N. L. GANGULY, J. This writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitu tion is filed by the landlady-owner of the premises in question. The respondent is a tenant of the premises. 2. An application under Section 21 (1) (a)of the U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972 was moved by the owner for release on the ground that she was living with her mother-in-law Smt. Niyazan Begum in her house. The said house was disposed of under a decree passed by the Civil Court in original suit No. 311 of 1975. Thereafter the petitioner came and started living with her mother Smt. Sayeeda Begum. The house of the petitioners mother Smt. Sayeeda Begum consists of two rooms in the ground-floor and one Baithaka at the upper storey and three families were residing in it. Ultimately she had to shift and take another accommodation on rent at the rate of Rs. 120 per month for her residence. The application under Section 21 giving rise to the present writ petition was filed when the petitioner was in fact giving in the rented accommodation. In the application under Section 21 it was said in para 10 that the application has a personal need as well as desires to live in her own house. 3. The case was contested by the respondent by filing a written state ment and affidavits were exchanged between the parties and affidavits of wit nesses were filed. The copies of the application and written statement are on the record. 4. The learned counsel for the parties placed the application and the written statement before the court. The perusal of these two documents and the judgment of both the courts below do not show the extent of the size of the accommodation in possession of the petitioner and the tenant respondent. It has come in evidence as well as finding of the prescribed authority that the family of the petitioner consists of eight persons and the size of the accom modation in possession of the petitioner is one room and one Baithak. Neither the respondent disclosed the size and area of the accommodation in his tenancy nor did he disclose the number of his family members. The prescribed authority in its judgment, after referring to the pleading of the petitioner and the defence of the respondent, finally allowed the application under Section 21. Neither the respondent disclosed the size and area of the accommodation in his tenancy nor did he disclose the number of his family members. The prescribed authority in its judgment, after referring to the pleading of the petitioner and the defence of the respondent, finally allowed the application under Section 21. The perusal of the judgment of the prescribed authority shows that there is no clear and categorical finding about comparative hard ship of the tenant-respondent and it has not been specifically mentioned why it was necessary to release the accommodation in favour of the petitioner. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the narration of fact and observations in the judgment of the prescribed authority indicate that the prescribed authority applied its mind and was legally correct in making such observations which are not mere observations but findings about the bona fide need and there was no further necessity of finding of more elaborate reasons about comparative hardship. 5. The respondent being aggrieved by the judgment of the prescribed authority filed an appeal before the District Judge, which was transferred and finally decided by the V Additional District Judge, Bareilly by the impugned judgment. In appeal the judgment of the prescribed authority was set aside and the appeal was allowed. 6. Heard Sri Vipin Sinha, counsel for the petitioner and Sri K. M. L. Hajela and Sri T. P. Singh, counsel for the respondent and perused the record of the case. 7. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the lower appellate court committed an error apparent on the face of the record and formulated the question that the lower appellate court erroneously reversed the findings recorded by the prescribed authority about the bona fide need and erroneously observed that the application of the petitioner was insufficiently worded and there was no statement of fact that the accommodation was bona fide needed by the landlady. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that it is not a stray sentence in the application which is to be taken into consideration but the entire application should have been read, which gives a clear indication of the fact that the landlady need the accommodation bona fide for her residence. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that it is not a stray sentence in the application which is to be taken into consideration but the entire application should have been read, which gives a clear indication of the fact that the landlady need the accommodation bona fide for her residence. The learned counsel for the petitioner also pointed out that the lower appellate court refused to consider the evidence adduced by the petitioner on the basis of affidavits before the prescribed authority and also the rejoinder affidavit filed by the petitioner was ignored by the lower appellate court on the ground that certain facts stated in the rejoinder affidavit, which were new facts and certain such other facts about which there was no pleading in the application under Section 21 filed originally and the facts stated in the rejoinder affidavit, if taken into consideration, would amount to shut the mouth of the respondent from adducing evidence. In other words, the rejoinder was not accepted as there no opportunity for rebutting the allegations contained therein to the tenant-respondent. The learned counsel for the petitioner lastly submitted that the lower appellate court had not decided the case in proper perspective and while considering the bona fide need and com parative hardship of the parties there is no finding by the lower appellate court based on cogent evidence which may show that the extent of accommodation in possession of the petitioner and the number of family members in her family and the accommodation in the tenancy in possession of the respondent and his family members was such in case the release application of the landlady was allowed the hardship of the tenant would be greater or vice versa. 8. The learned counsel for the respondent Sri K. M. L. Hajela sub mitted that the lower appellate court has correctly appreciated the evidence on record and the findings are pure findings of fact arrived at after appraisal of evidence. As submitted that there are no compelling circumstances which may be said sufficient for interference under Article 226 of the Constitution. The learned counsel for the respondent placed reliance on the case reported in AIR 1992 SC 1790, Smt. Parvatibai Subhanrao Nalawade v. Anwarali Hasanah Makani and others. As submitted that there are no compelling circumstances which may be said sufficient for interference under Article 226 of the Constitution. The learned counsel for the respondent placed reliance on the case reported in AIR 1992 SC 1790, Smt. Parvatibai Subhanrao Nalawade v. Anwarali Hasanah Makani and others. He placed reliance on para 10 of the said case and sub mitted that interference in a writ petition in respect of immovable property would be wholly uncalled for. He placed reliance on the observations of the Supreme Court that "before closing this judgment we would like to emphasis that in cases relating to immovable property, which are governed by the ordinary civil law, the High Court should not exercise its special jurisdiction under the Constitution unless the circumstances are exceptional". The law pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondent is settled law and there can be no two opinions about the observations of the Supreme Court. The facts and circumstances of the present case are also to be taken into considera tion. The fact that the landlady, who is living in a tenanted accommodation was found to be correct. Her case about bona fide need was accepted by the prescribed authority and the said finding was reversed by the lower appellate, court. The exceptional circumstances, which necessitate this court to look into the evidence, show that in arriving at the conclusion the lower appellate court had not taken note of most important fact that was necessary for arriving at a conclusion that the comparative hardship of the parties lay in favour of the tenant. In my view, this is an important and exceptional circumstance which calls for interference in the present case. 9. The learned counsel for the petitioner cited 1988 (1) ARC 123, Pannalal and another v. Dr. Raj Kumar Singh and others. The learned counsel for the respondent submitted that explanation (3) of Section 21 (1) (a) of the U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972 was not attracted and the Court was not required to go into the question of comparative hardship in such a case. The decision cited by the learned counsel is wholly inapplicable to the present case. It was a case tiled by two brothers, one whom retired from Air Force Service and the other was already in service of Air Force. The decision cited by the learned counsel is wholly inapplicable to the present case. It was a case tiled by two brothers, one whom retired from Air Force Service and the other was already in service of Air Force. In such a circumstance Explana tion (3) of Section 21 (1) (a) was considered by this Court, but in the present case there is no such factual controversy nor the facts held the petitioner in any manner. 10. The learned counsel for the respondent also cited 1986 (1) ARC 192 Ramdhani and others v. IInd Additional District Judge, Varanasi and others, The learned counsel pointed out that this court in the said judgment observed in paras 10, 12 and 13 that the finding of bona fide need and comparative hardship examination by the High Court was found well supported by the evidence on record. In such circumstances the High Court cannot interfere with such findings. There is no quarrel with the proposition of law but in the present case this Court has not accepted the submission of the learned counsel for the respondent or accepted the observation of the court below about the finding regarding comparative hardship as recorded by the lower appellate court. The reason for holding that the finding of the lower appellate court about comparative hardship has already been stated above and 1 shall deal further in subsequent paras. 11. As observed above, it was necessary for the court below to decide the case to advance substantial justice between the parties. It is not a stray sentence of the application or the written statement but the entire facts stated in the application or the written statement are always be taken into considera tion while deciding a case of this nature. It has not to be forgotten that, as stated in the application, the landlady was living with her mother-in-law in the house owned by the latter. It is also said that the house of the applicants mother-in-law was sole in pursuance of a decree of the Civil Court. It has also been said that the landlady after shifting from house of her mother-in-law had come to stay with her own mother, where she had only two rooms. It is also said that thereafter the landlady took the accommodation wherein she was living as a tenant. The said accommodation consisted of one room and one Baithak. It has also been said that the landlady after shifting from house of her mother-in-law had come to stay with her own mother, where she had only two rooms. It is also said that thereafter the landlady took the accommodation wherein she was living as a tenant. The said accommodation consisted of one room and one Baithak. Thus if she says that she wants to live in her own house and desires to live in the same, it does not mean that it is a mere desire. The facts and circumstances in which she says so has to be taken note of. The other respect of the matter is that what is the size of the family of the land lady. It has come in evidence and finding of the prescribed authority that the size of landladys family is eight members. The respondent neither disclosed in the written statement nor there is any such finding in the judgments of both the courts below about the tent of the area of the house in the tenancy of the respondent and number of his family members. The Court could arrive at a conclusion about hardship only when full and correct facts were brought on record. It is unfortunate that the courts below had not adverted themselves to find out or enquire about the above two facts before arriving the conclusion regarding bonafide need and comparative hardship between the parties. It would thus be necessary that the matter be remanded to the court below itself for recording finding on these questions. 12. The learned counsel for the respondent submitted that certain facts were stated in the rejoinder affidavit, which were not new and the lower appellate court had not taken into consideration the rejoinder affidavit on the ground that there was no opportunity for the respondent to rebut the said allegations. 13. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties on this aspect I am of the view that the litigation between the parties is to be decided once for all and should not be left for another inning. If certain facts have been stated in the rejoinder affidavit it is a must that the respondent should be given oppor tunity to rebut the same. Thus I am on the view that the writ petition deserves to be allowed. 14. If certain facts have been stated in the rejoinder affidavit it is a must that the respondent should be given oppor tunity to rebut the same. Thus I am on the view that the writ petition deserves to be allowed. 14. The writ petition is allowed, the judgment of both the courts below are quashed and the pre scribed authority is directed to decide the case in accordance with the observations made above giving opportunity to the respondents to file such reply and documentary evidence as he desires before the prescribed authority. The prescribed authority shall permit the parties to lead evidence by filing of affidavits before it about the num ber of their family members, as well as documentary evidence, if any. After concluding and complying with the above directions before deciding the case the prescribed authority is directed to make a local inspection of the house of the petitioner and that of the respondent and shall make a memorandum of the exact size and area of the accommodation in possession of the parties and then decide the case finally in accordance with law within a period of one year from the date of filing of a certified copy of this judgment. The prescribed authority is further directed not to grant frivolous adjournment to either of the parties. Petition allowed. .