Judgment S.K.Chattopadhyaya, J. 1. These three applications under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (shortly the Code) involve common question of law and, as such, they have been heard together and are being disposed of by this common judgment. 2. The petitioners have prayed for quashing the entire criminal proceeding initiated against them as well as the order taking cognizance for offences under Section 33 of the Indian Forest Act, 1927 , Forest Conservation Act, 1980 and Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 (hereinafter, for the sake of bravity, referred to as the Act of 1927, 1980 and 1986 respectively). 3. Before dealing with the grievances made by the petitioners, it would be appropriate to portray the factual backgrounds of the case. In Cr. Misc. No. 1337/90(R) a report was made by the Divisional Forest Officer, Ranchi West Division alleging inter alia, that for the purpose of carrying mining operation in the lease-hold area of M/s. Indian Aluminium Ltd., certain pillars have been removed from plot No. 215 which is notified as protected forest and thereby the petitioners have violated the provisions of Section 33 of the 1927 Act and also 1980 Act as well as 1986 Act. In Cr. Misc. No. 1339/90(R) allegation is of violation of the aforesaid three provisions on the ground that on the same plot No. 215 some trees were destroyed ; a list of seven trees was also given in the prosecution report having measurement and cost of each of the same. Similarly in Cr. Misc. No. 1340/90(R) allegation is that the lessee had demolished the marking pillars on plot No. 195 and some trees have been felled down and over burden dumped. On the basis of these three reports, three different forest cases were registered and the learned Judicial Magistrate has taken cognizance as aforesaid. 4. I shall now consider and weigh the contentions advanced by the counsel for the parties. Mr. Paul appearing on behalf of the petitioners firstly contended that from a bare perusal of the allegations made in the offence report, no offence, muchless under the aforesaid Acts, can be said to have been committed by the petitioners. 4. I shall now consider and weigh the contentions advanced by the counsel for the parties. Mr. Paul appearing on behalf of the petitioners firstly contended that from a bare perusal of the allegations made in the offence report, no offence, muchless under the aforesaid Acts, can be said to have been committed by the petitioners. Referring to Section 33 of the Act, 1927 it is submitted that this section itself does not bring any offeace referred therein into existence unless the trees which are alleged to have been felled, are reserved by issuing a notification reserving such trees as laid down in Section 30 of the Act, 1927. Advancing his argument, he submits that mere allegation of damaging the trees in a protected forest without mentioning that the trees which were damages, were reserved, the petitioner cannot be said to have committed any offence. According to him, incomplete allegation not even remotedly referring to the main factual element which is the basic ingredient of an offence cannot, ex facie constitute the offence. 5. Referring to offence alleged to have been committed under the 1980 Act, learned counsel submitted that the allegation made in the prosecution report as such does not make out any offence under this Act but in paragraph 5 of the counter affidavit the opposite parties have now come forward with a case that before operating the mining work, no approyal was taken as required under this Act. Mr. Pauls first challenge in this regard is that such allegation having not been made in the complaint petition, the opposite parties can not be allowed to put forward such acquisition which has no relevance at all. Second string of attack is that even assuming that the statements made in paragraph 5 of the counter affidvait are correct, the same do not constitute an offence inasmuch as admittedly the lease was granted in 1974 and Section 3-A of 1980 Act came into force with effect from 15-3-1989. This section being a penal provision cannot have any retrospective effect. Moreover, it is urged that complaints in all these cases were made prior to 15-3-1989 when the provisions as laid down under Section 3-A were not in existenee. 6. With reference to the allegation of violation of the provisions of 1986 Act, Mr. This section being a penal provision cannot have any retrospective effect. Moreover, it is urged that complaints in all these cases were made prior to 15-3-1989 when the provisions as laid down under Section 3-A were not in existenee. 6. With reference to the allegation of violation of the provisions of 1986 Act, Mr. Paul contended that by no stretch of imagination, it can be said that the petitioners have violated any of the provisions of the said Act. Secondly, it is urged that even if the allegations are presumed to be true, the learned Magistrate could not hava taken cognizance except on a complaint made by the Central Government or any appropriate authority or officer authorised in this behalf by it. 7. Relying on several decisions of the Supreme Court as well as High Courts, Mr. Paul summed up his argument by submitting that in such a case he High Court should exercise its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code if order to prevent the abuse of process of law. In support of his argument, the has relied on the following decisions: (1) AIR 1992 SC 604 , State of Haryana and other V/s. Ch. Bhajan Lal and other?; (2) AIR 1988 SC 709 , Madhavrao Jiwaji Rao Scindia and another etc. V/s. Sambhajirao Chandrajirao Angre and othen ; (3) AIR 1986 SC 1653 , Bihar State Electricity Board and another V/s. Nand Kishore Namakhuwala; (4) AIR 1991 Supp (2) SCC 329, Dr. Dhanwanti Vaswani V/s. State and another ; (5) AIR 1991 SC 1632 , Captain Subhash Kumar V/s. The Principal Officer, Mercantile Marine Deptt. Madras ; (6) AIR 1989 Cr LJ (Gauhati) 188, Md. Abdul Kadir Choudhury V/s. State of Assam and others and (7) AIR 1971 Ker 193 , State of Kerala V/s. V. P. Enadeen. 8. Mr. P. D. Agrawal, learned GP II, on the other hand, with industry and precision has attempted to support the initiation of proceeding and order taking cognizance under the Act 1927. However, with all fairness, Mr. Agrawal has submitted that the allegations of violation of the provisions of Acts of 1980 and 1986 respectively do not hold good, but he strongly contended that as far as the allegation of violation of Section 33 of the 1927 Act is concerned the same does constitute an offence. However, with all fairness, Mr. Agrawal has submitted that the allegations of violation of the provisions of Acts of 1980 and 1986 respectively do not hold good, but he strongly contended that as far as the allegation of violation of Section 33 of the 1927 Act is concerned the same does constitute an offence. Continuing his argument, it is submitted that whether there was any notification under Section 32 or not, that has to be seen at the time of trial. With reference to the decision of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1982 SC 58 (commonly known as Soda Asks case) Mr. Agarwal submits that in the aforesaid case also the High Court quashed the proceeding only because the notification could not be placed before the High Court on behalf of the State but the same notification, when was produced before the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the High Court and held that only because the notification could not be brought to the notice of the High Court, the High Court could not have quashed the proceeding. With reference to the present case, it is urged that the prosecution may at the trial stage produce the notification showing that the trees which were damaged, were actually reserved under Section 32 of the Act, 1927. Lastly it is -contended that in view of the recent decision of the Supreme Court, the proceeding cannot be quashed at the very threshold. 9. Before dealing with the merits of the contentions of the parties, I may deal with the jurisdiction of the High Court of exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code for quashing a criminal proceeding at the very initial stage. As far back as in the year, 1945 in the case of King Emperor V/s. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad, reported in AIR 1945 P. C. 189, it was, inter alia, held that no doubt, if no cognizable offence is disclosed, and still more, if no offence of aay kind is disclosed, the police would have no authority to undertake an investigation. After that the nagging question that came up for examination before the courts, more often than not, is under what circumstance and in that categories of cases a criminal proceeding can be quashed in exercise of the inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code. After that the nagging question that came up for examination before the courts, more often than not, is under what circumstance and in that categories of cases a criminal proceeding can be quashed in exercise of the inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code. In an off-quoted decision, namely, R. P. Kapoor V/s. State of Punjab, AIR 1960 SC 866 , it was observed as follows : "Cases may also arise where the allegations in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not constitute the offence alleged ; in such cases no question of appreciating evidence arises ; it is a matter merely of looking at the complaint or the First Information Report to decide whether the offence alleged is disclosed or not. In such cases, it would be legitimate for the High Court to hold that it would be manifestly unjust to allow the proprocess of the criminal court to be issued against the accused person." 10. In the case of State of West Bengal V/s. Swapan Kumar Guha, reported in AIR 1982 SC 949 , the legal position has been settled by the Apex Court by observing as follows : ".....the legal position is well settled. The legal position appears to be that if an offence is disclosed, the court will not normally interfere with an investigation into the case and will permit investigation into the offence alleged to be completed ; if, however, the materials do not disclose an offence, no investigation should normally be permitted......Once an offence is disclosed, an investigation into the offence must necessarily follow in the interests of justice. If, however, no offence is disclosed, an investigation cannot be permitted, as any investigation in the absence of any offence being disclosed, will result in unnecessary harassment to a party, whose liberty and property may be put to jeopardy for nothing. If, however, no offence is disclosed, an investigation cannot be permitted, as any investigation in the absence of any offence being disclosed, will result in unnecessary harassment to a party, whose liberty and property may be put to jeopardy for nothing. The liberty and property of any individual are sacred and sacrosanct and the couit zealously guards them and protects them..." In P. P. Sharmas case reported in 1986(3) SCC 67 , after examining the ambit and scope of Section 482 of the Code, it has been held that the question to be determined by the court at the stage of summoning the accused is as to whether on the basis of the allegation in the complaint without adding or subtracting anything, a cognizable offence is made out and at that stage the truth or otherwise of the allegations do not come for scrutiny. (Emphasis added). 11. All the aforesaid decisions have been scrutinised by the Supreme Court in the case of State of Haryana V/s. Choudhary Bhajan Lal and others (supra). Interpreting the relevant provisions of the Code on the principle of law enunciated by it in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of powers under Article 226 which is an extraordinary power of the High Court or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code, the Apex Court has laid down precisely some guidelines though net exhaustive, for exercising such powers. First guideline is where the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face valus and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, the High Court will be justified in inteferring with the same. 12. Thus, it is now well "settled that when a proceeding at the initial stage is sought to be quashed, the test to be applied is as to whether the un-controverted allegations as made prima facie establish any offence or not. It is also for the court to take into consideration any special feature which appear in a particular case to consider whether it is expedient in the interest of justice to permit the prosecution to continue. 13. On the backdrop of this legal position, the question which, therefore, arises for consideration is as to whether the allegations set out in the offence report constitute any offence against the petitioners. 13. On the backdrop of this legal position, the question which, therefore, arises for consideration is as to whether the allegations set out in the offence report constitute any offence against the petitioners. The first offence charged against the petitioners is under Section 33 of the Act, 1927. Section 33 of the said Act reads as follows : "Penalties for acts in contravention of notification under Section 30 or , of rules under Section 32.(1) any person who commits any of the following offences, namely (a) fells, girdles, ops, taps or burns any tree reserved under Section 30, or strips off the bark or leaves from, or otherwise damages, any such tree ; (b) contrary to any prohibition under Section 30, quarries and stone, or burns any lime or charcoal or collects, subject to any manufacturing process, or removes any forest produce ; (c) contrary to any prohibition under Section 30, breaks up, clears for cultivation or any other purpose any land in any protected forest ; (d) sets fire to such forest, or kindles a fire without taking all reasonable precautions to prevent its spreading to any tree reserved under Section 30, whether standing, fallen or felled, or to any closed portion of such forest ; (e) leaves burning any fire kindled by him in the vicinity of any such tree or closed portion ; (f) fells any tree or fags any timber so as to damage any tree reserved as aforesa/d; (g) permits cattle to damage any such tree ; (h) infringes any rule made under Section 32 ; shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months or with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees or with both." 14. From a bare perusal of the provisions of Section 33 of 1927 Act, it is clear that it is a penal provision for some acts which is done in contravention of notification under Section 30 or of rule made under Section 32 of the 1927 Act. Section 32 is a rule making power of the State Government in respect of protected forest. Section 32(h) is relevant for the purpose of this case which is for the protection from fire of timber lying in such forest and of trees reserved under Section 30. 15. Section 32 is a rule making power of the State Government in respect of protected forest. Section 32(h) is relevant for the purpose of this case which is for the protection from fire of timber lying in such forest and of trees reserved under Section 30. 15. Analysing the provisions of Section 33 of the 1927 Act, it is ciear that offence can be made out if any damage by cutting, felling, burning of any reserved tree but the trees must be notified as reserved as required under Section 30. There is no allegation in the offence report that the petitioners have damaged any tree reserved as such under Sec. 30. Even if the argument of Mr. Agrawal is to be accepted, a question will arise as to how the allegations made in the offence report will reveal that some reserved trees were damaged. By Section 32, the State Government can reserve some trees, for example, Sal, Mahua, Sagoon etc. It is not the case of the Forest Officer that those trees, which were reserved by notification, were damaged by the petitioners. Merely giving length and size of the trees, in my opinion, does not make it a reserved tree. The prohibited acts in reserved forest as contemplated under Section 26 of the Act will further show that an offence is said to have been committed when certain things are done in reserved forest which has been declared as such under Section 20 of the Act. In my opinion, taking into consideration the scope and ambit of Sections 32 and 33 of the 1927 Act, by no stretch of imagination it can be held that damaging of any sort of tree in a protected forest is an offence under Section 33. because creation of an offence is sine qua non for a notification under Section 30. The argument advanced by Mr. Agrawal that notification under Section 32 can be produced before the trial court, in my opinion, is of no avail because if the allegation would have been that the petitioners have damaged the trees which were reserved under Section 32, then probably the petitioners could not have raised before this Court. In that situation, whether those specified trees were actually reserved or not and whether any such notification was there or not, could have been seen at the trial stage. The decision relied upon by Mr. In that situation, whether those specified trees were actually reserved or not and whether any such notification was there or not, could have been seen at the trial stage. The decision relied upon by Mr. Agarwal could have been applicable in the instant case if the offence report would have revealed that the petitioners have committed an offence by damaging certain particular trees which were reserved trees. 16. As noticed above, the settled law is that if no offence is disclosed, an investigation cannot be permitted, as any investigation, in the absence of any offence being disclosed will result in unnecessary harassment to a party whose liberty and property may be put to jeopardy for nothing. One must not forget that the liberty and property of any Individual are sacred and sacrosanct and the court zeolously guards and protects them. In such view of the matter, I am of the opinion that the offence report does not disclose any violation of Section 33 of the Act and, as such, the same cannot be allowed to stand. 17. Similarly the allegation of violation of the provisions of 1980 Act, in my opinion, has no leg to stand, firstly because of the fact that offence report does not disclose as to what provision of the said Act has been violated. Section 3-A of the 1980 Act reads as follows : "Penalty for contravention of the provisions of the Act.Whether contravenes or abets the contravention or any of the provisions of Section 2, shall be punishable with simple imprisonment for a period which may extend to fifteen days," 18. It is an admitted fact that lease was granted in the protected forest in the year 1974 and this Act was come into force with effect from 27-12-1980. Thus when this Act came into existence the lease in respect of mining over the protected forest was already continuing. However, Section 3-A, on the other hand, was inserted by Act 69 of 1989 with effect from 15-3-1989. Uncontrovertedly the complaints in the present cases were filed much before this penal provision came into existence ; for example in Cr. Misc. No. 1337/90(R) on 5-8-1988, in Cr. Misc. No. 1339/90(R) on 5-9-1988 and in Cr.Misc. 1340/90(R) on 5-2-1989. It is well settled that a penal provisionc annot have any retrospective effect. Uncontrovertedly the complaints in the present cases were filed much before this penal provision came into existence ; for example in Cr. Misc. No. 1337/90(R) on 5-8-1988, in Cr. Misc. No. 1339/90(R) on 5-9-1988 and in Cr.Misc. 1340/90(R) on 5-2-1989. It is well settled that a penal provisionc annot have any retrospective effect. Secondly, the allegations do not disclose as to what is the nature of offence committed by the petitioners under this Act. The opposite parties cannot be allowed to make out a third case in the counter affidavit saying that mining operation is being carried on without prior permission of the Government. This allegation, in my opinion, is an after throught inasmuch as the lease was granted much before the Act itself came into existence. 19. The third allegation against the petitioners is of violation of the provisions of 1986 Act which is not only vague but also without any justification. Here also the forest officer has mechanically alleged violation of provisions of this Act without actually specifying the particular provision. Moreover in the counter affidavit a peculiar interpretation has been given to the provisions of Section 19(b) of the 1986 Act. Section 19 of the said Act reads as follows : "Cognizance of offence.No court shall take cognizance of any offence under this Act except on a complaint made by : (a) the Central Government or any authority or officer authorised in this behalf by that Government; or (b) any person who has given notice of not less than sixty days, in the manner prescribed, of the alleged offence and of his intention to make a complaint, to the Central Government or the authority or officer authorised as aforesaid." This section provides that cognizance of an offence under the Act can be taken only on a complaint. If follows that offence under the Act is cognizable offence, the complaint has to be made (i) by the Central Government or (ii) by an authority or officer of the Central Government provided such officer has been authorised in this behalf by the Central Government. If follows that offence under the Act is cognizable offence, the complaint has to be made (i) by the Central Government or (ii) by an authority or officer of the Central Government provided such officer has been authorised in this behalf by the Central Government. Sub-clause (b) of Section 19 contemplates that a citizen in his individual capacity can lodge a complaint provided he has served in the Central Government or authority or officer of the Central Government, if any, appointed by the Central Government in this behalf, a notice in writing of his intention to lodge a complaint and such notice has been given : (a) in the manner as prescribed by the rules ; (b) 60 days in advance i.e. 60 days must have elapsed between the notice received by the Central Government and making of the complaint. In my opinion, the purpose of the notice seems to be to inspire the Central Government if it so chooses to make a complaint by itself. 20. In the case in hand, I have already noted above the complaint has not been made by the Central Government or any authority or officer appointed by it and, as such, the court below could not have taken cognizance of the offence as the same is prohibited under Section 19 of the Act. I need not detain myself in discussing the relevant provisions of the Act, 1980 and 1986 because Mr. Agrawal has fairly submitted at the initial stage that the allegations made in the offence report do not make out a case either under the provisions of 1980 Act or the provisions of 1986 Act. 21. In my considered opinion, in order to constitute an offence either under Section 33 of the 1927 Act or under the Acts of 1980 and 1986 a person must commit an offence of the acts mentioned in the aforesaid sections or in the Act. There is no such allegation. None of these allegations contain any ingredient of an offence under the aforesaid sections and the two Acts mentioned thereof. No offence, in my opinion, therefore, can be said to have been committed on the allegations contained in the offence report. 22. There is no such allegation. None of these allegations contain any ingredient of an offence under the aforesaid sections and the two Acts mentioned thereof. No offence, in my opinion, therefore, can be said to have been committed on the allegations contained in the offence report. 22. On a careful consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case, as noted above, I am satisfied that the allegations made in the offence report, even taken at their face value, do not disclose the essential ingredients of any of the offences alleged against the petitioners. It is evident that there was no application of mind whatsoever by the Divisional Forest Officer to the facts of the case vis-a-vis the offences alleged The Judicial Magistrate issued processes without applying his mind to the fact whether the basic ingredient of the offences alleged were spelt out from the allegations made in the offence report. Issue of processes by the Judicial Magistrate in the instant cases under such circumstances cannot be allowed to continue. 23. In the result, all the three applications are allowed. The entire criminal proceeding initiated against the petitioners as well as the order dated 4-3-1989 passed in Forest Case No. 58/89, the order dated 20-3-1989 passed in Forest Ca6e No. 95/89 and the order dated 5-6-1989 passed in Forest Case No. 115/89 respectively taking cognizance are hereby quashed.