Exs. P8 to 27 as claimed by P.W. 2 and that they had spent a sum of Rs. 75,000/-for constructing the said building and that they had obtained further loan from the Co-operative Bank and other financiers under Exs. P28 and P29 and they disposed of other houses and properties under Ex. P30 are all not in controversy among the parties herein and with regard to the same, there is no dispute at any time. It was the consistent finding of both the learned Rent Controller and the learned Appellate Auth ority that the respondents herein are the mother and sons, among whom the respondents 2 and 3 are employed elsewhere and the respondents 4 and 5 are without any job, but, however helping their mother by having six sewing machines in the rear portion of the said building and thereby manufacuring pettycoats and other readymade garments under the name and style, ‘Lovely dresses’ as stipulated in Exs. P1 to P3, P6, P8 and P32. P1 to P3, P6, P8 and P32. It is thus seen that the concurrent findings recorded by both the courts were purely on the basis of the oral and documentary evidence adduced on behalf of the respondents which reveals clearly that by residing in the rear portion of the said building, the respondents are engaged in manufacturing ready-made garments by obtaining loans from banking institutions and doing the business therein. Admittedly, the Revision petitioner herein is doing business relating to the sale of radio and radio spare parts in the front portion of the ground floor of the said premises. It is, therefore, since this portion is situate in the frontal side of the road, the respondents want the same for their own occupation in order to cater to the need of their own business, viz., manufacturing and sale of readymade garments. The evidence of P.Ws. 2 and 3 as substantiated by the documentary evidence covered under Exs. P1 to P36 is not found controverted, but, however substantiated the case of the respondents, viz., that they are doing business of their own in a portion of the said rental premises and they require the rental premises for their own use and occupation. It is, therefore, for the same reason, perhaps, the Bar has not made any attempt to challenge the said concurrent findings of the courts below, before this Court. It is also noticed that the Revision Petitioner had not evinced or projected any serious attribution to her claim of bonafide requirement except a bare denial. 10. It is, therefore, for the same reason, perhaps, the Bar has not made any attempt to challenge the said concurrent findings of the courts below, before this Court. It is also noticed that the Revision Petitioner had not evinced or projected any serious attribution to her claim of bonafide requirement except a bare denial. 10. A legal controversy was taken before the learned Rent Controller as well as the Appellate Authority on behalf of the Revision Petitioner to the effect that since the respondents are residing in the rear portion of the building, and even assuming that they are doing some business, they require the portion of the rental premises in the occupation of the Revision Petitioner, for their own use and occupation, but the present application for eviction under Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act cannot be allowed to be entertained, and if it is so, the proper Section would be 10(3)(c) of the Act and that therefore, in the absence of any plea that the advantage caused to the landlord would not outweigh the hardship caused to the tenant, in case of requirement of the premises, under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, the petition should be dismissed. With regard to this aspect, the findings given by the learned Rent Controller as well as the Appellate Authority would clearly demonstrate and provide answer to the said questions and that therefore, I do not traverse the same once again, as it was felt unnecessary. It was also noticed at this stage that it is a settled principle of law that if a wrong provision of law has been relied in the context of adducing evidence and pleadings, the court cannot reject the relief basing on the question of mere technicality without applying its ratio. I am fully satisfied to accept the findings given by the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority in this regard. In short, to say with regard to the merits of the revision, in the context of the concurrent findings recorded by both the courts below, I do not come across any legal infirmities of laches to shake the impugned order in any manner. 11. It also was the concurrent finding of both the courts below that the contention of the revision petitioner that the lease is for a period of twenty five years has not been established. 11. It also was the concurrent finding of both the courts below that the contention of the revision petitioner that the lease is for a period of twenty five years has not been established. The contents of the rent deed provide that the period is five years. If the period is stipulated, then, it is common knowledge that when the stipulated period as in the rent deed, wherein both parties are deemed to be the landlord and tenant expires, in the context of absence of any extension of the period, the tenant of that agreement will become a statutory tenant, not a tenant by contract. It is not the case of the Revision Petitioner that the period of five years has been extended and that there was any agreement to that effect. Therefore, according to the Revision Petitioner, if perpetual lease for a period of more than five years is true, it should be only an oral understanding and that even so, that has not been established by any stretch of oral or convincing legal evidence in this case. Even assuming so, the prayer of eviction sought for by the respondents requiring the rental premises, is for their own use and occupation, attracting the ground even under Section 10(3)(a)(iii) or 10(3)(c) of the Act. It was the finding given by the learned Appellate Authority that the hardships likely to be caused to the tenant would not outweigh the advantages to be caused to the landlords/respondents, in this case, for the simple reason that evidently and admittedly, the Revision Petitioner/tenant owns and is in occupation of a three storeyed commercial building within 1000 feet in the same area, which has been leased out to various tenants as evident from the documentary evidence. This fact further establishes that the legal evidence adduced cannot be controverted by the Bar and in fact it was not being done so. 12. Admittedly, the concurrent findings of both the courts below, are that the first respondent along with respondents 4 and 5 are jobless, and do not own any other building either residential or non-residential and that they are carrying on business in manufacturing readymade garments and selling, as evident from the documentary as well as oral evidence and that they are carrying on their business in a portion of the building in which they are also residing. This being so, their requirement for improving the said business by having it in the front portion is deemed to be a bona fide one and cannot be suspected, viewed from any angle. 13. Coming to the legal concept of distinction between Section 19 (3)(a)(i) and Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, it is noticed that the difference between the two has to be identified on a proper and careful understanding of the purpose for which a Legislative intendment has been created between the above two sections. The basic difference between the two is that, notwithstanding the fact that the legislature amended Section 10(3)(a)(i) to fall in line with the judicial pronouncements of the court, yet, it did not think it necessary to improve upon or expand the intention and purpose contemplated in Section 10(3)(c). Under this Sub-Section the only requirement is that the landlord should be in occupation of a portion of the building and the additional accommodation sought for is needed bona fide by him. In so far as this subsection is concerned, a subsidiary finding, but equally a necessary one, has to be rendered by courts regarding such bonafides claimed by the landlord. This “subsidiary bonafides ” if such an expression can be used, touches upon the hardship which a tenant might suffer by reason of the order of eviction. If the hardship that is likely to be caused to the tenant outweighs the advantage which the landlord might obtain as a result of the same, then it is necessary for the courts to render an additional finding on this aspect of hardship in favour of either the landlord or the tenant. These are the essential differences between Section 10(3)(a)(i) and Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. In P.M. Kuppu Sah v. Rajaram Sah , Ramaprasada Rao, C.J. (as he then was) as reported in 92 L.W., 165, while dealing with the said differences as above referred to, has observed as follows:— “That possession is nine points of law is an ancient adage in Jurisprudence. Possession may be physical possession or juridical possession. In P.M. Kuppu Sah v. Rajaram Sah , Ramaprasada Rao, C.J. (as he then was) as reported in 92 L.W., 165, while dealing with the said differences as above referred to, has observed as follows:— “That possession is nine points of law is an ancient adage in Jurisprudence. Possession may be physical possession or juridical possession. Jurisprudence contemplates juridical possession as the nearest equation of physical possession, and therefore, in a case where the landlord keeps his things in a portion of the premises, which was vacated after he gave notice of termination of tenancy, and keeps it locked up and under his control and is in legal possession thereof, then it should be held that the intention of the landlord was to keep it in his physical possession and this satisfies the requirement under Section 10(3)(c)of the Act.” “Whether the landlord, after giving notice of determination of tenancy, finds that only one among the three tenants has vacated and out of necessity shifts himself to that portion which has fallen vacant, in such a case the request of the landlord to evict the tenants may also be considered under section 10(3)(c). There is nothing in law which prohibit the invocation of Section 10(3)(c) in such circumstances. The application originally filed under Section 10(3)(a)(c) may also be considered along with t he application under section 10(3)(c), subject, however to the prescription under Section 10(3)(c) being satisfied. As subsequent events can also be taken into consideration, without the same being ignored, for all purposes, it is possible for courts to consider such a situation under section 10(3)(c) of the Act also. No doubt, it has to be found whether the landlord requires the premises for his occupation and whether the hardship that might be caused to the tenant would or would not outweigh the convenience of the landlord. This is a case whether the landlord filed the application under Section 10(3)(c). No doubt, it has to be found whether the landlord requires the premises for his occupation and whether the hardship that might be caused to the tenant would or would not outweigh the convenience of the landlord. This is a case whether the landlord filed the application under Section 10(3)(c). This is certainly maintainable, because the landlord, though not in physical occupation, was in legal occupation of a portion of the building.” “It is by now well established by a series of decisions of this Court that it is not for the tenant to dictate as to what portion the landlord should require for his own purposes.” “The contention on behalf of the tenant that the tenant was in occupation for a number of years and that he could not find an alternative accommodation of a similar type elsewhere, would amount to begging the question. Merely because it will be difficult for the tenant to secure an alternative accommodation of a similar type, it cannot be said that the hardship that might be caused to him would outweigh the advantage to the landlord. This ‘subsidiary bona fides’ contemplated under Section 10(3)(c) proviso should be viewed in a reasonable fashion. Apriori considerations, such as the non-availability of similar accommodation, cannot be a guide and the only guide, to come to the conculsion that the harship would be more to the tenant.” 14. Considering the scope of relief made available under section 10(3)(a)(iii) and section 10(3)(c) of the Act and with regard to its applicability to a building consisting of two floors, a Division Bench of this Court in Thirupathi Nagar and Sons v. Dr. S.L. Kantha Rao (1980 T.L.N.J. page 145), held after discussing various case laws that the petition filed under section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, is maintainable. The relevant passage amounting to the findings of the Division Bench referred to above is extracted as hereunder from the page 154:— “The presence of the expression, ‘as the case may be’ towards the end of Section 10(3)(c) makes it absolutely clear that the two purposes preceding the expression, namely, ‘for residential purpose’ or ‘for purposes of business which he is carrying on’ are respectively relatable to the residential building and the non-residential building occurring in the opening of the provision and the significance of this expression cannot be ignored. If the significance of these expressions is taken into account, the result will be that for invoking Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, the following conditions must be satisfied: In the case of a residential building additional accommodation can be obtained only for residential purpose; in the case of a non-residential building additional accommodation can be obtained only for purposes of business which the landloard is carrying on’. Thus, it will be seen that part of Section 10 (3)(c) concerning the residential building corresponds to section 10(3)(a)(i) and the other part concerning non-residential building corresponds to Section 10(3)(a)(iii). In such context full meaning can be given to the non-obstante clause. Section 10(3)(a)(i) refers to the landlords not occupying residential building of his own’. Similarly Section 10(3)(a)(iii) refers to the landlord not occupying anon-residential building which is his own.’ With reference to these provisions, it may be possible to contend that a ‘building’ includes its part and hence, if a landlord is in the occupation of a part of his building, he cannot get possession of the par t in the occupation of the tenant under these provisions. It is to meet such a situation separate provision has been made in Section 10(3)(c) and hence the significance of the non-obstante clause. If so construed, certainly Section 10(3)(c) will have no application to the facts of the present case, because the respondent-landlord did not require additional accommodation for the purpose of his residence. But, on the other hand, he requires additional accommodation for the purpose of running his dispensary and clinic. To such a case, Section 10(3)(c) will have no application. As we have pointed out already, all the requirements of Section 10(3)(a)(iii) are complied with in the present case, and, therefore, the Appellate Authority was right in holding that the petition was maintainable under Section 10(3)(a)(iii) and, on merits, about which there was no controversy before us, allowing the eviction petition filed by the respondent herein, who is the landloard. Consequently, the Civil Revision Petition fai ls and is dismissed.” 15. Mr. Consequently, the Civil Revision Petition fai ls and is dismissed.” 15. Mr. Chinnasamy, learned senior counsel, while pursuing his contention above referred to, viz., subsequent events to be considered by this Court, has referred the case-law laid down in Hasmat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad (A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 1711), in which the Supreme Court has held as follows:— “Where possession is sought for personal requirement it would be correct to say that the requirement pleaded by the landlord must not only exist on the date of the action, but must subsist till the final decree or an order for eviction is made. If, in the meantime events have cropped up which would show that the landlords requirement is wholly satisfied, then in that case his action must fail, and in such a situation, it is incorrect to say that as decree or order for eviction is passed against the ten ant he cannot invite the Court to take into consideration subsequent events. Once an appeal against decree or order of eviction is preferred, the appeal being a continuation of suit, the landlords need must be shown to continue to exist at appellate stage. If the tenant is in a position to show that the need or requirement no more exists because of subsequent events, it would be open to him to point out such events and the court including the Appellate Court has to examine, evaluate and adjudicate the same.” 16. Importing the said ratio and in the light of well-settled principles of law, if subsequent events happened, which go to the root of the very points involved in the pending litigation, Courts of law can take judicial notice of them and consider the same for the purpose of adjudicating the matter in hand in the proper perspective and correct manner. With reference to the facts of the instant case, I may now proceed to consider the affidavit filed by one of the so-called partners of Ananthavalli Chit Funds, a tenant in the ground floor of the rental premises who has vacated, but the signboard of the said firm is still available as evident from the sworn affidavit. With reference to the facts of the instant case, I may now proceed to consider the affidavit filed by one of the so-called partners of Ananthavalli Chit Funds, a tenant in the ground floor of the rental premises who has vacated, but the signboard of the said firm is still available as evident from the sworn affidavit. But, however, the said vacation was controverted by the Managing Partner of the said firm by name Ananthavalli Chit Funds stating that they had not vacated the business concern from the rental premises and the affidavit filed by the so-called partner was not correct with reference to its truth, genuineness and correctness. The difference between the rubber stamp seal was relied on by the Managing Partner of the so-called firm. It is also worthwhile to note that the Managing Partner has stated that not only the portion in their occupation has not been vacated, but the claim that the said portion has been leased out to Micky Traders has also been denied. To substantiate it, however, a sworn affidavit on behalf of the respondents has also been filed denying the whole subsequent events said to have happened. In the context of prevaricating position and prompt conflicting nature of the claims of persons concerned with Ananthavali Chit Funds, I am at every difficulty to hold that there is any substance in the contention that there exist subsequent events relating to the very subject matter of the scene involved in the revision. For the said reasons, I am not convinced to believe the very happening of the event itself, for want of its proof and existence. 17. Even so, assuming for a moment, it is well-settled law that it is always not open for the tenant to dictate to the landlord to occupy a portion on the opinion of the tenant. Barring that, the portion referred to in the additional affidavit, of the learned senior counsel, (sic) is only in the first floor of the building, while the portion now in the occupation of the Revision Petitioner is in the front side of the ground floor of the rented premises and that is the portion, what is required by the respondents for their own occupation and not any portion in the first floor. Therefore, the subsequent events, even if they are taken as true, cannot have any interaction between the bonafide requirement of the respondents/landlords and the tenant and therefore, for the reasonings above referred, it is decided as having become out of point now. Having thus considered the whole gamut of the case, I am fully constrained to hold that the bonafide requirement of the rental premises by the respondents/landlord has been established by adducing all types of legal evidence by the landlords which would clearly demonstrate that the case of the Revision petitioner must necessarily fail and that for the said reasons, I do not come across any laches or illegality or impropriety inherent in the impugned order passed by the learned Appellate Authority or the Rent Controller. In short to say, the Revision lacks every merit. No other contention has been placed before me. It is, thus, having identified every legality, propriety and correctness in the impugned order, I am of the firm view that this Revision preferred by the tenant has to fail. 18. In the result, the revision fails and accordingly, it is dismissed. Consequently, the order of eviction passed by the leaned Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority in R.C.O.P. No. 354 of 1986 dated 16.11.1989 and R.C.A. No. 2 of 1990 dated 4.2.1991 respectively is hereby confirmed and maintained. However, on facts and circumstances, since learned senior counsel for the Revision petitioner requested for considerable time to vacate the premises, in the context of business established by the Revision petitioner in the rental premises for a very long time, in the interest of justice, lam inclined to grant four months time to the Revision petitioner to vacate the rental building and hand over the possession of the same to the respondents, subject to the condition that the petitioner has to file an affidavit of undertaking to the said effect within 30 (thirty) days from today before the trial court. In the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs for either of the parties.