JUDGMENT 1. - The three petitioners in the three writ petitions have been detained by three different orders passed by the District Magistrate, Barmer on 1st June, 1994 under Section 3 of the National Security Act, 1980 (hereinafter referred to as 'the N.S. Act'). They have challenged the same by way of separate writ petitions. As the grounds of challenge are same in all the three cases, they are being disposed together. 2. In the case of petitioner Jabal, the detention order is Annexure-1, dated 1st June, 1994. The grounds of detention were supplied to the detenu on the next day i.e. on 2nd June, 1994. Amongst the grounds it has been mentioned that there are reports of Special Bureau, Government of India, Military Intelligence, Confidential Department of the Border Security Force, C.I.D. Border Intelligence as well as the secret reports of the Station House Officer, Police Station, Gadra Road, that these persons are engaged in spying activities; they have connections with persons in Pakistan; they supply secret information to them; they bring unauthorised arms to India; they keep on visiting Pakistan from time to time; they give refuge to Pakistani citizens who enter illegally into India etc. Names of certain persons with whom they have connections in Pakistan have also been given. The cases of other two petitioners are similar. 3. The detention order passed by the District Magistrate, Barmer was confirmed by the State Government vide order dated 10th June, 1994 (Annexure-3). 4. The grounds on which the detention orders have been challenged are as under:- (i) that the grounds of detention contained in Annexure-2 are vague. This order is not accompanied by any document and the details of the reports submitted by the various intelligence agencies have not been furnished to the petitioners. The actual date of the incident has not been mentioned without which the petitioners are not in a position to give an effective explanation or make any effective representation. (ii) There is non-application of mind by the Detaining Authority as he has accepted the reports of the Sponsoring Authority namely the Superintendent of Police, Barmeras it is without examining the matter for himself. (ii) There is non-application of mind by the Detaining Authority as he has accepted the reports of the Sponsoring Authority namely the Superintendent of Police, Barmeras it is without examining the matter for himself. It is contended that the grounds should be set out first and thereafter the concerned authority should take a decision about the detention and in this case the reverse process has been followed which reflects on the manner in which the District Magistrate approached in the matter. (iii) The petitioners were not informed by orders Annexures-1 and 2 that they have a right to make a representation; and (iv) That the District Magistrate, Barmer has no authority to pass the detention order and that the delegation of power to him under Section 3(3) of the N.S. Act is also not proper. Referring to Annexure-R/1, which is an order by which the power has been conferred upon the District Magistrates of passing orders under Section 3 of the N.S. Act from March, 1994 to 6th June, 1994, it is contended that the necessity for delegation of these powers has not been established and as such, the delegation is not proper. 5. On behalf of the State Government, it has been contended that under Section 8 of the N.S. Act, grounds of detention are to be communicated to the detenu but Sub-section (2) provides that the authority shall not be required to disclose the facts which it considers to be against interest. On basis of this proposition it is contended the reports of the various intelligence authorities cannot be disclosed as it would be against the interest but the substance of the same so far it to each of the petitioner have been given and when the detenu has been informed about the pith and substance allegations against him, it cannot be said that he has been prevented from making an effective representation. Full information has been given as to what were the activities of these detenus and the source from which these information's were obtained cannot be disclosed. 6. Before coming to the case law which has been cited on behalf of both the sides, we may like to look into the record of the cases. We have gone through the record shown to us by the learned Government Advocate in which the details of the reports of various Intelligence Agencies have been given. 6. Before coming to the case law which has been cited on behalf of both the sides, we may like to look into the record of the cases. We have gone through the record shown to us by the learned Government Advocate in which the details of the reports of various Intelligence Agencies have been given. All this information was collected from the concerned areas and it is only a matter of record that the authorities could not catch any of the petitioners while they were engaged in the activities which are against the security of the State. We have also noticed from the file that the Sponsoring Authority namely the Superintendent of Police, Barmer placed the necessary material before the Collector/ District Magistrate for passing the order of detention but the grounds of detention mentioned in Annexure- 2 are not verbatim grounds which have been mentioned by the S.P. in his report. The matter has been examined by the Collector and he has formulated his own grounds of detention. 7. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has relied upon Rameshwar Lal Patwari v. State of Bihar(1958 Cr. L.J. 1490) . It has been held that the grounds of detention must not be vague or indefinite and must afford a real opportunity to make a representation against that detention. In this case, the detention was of a person who indulged in black marketing. The Supreme Court observed that the Courts are not concerned with the sufficiency or reasonableness of the grounds but when the two grounds were vague and one was false and the other two were merely lame excuse, the detention was held to be not justified. In Veshisht Narain Karwaria v. State of U.P. (1990 SC 1472), the petitioner was detained for creating terror at the place of auction of liquor shops and this was the sole ground for detention. The detention order was quashed because it had been made only on one ground but it was found that extraneous circumstances had influenced the mind of the Detaining Authority. In Milan Kumar v. State of U.P. and Others (1988(1) Crimes 20), the detention order held to be wholly illegal and quashed where the grounds of detention was honest and the District Magistrate had not applied his mind to the facts and circumstances of the case and passed the order mechanically. In Milan Kumar v. State of U.P. and Others (1988(1) Crimes 20), the detention order held to be wholly illegal and quashed where the grounds of detention was honest and the District Magistrate had not applied his mind to the facts and circumstances of the case and passed the order mechanically. In Gulab Mehra v. State of U.P. and Others ( AIR 1987 SC 2332 ), the detention order was quashed on the ground that the grounds of detention were vague and there could not be a proper representation. Further, that there was no proof of satisfaction of the Detaining Authority. In Gurwinder Singh v. State of Punjab and Others (1991 Cr.L.J. 1588), the detenu was detained for a substantive offence and one of the reasons which weighed with the Detaining Authority was that chances of conviction were remote. Such detention order was quashed. In Abhay Shridhar Ambulkar v. S.V. Bhave, Com- missioner of Police and Others ( AIR 1991 SC 397 ), the conferment of power by the State Government to detain preventively was held to be bad for non-application of mind when the conferment order was passed after taking into consideration the circumstances prevailing and likely to prevail in future. However, in the present case, the conferment is only in view of the prevailing circumstances, this authority is not applicable. 8. On behalf of the State Government, reliance has been placed on Master Lal Mohd. Sabir v. State of Jammu and Kashmir and Others (1971 Cr.L.J. 1271). Non-disclosure of grounds of detention on ground that it would be against the security of State was upheld holding that it would tantamount to saying that it would be against the public interests to disclose it. 9. From what has been seen above it can be said that the grounds on which the petitioners have been detained have been given in Annexure- 2 but the actual documents which are reports of Intelligence Agencies have not been supplied on the plea that it would be against the public interest which is permissible to the State under Section 8(2) of the N.S. Act. The record shows that the report of the Superintendent of Police, Barmer has not been made the basis of the detention order in verbatim manner but the District Magistrate has applied his mind in scrutinising the grounds and then formulating those grounds on which the detention has been based. The record shows that the report of the Superintendent of Police, Barmer has not been made the basis of the detention order in verbatim manner but the District Magistrate has applied his mind in scrutinising the grounds and then formulating those grounds on which the detention has been based. The delegation of powers under Section 3(3) of the N.S. Act is also in accordance with the law as it was in the circumstances prevailing that the District Magistrate were authorised to pass detention orders on being satisfied that there are grounds for detention in accordance with Section 3(3) of the N.S. Act. 10. The only fact which remains is whether the petitioners have been deprived from making representation against the detention order. Section 8(1) provides for supply of grounds of detention in order to afford the detenu an earliest opportunity of making a representation against the detention order to the appropriate Government. This provision reads as under : "8. Grounds of order of detention to be disclosed to persons affected by the order:-(1) When a person is detained in pursuance of detention order authority making the order shall as soon as may be but ordinarily not later than five days and in exceptional circumstances and for reasons to be recorded in writing, not later than ten days from the date of detention communicate to him to grounds on which the order has been made and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order to the appropriate Government." 11. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has placed reliance on Fatmabi Sheikh Bhikan Sunabi v. Commissioner of Police and Ors. (1993(1) Crimes 262) . In this case, it has been held by the Bombay High Court that where the concerned authority communicates to the detenu that he has right to represent against the order but fails to specify the authority to whom such representations are required to be addressed then this does riot amount to strict compliance of the procedure required and the detention order was set aside. In the present case, the orders (Annexures-1 and 2), the detention orders and the grounds of detention do not communicate to the detenus that they have a right to represent. In the present case, the orders (Annexures-1 and 2), the detention orders and the grounds of detention do not communicate to the detenus that they have a right to represent. However, the detenus submitted representations prepared by their Advocate through the Superintendent of the Jail where they were detained and the same were forwarded to the appropriate authorities and later decided. 12. On behalf of the State Government, an additional affidavit of Mr. Sanjay Dixit, District Magistrate, Barmer has been filed stating therein that the petitioners were informed by letters (Annexure-R/2) dated 2nd June, 1994 that they could make representations against the order of detention to the Home Department, Government of India, Home Department, Government of Rajasthan and Advisory Board. Receipts of these letters by the petitioners have also been annexed. In view of this, it cannot be said that the petitioners have been denied the right of making effective representations as provided under Section 8 of the N.S. Act. 13. In these cases, the representations were submitted by the petitioners on 4th July, 1994 and were rejected on 13th July, 1994 and the petitioners were informed about this on 14th July, 1994. Thereafter, the representations and the report of the State Government were for-warded to the Central Government on 13th July, 1994 which were rejected on 24th July, 1994. Thus, they were dealt with on day-to-day basis and were decided in an expeditious manner. There is no basis to show that the representations have been decided after delay. 14. As discussed above, there is no force in these petitions and the same are dismissed.Writ Petitions dismissed. *******