Honble TIBREWAL, J. - Section 18 of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (hereinafter to be referred to as the Atrocities Act) has been a subject matter of legal battle since the Act came into force: Section-18 of the Atrocities Act reads as under: "18. Section 438 of the Code not to apply to persons committing an offence under the Act — Nothing in section 438 of the Code shall apply in relation to any case involving the arrest of any person on an accusation of having committed an offerce under this Act." Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides for grant of anticipatory bail to persons apprehending their arrest. It provides inter alia, that when any person has reason to apprehend that he may be arrested on an accusation of having committed a non-bailable offence, he may apply to the High Court or to a Court of Sessions for a direction that in the event of such arrest, he shall be released on bail. (2). The question for consideration before me is whether the provisions of Sec. 18 of the Act providing denial of the right of anticipatory bail in respect of offences committed under the Act should be interpreted in the manner that it even debars the Court to have judicial scrutiny to the facts of the case to find out whether an offence under the Act was committed or not before declining pre-arrest bail to a person apprehending arrest? (3). The Act of 1989 has been enacted in order to prevent commission of atrocities against members of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and to provide for special Courts for the trial of offences under the said Act and also to provide for the relief and rehabilitation of victims of such offences. The Statement of Objects and Reasons accompanying the Act sets out the circumstances surrounding the enactment of the Act and points to the evil which the statute sought to remedy. In the Statement of Objects and Reasons it is stated: "Despite various measures to improve the socio-economic conditions of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes, they remain vulnerable. They are denied number of civil rights. They are subjected to various offences, indignities, humiliations and harassment. They have, in several brutal incidents, been deprived of their life and property. In the Statement of Objects and Reasons it is stated: "Despite various measures to improve the socio-economic conditions of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes, they remain vulnerable. They are denied number of civil rights. They are subjected to various offences, indignities, humiliations and harassment. They have, in several brutal incidents, been deprived of their life and property. Serious crimes are committed against them for various historical, social and economic reasons. 2......When they assert their rights and resist practices of untouchability against them or demand statutory minimum wages or refuse to do any bonded and forced labour, the vested interests try to cow them down and terrorise them. When the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes try to preserve their self- respect or honour of their women, they become irritants for the dominant and the might. Occupation and cultivation of even the government allotted land by the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes is resented and more often these people become victims of attacks by the vested interests. Of late, there has been an increase in the disturbing trend of commission of certain atrocities like making the Scheduled Castes persons eat inedible substances like human excreta and attacks on and mass killings of helpless Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and rape of women belonging to the Scheduled Castes and the "Scheduled Tribes....A special legislation to check and deter crimes against them committed by non-Scheduled Castes and Non-Scheduled Tribes, has, therefore, become necessary." The above statement describes the social conditions compelling a legislation to prevent atrocities to the members of Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes. In fact, the Parliament in its utmost wisdom has rightly evinced great concern and anxiety over the atrocities which are going on unabated against the members of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and the need of a stringent legislation which could help save the situation by effectively providing the legal protection to them, who are weaker and down trodden segment of the society. There can be no doubt that the Legislature considered the crimes against the members of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes to be of aggravated nature if committed by others who are no members of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. (4). The expression atrocity has been defined in section-2 of the Act to mean an offence punishable under section-3 (1) of the Act. (4). The expression atrocity has been defined in section-2 of the Act to mean an offence punishable under section-3 (1) of the Act. Section 3(1) provides punishment for offences of atrocities to a member of Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe by a person not being a member of Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. The effect of Section-3 of the Act is that if certain offences are committed by persons not being members of Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribes against persons of Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribes, they become more serious involving more severe punishment. Section-4 provides punishment of neglect of duties by public servants which are required to be performed by them under the Act. Section-7 makes a provision for forfeiture of property used for commission of the offence under the Act. Section-8 creates certain presumptions as to offences which are not otherwise available in common law, Section-10 empowers Special Courts to direct any person likely to commit any offence under Chapter- III of the Act to remove himself beyond the limits of such area, by such route and within such time as may be specified in the order, and not to return to that area from which he was directed to remove himself for such period not exceeding two years, as may be specified in the order. In the common law there is no such provision except in Sec. 20 of the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act, 1956 and Sections-3, 4 and 5 of the Rajasthan (Control of Goondas) Act, 1975. Section 13 prescribes penalty for non-compliance of order made under Section-10. Section-14 lays down constitution of Special Courts to try offences under the Act. Section-15 deals with appointment of an Advocate as a Special Public Prosecutor for the Special Court. Then, Section-16 empowers the State Government to impose collective fine in certain cases. Section-20 over-rides other laws which are inconsistent to the provisions of the Act. A perusal of the various provisions of the Act, thus, makes it clear that there is a departure from the ordinary law, since the ordinary law was found to be inadequate and not sufficiently effective to deal with the atrocities committed against the members of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes. The act is a penal statute and its provisions are drastic in nature. The act is a penal statute and its provisions are drastic in nature. Certain acts have been made to construe as an offence which is not in the common law and in certain cases enhanced punishments have been provided. The Act contains some special provisions which in certain respects are harsh but are intended to achieve the object for which the Act was enacted. (5). In the background of the aforesaid statutory provisions, this Court is required to consider the question involving interpretation of Section 18 of the Act. (6). Section 18 of the Act came for consideration before a learned Single Judge (K.J. Vaidya J.) of Gujarat High Court in Pankat D. Suthar vs. State of Gujarat (1). The following question for determination was formulated by the learned Judge: "Whether in cases wherein the accusation in the "Complaint levelled against any person is to the effect that he has committed an offence punishable under Section 3 of the Scheduled Caste and Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (for short "Atrocities Act"), which on prima facie judicial scrutiny is found to be not free from doubt, can then in such cases the accused person be blindly and mechanically denied the benefit of anticipatory bail under Section 438 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (for short "the Code") by virtue of the provision contained in Section 18 of the Atrocities Act, merely because he has been so mischievously branded as an accused of having committed an offence under the Atrocities Act?" After considering the object behind the Act, particularly Sec. 18 and the various submissions made by the counsel for the parties, the learned Judge observed as under : — "The very same fundamental question arises in the facts and circumstances of this case also, viz. "Whether any statute like the present Atrocities Act, especially enacted for the purpose of protecting weaker sections of the society hailing from S.C. and S.T. communities can be permitted to be abused by conveniently converting the same into a weapon of wrecking personal vengeance on the opponents?" The answer to this question is undoubtedly and obviously "No". "Whether any statute like the present Atrocities Act, especially enacted for the purpose of protecting weaker sections of the society hailing from S.C. and S.T. communities can be permitted to be abused by conveniently converting the same into a weapon of wrecking personal vengeance on the opponents?" The answer to this question is undoubtedly and obviously "No". Under such circumstances, if the courts are tor apply such provisions of Sec. 18 of the Atrocities Act quite mechanically and blindly merely guided by some general and popular prejudices, based on some words and trickly accusations in the complaint on mere assumptions without intelligently scrutinising and testing the probabilities, truthfulness, genuineness and otherwise dependability of the accusations in the complaint. etc. then it would be simply unwittingly are credulously playing in the hands of some scheming unscrupulous complainant in denying the justice. Virtually it would be tantamount to abdicating and relegating its judicial duty, function of doing justice in such matters in favour and hands of such unscrupulous complainant by making him a Judge in his own cause. This is simply unthinkable and therefore impermissible. Whether the provisions of any particular Act and for that purpose the Rules made there under are applicable to the facts of a particular case or not, is always and unquestionably a matter which lies strictly and exclusively within the domain of judicial consideration discretion" and therefore neither mere allegation made in the complaint by themselves nor bare denials by the accused can either automatically vest or divest the court from discharging its ultimate judicial function-duty to closely scrutinise and test the prima facie dependability of the allegations made in the complaint and reach its own decision." (7). In Ramdayal and Ors. vs. State of M.P. (2), a learned Single Judge of M.P. High Court (Sachinder Dwivedi J.) also considered this aspect and it was held that a judicial scrutiny of the facts of the case was permissible to find out that the person is involved in the offence or connected with the offence under the Act as to attract the rigour of Sec. 18 of the Act. It was observed as under:— "On the allegation that a particular person has committed an offence or is an accused under the Act or if he has been so described by the Police as an accused, the Court would not without examining the merits of the accusation, dismiss his application, where there is no material to reasonably raise a suspicion of the commission of an offence, it cannot be said that there is an accusation within the meaning of section 18 of the Act; and the maintainability of application under Section 438, Cr.P.C. cannot be challenged. (8). In Amar Singh &. Ors. vs. State of Raj. (3), N.C. Sharma, J. (as he then was) granted anticipatory bail in a case registered under Section-3 (1) (v) of the Act after judicial scrutiny and finding that prima-facie no offence under Sec. 3(1) (v) of the Act was made out. (9). In Satya Narain and Ors. vs. The State of Raj.. (4), G.S. Singhvi, J. (as he then was) of this Court also did not agree with the view that anticipatory bail cannot be granted in view of Section -18 of the Act since the case was registered under Sec. 3 of the Act. It was observed:- "Once it is found that the person is accused of having committed an offence under the Act, 1989 the embargo imposed under Section 18 of the Act, 1989 against the grant of anticipatory bail would come into play. However before the provision of Section 18 of the 1989 Act is made applicable the court is bound to consider as to whether the applicant is an accused of having committed an offence under the 1989 Act. Since the provisions contained in Section 18 is an exception carved out from general provisions of anticipatory bail contained in Section 438, Cr.P.C. it has to be construed strictly. Once it is found that an offence specified under the 1989 Act is committed irrespective of the gravity of the offence anticipatory bail has to be declined. But the Court has to apply its mind to the facts of the case and record a finding that the applicant has been an accused of having committed an offence under the 1989 Act." (10). In Munir Khan and Ors. vs. State of Raj. But the Court has to apply its mind to the facts of the case and record a finding that the applicant has been an accused of having committed an offence under the 1989 Act." (10). In Munir Khan and Ors. vs. State of Raj. (5), I had an occasion to hear a full debate on Section-18 of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act and its impact. Several leading members of the Bar put their view- point to assist the Court as the question was of vital importance. After considering various provisions of the Act and the land mark judgment in Gurbux Singh Sibal and Ors. vs. State of Punjab (6), on the point of anticipatory bail and other judgments of the Apex Court of the country, it was observed by me as under : (Paras 12 to 16): 12. In the aforesaid background section 18 of the Act has to be interpreted. Section 18 of the Act prescribes that nothing in section 438 Cr.P.C. shall apply in relation to any case involving the arrest of any person on an accusation having committed an offence under the Act. In other words, the benefit of pre-arrest bail under section 438 Cr.P.C. has been excluded in a case involving the arrest of any person on an accusation of having committed an offence under the Act. The question then arises, who should decide as to whether a person has committed an offence under the Act? Whether it should be left entirely to the person who makes a complaint and who may have a grudge in getting a person arrested by making such allegations so that he may be deprived the benefit of pre-arrest bail or it should be left to the police officers who register the case and who may also have some design for various persons. In my view, section-18 of the Act should be so construed so that it may safeguard the fundamental right of personal liberty and equal protection available to a citizen under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution on the one hand and that the object underlying the Act is also not frustrated. This is possible only if a judicial scrutiny is permissible and the matter is not left entirely either to the complainant or to a Police Officer. This is possible only if a judicial scrutiny is permissible and the matter is not left entirely either to the complainant or to a Police Officer. If Section 18 of the Act is given such an interpretation so as to exclude entertainability of an application under Section 438 Cr.P.C. in the concerned Court simply because a case under section3 or 4 of the Act has been registered at any stage, then the chances of injustice and misuse shall be much more. There may be cases in which even the allegations made in the report/complaint taken on the face value do not constitute an offence under the Act and there may be cases also that after taking into consideration the statements of the witnesses recorded during investigation and other material collected, commission of an offence under the Act by an accused person is not prima-facie disclosed or made out. Should a citizen in such situation, be deprived the benefit of the provision of Section 438 Cr.P.C. on the ground that Section 18 of the Act prohibits even entertainability of such application for pre- arrest bail under Section 438 Cr.P.C. In my considered view, such view may lead to absurdity and unreasonableness and may also be violative of the fundamental right of equal protection and personal liberty enshrined under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution (13). The matter may be considered from a different angle also. Whenever a complaint is made by a person to put criminal machinery in motion, he is always jealous to see the person, against whom he is making the complaint, should be humiliated by getting his arrest by police and in order to achieve this object, he may be over enthusiastic to see that the case is registered under section-3 or 4 of the Act. There may be some unscrupulous police officers who may also adopt the same line for various reasons. To interpret section 1.8 of the Act in a way so as to create a complete bar even to the maintainability of an application under Section 438 Cr.P.C. in the concerned court, then it would mean that a power of arrest is given in the hands of the complainant or the Police Officer. To interpret section 1.8 of the Act in a way so as to create a complete bar even to the maintainability of an application under Section 438 Cr.P.C. in the concerned court, then it would mean that a power of arrest is given in the hands of the complainant or the Police Officer. It cannot be the intention of the legislature that the persons who did not commit an offence under the Act and are roped in by stretching the language of Sections-3 and 4 of the Act, should be denied the benefit of pre- arrest bail if they are otherwise entitled to get the same. Therefore, a harmonious construction should be given to section 18 of the Act in such a manner that the object of the Act is not frustrated but at the same time the persons who did not commit an offence under the Act is not deprived the benefit of pre-arrest bail if he is otherwise entitled to get under the provisions of Section 438 Cr.P.C. This is possible only if a judicial scrutiny is made permissible and it is held that Sec. 18 of the Act does not create a complete bar to the maintainability/entertainability of an application under section 438 Cr.P.C. I, therefore, hold that Section-18 of the Act does not exclude the applicability of Sec. 438 Cr.P.C. completely so far the maintainability of an application for grant of pre-arrest bail is concerned. (14). The matter does not end here, as the question of ambit of consideration of judicial scrutiny is also vital to be decided. Learned counsel for both the parties have made submissions that if a judicial scrutiny is permissible then it should not be limited only to the police report or the complaint and the statements of witnesses and other material should also be taken into consideration. In this connection, both the parties have their own fears. While from the side of the accused, the fear is that though such allegations may be made by a complainant in the police report or complaint which constitute an offence u/s. 3 or 4 of the Act but there is no evidence to substantiate those allegations and in that situation a person should not be deprived the benefit of pre-arrest bail u/s 438 Cr.P.C. simply because the case has been registered u/s. 3/4 of the Act. Contrary to this, the fear of the other party is that the FIR is not the last word and it may be lacking averments to constitute an offence u/s. 3/4 of the Act but subsequently at the stage of enquiry/investigation sufficient material may come on record by which prima-facie case of the commission of an offence under the Act is made out and in that situation the person should not be entitled to get benefit of pre-arrest bail in view of section 18 of the Act. In my view, learned counsel for both the parties are right in their submissions and the judicial scrutiny should not be limited to the extent of police report/complaint but also to he statements of the witnesses and other material collected during investigation. But the ambit of judicial scrutiny cannot be extended to the extent of appreciation of evidence, but to the extent to evaluate the material and. documents on record with a view to find out if the facts emerging therefrom, taken on their face value, disclose the existence of the ingredients constituting an offence under the Act." 15. The net result of the aforesaid discussion is as follows: (i) That section 18 of the Act does not create a complete bar even to maintainability of an application u/s 438 Cr.P.C. (ii) That whenever such application comes for consideration before the competent Court then it should make a judicial scrutiny as to whether from the FIR, the statements of witnesses and other documents on record and the facts emerging therefrom, taken at their face value, disclose the existence of the ingredients constituting an offence under the Act or not. The court may for this limited purpose, shift the evidence as it cannot be expected even at that initial stage to accept all that the prosecution states as gospel truth even it is opposed to common sense or to broad probabilities of the case. But it does not mean that it can appreciate the evidence at this stage and make a roving inquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and the evidence. 16. That if on judicial scrutiny, the Court comes to the conclusion that an offence under the Act is prima-facie made out then it should exclude the application of Sec. 438 Cr.P.C. and dismiss the same without further going into the merits of the case at that stage." (11). Mr. 16. That if on judicial scrutiny, the Court comes to the conclusion that an offence under the Act is prima-facie made out then it should exclude the application of Sec. 438 Cr.P.C. and dismiss the same without further going into the merits of the case at that stage." (11). Mr. M.R. Mitruka, learned counsel appearing for the complainant, laying absolute emphasis on the language employed in Section 18 of the Act, vehemently contended that the very moment a criminal case is registered for an offence punishable under the Atrocities Act, the bar contained in Section 18 of the Act for anticipatory bail under Sec. 438 Cr.P.C. comes into play. Learned counsel contended that despite express exclusion of anticipatory bail under Sec. 438 Cr.P.C. by virtue of Sec. 18 of the Atrocities Act, the Courts were yet to release the accused (alleged to have committed an offence under the Atrocities Act) on anticipatory bail, the said express provision under section 18 of the Atrocities Act will not only lose its vigour and sanctity but would stand virtually defused and written off. The learned counsel, therefore, contended that the view taken by me in Munir Khans case (supra) requires reconsideration and in any case, the matter should be referred to a Larger Bench in view of the importance of the question involved in the matter. Lastly it was contended by Mr. Mitruka that the view expressed in Munir Khans decision and other decisions referred to above,stand impliedly over-ruled after the Full Bench judgment of this Court in Jai Singh and Anr. vs. Union of India (7) and that of Supreme Court in State of M.P. and Anr. vs. Ram Krishna Balotia and Anr. (8). (12). On the other hand, learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Senior members of the Bar who appeared as intervener, contended that the view taken in Munir Khans case is well considered and does not require reconsideration. For the last submission of Mr. Mitruka, it was contended that before the Full Bench of this Court or before the Supreme Court in the above referred judgments, the question of interpretation of Section 18 of the Atrocities Act was not involved, nor this question was canvassed before their Lordships and their Lordships were only concerned with constitutional validity of the various provisions including Sec. 18 of the Atrocities Act. It was, therefore, contended that no where this Court or the Honble Supreme Court, in the above referred judgments, has laid down that judicial scrutiny is completely barred to find out from facts of the case whether an offence under the Atrocities Act has been committed or not. Mere registration of a case for an offence punishable under the Atrocities Act either at the police station or in the Court should not debar the Court in granting anticipatory bail to a person if on judicial scrutiny of the facts and material on record an offence under the Act is not prima-facie found to have been committed by him. (13). At the out-set it may be stated that before the Full Bench of this Court in Jai Singhs case (supra) to which I was also a party, the question was whether the provisions of the Atrocities Act, 1989 were ultra-vires of the Constitution of India. The Full Bench judgment starts with "This Full Bench has been constituted to decide whether the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act No. 33 of 1989 is ultra-vires of the Constitution of India?" Section 18 of the Act was challenged on the ground that it contravened Article 21 of the Constitution. The interpretation of Section 18 of the Act was not before the Full Bench and the Bench had no occasion to examine whether judicial scrutiny of the facts of a case was permissible or not to find out whether the accused has committed an offence under the Act or not, so as to decline him the benefit of anticipatory bail under Section 438 of the Code. Mr. Mitruka referred to paras 50 and 54 of the judgment to substantiate his argument that intention of the Full Court is clear from the observations made in these paragraphs that the benefit of anticipatory bail under Sec. 438 Cr.P.C. has been expressly taken away by Sec. 18 of the Atrocities Act. I do not agree with this submission. Pararaphs 50 and 54 of the judgment are reproduced as under : "50. The right to anticipatory bail did not flow from Art. 21 of the Constitution either expressly or impliedly. This right has been conferred by the statute enacted by the Parliament. The Parliament by enacting another law or by amending the Code of Criminal Procedure could take it away also. 54. The right to anticipatory bail did not flow from Art. 21 of the Constitution either expressly or impliedly. This right has been conferred by the statute enacted by the Parliament. The Parliament by enacting another law or by amending the Code of Criminal Procedure could take it away also. 54. The settled principles of interpretation is that the special enactment will prevail over the general. The Special Act must prevail in respect of the power of the High Court to entertain an application for bail under Sec. 438 or 439 Cr.P.C." In the above paragraphs no-where it has been laid down that a judicial scrutiny is not permissible to see whether the person has committed an offence under the Atrocities Act so as to decline him the benefit of anticipatory bail under Sec. 438 Cr.P.C. In these paragraphs general principles of law have been stated to hold that Section 18 of the Act was not ultra-vires of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Similarly, the question which was for consideration before the Supreme Court has been referred to in paragraph 4 of the judgment and it states; — "We have to consider whether a denial of this right to apply for anticipatory bail in respect of offences committed under the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 can be considered as violative of Articl 14 and 21 of the Constitution." (14). I, therefore, have no hesitation in rejecting the argument of Mr. Mitruka that the decision of Full Bench in Jai Singhs case (supra) or that of Supreme Court in State of M.P. & Anr. vs. Ram Krishna Balotia (supra) has impliedly over-ruled the view taken by me in Munir Khans case (supra) and other judgments referred to above, where judicial scrutiny has been made permissible to examine the facts of the case to find out whether an offence under the Act has been committed or not. (15). In Munir Khans case, the question has been dealt with elaborately and extensively by me and the view taken also gets support from the decisions of Madhya Pradesh and Gujarat High Courts, as well, of this Court by other Judges as referred to above. I do not find any new ground for reconsideration of the above view by a Larger Bench. I do not find any new ground for reconsideration of the above view by a Larger Bench. While adhering to the law laid down in Munir Khans case, I would like to add few words more in support of the view taken by me. (16). Ours is a mixed society of persons having different religions and castes. Several crores of persons belonging to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribes live side by side to other persons and they are often inter-dependent for their day today living. As co-citizens, either as employer and employee or landlord and tenant or neighbourers etc. they come in close contact with each other and this is likely to cause some dispute or altercation in them. It could not be the intention of the Legislature that all such disputes between members of Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes and other persons be brought within the ambit of an offence under the Act and to decline anticipatory bail whenever a report or a criminal complaint is made by a member of Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe against a non-member. Section 3 of the Act also does not speak that all disputes between members of Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes with non-members are offences under the Act. The offence of atrocity, which has been made punishable under section 3 of the Act, is committed by a person not being a member of Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe if the same is committed under a particular situation or circumstances as narrated in Section 3 of the Act. Then, who should decide whether: (i) the averments made in a report or complaint even taken on their face value, do make out a case of commission of an offence under the Act; (ii) the evidence collected during investigation or inquiry does involve a person for having committed an offence under the Act; (iii) the accusations levelled against a person are malafide, improbable frivolous or vexatious with an oblique motive to injure and humiliate him by his arrest. (17). It should not be forgotten that denial of bail amounts to deprivation of personal liberty to a citizen. (17). It should not be forgotten that denial of bail amounts to deprivation of personal liberty to a citizen. Section 438 Cr.P.C. is a procedural provision which is concerned with the personal liberty of an individual who is entitled to the benefit of the presumption of innocence since he is not, on the date of application for anticipatory bail, convicted of the offence in respect of which he seeks bail. Hence, depriving a person of his liberty must be fair, just and reasonable and it should not be left at the whims of an unscrupulous complainant or a police officer. It should not be taken that the Act is intended to harass or falsely implicate innocent persons not belonging to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe community. The object of the Act is to protect the members of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes who are subjected to atrocities simply of their being weaker and down- trodden segment of the society. The provisions of this beneficial legislation should not be interpreted so as to deny anticipatory bail to innocent persons. On the contrary, they should be protected by the abuse and black-mailing at the hands of wrong persons having oblique motive or wrecking some personal vengeance. The Act should not be allowed to create a gulf between non-members and members of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes or to create feeling amongst them to think themselves as separate unit insisting on their sentiments as a separate entity requiring separatic presentation and preservation. It is also the duty of the Court to see that provisions of the Act are not misused so as to create a confrontation, resentment and segregation between non-members and members of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. This can be achieved only if judicial scrutiny is made permissible to find out whether an offence under the Act has been committed by a person before declining him the benefit of pre- arrest bail. I would like to refer the following observations/guidelines made by the Supreme Court in Kehar Singh and Ors. vs. The State (Delhi Admn.) (9) for interpretation of a statute : "During the last several years, the golden rule has been given a go-by. We now look for the intention of the Legislature or the purpose of the statute. First, we examine the words of the statute. vs. The State (Delhi Admn.) (9) for interpretation of a statute : "During the last several years, the golden rule has been given a go-by. We now look for the intention of the Legislature or the purpose of the statute. First, we examine the words of the statute. If the Words are precise and cover the situation in hand, we do-not go further. We expound those words in the natural and ordinary sense of the words. But, if the words are ambiguous, uncertain or any doubt arises as to the terms employed, we deem it as our paramount duty to put upon the language of the legislature rational meaning. We then examine every word, every section and every provision. We examine the Act as a whole. We examine the necessity which gave rise to the Act. We look at the mischiefs which the legislature intended to redress. We look at the whole situation and not just one-to-one relation. We will not consider any provisions out of the frame-work of the statute. We will not view the provisions as abstract principles separated from the motive force behind. We will consider the provisions in the circumstances to which they owe their origin. We will consider the provisions to ensure coherence and consistency within the law as a whole and to avoid undesirable consequences." (18). In the above back ground, I reiterate the view expressed by me in the case of Munir Khan (supra) and the preliminary objections raised by learned counsel for the complainant is rejected. (19). After having held so, the further question arises whether a prima-facie case of committing an offence under Section 3 (1) (v) and (x) of Atrocities Act is made out against the petitioners so as to decline benefit of anticipatory bail to them. From the material produced alongwith the petition it appears that one Surja Ram son of Chimna Ram Naik (a member of Scheduled Caste) was in possession of the disputed land bearing Khasra No. 471/23 and it was allotted to him vide order dated, 9.5.95. The said allotment was challanged before the Collector, Jhunjhunu, who set aside the allotment vide order dated 5.2.92, and the order dated 9.5.85 of the Tehsildar regularising possession of Surja Ram was set aside. The said allotment was challanged before the Collector, Jhunjhunu, who set aside the allotment vide order dated 5.2.92, and the order dated 9.5.85 of the Tehsildar regularising possession of Surja Ram was set aside. The Tehsildar, Jhunjhunu was directed to take steps for taking possession of the said land after the injunction order dated, 22.7.88 passed in favour of Surja Ram is vacated. It appears that the injunction order in favour of Surja Ram is still in force. The petitioner Rakesh claims that the said land was given in his possession on rent by Shri.Budh Ram son of Surja Ram Naik. Learned counsel also drew my attention to a report made by Surkha Dev son of Surja Ram Naik before the S.P., Jhunjhunu on 26.2.94. It appears that some bonafide dispute exists between the parties and prima-facie it does not appear that the petitioners have committed an offence under section 3 of the Atrocities Act, though a final verdict shall be given by the Court in case any charge-sheet is filed. (20). In the facts and circumstances, the petitioners are entitled to be given the benefit of pre-arrest bail under section 438 Cr.P.C. It is, therefore, ordered that the petitioners Rakesh S/o Phool Chand, Dayanand S/o Shri Chiman Singh, Sanjeev son of Shri Chunni Lal by caste Jat, and Vidhya Dhar son of Shri Bhagwana shall be released on bail in the event of their arrest in F.I.R. No. 263/1994 Police Station, Kotwali Jhunjhunu, provided each one of them furnishes personal bond in the sum of Rs. 5,000/- with one surety in the like amount to the satisfaction of the Arresting Officer/S.H.O. concerned with the stipulation that they shall appear before him as and when called upon to do so during investigation of the case. The bail shall be subject to following conditions: (i) that the petitioners shall make themselves available for interrogation by a Police Officer as and when required; (ii) that the petitioner shall not directly or indirectly make any inducement, threat or promise to any person acquainted with the facts of the case, so as to dissuade him from disclosing such facts to the Court."