M. R. CALLA, J. ( 1 ) ). Heard learned Counsel. ( 2 ) ). The exemption under Section 21 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (`the Act for short) was granted to the petitioner in respect of Plot Nos. 525 and 511, on 20th December 1983, subject to the condition that the petitioner shall have to commence the work within a period of one year from the date of the order of exemption and shall be required to complete the construction within a period of five years from the date of the order of exemption. The petitioner did not start the construction work within a period of one year and a show-cause notice dated 14th April 1986 and a further show-cause nhotice dated 21st July 1989 were given to him, that the petitioner had failed to comply with the condition on which the exemption was granted. The Competent Authority then passed an order on 16th March 1993, cancelling the exemption in respect of Plot No. 525 only. The exemption was not cancelled in respect of Plot No. 511 because the petitioner had completed the construction work within-the time limit of five years in Plot No. 511. ( 3 ) ). The argument of the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that the respondents had no power to impose the condition that the construction work was not commenced in respect of Plot No. 525, within a period of one year and he has placed reliance on a decision rendered by this Court on 17th November 1994 in Special Civil Application No. 1390 of 1983, following an earlier reported decision of this Court, reported in AIR 1994 Gujarat 130 (K. M. Sheth v. Competent Authority and Addl. Collector (Ceiling) Rajkot and Anr.), and has submitted that even if the construction work was not started within a period of one year, the exemption granted under Section 21 of the Act could not be cancelled because the prescription of time limit of one year for commencement of the construction work is illegal and merely because the petitioner had agreed to abide by these conditions imposed by the Competent Authority is not relevant. ( 4 ) ). ( 4 ) ). True it is that, in the instant case, the first show-cause notice was given to the petitioner on 4th April 1986 on the ground that the petitioner had failed to commence the construction work within a period of one year, but it is also clear that the second show-cause notice was given on 21st July 1989 because the petitioner had failed to complete the construction work within a period of five years. Even if the failure to commence the construction work within a period of one year is ignored, the fact remains that even after commencing the work after the expiry of one year, the petitioner was under an obligation to complete the construction work within a period of five years from the date of the grant of exemption. The exemption in the case at hand was granted on 20th December 1983 and, therefore, notwithstanding the fact that whether the petitioner has started the construction work within a period of one year or after the expiry of one year, he ought to have completed the construction work, in any case, before 20th December 1983 and precisly, this was objection which he was supposed to meet in response to the show-cause notice dated 21st July 1989. The impugned order has been passed on 16th March 1993, i. e. after a period of more than nine years and, admittedly, the petitioner did not complete the construction work within the time limit of five years, which expired on 4th April 1986 on account of breach of the condition to commence the construction work within a period of one year and such a condition has been held to be unlawful by this Court, the petitioner cannot absolve from the obligation to hve completed the construction work within a period of five years and on this part, the failure of the petitioner is factually admitted. The judgment of Special Civil Application No. 1390 of 1988 dated 17th November 1994 cannot be of any avail to the petitioner for the simple reason that, in that case, the order was set aside on the ground that the condition of commencing the work within a period of one year was unlawful. The judgment of Special Civil Application No. 1390 of 1988 dated 17th November 1994 cannot be of any avail to the petitioner for the simple reason that, in that case, the order was set aside on the ground that the condition of commencing the work within a period of one year was unlawful. The contents of para 5 of that decision in that case and the exemption was cancelled on the sole ground of failure on the part of the petitioner to commence the construction work within a period of one year and the Court has taken care to observe that the petitioner shall have to complete the construction work within a period of five years from the date of granting of the sanction, nay, the Court has taken further care to say that the period between the date of the order of cancellation and the date of the order of the Court shall stand excluded while computing the period of five years. Similarly, in the reported decision in the case of K. M. Sheth (supra), exemption was granted on 30th October 1979, the show-cause notice was issued on 8th/9th December 1982, i. e. within a period of five years from 30th October 1979. Therefore, both these cases are clearly distinguishable on facts inasmuch as the foundation of the cancellation in these two decisions on which the reliance has been placed by the learned Counsel for the petitioner is the failure to commence the construction work within a period of one year and the orders of cancellation in both these cases had been passed prior to the expiry of five years, whereas in the case at hand, even if the failure to comply with the condition of commencing the construction work within a period of one year is ignored, the cancellation of the exemption is clearly sustainable because the order of cancellation has been passed firstly after giving the second show-cause notice in the year 1989 after expiry of five years and the final order cancelling exemption has also been passed after the expiry of five years when the petitioner failed to complete the construction work within the stipulated time of five years which was an essential and lawful condition on which the exemption was granted. I, therefore, do not find any merit in this Special Civil Application and the same is hereby dismissed. I, therefore, do not find any merit in this Special Civil Application and the same is hereby dismissed. The Notice is hereby discharged with no order as to costs. .