Judgment : The four accused in C.C. No. 138 of 1984 before the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Nagercoil, who were acquitted of the charges for the offences under Secs. 147, 447 and 323, I.P.C. are the revision petitioners herein challenging the propriety and legality of the impugned order passed by the learned Sessions Judge at Nagercoil made in Crl.M.P. No. 1829 of 1991, dated 111. 1991 condoning the delay of 90 days in preferring Crl.R.P. No.70 of 1991 and allowed the petition filed under Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act. 2. The four revision petitioners herein are the accused for the offences under Secs. 147, 447 and 323, I.P.C. and tried by the learned trial Magistrate and consequently after the trial they were acquitted of all the charges and against which it appears that there was no appeal preferred by the affected parties or the State. However, Crl.M.P. No.1829 of 1991 was filed under Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act by the complainant by name Padmanabhan, son of Thangappa Nadar, adding these four accused as respondents 1 to 4 along with the State represented by the Public Prosecutor as fifth respondent, praying to condone the delay of 90 days in preferring Crl.R.P. No.70 of 1991 against the order of acquittal. The case records show that the fifth respondent viz., the Assistant Public Prosecutor appearing for the State alone had the notice and made an endorsement that he has no objection for allowing the condone delay petition and that no notice was served upon the respondents 1 to 4 who are the revision petitioners for the obvious reasons known to the petitioner therein. The learned Sessions Judge, while entertaining the petition above referred to has also not directed notice to be served upon the respondents 1 to 4. It is noted that they are the accused persons tried for the offences above referred to and ultimately found not guilty and consequently acquitted thereupon. For the mere reasoning of the fifth respondent had said ‘no objection’ for the condoning the delay the learned Sessions Judge by merely saying that there is enough ground to condone the delay, has allowed the said petition. Aggrieved at this, the four accused/ respondents 1 to 4 have preferred this revision challenging the impugned order as aforementioned. 3. For the mere reasoning of the fifth respondent had said ‘no objection’ for the condoning the delay the learned Sessions Judge by merely saying that there is enough ground to condone the delay, has allowed the said petition. Aggrieved at this, the four accused/ respondents 1 to 4 have preferred this revision challenging the impugned order as aforementioned. 3. Mr.K.S. Rajagopalan, the learned counsel appearing for the revision petitioners dwelt his attack upon the impugned order passed by the learned Sessions Judge on the ground that the impugned order passed by the learned Sessions Judge was against the principles of natural justice and the spirit of law accepted by the judicial forms consistently all through has not been followed in this case and that the four accused, the revision petitioners herein were not at all served with the notice of the petition filed under Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act. Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 runs like this: “Extension of prescribed period in certain cases: Any appeal or any application other than an application under any of the provisions of O.21 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period. Explanation: The fact that the appellant or the applicant was misled by any order, practice or judgment of the High Court in ascertaining or computing the prescribed period may be sufficient cause within the meaning of this section.” A mere casual reading of the above section of law envisages the parameter to be adhered in allowing an application or request to condone the delay in preferring any appeal or revision or otherwise in thus subject to the satisfaction to be arrived at by the Court of Law, as the cause for such delay in preferring the said appeal or revision or application ought to be adequate and sufficient. It is thus, this ingredient alone has been spelt out clearly in the section. What is meant by the sufficient cause and to what extent it can be meant has been attempted to be explained in the Explanation provided to the said section. It is thus, this ingredient alone has been spelt out clearly in the section. What is meant by the sufficient cause and to what extent it can be meant has been attempted to be explained in the Explanation provided to the said section. A combined reading of the section with its Explanation provided therefor would provide a minimum understanding for all the courts that the above remedy has to be given on the explanation of the things that happened beyond the control or adequate reasoning for the delay and that must be identified and ascertained only after hearing the respective parties to the litigation. If such an exercise is to be done, both parties to the litigation or the application must be heard and following the full opportunity to be given it must be the intention of the Legislature in providing such opportunity in built in the above section of law and if all these taken to mean in the legal perspective on the basis of principles of natural justice, then the concerned parties to such litigation or the petition must necessarily be heard. In the case on hand also it is noticed that the fifth respondent alone was served with the notice of the petition but not the others, namely, respondents 1 to 4. In fact, the respondents 1 to 4 are the accused charged for the offences and finally acquitted and for this reason they are deemed to be the main persons to be heard particularly and without ordering the notice and hearing them, the allowing of the petition by condoning the delay of 90 days is, in my respectful, view, totally against the principles of natural justice and hit by the doctrine of ‘audi alteram partem’. 4. That apart, the learned Sessions Judge while passing the impugned order had not found nor even referred to any reasoning or ground to condone the delay. What is meant by ‘sufficient cause’ as spelt out in the Explanation in the section has not been identified or ascertained in the instant case and on this ground also the impugned order is liable to be set aside. .5. What is meant by ‘sufficient cause’ as spelt out in the Explanation in the section has not been identified or ascertained in the instant case and on this ground also the impugned order is liable to be set aside. .5. The delay of 90 days in this case should not be excused without giving notice to the respondents 1 to 4 because the revision was sought to be filed after a period of limitation prescribed therefor and consequently respondents 1 to 4 acquired a valuable right and such right cannot be deprived without notice to them. In this context, it has become necessary for the to advert the ratio laid down by the Privy Council in Krishnaswami Panikondar v. Ramaswami Chettiar, I.L.R. 41 Mad. 412: A.I.R. 1971 P.C. 179, which was followed very much by the learned single Judge of this Court in In re., Raman, (1958) 1 M.L.J. 245: 1958 M.L.J. (Crl.)261: A.I.R. 1958 Mad. 312: I.L.R. 1958 Mad. 507: (1958)71 L.W. 138 : 1958 M.W.N. 172: 1958 Crl. L.J. 779. The ratio spelt out above is extracted as hereunder: .“....in terms it purported to deprive him of a valuable right, for it put in peril the finality of the decision in his favour, so that to preclude him from questioning its propriety would amount to a denial of justice. It must, therefore, in common fairness be regarded as a tacit term of an order like the present that though unqualified in expression it should be open to reconsideration at the instance of the party prejudicially affected: and this view is sanctioned by the practice of the Courts in India.” .6. Besides, the Supreme Court in very many cases has consistently and repeatedly held that the affected party while acquiring a right of acquittal by rendering a judgment by a Court of Law must necessarily be made a party while the order of acquittal is challenged and without hearing them to decide any matter among themselves would automatically cause serious prejudice to them and that therefore the said aspect is clearly against all the norms of the principles of natural justice. The case records in the instant case do not have any material to show that the revision petitioners were served with the notice of the petition filed under Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act. The case records in the instant case do not have any material to show that the revision petitioners were served with the notice of the petition filed under Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act. Though the decision to be arrived at in condoning the delay as provided under Sec. 5 is purely discretionary, it is subject to the principles of natural justice, and only upon following the said principle the Court has to legally exercise its power in order to arrive at the full satisfaction as provided therefor. If for any reason it has not been done, then the said order is vitiated with every illegality and impropriety. 7. None appeared on behalf of the first respondent herein, though he has entered appearance through the Bar and his name was printed in the list for disposal for the last more than a week. Under such circumstances, I do not find any reason to reject the contention raised on behalf of the revision petitioners. For the said reasoning, the revision has to succeed and the impugned order is liable to be set aside. 8. In the result, for all the foregoing reasoning, the revision succeeds and accordingly it is allowed. Consequently, the impugned order passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Nagercoil in Crl.M.P. No. 1829 of 1991 in Crl.R.P. No.70 of 1991 dated 111. 1991 is hereby set aside.