Judgment : Respondents 3 and 4 who were judgment-debtors 3 and 4 in E.P. No.185 of 1979 in O.S. No.817 of 1966 on the file of the learned District Munsif of Erode and the revision petitioners herein, challenging the order passed by the executing court on 20.1.1988 in the above matter, for its want of propriety and legality, under Sec.115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 2. The respondents 1 and 2 herein had obtained a simple money decree in the above suit O.S. No.817 of 1966 against Kumaraswany Gounder and others, including the respondents/ defendants 3 and 4, who are the revision petitioners herein on 29. 1966. Subsequently, since the original parties to the suit, the decree holder dried, their legal representatives as shown in the execution petition were added and brought on record. An execution petition E.P.R. No.948 of 1967 was filed against the judgment-debtors, including the revision petitioners herein and whereupon, a sum of Rs.721.85 was recovered as part satisfaction, however, with the recording of the part satisfaction, the said execution petition was closed. Another execution petition E.P.R. No.201 of 1967 was filed for attachment of the petition mentioned properties which was taken on filed and for want of filing the sale papers, the said execution petition was dismissed making the attachment absolute for a period of three months from 25. 1967 onwards. The other execution petition was dismissed on 25. 1968. For the recovery of the balance of the decretal amount and seeking attachment of the schedule mentioned properties and for sale as provided under 0.2:, Rules 54 and 66 of the Code of Civil Procedure’, the present Execution Petition No.185 of 1979 was filed before the executing court by the decree-holders. 3. The said execution was resisted by filing a counter statement on behalf of the third respondent contending inter ana that the second judgment- debtor is the father of the respondents 3 and 4 and the husband of respondent No.5 and son of the respondent number 6 was a gambler and spend thrift and that therefore the debt, if any, incurred by him would have been not for the benefit of the family nor for any legal necessity and that therefore the decree is not binding on them. It was also contended that the decree debt did not benefit the revision petitioners and other judgment-debtors in any manner and they cannot be hold responsible and liable to pay the same. The third ground on the basis of which execution petition was resisted was that there was already a partition of the schedule mentioned properties among the respondents herein and in which, a fair division was affected even before the decree and suppression of the said fact would not entitle the execution petition to be maintained. The decree holders are not entitled to claim any interest. Lastly, the most important ground upon which the execution petition was resisted was that the present execution petition filed before the executing court in the year 1979 is clearly barred by limitation. 4. In the context of the above position, the learned District Munsif, Erode, being the executing Court passed the impunged order under this revision on 20th January, 1988. The order passed by him runs as follows: “Heard. Settlement of proclamation by 22. 1988.” Aggrieved at this order, judgment- debtors 3 and 4 have come forward with this revision as mentioned supra. 5.I have heard the bar for the respective parties for and against the impugned order. 6. The first attack dwelt by Mr. A.K. Kumaraswamy learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, is that inspite of the two remand orders passed by this Court directing the executing court to consider the defence taken by the judgment- debtors, the executing court has overlooked the same totally and has not passed a considered order and that therefore, the impugned order is a non-speaking one and as such, it is liable to be set aside immediately. The second ground urged by the learned counsel was that since the date of decree involved in the decree was 29. 1966 and the present execution petition was filed in the month of March, 1979, having not been filed within a period of 12 years from the date of decree, the execution petition as a whole has become time barred under the Law of Limitation and that after the dismissal of the previous execution petitions for one reason or another, the filing of the present execution petition, beyond the 12 years period, cannot be deemed to be the revival of the old applications for the purpose of limitations under the new Act. 7. 7. Controverting the same, Mr.V.K.Muthuswamy, learned counsel for the respondents relied on the facts of filing the execution appearing petition E.P.R. No.948 of 1967 terminated on 25. 1968, in which.a sum of Rs. 721.85 in part satisfaction of the decree was recovered and another execution petition E.P.R. No.201 of 1967 was dismissed for non-filing of the sale papers on 25. 1967 and submitted that as contemplated under Sec.48 of the Code of Civil Procedure, they would enable the decree holders to file the present execution petition and that therefore, the plea that the present execution petition is hit the doctrine of limitation is not correct. 8. In the context of the rival position, the only question that arises for consideration in this revision is, whether the impugned order passed by the executing court is tainted with every illegality and impropriety, and as such, it is liable to be set aside? 9. With regard to the factual aspects of the case, namely, obtaining a simple money decree by the respondents herein against the revision petitioners and others as judgment- debtors, filing of the two prior execution petitions for the recovery of the amount and partly recovered and for the bringing of immovable properties for sale but however both dismissed on the relevant dates for non-compliance or so, as claimed, are not in controversy among the parties herein. The two execution petitions filed on previous occasions ended in dismissal on 25. 1967 and 25. 1968. The date of decree is 29. 1966, which became enforceable under column 3 of Art.136 of the Law of Limitation on 21. 1967, for the reason, that column 3 of the execution petition contains particulars that four months time was given to the judgment-debtors to pay the decretal amount on 29. 1966. Therefore, the enforceability of the decree as provided under Art.136 of the Limitation Act, fell on 21. 1967. However, the present execution petition was filed on 3. 1979. According to the learned counsel for the revision petitioners, it was filed after a period of 12 years. Though two execution petitions were filed in the year 1967, both were terminated one on 25. 1967 and another on 25. 1968. There was no reason or explanation of any kind given by the respondents herein for not having filed the present execution petition within a period of 12 years. Though two execution petitions were filed in the year 1967, both were terminated one on 25. 1967 and another on 25. 1968. There was no reason or explanation of any kind given by the respondents herein for not having filed the present execution petition within a period of 12 years. Art.136 of the Limitation Act, 1963 which is amply applicable for the instant case, provides that for the execution of any decree (other than a decree granting a mandatory injunction) or order of any civil court, the limitation is twelve years when the decree or order becomes enforceable or where the decree or any subsequent order directs any payment of money or the delivery of any property to be made at a certain date or at recurring periods, when default in making the payment or delivery in respect of which execution is sought, takes place: provided that an application for the enforcement or execution of a decree granting a perpetual injunction shall not be subject to any period of limitation. 10. Tracing the backdrop of the legal history, it is worthwhile to note that before the enactment of the present Limitation Act XXXVI of 1963 limitation for purposes of execution had been dealt with in Sec.48 of the Code of Civil Procedure and Arts. 182 and 183 of the Limitation Act of 1908. Art.183 governed applications for the execution of decrees and orders of courts established by Royal Charter and of the Supreme Court. Art.182 was held inapplicable to such cases. A decree or order failing under that Article could be kept alive indefinitely. Sec.48 stated that, "Where an application to execute a decree not being a decree granting an injunction has been made, no order for the execution of the same decree shall be made upon any fresh application presented after the expiration of twelve years from the date of the decree sought to be executed". "Thus, Sec.48 provided a maximum period of twelve years before the expiry of which any fresh application for execution had to be made, and a decree ceased to enforceable after twelve years. Art.182 governed the first and the successive execution applications which the decree-holder could make within such maximum period under the Civil Procedure Code. "Thus, Sec.48 provided a maximum period of twelve years before the expiry of which any fresh application for execution had to be made, and a decree ceased to enforceable after twelve years. Art.182 governed the first and the successive execution applications which the decree-holder could make within such maximum period under the Civil Procedure Code. It was also provided by Art.182 that such applications should be made within a period of three years from the various specified in the Article However, it is worthwhile to note that by the amendment Act introduced in 1963, Sec.48 and the implications provided under Art.182 of the old Act have been totally repealed by introducing.Art.136 of the New Act. It seems at this juncture that two principles are identified to control the operation of the above Art.136, which are firstly that it is the policy of the law that this Article should receive a fair and liberal and not a technical construction with a view to enable the decree-holder to reap the fruits of his decree, and it will not be in consonance with the principles of just interpretation to strain the language of the Article in favour of the judgment-debtor who had not paid just dues. If the language is fairly open to two interpretations that one which assists the decree-holder to realise the fruits of his decree should be preferred to‘the one which precludes him from doing so, for the reason that the decree-holder acquires vested right under the decree and that right ought not to the wiped out except under a clear and unambiguous enactment. For the reason of the unambiguous Art.136, there is no scope for the court exercising its discretion in favour of a decree-holder who has been guilty of laches and courts do not possess any general discretion to decide the limits of the Act. I am able to perceive that this Article is total and provides a blank cover on all the applications for execution of the decrees or orders. Therefore, there is no escape from the conclusion that though the enforceability of the decree in the instant case commenced from 21. I am able to perceive that this Article is total and provides a blank cover on all the applications for execution of the decrees or orders. Therefore, there is no escape from the conclusion that though the enforceability of the decree in the instant case commenced from 21. 1967 and two execution applications were filed by the decree-holders in the year 1967 but one ended in the same year and the other during the next year as dismissed for one reason or other and the last of them having been filed in March, 1979, beyond twelve years, clearly from the date of decree, in my considered view, is barred by limitation as specified under Art.136 of the Limitation Act, 1963. 11.. For the reason of repealing of Sec.48 of the Code of Civil Procedure and Art.182 of the Old Law of Limitation, by substituting the present Art.136 of the Limitation Act, I am totally not in agreement with the contentions raised by Mr. V.K. Muthusamy, learned counsel for the respondents. Of course, the bar for the respective parties had expressed their consensus that though the plea of limitation had been raised before the execution court among other grounds, the executing court did not evince any interest to consider the same while passing the impugned order, which is a non-speaking one in all purview? On this ground alone, the impugned order is liable to be set aside and interferred with. Evidently, both the above points were not at all in the mind of the learned executing Judge, prompting a total discussion and consideration. At this juncture, it is also noted that in C.R.P. No.4844 of 1982 between the same parties and same grounds, this Court by Maheswaran, J., on 18. 1986 set aside a similar order passed by the executing court and remanded and whole matter to the trial court with a direction to consider the point of limitation and other defences taken. It appears from the record that a similar revision on an earlier occasion, C.R.P. No.3134 of 1989 also ended with the same fate on 19. 1980. However, in spite of the two orders directing the executing court to consider the defence, they are conspicuously and consciously overlooked without any consideration by the executing court. It appears from the record that a similar revision on an earlier occasion, C.R.P. No.3134 of 1989 also ended with the same fate on 19. 1980. However, in spite of the two orders directing the executing court to consider the defence, they are conspicuously and consciously overlooked without any consideration by the executing court. It is also amusing to note that inspite of the two orders passed by this Court, within a range of six years, the directions given by this Court have not been complied with by the Subordinate judiciary for the reason known to themselves. It is this disturbing feature, which had made the litigants to wait till today, that is rather perturbing in my mind over the judicial inability exhibited by the subordinate judiciary. At this juncture, it is noticed that though the decree was granted in the year 1966, for the last 29 years, the matter has been allowed to travel the long steps of the judiciary for the laches of its own. For the said reason and for all the reasonings given above, I do not propose to remit back the whole matter to the executing court again for fresh consideration while setting aside the impugned order. In short, I am fully constrained to hold that the execution petition levied is clearly out of time and barred by the law of limitation. It is thus seen that there is every force in the contentions raised on behalf of the revision petitioners. Though number of authorities have been cited, I am at every difficulty to find any interaction between the ratios held therein and the facts of the instant case. 12. In the result, for all the foregoing reasons, the revision succeeds and is allowed. Consequently, the non-speaking order passed by the learned District Munsif, Erode, in E.P. No.185 of 1979 on 20th January, 1988 is set aside and the execution petition if any, is hereby terminated as hit by the law of limitation. However, on facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs for either of the parties.