Judgment I.P.Singh, J. 1. This application in revision under Sections 397 and 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short the Code) is directed against the judgment dated 18-8-1992, passed in Cr. Appeal No. 133 of 1991 by Shri Aditya Sharan, Sessions Judge, Gaya, by which the learned Sessions Judge confirmed judgment dated 23-9-1991, passed by Sri U. S. Prasad, S.D.J.M., Gaya, convicting the petitioner under Section 406 of the Indian Penal Code and sentencing him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of two years and to pay a fine of Rs 5,000 in default, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months. 2. The prosecution case, in short, is that for the benefit and welfare of the persons of Kasera community at Gaya as maintained as "Hai Hai Vanshi Khatriya Kanskar Gaya Manpur Nagar Society" (in short the Society) was formed. The complainant-opposite-party No. 2, filed a complaint petition against the present petitioner under the various sections of the Indian Penal Code in the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Gaya (Complaint Case No. 995/81) alleging therein that the petitioner was elected as the Secretary of this Society and was functioning as such since 1954. Further allegation against the petitioner is that he used to manage the entire affairs of the Society and also used to collect the funds from its members and ours. The Society purchased a house in Muhalla Katothar Talab through its President and the Secretary (the petitioner) for the purpose of a Dharamashala for this Society. Subsequently through another sale-deed another house was purchased by the Society in the name of the petitioner as the Secretary of the Society and also in the name of Jag Narain Prasad as a member of the Society for the Dharamashala. A piece of land was also purchased by the petitioner lying adjacent to this house. The rooms constructed in this Dharamashala were let out to different tenants from whom the petitioner collected the rpnt in the name of the Society in the capacity being its Secretary. However, in a partition suit of the family the petitioner included this Dharmashala building also in the list of the joint family property and got the same partitioned. Accordingly a case under Section 406 of the Indian Penal Code was instituted against him in which he was convicted by the trial court in the manner indicated above. However, in a partition suit of the family the petitioner included this Dharmashala building also in the list of the joint family property and got the same partitioned. Accordingly a case under Section 406 of the Indian Penal Code was instituted against him in which he was convicted by the trial court in the manner indicated above. On appeal this judgment of conviction was upheld. 3. In this application the petitioner has contended that the learned courts below grossly erred in deciding the title of the suit property and exceeded their jurisdiction since the question of title could only be gone into by a civil court. As a matter of fact the question of its title is pending decision in T. S. No. 6/1987 before Sub-Judge I Court, Gaya. The Society in question was established in the year 1954 with the petitioner as its, Secretary. The Society seized to function after 1960, as no meeting of the Society was called. The learned court below exceeded their jurisdiction in deciding the title of the Dharamashala building. The real fact is that the petitioner being annoyed with the members of the old Society decided to built a Dharamashala for the community out of his personal fund and accordingly, purchased the property as mentioned above through Ext 7 and Ext. 7/A. Since the Dharamashala property was purchased out of the personal fund of the petitioner, there was no question of its belonging to the Society. The judgment of conviction against the petitioner is based on wrong facts and the same could not be sustained. The learned court below committed gross errors in law as also on facts in arriving at their findings. The amei (sic) against the weight of evidence on record. The conviction of the petitioner is bad in law and is fit to be set aside. On these grounds amongst others it has been prayed that the impugned judgment and the order of conviction of the courts below be set aside and the petitioner be acquitted. 4. The only point for decision before me is whether this application is fit to be allowed or not. 5. This application has been filed under Sections 397 and 401 of the Code. It is an application in revision. The scope of a revision filed under the aforesaid sections is well defined and from time to time the courts have determined the same. 5. This application has been filed under Sections 397 and 401 of the Code. It is an application in revision. The scope of a revision filed under the aforesaid sections is well defined and from time to time the courts have determined the same. It has been held that revisional court cannot function as an appellate court on all occasions even if their powers are co-extensive. This law is well-settled and has been repeatedly held by the Honble Supreme Court from time to time. To cite one decision a reference may be made to the case of State of Orissa V/s. Nakula Sahu, AIR 1979 SC 663 . This was case under the old Code of the Criminal Procedure in which the revisional powers were contained in Sections 435 and 439 It has been held that althogh the revisional power of the High Court under Section 438 read with Section 435 is as wide as power of the appeal under Section 423 of the Code, it is now well-settled that normally the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 439 is to be exercised only in exceptional cases when there is a glaring defect in the procedure and there is a manifest orror on a point of law which has consequently resulted in flagrant miscarriage of justice. In spite of the wide power under Section 435 the High Court is not expected to act under Section 435 or Section 439 as if it is bearing an appeal. Section 397 of the present Code corresponds to Section 435 of the old Code. Similarly Section 401 of the present Code corresponds to Section 439 of the old Code. 6. From the aforesaid decision it is clear that the scope of the revisional power of this court is to some extent limited and it cannot be co-extensive with its appellate powers. Now coming to Section 397, it is clear that the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceeding before any interior criminal court situated within its jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding sentence or order, recorded or passed, in other words while exercising the revisional power under Section 397 of the Code this Court will have to confine itself to determine the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. While exercising the revisional power this court will normally not enter into a detailed discussion of the facts of the case. This will not mean that the revisional court cannot look into the facts of the case. The only caution required to be taken in this connection is that the facts of the case may be examined only to find out the propriety, legality, correctness of the order. While disposing of the revision application the aforesaid principles below have to be kept in mind. 7. The petitioner has been convicted under Section 406 of the Code for an offence of criminal breach of trust. The ingredients of this section could be satisfied if it is found that the person convicted for criminal breach of trust as defined under Section 405. This definition shows that, whoever being in any manner entrusted with property or with any dominion over the property dishonestly misappropriates or converts to his own use that property or dishonestly uses or disposes of that property in violation of any direction of law prescribing the mode in which such trust is to discharge committed offence of criminal breach of trust. 8. In the present case the allegation against the petitioner is that he was the Secretary of the aforesaid Society from the year 1954 and in this capacity he used to collect rent from tenants of the Dharamshala, used to receive the donation and funds from the members of this Society or members ol the community and also otherwise used to manage the property of the Sociery. It has further been alleged that while discharging the aforesaid trust he committed breach of trust inasmuch as he included this Dharamshala building in a partition suit relating to his family property thereby Knowingly claiming this Dharamshala of the Society as his own. I have carefully perused the judgments of the trial court as well as the lower appellate court, I find that the facts of the case have been properly discussed and the evidence on records has been properly evaluated. The conclusion drawn by the lower courts also appear to be correct and they do not warrant any interference. I have carefully perused the judgments of the trial court as well as the lower appellate court, I find that the facts of the case have been properly discussed and the evidence on records has been properly evaluated. The conclusion drawn by the lower courts also appear to be correct and they do not warrant any interference. As is the prosecution case, when the petitioner was called upon to furnish the accounts of the Society he created a partition deed (Dated 24-7-1981 with respect to this Dharamshala building partitioning the 6ame amongst his relation and thereby misappropriating this property belonging to the Society. There appears to be concurrent finding of two courts that there was entrustment of the property belonging to the Society with the petitioner and the petitioner having dominion over the same dishonestly misappropriated and converted it to his own use. On the basis of oral and documentary evidence on record the trial court as well as the 1st appellate court found beyond all shadow of doubt that the petitioner had committed criminal breach of trust with respect to the said Dharamshala building and fund of, the Society entrusted to his and over which he had dominion. 9. In this connection a reference may be made to paragraph 15 of the judgment of the lower appellate court. In this paragraph the learned Sessions Judge has properly examined the questions of law involved and appears to have come to the correct conclusion. He has firstly found that the aforesaid Society did exist with the petitioner as its Secretary. He has referred Ext. D dated 16-2-1954, showing that the said Society existed on the said date or even prior to it. Ext. D will further show that the people of Kasera community purchased a property in Muhalla Kathokar Talab in the town of Gaya. The name of the present petitioner also figured as one of the purchaser on behalf of the Society, in which he has been described as its Secretary. Ext. D/V is a sale-deed dated 25-3-1960. In this document, executed in favour of the Society the petitioner Dina Nath Prasad have been shown to be its Secretary. Ext, 7/A is another sale-deed dated 3-2-1963. The recital of the deed also shows that it was being purchased for the aforesaid Society in the name of the present petitioner as its Secretary. Ext. 7 is another such sale-deed dated 31-3-1965. Ext, 7/A is another sale-deed dated 3-2-1963. The recital of the deed also shows that it was being purchased for the aforesaid Society in the name of the present petitioner as its Secretary. Ext. 7 is another such sale-deed dated 31-3-1965. According to which some land was purchased in favour of the Society describing the petitioner as its Secretary. Ext. 4 is application dated 5-3-1964 filed before the Special Officer, Gaya Municipality for mutation of the name of the Society over the land purchased through Ext. 7. This application has been filed by nobody else than the present petitioner describing himself as the Secretary of the Society. It is, thus, clear that the above-named Society did exist of which the present petitioner happened to be the Secretary. It also appears that from time to time this Society purchased various properties and in all those sale-deed the petitioner has been described as Secretary of the Society. Even the donation receipts Exts. 6 to 6/D it clearly go to show that the petitioner was receiving the donations on behalf of the Society in the capacity of being its Secretary. However, from Ext. 9/A, which if the certified copy of the judgment passed in an eviction suit relating to a shop of this Dharamshala the petitioner described himself as owner of the Dharamshala. From the aforesaid documents it becomes clear that the charge of criminal breach of trust against the petitioner has been proved to the hilt. 10. From the discussions made above 1 do not find any merit in this revision application. This revision application is accordingly dismissed.