Honble SINGHAL, J. — The following question has been referred to this Full Bench for consideration: "Whether in the Schedule to the Rajasthan State Electricity Board Officers (Recruitment, Promotion and Seniority) Regulations, 1974 under Entry No. 19 providing quota of 25% for promotion of Accountants holding the qualifica-tion of Intermediate with ICWA or Graduate with DCWA is valid and is not violative of Arts. 14 & 16 of the Constitution."? An objection was taken by the learned counsel for the respondents that in the present matter — a writ petition was filed by the Rajasthan Rajya Vidyut Karamchari Federation vs. R.S.E.B., D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 5720/90 which was decided on 03.1.1991 and the prayer in the said writ petition was same which has been made in the present writ petition. It is submitted that the said writ petition was dismissed and, therefore, the members of Rajasthan Rajya Vidyut Karamchari Federation which a registered body, cannot submit another writ petition in the name of an unregistered association. This objection is being raised on two grounds : (i) That the matter is barred by principles of res-judicata, and (ii) That an unregistered association cannot file a writ petition as it has no fundamental right under Chap. III of the Constitution of India. (2). Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that in accordance with the provisions of Rule 59 of the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan Rules, 1952 the Full Bench is bound to decide the question which has been referred and cannot decide any other point. Reliance has been placed on the decision of Habu vs. State of Raj. (1), wherein the Full Bench of this court has taken the view that it is for the Full Bench to consider whether the question referred has to be answered in affirmative or negative or not to answer at all. (3). On the preliminary objection which has been raised a specific question was asked to the learned counsel for the petitioner that in view of the decision on which reliance is placed, the Full Bench has the jurisdiction not to answer the question and refusal to answer the question has to be based on certain reasons. If the Full Bench comes to the conclusion that the reference itself was incompetent as the writ petition was not maintainable it has jurisdiction to refuse to answer the reference. If the Full Bench comes to the conclusion that the reference itself was incompetent as the writ petition was not maintainable it has jurisdiction to refuse to answer the reference. Learned counsel for the petitioner could not effectively make any submission on this preposition and, therefore, we are of the view that even if the reference is made by the Honble Chief Justice under Rule 59 of the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan Rules, 1952 the Full Bench has the jurisdiction to refuse to answer the question referred. The reasoning will depend on the facts of each case and cannot be generalised. (4). On the question which is now raised on the principles of res-judicata that the second writ petition is not maintainable, we are of the view that though the provisions of Civil Procedure Code are not applicable to the writ jurisdiction but the principles can be applied. For the purpose of analysing the principles of res-judicata the provisions of Sec. 11 C.P.C. can be taken into consideration which are as under: "Sec. 11— Res-judicata — No court shall try any suit or issue in which the matter directly and substantially in issue has been directly and substantially in issue in a former suit between the same parties, or between parties under whom they or any of them claim, litigating under the same title, in a court competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised, and has been heard and finally decided by such court." (5). The above provisions make it clear that if the matter which is directly and substantially was in issue in former suit between the same parties under whom they or any of them claim, litigating under the same title, then the principles of res-judicata would be made applicable. The earlier writ petition which was filed was on behalf of 332 members as mentioned in para 3 of the writ petition No. 5720/90. If a decision is given in the case of a registered association, then it is binding not only on the association but also on all the members thereof and, therefore, they cannot form a separate association which may be registered or unregistered and file another writ petition. If a decision is given in the case of a registered association, then it is binding not only on the association but also on all the members thereof and, therefore, they cannot form a separate association which may be registered or unregistered and file another writ petition. Explanation (vi) to Sec. 11 CPC provides that where persons litigate bonafide in respect of a public right or of a private right claimed in common for themselves and others, all persons interested in such right shall, for the purposes of this section, be deemed to claim under the persons so litigating. The writ petition therefore, which was filed in the name of a registered association, the members thereof will be deemed to be litigating through the association and, therefore, it will be considered that the former writ petition which is filed has adjudicated their rights and they have no jurisdiction to file the writ petition again in respect of the same matter. The said decision was given by a Division Bench on merit and it is not in dispute that writ petition No. 338/91 from which this reference is made to this Full Bench, has been filed in the name of R.S.E.B. Accountants Association showing its strength of 12 members who were the signatories to the resolution. The earlier writ petition was signed by Shri Davendra Kumar Ludhani and the present writ petition was filed by Shri Tek Singh Arora as Convenor of the R.S.E.B. Accountants Association. This association also has membership of Shri Davendra Kumar Ludhani. In the earlier writ petition the circular/letter, dated 6.10.1990 with regard to the decisions taken, by the association bears the signature of Shri Davendra Kumar Ludhani as well as of Shri Tek Singh Arora. Even otherwise as observed above, if the writ petitions have been filed by a registered association every member thereof is bound by the decision given on the writ petition filed by the said association. If the decision given is against the association the members thereof cannot in any manner have the right to file the second writ petition in respect of the same issue. The contention of the learned counsel for the respondents therefore is accepted and it is held that the writ petition itself was not maintainable and no reference could have been made on such a writ petition. The contention of the learned counsel for the respondents therefore is accepted and it is held that the writ petition itself was not maintainable and no reference could have been made on such a writ petition. We are also supported by the decision of the Apex Court in the case of the Direct Recruitment Class-II Engineering Officers Association and Ors. vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors. (2) where even the writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution by same parties for the same relief was held to be barred on the principles of res-judicata when the writ petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution was dismissed by High Court after hearing on merits. Binding character of judgments of courts of competent jurisdiction is an essence a part of the rule of law on which the administration of justice is former. (6). An objection to this effect was taken by the respondents in reply to the writ petition which was not dealt with and reference was made and now have again been raised before us. (7). It may also be observed that an unregistered association has no fundamental right to approach this court under Art. 226 of the Constitution and this point is concluded the decision in the case of Shri Mahinder Kumar Gupta vs. Union of India, Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas (3). A decision in the case Akhil Bharatiya Soshit Karamchari Sangh vs. Union of India & Ors. (4), was relied where the non-recognised Association was held to apply under Art. 32 of the Constitution. We may observe that there had been number of the instances of public litigation where large body of persons is having the grievance against inaction of the State. Even letters have been considered to be a writ petition but all these are the matters where large section of public is affected and the personal interest of any particular person or a similar section, as in the present case, is not involved. Even in the case of Peoples Union for Democratic Rights vs. Union of India (5) when the question of locus standi was considered, the Honble Supreme Court had taken into consideration the poverty, illiteracy and ignorance, obstructing and impeding accessibility to the judicial process and on that ground it was considered that writ petition can be filed. In D.S. Nakara & Ors. In D.S. Nakara & Ors. vs. Union of India (6), the old pensioners individually were unable to undertake journey through labyrinths of costly and protected (sic protracted) judical process for allowing to espouse their cause. In case of S.P. Gupta & Ors. vs. President of India (7), poverty, helplessness and disability or social or economic disadvantaged, position was considered a sufficient ground for maintaining the writ petition. There had been other decisions of the Apex Court as well and principles which emerge from all of them are as under: a. That the members of the said association should have sufficient strength so as to come in the category of a large sect of public, b. That the members should be identified, c. That the members must be of the category of poor/illiterate/helpless or disable, d. That the individual member must not be capable of filing a writ petition. e. That the entire body of the members must authorise the association to protect their legal rights, f. That such an association must have its own?. Constitution, and g. That there must be authority to file a writ petition on behalf of all the members. (8). If all the above conditions are fulfilled, then an unregistered association can file a writ petition in respect of the legal right but the said association cannot file a writ petition alleging breach of fundamental right as the association by itself has no fundamental rights of its own. (9). If a petition has once been filed alleging breach of legal right and is decided by the High Court, the decision thereof is binding on all the members and few of them cannot file another fresh writ petition in the name of other association. If it is permitted it would be an unending litigation as in the present case the earlier writ petition was filed by a recognised association. The second writ petition has been filed by few of the members of that very association and if the decision goes in the present writ petition against such unregistered and unrecognised association, then even a third unrecognised association can be formed to file the writ petition. This is not contemplated that such an association has any legal personality under law and as such the writ petition by an unregistered association is not maintainable in the facts and circumstances of the case. (10). This is not contemplated that such an association has any legal personality under law and as such the writ petition by an unregistered association is not maintainable in the facts and circumstances of the case. (10). There may be certain unincorporated associations which are permitted by specific statutory provisions to sue or to be sued, the position in that case would be different. (11). The question which has been referred therefore, does not require any consideration by this court. The arguments however, were heard on merit as well and the point which has been raised is considered in this case which shall not be a precedent in other cases as the writ petition once having been found not maintainable, there is no necessity to consider the merits of the case, but in the facts and circumstances of the present case the matter is considered on merit as well. (12). The reference which has been made by the Division Bench was on the ground that the earlier decision, dated 3.1.1991 has taken a view that providing quota for promotion on the basis of qualifications is valid, but the said decision has not taken into consideration the fact that the source of recruitment is one and the nature of the duties is same and there is an `intergrated seniority list therefore, providing different quota for them on the basis of qualifications and experience is discriminatory and is not valid under Arts. 14 & 16 of the Constitution of India. The decision of the Division Bench has made a reference to the decision of P.S.E.B. Patiala vs. Ravinder Kumar (8), but has not considered the case of Mohammad Shujat Ali and Ors. vs. Union of India & Ors. (9) and N. Abdul Basheer and Ors. etc. vs. K.K. Karunakaran and Ors. (10). The facts of the present case are that under the Rajasthan State Electricity Board Officers (Recruitment, Promotion and Seniority) Regulations 1974 Entry 19 of the Schedule provides for the method of recruitment and percentage with qualification for the category of posts specified therein. Entry 19 is an under: **** TABLE **** So far as the method of recruitment and percentage is concerned that is not in dispute before us and initially the words 100% by Promotion which were existing in Column 3 were substituted by the words 100% by Selection vide Order, dated 14.6.1976. Entry 19 is an under: **** TABLE **** So far as the method of recruitment and percentage is concerned that is not in dispute before us and initially the words 100% by Promotion which were existing in Column 3 were substituted by the words 100% by Selection vide Order, dated 14.6.1976. The dispute is only with regard to the qualification specified in Column 4 and in accordance with the order, dated 14.6.1976 the words Seniority-cum-merit were replaced by the words on merit. The percentage of 75% from Accountants having 7 years experience and 25% with I.C.W. qualification and 5 years experience was from the very beginning and that is the position even today. The grievance, of the petitioner is that filling up 25% of posts by promotion on the basis of qualification is unreasonable and it has no nexus to the objects sought to be achieved and is discriminatory inasmuch as all the Accountants form one class and are treated to be equals in a cadre which is one and is integrated service having same duties, for the purpose of promotion no separate quota could have been provided on the basis of qualification. Before the Division Bench a decision of P.S.E.B. Patiala and Anr. vs. Ravindra Kumar Sharma & Ors. (supra) was relied. The facts of this case were that in Punjab State Electricity Board there was common seniority list for Diploma holder and non-diploma holder lineman. The quota for promotion for both the categories was fixed separately and the. court came to the conclusion that "there is no gainsaying that all the Line-men either diploma holders or non-diploma holders are performing the same kind of work and duties and they belong to the same cadre having a common/joint seniority list for promotion to the post of Line Superintendent. The orders dated 12.7.1977 being order No.73 promoting defendants 3,4 and 5 and well as office order No. 898 dated 17.8.1977 promoting defendants 6 & 7 on the basis of quota from diploma holders as fixed by the order of the State Electricity Board dated 9.5.1974 is wholly arbitrary, illegal, discriminatory and violative of the equality clause contained in Arts. 14 and 16 of the Constitution inasmuch as it purports to promote defendants 3 to 7 who are admittedly junior to respondent 1 in service as Line-man in the State Electricity Board. 14 and 16 of the Constitution inasmuch as it purports to promote defendants 3 to 7 who are admittedly junior to respondent 1 in service as Line-man in the State Electricity Board. It has been rightly held by following the decision in Shujat Alis case (supra) that the promotions of defendants 3 to 7 who are admittedly junior to the plaintiff- respondent in the service as Line-man to the post of Line Superintendent are illegal, arbitrary and discriminatory and so bad." (13). The court held that the promotion on the basis of qualification from Line Man to the post of Line Superintendent is wholly bad and discriminatory. This decision was given by two Honble Judges of the Supreme Court. Another judgment of three Honble Judges of the Supreme Court in the case of N. Abdul Basheer and others etc. Vs. K.K. Karunakaran and Ors. (supra) has also been relied upon where the dispute was with regard to promotion to the post of Second Grade Excise Inspector from the post of Excise Preventive Officer, the prescription of a ratio dividing the quota of promotion between graduate Preventive Officers and non- graduate Preventive Officers was declared invalid on the ground that it violates Arts. 14 and 16 of the Constitution. Decision in the case of Mohammad Shujat Ali & Ors. vs. Union of India (supra) was also considered in this case. It was observed that the Apex Court has upheld differentiation between graduate supervisors and non-graduate supervisors for the purpose of promotion as Asstt. Engineers. But it is clear that this was on the ground that the two categories of supervisors had been kept distinct and apart under the Cadre Rules from the beginning with different pay scales and different treatment for the purpose of promotion. Reference was also made to State of Jammu and Kashmir vs. Triloki Nath Khosa (11), but it was held that having regard to the object of achieving administrative efficiency in the Engineering Service it was a just qualification to maintain a distinction between Assistant Engineers who were degree holders and those who were merely diploma holders. Reference was also made to State of Jammu and Kashmir vs. Triloki Nath Khosa (11), but it was held that having regard to the object of achieving administrative efficiency in the Engineering Service it was a just qualification to maintain a distinction between Assistant Engineers who were degree holders and those who were merely diploma holders. In S.L. Sachev vs. Union of India (12) again the discrimination between UDCs drawn from Audit Offices and other UDCs in the matter of the eligibility qualification for promotion was justified on the basis that the one enjoyed greater experience and that the distinction based on length of service was directly related to the object of the classification. In Col. A.S. Iyer vs. V. Balasubramanyam (13), upon which reliance has been placed by the appellants, the recruits were from two different sources which had not completely fused into one integrated service but were instead allowed to maintain their separate identity, and regard was had to their basis (sic basic) functional character, operational capabilities and futuristic uses to support the differential treatment between military engineers and civilian engineers. H.H. Shri Swamiji of Shri Admar Mutt. vs. Commr. Hindu Religious & Charitable Endowments Department (14), is a case where we find it difficult to see any arguments in favour of the appellants, for the passage therein to which our attention has been drawn specifically alludes to the circumstances that the passing of time results in altering a fact situation which has the consequence of wearing out the basis on which the differentiation is founded. So also in Motor General Traders vs. State of Andhra Pradesh (15). It was observed by this court that an exemption provision initially valid could become discriminatory where with the passage of time the nexus with the object did not survive any longer." The matter with regard to equality of opportunity in the matters of pubic employment was considered by the Apex Court in the case of The State of Mysore and Anr. vs. P. Narasinga Rao (16), wherein it was observed by the Constitutional Bench it is well settled that though Art. 14 forbids class legislation, it does not forbid reasonable classification for the purposes of legislation. When any impugned rule or statuary provision is assailed on the ground that it contravenes Art. 14, its validity can be sustained if two tests are satisfied. When any impugned rule or statuary provision is assailed on the ground that it contravenes Art. 14, its validity can be sustained if two tests are satisfied. The first test is that the classification on Which it is founded must be based on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things grouped together from others left out of the group, and the second test is that the differentia in question must have a reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved by the rule or statutory provisions in question. In other words, there must be some rational nexus between the basis of classification and the object intended to be achieved by the statute or the rule. As we have already stated, Art. 14 and 16 form part of the same constitutional code of guarantees and supplement each other. In other words Art. 16 is only an instance of the application of the general rule of equality laid down in Art. 14 and it should be construed as such. Hence, there is no denial of equality of opportunity unless the person who complains of discrimination is equally situated with the person or persons who are alleged to have been favoured; Art. 16 (1) does riot bar a reasonable classification of employees or reasonable tests for their selection". It was further observed: "The provisions of Art. 14 or Art. 16 do not exclude the laying down of selective tests, nor do they preclude the Government from laying down qualifications for the post in question. Such qualifications need not be only technical but they can also be general qualifications relating to the suitability of the candidate for public service as such. It is therefore not right to say that in the appointment to the post of tracers the Government ought to have taken into account only the technical proficiency of the candidates in the particular craft. It is open to the Government to consider also the general educational attainments of the candidates and to give preference to candidates who have better educational qualifications besides technical proficiency of a tracer. It is open to the Government to consider also the general educational attainments of the candidates and to give preference to candidates who have better educational qualifications besides technical proficiency of a tracer. The relevance of general education even to technical branches of public service was emphasised long ago by Macaulay as follows: "Men who have been engaged, up to one and two and twenty, in studies which have no immediate connection with the business of any profession, and the effect of which is merely to open, to invigorate, and to enrich and mind, will generally be found, in the business of every profession, superior to men who have at eighteen or nineteen devoted themselves to the special studies of their calling. Indeed, early superiority in literature and science generally indicates the existence of some qualities which are securities against vice-industry, self-denial, a taste for pleasures not sensual, a laudable desire of honourable distinction, a still more laudable desire to obtain the approbation of friends and relations. We, therefore, think that the intellectual test about to be established will be found in practice to be also the best moral test that can be devised." "In our opinion, therefore, higher educational qualifications such as success in the S.S.L.C. examination are relevant considerations for fixing a higher pay scale for tracers who have passed the S.S.L.C. examination and the classification of two grades of tracers in the New Mysore State, one for matriculate tracers with a higher pay scale and the other for non-matriculate tracers with a lower pay scale is not violative of Arts. 14 & 16 of the Constitution." (14). The matter came up again for consideration before the Constitutional Bench in the case of State of J. & K. vs. T.N. Khosa (supra) where the dispute was, if persons are drawn from different sources and integrated into one class, can they be classified for the purposes of promotion on the basis of their educational qualifications. The contention that the qualification is germane to the initial recruitment and for the purposes of promotion efficiency and experience alone must count. It was observed by the Apex Court: "The challenge, at best, reflects the respondents opinion on promotional opportunities in public services and one may assume that if the roles were reversed, respondents would be interested in implementing their point of view. It was observed by the Apex Court: "The challenge, at best, reflects the respondents opinion on promotional opportunities in public services and one may assume that if the roles were reversed, respondents would be interested in implementing their point of view. But we cannot sit in appeal over the legislative judgment with a view to finding out whether on a comparative evaluation of rival theories touching the question of promotion, the theory advocated by the respondents is not to be preferred. Classification is primarily for the legislature or for the statutory authority charged with the duty of framing the terms and conditions of service; and if, looked at from the standpoint of the authority making it, the classification is found to rest on a reasonable basis, it has to be upheld." It was observed that the persons appointed directly and by promotion were integrated into a common class of Assistant Engineers, they could, for purposes of promotion to the cadre of Executive Engineers, be classified on the basis of educational qualifications. The rule providing that graduates shall be eligible for such promotion to the exclusion of diploma-holders was held not violative of Arts. 14 & 16 of the Constitution. (15). The matter of Mohammad Shujat Ali & Ors. vs. Union of India (supra), Constitutional Bench decision, which was referred in the judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner was in respect of the decision of Government of Andhra Pradesh denying equivalence of U.S. and O.C.E. certificates of Osmania Engineering College with L.C.E., L.M.E. or L.E.E. diploma of any other recognised institution. vs. Union of India (supra), Constitutional Bench decision, which was referred in the judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner was in respect of the decision of Government of Andhra Pradesh denying equivalence of U.S. and O.C.E. certificates of Osmania Engineering College with L.C.E., L.M.E. or L.E.E. diploma of any other recognised institution. It was observed by the Apex Court: "It must be noted that the question in regard to equivalence of educational qualifications is a technical question based on proper assessment and evaluation of the relevant academic standards and practical attainments of such qualifications and where the decision of the Government is based on the recommendation of an expert body which possesses the requisite knowledge, skill and expertise for adequately discharging such a function, the court, uninformed of relevant date and unaided by the technical insights necessary for the purpose of determining equivalence, would not lightly disturb the decision of the Government is shown to be based on extraneous or irrelevant consideration or actuated by mala fides or irrational and perverse or manifestly wrong that the court would reach out its lethal arm and strike down the decision of the Government. Here in the present case it cannot be said that the view taken by the Government of Andhra Pradesh that US and OCE certificates of the Osmania Enginering College were not equivalent to US or OCE diploma of the College of Engineering, Guindy or LCE, LME or LEE diploma of any other recognised institution suffered from any of these infirmities. It was based on the recommendation of an expert high powered body like the State Board of Technical Education consisting of distinguished administrators, educationists and technical experts against whom nothing could be alleged on behalf of the petitioners/appellants. The State Board of Technical Education included inter alia Principles of different engineering colleges in the State, the Secretary of the Regional Committee of the All India Committee on Technical Education, retired Chief. The State Board of Technical Education included inter alia Principles of different engineering colleges in the State, the Secretary of the Regional Committee of the All India Committee on Technical Education, retired Chief. Engineers as also Chief Engineers in office who would be expected to be familiar with the academic standards and practical content of the different qualifications and the decision taken by the Government of Andhra Pradesh on the basis of the recommendation of the State Board of Technical Education could not be regarded as unreasonable or perverse or manifestly wrong nor could it be said to be mala fide or based on extraneous or irrelevant considerations. Instead, the government of Andhra Pradesh could not do better than rely on the recommendation of the State Board of Technical Education." It was also observed that a right to be considered for promotion is a condition of service, mere chance of promotion is not. A rule which merely affects chances of promotion cannot be regarded as a varying a condition of service. It was further observed: "Now, here in the present case, all that happened as a result of the application of the Andhra Rules and the enactment of the Andhra Pradesh Rules was that the number of posts of Assistant Engineers available to non-graduate Supervisors from the erstwhile Hyderabad State for promotion, was not affected but the chances of promotion were severaly reduced." (16). The matter with regard to prescribing different conditions for diploma holders and graduates for promotion from the cadre of Junior Engineers to the Asstt. Engineers and from Asstt. Engineers to Executive Engineers was considered in the case of the two Judges Bench decision in Roop Chand Adlakha and Others etc. vs. Delhi Development Authority and Others (17), where the case of State of Jammu & Kashmir vs. Triloke Nath Khosa (supra) was taken into consideration with reference to the following observations : "Though persons appointed directly and by promotion were integrated into a common class of Assistant Engineers, they could, for purposes of promotion to the cadre of Executive Engineers, be classified on the basis of educational qualifications the rule providing that graduates shall be eligible for such promotion to the exclusion of diploma holders does not violate Arts. 14 and 16 of the Constitution and must be upheld." On the basis of above observations it was observed by the Apex Court that possession of a diploma, by itself and without more, does not confer eligibility. Diploma for purposes of promotion, is not considered equivalent to the degree. This is the point of distinction in the situations in the two cases. If Diploma-holders — of course on the justification of the job- requirements and in interest of maintaining a certain quality of technical expertise in the cadre could validly be excluded from the eligibility for promotion to the higher cadre, it does not necessarily follow as an inevitable corollary that the choice of the recruitment policy is limited only to two choices, namely, either to consider them "eligible" or "not eligible". State, consistent with the requirements of the promotional-posts and in the interest of the efficiency of the service, is not precluded from conferring eligibility on Diploma-holders conditioning it by other requirements which may, as here, include certain quantum of service-experience. In the present case, eligibility-determination was made by a cumulative criterion of a certain educational qualification plus a particular quantum of service experience. It cannot, in our opinion, be said, as postulated by the High Court, that the choice of the State was either to recognise Diploma- holders as "eligible" for promotion or wholy exclude them as "not eligible". If the educational qualification by itself was recognised as conferring eligibility for promotion, then the suprim position of further conditions such as a particular period of service, selectively, on the Diploma-holders alone to their disadvantages might become discriminatory. This does not prevent the State from formulating a policy which prescribes as an essential part of the conditions for the very eligibility that the candidate must have a particular qualification plus a stipulated quantum of service-ex-perience. It is stated on the basis of the "Vaish-Committee" report, the authorities considered the infusion of higher academic and technical quality in the personnel requirements in the relevant cadres of Engineering Services necessary. These are essentially matters of policy. Unless the provision is shown to be arbitrary, capricious, or to bring about grossly unfair results, judicial policy should be one of judicial restraint. The prescriptions may be somewhat cumbersome or produce some individual cases; but they cannot be struck down as unreasonable, capricious or arbitrary.". (17). These are essentially matters of policy. Unless the provision is shown to be arbitrary, capricious, or to bring about grossly unfair results, judicial policy should be one of judicial restraint. The prescriptions may be somewhat cumbersome or produce some individual cases; but they cannot be struck down as unreasonable, capricious or arbitrary.". (17). In the decision of Shamkant Narayan Deshpande vs. Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation & Anr. (18) another two Honble Judges Bench decision with regard to permissibility of promotion on the basis of qualification the decision of Mohd. Sujat Ali (supra) was followed and the decision of H.C. Sharma and Ors. vs. Municipal Corporation of Delhi and Ors. (19) was held per inquerium. (18). In P. Murugesan and Others vs. State of Tamil Nadu and Ors. (20), there was amendment of rule introducing ratio of 3:1 between Graduate Assistant Engineers and Diploma-holder Junior Engineers for promotion to the post of Assistant Executive Engineer. The decision of T.N. Khosa, referred to above was followed and it was held where direct recruits and promotees are integrated into a common class, they could for purposes of promotion to the higher cadre be classified as the basis of educational qualification that when the rule making authority cannot be precluded from restricting the promotion, the rule making authority may be of the opinion, having regard to the efficiency of the administration and other relevant circumstances that while it is not necessary to bar the diploma holders from promotion altogether, their chances of promotion should be restricted. The controversy now has been set at rest by the decision of the Apex Court in the case of T.R. Kothandaraman and others vs. Tamil Nadu Water Supply and Drainage Board and Others (21), where the rule prescribing ratio of 3:2 for direct recruits and promotees, the former being degree-holders and the latter diploma holders for purposes of promotion was considered as not violative of guarantee of equality embodied in Article 16 of the Constitution. In this case the decision of State of Mysore vs. P. Nar Singa Rao and Union of India vs. Dr. S.N. Kohili (supra) was taken into consideration in respect of educational qualifications being a valid basis of qualification. In this case the decision of State of Mysore vs. P. Nar Singa Rao and Union of India vs. Dr. S.N. Kohili (supra) was taken into consideration in respect of educational qualifications being a valid basis of qualification. The decision of Roshan Lal vs. Union of India (22) was considered to have been explained in Khosas case (supra) by stating that what that case had laid down was that if two differently situated holders of public office have fused into one, causing disappearance of genetic blemishes, they cannot be differentiated thereafter having been interegrated into a common class, as that would amount to make equals un-equals once again. It was further noted that the same Bench which has decided Roshan Lals case after a fortnight decided another case of Narsinga Rao and held that higher educational qualifications can form basis of classification for the purpose of fixing different pay-scales to the persons belonging to the same service. (19). The decision of Mohd. Sujat Ali considered the Khosas case and pointed out that the variant educational qualification can form basis of classification, but it can not be laid down as an invariable rule that whenever any classification is made on such basis, the same must be held to be valid, irrespective of the nature and purpose of the classification or the quality and extent of the differences in the educational qualifications. It was further observed that it may be perfectly legitimate for the administration to say that having regard to the nature of the functions and duties attached to the post, for the purpose of achieving efficiency in public service, only degree holders shall be eligible for promotion and not diploma or certificate holders. It was then observed that though this distinction may be permissible for deciding the question of eligibility for promotion, it would be difficult, consistently with the claim for equal opportunity, to lay down a quota of promotion for each and give a preferential treatment to graduates over non-graduates in the matter of fixation of the quota. Sujat Alis case (supra), ultimately took the stand that to permit discrimination based on educational attainments not obliged by nature of the duties of the higher post is to satisfy the social thrust of equality clause. Sujat Alis case (supra), ultimately took the stand that to permit discrimination based on educational attainments not obliged by nature of the duties of the higher post is to satisfy the social thrust of equality clause. Even so, the Bench did not strike down the quota rule challenged before it because of the historical background noted at page 481 of the Report. (20). The decision of Punjab State Electricity Board vs. Ravinder Kumar (supra) was without taking into consideration the decision of Khosas case or Mohd. Sujat Alis case and so was the position in Shamkants case and, therefore, the Division Bench felt that these decisions cannot be called in aid by any of the parties and for the same reason the decision of Abdul Basheer cannot be considered. In the case of Roop Chand Adhakha (a two Judges Bench decision) after taking into consideration the decision in Khosas case and Sujat Alis case the court observed; "The State is not precluded from conferring eligibility on diploma holders conditioning it by other requirements like varying period of length of experience, which in the case of Roop Chand was 10 years for the diploma-holders and 8 years for degree-holders. It was concluded by stating that Art. 16 would not prevent the State from formulating a policy which prescribes as an essential part of the conditions for the very eligibility that the candidate must have a particular qualification plus a stipulated quantum of service-experience. Being of this view, the rule in question laying down different period of service experience for diploma holders and degree-holders was not found violative of Arts. 14 & 16 of the Constitution." (21). In the decision of P. Munigesan vs. State of Tamil Nadu (supra) the decision of Sujat Ali was considered and after taking into consideration the various decisions the following principles were laid down : (1) Higher educational qualification is a permissible basis of classification, acceptability of which will; depend on the facts and circumstances of each case, (2) Higher educational qualification can be the basis not only for barring promotion, but also for restricting the scope of promotion, and (3) Restriction placed cannot however go to the extent of seriously jeopardising the chances of promotion. To decide this, the extent of restriction shall have also to be looked into to ascertain whether it is reasonable. To decide this, the extent of restriction shall have also to be looked into to ascertain whether it is reasonable. The Division Bench came to the conclusion that "higher educational qualification has relevance in so far as the holding of higher promotional post is concerned, in view of the nature of the functions and duties attached to that post. That classification has, therefore, nexus with the object to be achieved. This apart, history also supports the differentiation sought to be made by the rule in question." The ratio of 3 : 2 was considered to be reasonable. It was also observed that the court should not interfere with the same because of the fact that any different view would create almost a chaotic situation in the working of the Board as the Boards decision, which is of 1974 has held the field for about two decades. (22). The earlier Division Bench in writ petition No. 5720/90, decided on 03.1.1991 observed : "It is admittedly that the posts of Assistant Accounts Officer is filled from amongst Accountant. Promotion to the post of the Assistant Accounts Officer is regulatory by the provisions contained in "1974 Regulations". The employer is the best judge to choose the source of recruitment for a particular post. Normally the courts do not interfere with the choice of the employer to choose the source of recruitment and prescription of qualifications for appointment to a particular post. Only when the court feels satisfied that the rule providing for recruitment to a particular post is wholly arbitrarily or irrational or that qualification prescribed for a particular post is wholly un- related to the requirement of that job, then the court interferes with the decision of the employer in this regard. Every employer has to maintain the balance between the efficiency of service and the normal expectation of the employees to advance their carrier during the course of service. How efficiency can be achieved while providing carrier advancement by the employees, can be best judged by the employer who primarily knows the requirements of service of the organisation/establishment. Courts are not in a position to make the deep probe in all these issues ordinarily. The qualifications which have been indicated in the schedule appended to 1974 Regulations, are such which are related to the work of a person holding the post of Assistant Accounts Officer. Courts are not in a position to make the deep probe in all these issues ordinarily. The qualifications which have been indicated in the schedule appended to 1974 Regulations, are such which are related to the work of a person holding the post of Assistant Accounts Officer. He has to discharge supervisory duties in addition to others in the matters of Accounts etc. and certainly a person having a specific qualification in the field of Cost & Works from a recognised institute will be better equipped to discharge the functions of the post of Assistant Accounts Officer. The learned counsel for the petitioner has not shown to that the duties of Accountants and Assistant Accounts Officers are identical or that the qualifications indicated in the schedule are wholly un-related to the job requirement of the post of Assistants Account Officer. We find that in most of the services different quotas are prescribed for recruitment and the distinction has been made on the basis of qualifications. As already observed in a given case where qualifications are wholly un- related to the job requirement of the posts, the court may interfere with the prescription of quota for promotion on the basis of qualifications. However, in the instant case learned counsel for the petitioner has failed to make out that there is a total absence of relation between the qualification and the job requirement of the Assistant Accounts Officer." (23). On the basis of various decisions we feel that principles as have been laid down in T.R. Kothnadaraman and other case holds the fields. It is a cardinal rule of jurisprudence that if a judgment of the Supreme Court is considered and explained in a latter judgment, by the Apex Court itself the latter judgment will be binding under Art. 141 of the Constitution of India, no fault can be found with that. The submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the Division Bench should have referred the matter to a larger Bench, cannot be allowed to be raised nor can be considered by this court. Even on merit it is not a case where the the chances of promotion are completely blocked. The submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the Division Bench should have referred the matter to a larger Bench, cannot be allowed to be raised nor can be considered by this court. Even on merit it is not a case where the the chances of promotion are completely blocked. The position continued from the very inception when the rules were framed and it was known to the petitioners and the like that whenever consideration for promotion could be made the persons having better qualifications would be given a better chance on account of their educational qualification. There is no fusion of the service and it is a case of integrated service where the Accountants were having one course of recruitment. If after the recruitment the employer considers that the better service can be rendered by better qualified persons and, therefore, few of them should be given priority in the matter of promotion, it cannot be considered that any rights of the petitioners are affected. The percentage so fixed cannot only be said to be reasonable but is most reasonable and, therefore, we are of the view that the Schedule to R.S.E.B. Officers (Recruitment, Promotion and Seniority) Regulations 1974 under Entry No. 19 providing quota for Accountants holding qualification of Intermediate with ICWA or Graduates with DCWA is valid and is not violative of Arts. 14 & 16 of the Constitution. Reference is answered accordingly.