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1995 DIGILAW 542 (BOM)

Gurunath Madhavrao Jamalpure v. Zilla Parishad Teachers Co-op. Credit Society, Ltd. and others.

1995-11-15

N.P.CHAPALGAONKER

body1995
JUDGMENT - N.P. CHAPALGAONKER, J. :---Heard Shri V.G. Sakolkar, learned Counsel for the petitioner, Shri Kishore Patil, learned A.G.P. for respondent Nos. 2 and 3 and Shri D.N. Suryawanshi, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 4. 2. Rule. Taken up for final hearing forthwith by consent. 3. Petitioner's nomination is rejected on the ground that he was a member of the committee, which was removed under section 78 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 and, therefore, is not entitled for re-election in the next following elections. The order of the Returning Officer was challenged before the Assistant Registrar, Co-operative Societies in Appeal No. 9/1995 under section 52-A the Co-operative Societies Act. The said appeal came to be dismissed. This writ petition challenges the said order of the Assistant Registrar dismissing the appeal along with the rejection of nomination paper by the Returning Officer. Shri V.G. Sakolkar, learned Counsel for the petitioner relied on the judgment of this Court in the case of (Bhujangrao Narayanrao Deshmukh v. State of Maharashtra)1, reported in 1995(1) Mh.L.J. 437 and also contended that the bar to eligibility of a member to be re-elected is limited to individual member if he is so removed and not to the committee as a whole. According to Shri Sakolkar, the petitioner was not individually removed but the whole committee was removed and, therefore, the proviso to Clause (b) to sub-section (1) of section 78 does not apply and his nomination paper is wrongly rejected. 4. Shri. D.N. Suryawanshi, learned Counsel for the respondent, submitted that the decision of this Court in Bhujangrao's case (cited supra) needs reconsideration and the matter may be referred to a larger Bench. He submitted that so far as the individual defaulters are concerned, care was taken to provide for their removal and punishment in section 73-FF and 73-FFF and what has been provided under section 78 is to take action against the collective default and, therefore, if under section 78, a committee is removed, all members of the committee shall have to be construed to have been individually removed and the proviso would be applicable to each one of them though a common order against all committee members is passed. 5. 5. Shri Suryawanshi further contended that the mechanical approach in interpretation is likely to defeat the very purpose of the Act and, therefore, a purposeful construction will have to be gathered by properly interpreting the proviso. He submitted that since the action against an individual member was well taken care of in other provisions of the statute, there was no need to add this proviso in section 78 unless we interpret it to be applicable to all members of the committee when collective action is taken against a committee of its removal. 6. Section 73-FF speaks about disqualification for membership of a committee and section 73-FFF provides for eligibility for reappointment or re-election as a member of a committee. In fact, section 73-FFF provides for a period of qualifying during which the defaulter member will have to be kept away from the co-operative movements. Section 78 is a power entrusted in the Registrar for removal of the committee or the member thereof for certain reasons. It is true that a disqualification under section 73-FF also will not come into play so far as the sitting members of the committee are concerned, unless they are removed by the Registrar after an inquiry under section 78 by giving due opportunity but in case of their qualification to be a candidate at the election, no such inquiry is contemplated and if the committee defaults, under section 73-FF, they are disqualified and their nomination papers can well be rejected. 7. Section 78 authorises the Registrar to remove a committee or a member. Needless to say that two types of defaults are dealt with in this provision. The first one is the collective act or collective omission by the committee in making default or being negligent in performance of the duties imposed on them or in wilfully disobeying the directions issued by the State Government or by the Registrar for the purpose of securing proper implementation of co-operative policies approved or undertaken by the State Government or in other words, not discharging the functions of the committee properly and diligently. A collective act or omission is totally different from an individual act or omission. A committee of a co-operative society, with which the management of the society vests under section 73, is a body corporate and acts as such. A collective act or omission is totally different from an individual act or omission. A committee of a co-operative society, with which the management of the society vests under section 73, is a body corporate and acts as such. Sometimes, an individual member may not be a willing party with the decision taken by the committee or might be absent when a particular act or omission was done by the committee. When it is felt that the committee as a whole, has failed in its duty, it is not necessary to scan the role played by an individual in it and the Registrar will be fully justified in removing the whole committee, as empowered by section 78. 8. However, section 78 also empowers the Registrar to consider the acts and omissions by an individual, who are members of the committee and take action against them. If an individual member is found guilty of the lapses as mentioned in sub-section (1) of section 78, the Registrar may remove him. If a committee is removed, the Registrar has a power to appoint a committee consisting of three or more members who shall not be the members of the committee so removed or appoint one or more Administrators, who need not be the members of the society for a period of six months, which can be extended by further three months. The members of the committee, which is removed, are not entitled to be re-appointed as the members of the committee appointed by the Registrar but they are very much eligible for re-election when the new election takes place. 9. In the light of this provision, we have to consider that what is the purpose and import of the proviso added below Clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 78 by the Act No. 13 of 1994. The proviso is as follows :--- "Provided that, the member who has been so removed, shall not be eligible to be re-elected, re-appointed, re-nominated or re-co-opted, as a member of the committee till the expiry of the period of next one full term of the committee from the date on which he has been so removed." Firstly, we will have to bear in mind that this is a penal provision which has to be construed strictly. This imposes an action of punishment and, therefore, unless the words of the Statute are clear, we can not bring more persons under the umbrella of this provision than is intended by the Legislature. It speaks about the single member and not of committee. It has been added just below Clause (b) of sub-section (1), which provides for removal of the member. 10. It is true that in some cases, a proviso may be applicable to whole of the section and not only to any part thereof. It is also true that in cases, the proviso may be a substantive provision itself and could be read without reference to the main section. But the present case is not so. If under section 78, the Registrar removes somebody and the case is not covered by section 75-FFF, then what should be the period for which the person so removed is disqualified? It has been provided for by this proviso. If this proviso would not have been there, an interpretation would have been possible that if a member is removed by the Registrar, then he is entitled for re-election whenever such election takes place without any period of disqualification. This would have been contrary to the intention of the Legislature which is very much explicit from the scheme of the Act, as is evident from reading section 73-FFF and 78 together. Therefore, I do not find that a different view from the view taken by Mane, J., in Bhujangrao's case (cited supra) is required or any re-consideration of the Bhujangrao's case is necessary. 11. The view that the proviso applies to the members when individually removed for individual act is not based on a mechanical approach that the proviso follows Clause (b) of sub-section (1) but it is based on the consideration that the provisions about disqualification will have to be read as a whole and the statute will have to be put to a homogeneous construction. The purposeful reading of the proviso impugned brings one to an inevitable result that it was provided for a different purpose than was taken care in Clause (a)(ii) of sub-section (1) of section 78, which is disqualifying the members of the erstwhile committee from being nominated as the members of the committee appointed by the Registrar. The purposeful reading of the proviso impugned brings one to an inevitable result that it was provided for a different purpose than was taken care in Clause (a)(ii) of sub-section (1) of section 78, which is disqualifying the members of the erstwhile committee from being nominated as the members of the committee appointed by the Registrar. The Legislature thought that when an individual member is removed for his act or omission, he will have to be kept away from the co-operative movements for a certain period and the period has been prescribed in the proviso. 12. In the instant case, admittedly the whole committee was removed and thereafter the elections are taking place. Therefore, the nomination paper of the petitioner was improperly rejected by misinterpreting the provisions of section 78(1)(b). In this view of the matter, the order passed by the Returning Officer on 18-10-1995 and by the Assistant Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Udgir on 27-10-1995 in Appeal No. 10/1995 will have to be set aside. 13. I direct that the petitioner's nomination be accepted and he be allowed to contest the ensuing elections. Rule made absolute in the above terms. No order as to costs. Petition allowed.