Judgment :- Janarthanam, J. One Kullammal (petitioner) wife of the detenu Ettadi alias Thangavel, against whom the District Magistrate and District Collector, Salem (second respondent) clamped upon the impugned order of detention, in his proceedings C.M.P. No.23/ BLA/94 (C2), dated 14. 1994, in exercise of the powers conferred by Sub-Sec. (1) of Sec. 3 of the Tamil Nadu Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Drug Offenders, Forest Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and Slum Grabbers Act, 1982 (Tamil Nadu Act 14 of 1982), castigating him as a bootleggers, with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and health, challenges the order of detention so passed, in this action. 2. The jurisdictional or fundamental facts, which led to the passing of the impugned order of detention may briefly be stated here, with a view to understand in the best of fashion possible, the arguments projected as affecting the constitutional rights, inhering in favour of the detenu under Art.22(5) of the Constitution of India. (a) The incident in the ground case took place on 23. 1994 and a case in connection with the said incident has been registered in Rasipuram P.W. Crime No.1302/94 under Secs. 4(1-A) and 4 (1)(i) of the Tamil Nadu Prohibition Act, 1937 (Tamil Nadu Act X of 1937 - for short “TNP Act”) and the narration of the facts of the ground case had been referred to in detail in paragraph 3 of the grounds of detention. (b) The detenu had also come to adverse notice in six other cases of Rasipuram police station. (i) The first case is relatable to Crime No.255/93 for illicit distillation of arrack on 13. 1993 for the alleged offence under Sec.4(1)(b) of the T.N.P. Act, registered as S.T.R. No.755/93 by the Judicial Magistrate, Rasipuram, which ended in conviction and sentence to pay a fine of Rs.350 and in default to undergo simple imprisonment for one month. (ii) The second case is relatable to sale of illicitly distilled arrack on 8. 1993 concerned in Crime No.749 of 1993 under Sec. 4(1)(i) of T.N.P. Act and since he expressed his willingness to compound the offence under Sec. 24-D thereof, a compounding fee of Rs.500 was collected under Receipt No. 683/93/ DSP/Salem Rural, dated 20.8.1993. (iii) Similarly, the other four cases referred to as S.Nos. 1993 concerned in Crime No.749 of 1993 under Sec. 4(1)(i) of T.N.P. Act and since he expressed his willingness to compound the offence under Sec. 24-D thereof, a compounding fee of Rs.500 was collected under Receipt No. 683/93/ DSP/Salem Rural, dated 20.8.1993. (iii) Similarly, the other four cases referred to as S.Nos. 3 to 6 are relatable to sale of illicitly distilled arrack on different dates, namely, 30.8.1993, 10. 1993, 212. 1993 and 21. 1994 concerned respectively in Crime Nos. 835 of 1993, 2450/93, 3596/ 93 and 415/94 under Sec. 4(1)(i) of the T.N.P. Act and excepting the last case in all other cases, since the detenu expressed his willingness to compound the offence under Sec. 24-D of the Act and compounding fee in a specified sum, in each of the cases, had been collected and receipts for collection of such compounding fee had been issued therefor. However, in the last case, the detenu had been convicted and sentenced to pay a fine of Rs.300 and in default to undergo simple imprisonment for one month in S.T.R. No.59 of 1994 by the Judicial Magistrate, Rasipuram. (c) All the details of those adverse cases had been referred to in paragraph 1 of the grounds of detention in order to point out that he is a habitual offender and his activities are proximately connected to the ground case. 3. The impugned order, the grounds of detention and the booklet of documents, on which the grounds had been formulated had also been served on the same date, namely 14. 1994 upon the detenu while he was lodged in Central Prison, Salem. 4. The wife of the detenu namely, the petitioner also sent a representation dated nil, which had been received by the first respondent-Government on the 5th of May, 1994. In the representation so made, a request had been made for furnishing copies of the documents relatable to the foundational facts of those adverse cases. 5. 4. The wife of the detenu namely, the petitioner also sent a representation dated nil, which had been received by the first respondent-Government on the 5th of May, 1994. In the representation so made, a request had been made for furnishing copies of the documents relatable to the foundational facts of those adverse cases. 5. The first respondent- Government, in its reply under letter No.17965-P&E (14/94), dated 233.1994 stated that there is no need or necessity to furnish copies of documents relatable to the adverse cases, which had once and for all been disposed of, resulting in conviction and sentence either by way of composition and payment of compounding fee or to substantive sentence or imprisonment excepting furnishing of copies of documents, namely, extracts from the summary trial Register maintained by the court of the Judicial Magistrate, Rasipuram containing the particulars of crime number, date of commission and report of me offence, name and address of the complainant and accused, the section under which he had been prosecuted plea of the accused, finding of the court and order passed thereon, together with the date on which the proceedings got terminated. The other ritualistic formalities of consideration of the representation forwarding the case to the Advisory Board, confirmation of the detention, after receipt of the expression of opinion by the Advisory Board had also been duly complied with. 6. Mr.B. Kumar, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would press into service the following points for consideration: 1. The entirety of the facts, referred to in the grounds of detention could have influenced the mind of the Detaining Authority (the second respondent) in formulating the grounds, which resulted in the passing of the impugned order of detention and looked at from that angle, it goes without saying that the jurisdictional facts of the adverse cases constituting offences, in the shape of documents required to be given to the detenu had been furnished so as to enable him to make an effective representation inhering in his favour under Art.22(5) of the Constitution of India and in the adverse case, referred to Sl.No.2, though it has been specifically averred that the detenu had effected sale of illicitly distilled arrack on 8. 1993, yet the basis of the material, in the shape of documents, that he effected such sale of illicitly distilled arrack on the said date had not been furnished to the detenu in the booklet of documents supplied to him, notwithstanding the fact that the same was asked for to be furnished in the representation sent to the first respondent by the petitioner wife of the detenu and non-furnishing of such vital documents vitiated the impugned order of detention. 2. The Detaining Authority (second respondent) could not validly take into account the incidents or events relatable to adverse cases referred to in S.Nos.2 to 5 which resulted in the composition, pursuant to the salient provisions adumbrated under Sec. 24-D of the T.N.P. Act, inasmuch as such composition, in law, would tantamount to acquittal. 3. The detenu had not been apprised of his right to make a written representation to the Advisory Board either in the grounds of detention or in any other documents supplied to him contemporaneously. 7. Mr.K. Raghupathi, learned Additional Public Prosecutor would, however, repel such submissions and produce the relevant file for perusal and consideration of this Court. 8. The points 1 to 3 as projected by learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, though appearing to be distinct different from the other, yet, on an analysis and a careful scrutiny of those points, it transpires, all of them revolve on the facets of the constitutional rights inhering in favour of the detenu under Art.22(5) of the Constitution of India, As such, all of them may now fall for consideration the arena of discussion. 9. Art.22(5) reads as follows: "When any person is detained in pursuance of an order made under any law providing for preventive detention the authority making the order shall, as soon as may be communicated to such person the grounds on which the order has been made and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order." 10. It is not as if the extent and content of Art.22(5) had not been considered anterior in point of time by the Apex Court of this Court and the plaint fact is that on occasions more than one, the Supreme Court happened to consider the same. The case in Mohd. It is not as if the extent and content of Art.22(5) had not been considered anterior in point of time by the Apex Court of this Court and the plaint fact is that on occasions more than one, the Supreme Court happened to consider the same. The case in Mohd. Yousuf v. State of Jammu and Kashmir, A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 1925: (1979) 4 S.C.C. 370 : 1979 S.C.C. (Crl.) 999, is one of the Eooch making judgments of the Apex Court on this subject. The background facts of the said case, if stated in a crisp and incisive fashion, we may be in a better position to understand the principles evolved therein, in the interpretation of Art.22(5) of the Constitution of India. .(a) The grounds of detention had been admittedly sent to the petitioner, by way of annexure to the District Magistrate Order. It had been stated therein that the detention had been ordered "on the ground specified in the Annexure.....which also contained facts relevant thereto" and the petitioner had been informed that he might, make a representation to the Government against the order of detention, if he so desired. .(b) The annexure read as follows: "You are a die-had Naxalite and you are notorious for your activities which are proving prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. You are in the habit of organising meetings, secret as well as public in which you instigate the people to create lawlessness which spreads panic in the minds of common people. You are also reported to be in the habit of going from one village to the other, with intent to compel the shop keepers to close down their shops and participate in the meetings. You are reported to have recently started a campaign in villages, asking the inhabitants not to sell their extra paddy crop to the Government and in the case they are compelled to do so, they should manhandle the Government officials deputed for the purpose of purchasing shall on voluntary basis from the villagers. On 2. You are reported to have recently started a campaign in villages, asking the inhabitants not to sell their extra paddy crop to the Government and in the case they are compelled to do so, they should manhandle the Government officials deputed for the purpose of purchasing shall on voluntary basis from the villagers. On 2. 1979 you, after compelling the shopkeepers to close down their shops, organized a meeting at Chowalgam and asked the participants to lodge protests against the treatment meted out to Shri Z.A. Bhutto, late Prime Minister of Pakistan by General Zia-Ul-Haq, in fact, you did not have any sympathy for the late Prime Minister but you did it with the intent to exploit the situation and create lawlessness. On 23. 1979 you presided over a meeting at Kulgam and delivered a speech. Among other things, you passed derogatory remarks against Sheik Mohd. Abdullah, the Chief Minister of the State and compared him with General Zia of Pakistan, said that he (the Chief Minister) also wants to become a dictator. You further stated that the Mullas of Kashmir are preparing for distribution of sweets on the day when Shri Bhutto is sent to gallows. You also stated that the people of the State have been oppressed and blamed the Chief Minister for their oppression. You asked the audience to shun the life of dishonour and rise in revolt against oppression. You went to the extent of saying that India should vacate the forcible occupation of the State, as the Kashmir question has not so far been settled. These irresponsible utterances of you are likely to create feelings of hatred and enmity will ultimately disturb the public order. On 23. 1979 posters were found posted on walls in Kulgam area which were got published by the CPI (ML). It was learnt that there was your hand in pasting these posters, the posters were captioned "Inqulab ke bager kee hal nahin" The contents of the poster, among other things, revealed that it made a mention of plebiscite saying that the demand was given by with ulterior motives. It further stated that the people should prepare themselves for revolution. You were also noticed instigating the Educational (1) (sic.) unemployed youth who had recently gone on a hunger strike at Anantnag. On 4. 1979 and 4. It further stated that the people should prepare themselves for revolution. You were also noticed instigating the Educational (1) (sic.) unemployed youth who had recently gone on a hunger strike at Anantnag. On 4. 1979 and 4. 1979 after Mr.Z.A. Bhutto was hanged, you were found leading the unruly mobs in different villages and instigating them to set the house of J.E.I. worker on fire. As a result of this instigation a number of houses were set on fire, property looted and heavy damages caused to the people at village Rarigam. In this connection, a case F.I.R. No.34/79 under Secs. 305, 436, 148, 307, etc., has been registered at Police Station Kulgam against you and others. Property worth thousands has so far been recovered during the investigation of this case. Your activities are highly prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and I am convinced that unless you are detained, large scale disturbances resulting in wide spread loss to the public and private property and to the safety of peaceful citizens will occur." (c) Learned counsel for the respondents has not found it possible to contend that no part thereof was vague. He, however, tried to argue that the annexure contained a preamble as well as grounds of detention and that the vagueness of the preamble could not possibly justify the argument that the grounds of detention are also vague. In consideration of the projection of such a submission what Their Lordships of the Supreme Court expressed in paragraphs 3 to 8 is reflected as below: "3. Preamble "has been defined in the Oxford English Dictionary to mean "a preliminary statement, in speech or writing, an introductory, paragraph section, or clause, a preface, prologue, introduction." It has further been defined there as "an introductory paragraph or part in a statute deed, or other document setting forth the grounds and intention of it". The preamble thus be tokens that which follows: The respondent’s learned counsel has not however found it possible to point out where the preamble could be said to begin, or to finish, and which of the paragraphs could be said to constitute the grounds of detention as such. .4. The preamble thus be tokens that which follows: The respondent’s learned counsel has not however found it possible to point out where the preamble could be said to begin, or to finish, and which of the paragraphs could be said to constitute the grounds of detention as such. .4. As it is, in the very first paragraph, which alone could be said to be in the nature of an introductory paragraph or a preliminary statement, it has been stated, inter alia, that the petitioner was reported to have recently“started a campaign in villages asking the inhabitants not to sell their extra paddy crop to the Government and to manhandle the Government officials in case they were compelled to do so. There is however no mention, in any other part of the annexure, of the petitioner’s asking the inhabitants not to sell their paddy crop anywhere else or to manhandle the Government officials deputed for its purchase. We are therefore, unable to think that even the first paragraph is in the nature of a preamble to what has been stated in the subsequent paragraphs.” 5. A reading of the first paragraph shows that it is vague in several respects. It does not state the places where the petitioner is said to have organised the meetings, or the nature of lawlessness instigated by him. It does not also mention the names of the villages where he is said to be in the habit of going for compelling the shopkeepers to close down their shops and to participate in the meetings. So also, it does not mention on the villagers where the petitioner was reported to have ‘recently’ started the campaign asking the inhabitants not to sell their extra paddy, or, to manhandle the Government officials. The paragraph is therefore undoubtedly very vague. 6. So also, it does not mention on the villagers where the petitioner was reported to have ‘recently’ started the campaign asking the inhabitants not to sell their extra paddy, or, to manhandle the Government officials. The paragraph is therefore undoubtedly very vague. 6. But even if the first paragraph is left out of consideration on the pretext that it is in the nature of a preamble, the fifth paragraph is quite vague, for while it states that the petitioner was noticed instigating the educated unemployed youth who had recently gone on a hunger strike in Anantnag the nature of the purpose of the alleged instigation has not been stated so that it is not possible to appreciate whether it could be said to fall within the mischief of clause (b) of Sub-Sec. (3) Sec. 8 which defines what is meant by acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of ‘public order’ within the meaning of clause (a) (i) of Sub-Sec. (1) of Sec. 8. For instance, if it was noticed that the petitioner was instigating the educated unemployed youth to go on hunger strike for the purpose of pressing their demand for employment that would not amount to acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order as it would not be covered by any of the four meanings assigned to that expression in clause (b) of Sub-Sec. (3)of Sec.8. .7. The sixth paragraph is also vague for while it states that the petitioner was found leading the unruly mobs in different villages and instigating them to set fire to the house of the worker of Jamaiat-Islami the names of those villages and the name of the owner of burnt house have not been stated. 8. It is obvious therefore that the above grounds of detention are vague. This Court has diapproved of vagueness in the grounds of detention because that impinges on the fundamental right of the detenu under Art.22(5) of the Constitution to make a representation against the order of detention when the grounds on which the order has been made are communicated to him. The purpose of the requirement is to afford him the earliest opportunity of seeking redress against the order of detention. The purpose of the requirement is to afford him the earliest opportunity of seeking redress against the order of detention. But as is obvious, that opportunity cannot be said to be afforded when it is established that a ground of detention is so vague that he cannot possibly make an effective representation.“ (d) Their Lordships of the Supreme Court further expounded two facets of the rights under Art.22(5) of the Constitution inhering in favour of the detenu in paragraph 17 as below: ”....a detenu has two rights under Art.22(5) of the Constitution. (1) To be informed as soon as may be, of the grounds on which the order of detention is based, that is, the grounds which led to the subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authority, and (2) to be afforded the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order of detention, that is, to be furnished with sufficient particulars to enable him to make a representation which on being considered may obtain relief to him. The inclusion of an irrelevant or nonexistent ground among other relevant grounds is an infringement of the first of the rights and the inclusion of an obscure or vague ground among other clear and definite grounds is an infringement of the second of the rights. In either case there is an invasion of the constitutional rights of the detenu entitling him to approach the court for relief. The reason for saying that the inclusion of even a single irrelevant or obscure ground among several relevant and clear grounds is an invasion of the detenu’s constitutional right is that the court is precluded from adjudicating upon the sufficiency of the grounds and it cannot substitute its objective decision for the subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authority." 11. In Hemlatha v. State of Maharashtra, A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 8:1982 Crl. L.J. 150: (1981)4 S.C.C. 647 :1982 S.C.C. (Crl.) 16: (1982)1 S.C.R. 1028 , the detenu asked for six particulars to enable him to make a representation. They are: .(1) The name and designation of the officer on whose satisfaction the order of detention was made and relevant authority under the rules of business, enabling the said officer to pass detention orders on behalf of the Government. .(2) The date on which the proposal to detain was received by the Detaining Authority. They are: .(1) The name and designation of the officer on whose satisfaction the order of detention was made and relevant authority under the rules of business, enabling the said officer to pass detention orders on behalf of the Government. .(2) The date on which the proposal to detain was received by the Detaining Authority. .(3) Whether facts mentioned in para 3 of the grounds of detention have been used against the detenu for making the order of detention. .(4) The provision of law under which the import of Palladium is prohibited. .(5) Whether the Detaining Authority has accepted or rejected my client’s story about the acquisition of colour T.V. Akai cassette, video recorder, Air-conditioner, etc., If it has been rejected, then the material on the basis of which this decision was taken, and .(6) Whether any inquiries, if any, were made from Oman consulate or from Consul General Mr.Salim Hakim. .(a) The particulars under item 1 alone had been furnished to the detenu and none of the remaining five particulars were furnished. The submission of learned counsel was that the Government was bound to disclose under what provision of law, the import of Palladium is prohibited and their failure to disclose such information deprived the detenu in making proper representation. .(b) Items 3, 5 and 6 are akin. With regard to item (3), whether the facts mentioned in para (3) of the grounds of detention were used against the detenu for making the order of detention the Secretary to the Government of Maharashtra Home Department, in his counter-affidavit has stated in paragraph 20: .".....I have not passed the order of detention on the ground that the four items seized from the detenu’s house were smuggled. I say that I have mentioned the seizure of the said goods in the grounds of detention as narration of facts. I say that paras 3 and 4 of the grounds of detention are the narrations of the fact and the same is not a ground for detention. I say that I have mentioned the seizure of the said goods in the grounds of detention as narration of facts. I say that paras 3 and 4 of the grounds of detention are the narrations of the fact and the same is not a ground for detention. .(c) In such context what the Supreme Court expressed is reflected in the relevant portion of paragraph 6 as below (at p. 12): ."In our opinion the request of the detenu for the ‘information’ whether the detention was inter alia based on the seizures of the four articles mentioned in para 3 of the list of grounds and the reply of the authority to the request were irrelevant. When an order of detention together with the grounds of detention is served on a detenu, the detenu, may ask for particulars on which a ground is based if they are not already there. When a document contains what are called "grounds" which often consist of the background of case, narration of facts and instances of the detenu’s activities the detenu is not entitled to know which part or parts of the ‘grounds’ was or were taken into consideration and which not. The court may not take into consideration any reply given by the Detaining Authority to such an enquiry for the reply may be an afterthought. It will be for the court to Judge whether the facts narrated constitute a ground of detention or which facts might possibly enter and influence the Detaining Authority in coming to its subjective satisfaction. The information sought as per Cl.(4) of the letter, namely, the provisions under which the import of Palladium is prohibited is equally untenable. Whether or not the import of Palladium is prohibited or not is an information on a question of law and can be obtained from statutes, Rules or notifications. In our opinion, the Government is not under any liability to furnish the detenu with legal information available from legal literature. Whether or not the import of Palladium is prohibited or not is an information on a question of law and can be obtained from statutes, Rules or notifications. In our opinion, the Government is not under any liability to furnish the detenu with legal information available from legal literature. The liability of the Detaining Authority is only to comply with the requirement of Sub-Art.(5) of Art.22 of the Constitution." .(d) The Supreme Court further expressed as respects the power of the High Court under Art.226 of the Constitution and the Supreme Court either under Art.32 or under Art. 136 of the Constitution in paragraph 15, which reads thus: "It is needless to say that the High Court under Art.226 of the Constitution and the Supreme Court either under Art.32 or under Art. 136 of the Constitution do not sit on appeal on the orders of preventive detention. The normal law is that when an isolated offence or isolated offences is or are committed, the offender is to be prosecuted. But, if there be a law of preventive detention empowering the authority to detain a particular offender in order to disable him to repeat his offences, it can do so, but it will be obligatory on the part of the Detaining Authority to formally comply with the provisions of Sub-Art.(5) of Art.22 of the Constitution of India. The High Court under Art.226 and the Supreme Court under Art.32 has to see whether the formalities enjoined by Art.22(5) have been complied with by the Detaining Authority. If the formalities have been complied with, the court cannot examine the materials before it and find that the Detaining Authority should not have been satisfied on the materials before it and detained the detenu under the Preventive Detention Act, for, that is the function of an appellate court.“ 12. In Shalini Soni v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 431:1980 Crl.L.J. 1487: (1980) 4 S.C.C. 544 :1981 S.C.C. (Crl.) 38: (1981)1 S.C.R. 962 , the Supreme Court expressed the effect of breach of procedural safeguards, as adumbrated under Art.22(5) of the Constitution, in paragraph 7 (at O.434) thus: ”7. The Article has two facets: (1) communication of the grounds on which the order of detention has been made: (2) opportunity of making representation against the order of detention. The Article has two facets: (1) communication of the grounds on which the order of detention has been made: (2) opportunity of making representation against the order of detention. Communication of the grounds presupposes the formulation of the grounds requires and ensures the application of the mind of the Detaining Authority to the facts and materials before it, that is to say that pertinent and proximate matters in regard to each individual case excludes the elements of arbitrariness and automatism (if one may be permitted to use the word to describe a mechanical reaction without a conscious applications of the mind). It is an unwritten rule of the law, constitutional and administrative, that whenever a decision making function is entrusted to the subjective satisfaction of a statutory functionary there is an implicit obligation to apply his mind to pertinent and proximate matters only, eschewing the irrelevant and remote. Where there is further an express statutory obligation to communicate not merely the decision that (but also) the grounds on which the decision is founded, it is a necessary corollary that the grounds communicated, that is, the grounds so made known, should be seen to pertain to pertinent and proximate matters and should comprise all the constituent facts and materials that went in to make up the mind of the statutory functionary and not merely the inferential conclusions. Now, the decision to detain a person depends on the subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authority. The constitution and the statute cast a duty on the Detaining Authority to communicate the grounds of the detention to the detenu. From that we have said above, it follows that the grounds communicated to the detenu must reveal the whole of the factual material considered by the Detaining Authority and not merely the inferences of fact arrived at by the Detaining Authority. The matter may also be looked at from the point of view of the second facet of Art.22(5). An opportunity to make a representation against the order of detention necessarily implies that the detenu is informed of all that has been taken into account against him in arriving at the decision to detain him. It means that the detenu is to be informed not merely as we said of the inferences of fact but of all the factual materials which have led to the inferences of fact. It means that the detenu is to be informed not merely as we said of the inferences of fact but of all the factual materials which have led to the inferences of fact. If the detenu is not to be so informed to opportunity so solemnly guaranteed by the constitution becomes reduced to an exercise in futility: “Whatever angle from, which the question is looked at, it is clear that ‘grounds’ in Art.22(5) do not mean mere factual inference but mean factual inferences plus factual material which led to such factual inferences. The ‘grounds’ must be self-sufficient and self-explanatory. In our view copies of documents to which references is made in the ‘grounds’ must be supplied to the detenu as part of the ‘grounds’.” 13. We shall now sift and analyse the facts of the case on hand, in the light of the principles evolved by the Apex Court, as extracted above. Paragraph 1 of the grounds of detention as adverted to earlier, contains the list of six adverse cases, covered by Sl.Nos.1 to 6. Of them, the adverse case in Sl.No. 1 is relatable to distillation of arrack on 13. 1993 and Sl.No.6 is relatable to the sale of illicitly distilled arrack on 21. 1994, resulting in conviction and sentence, as indicated therein in S.T.Nos.755 of 1993 and 59 of 1994 on the file of the Judicial Magistrate, Rasipuram, respectively on 30.6.1993 and 21. 1994. The other four adverse cases covered by Sl.Nos.2 to 5 are relatable to sale of illicitly distilled arrack on various dates, resulting in payment of composition fee under Sec. 24-D of the TNP. Act on the expression of the willingness on the part of the detenu in that respect. 14. It is an undisputed fact that the materials in the shape of documents relatable to the sale of illicitly distilled arrack on various dates in those adverse cases have not been furnished to the detenu. It is the non-furnishing of such materials, that is being made much a do by learned counsel for the petitioner and what he would say is that penning down of such statements in those adverse cases, without furnishing copies thereof, would tantamount to consideration of extraneous materials for clamping the order of detenu. To such a view, we are unable to share ours, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case. To such a view, we are unable to share ours, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case. Those adverse cases are referred to in paragraph 1 of the grounds of detention to point out that for the prejudicial activities relatable to those adverse cases, composition took place on his expressing willingness therefor. The fact that the detenu paid compounding fees in those cases alone would have weighed into the mind of the second respondent- Detaining Authority in formulating the grounds of detention and not the jurisdictional facts constituting offences in those cases. In such state of affairs, even if copies of documents constituting jurisdiction facts in all those cases had been furnished to the detenu and such of those documents even if contained materials pointing out some discrepancies, such discrepancies, can, by no stretch of imagination, be stated to have been taken into account by the second respondent-Detaining Authority in the sense of going behind the orders, that had been passed by the competent authorities in those cases. Therefore, non-furnishing of such materials is of no consequence. 15. Point No.2, as projected above, appears to be very attractive, on the face of it. But a little bit of a further probe, if however, is made, the utter untenability taking shelter thereunder would get exposed. Sec. 24-D of the TNP. Act deals with power to compound offences. The power to compound offences under the said Act inheres not in favour of all prohibition officers, but such a power is inhering only in favour of such prohibition officer specifically empowered in this behalf of the State Government. Such an empowered officer may accept from any person, who has committed or is reasonably suspected of having committed an offence under the said Act or the Rules made thereunder, other than an offence under Sec. 6 or Sec. 52-E, by way of composition of such offence, a sum of money not exceeding two thousand rupees, but not less than five hundred rupees. On payment of such sum of money to such officer, the accused person, if in custody, shall be discharged and no further proceedings in respect of the offence shall be taken against such person. 16. We have to remember, at this juncture, that TNP. On payment of such sum of money to such officer, the accused person, if in custody, shall be discharged and no further proceedings in respect of the offence shall be taken against such person. 16. We have to remember, at this juncture, that TNP. Act is a special law, as defined by Sec. 41 of the Indian Penal Code (Act 45 of 1860), Sub-Sec. (1) of Sec. 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Act II of 1974 - for short ‘Code’) Prescribes that all offences under the Indian Penal Code (Act No. 45 of 1860) shall be investigated, inquired into, tried and otherwise dealt with according to the provisions hereinafer contained. Sub-Sec. (2) thereof states that all offences under any other law shall be investigated, inquired into tried and otherwise dealt with according to the same provisions, but subject to any enactment for the time being in force regulating the manner or place of investigating, inquiring into, trying or otherwise dealing with such offences. (a) Sec. 5 thereof prescribes that nothing contained in this Code shall, in the absence of a specific provision to the contrary, affect any special or local law for the time being in force, or any special jurisdiction or power conferred or any special form of procedure prescribed by any other law for the time being in force. 17. On the face of the sanguine provisions adumbrated under Secs. 4 and 5 of the Code, it goes without saying that the provisions adumbrated under Sec. 24-D of the TNP. Act, being a special law, alone would govern the situation in the case on hand and not the Code. No doubt, Sub-Sec. (8) of Sec. 320 of the Code prescribes that the composition of an offence under that section shall have the effect of an acquittal of the accused with whom the offence has been compounded. Such a salient provision is not traceable with any of the provisions in the TNP. Act, much less Sec. 24-D thereof. In such a situation, composition of the offence under Sec. 24-D thereof, can, by no stretch of imagination, be stated to have the effect of an acquittal, so that the composition cannot at all be taken in to account relatable to an antecedent prejudicial act of the detenu constituting those adverse cases. 18. Act, much less Sec. 24-D thereof. In such a situation, composition of the offence under Sec. 24-D thereof, can, by no stretch of imagination, be stated to have the effect of an acquittal, so that the composition cannot at all be taken in to account relatable to an antecedent prejudicial act of the detenu constituting those adverse cases. 18. The third point, as projected above, we rather feel, deserves outright rejection, on the face of what has been penned down in paragraph 7 of the grounds of detention, which is reflected as below: "I, Thiru. Ettadi alias Thangavel is informed that he has right to make representation in writing against the order under which he is kept in detention. If he wishes to make such representation, he should address it to the Secretary to Government, Home (Prohibition and Excise) Department, Madras-600 009 and forward it through the Superintendent of Prison in which he is to be confined as expeditiously as possible. Any representation that is made by him will be duly considered by the Government and will also be placed before the Advisory Board for consideration of his case under Sec. 10 of the Tamil Nadu Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers. Drug Offenders, Forest Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and Slum Grabbers Act, 1982 (Tamil Nadu Act 14 of 1982). He is informed that he is entitled to, to be heard in person if he so desires by the Advisory Board. He is requested to intimate to the Secretary to Government, Home (Prohibition and Excise) Department, Madras-9, specifically in writing as expeditiously as possible whether or not be desires to be heard in person by the Board." 19. For the reasons, as above, the habeas corpus petition deserves to be dismissed and the same is accordingly dismissed.