Judgment : Heard the learned counsel for the parties. 2. The petitioner has filed this writ petition challenging the order dated 211. 1984 passed by the first respondent in I.A. Nos.452 and 453 of 1984 in I.D. No.322 of 1981 and has sought for quashing the same. 3. Briefly stated the facts which are considered necessary for the disposal of this writ petition are the Petitioner is She owner of a Cinema theatre by name Ramesh Theatre., Cuddalore. The second respondent raised an industrial, dispute over his nonemployment under sub-sec (2) of Sec.33-C of the industrial Disputes Act, ;947 (for short, ‘the Act’), and the same was referred for adjudication to the first respondent I.D. No.322 of 1981, The petitioner had entrusted the management of the the are tempotarily to another person and was living at Madras for certain domestic reasons beyond -us control, and he was not posted with the infomation relating to the hearing of the afore-mentioned industrial dispute before the first respondent. It is further stated that the first respondent had not sent, any notice of hearing under registered post ackowledgment due, to the petitioner. However, the first respondent proceeded to pass an expere a ward on 24.1,198.3 which was published in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette dated 3. 1983. 4. According to the petitioner, one S. Regothama Rao sor.of T. Srinivasa Rao informed the petitioner at Mad -as about the award, as he had no chance to know about the passing of the award. Thereafter the petitioner on 27 6.1984 filed LA. Nos.452 and 453 of 1984 for condonation of delay in filing the applicator to set aside the ex parte award, and to set aside the ex parte award respectively. The first respondent dismissed the said applications by a common order, which is impugned in this writ petition, placing reliance on the decision in Grindlays Bank v. Central Government Industrial Tribunal and others, (1981)1 L.L.J. 32’7 and held that he had become functus officio when once the award had been published, It is aggrieved by that order, the present writ petition is filed for Quashing the same. 5. The second respondent has filed a counter-affidavitresisting the claim of the petitioner. 5. The second respondent has filed a counter-affidavitresisting the claim of the petitioner. It is contended that the affidavit sworn to by one S. Raghothama Rao on behalf of the petitioner is not in order: and the writ petition filed by the petitioner is not maintainable on that account. It is denied that no notice of hearing was sent to the petitioner by the first respondent. It is further submitted that the first respondent sent notices to the petitioner for each adjourned date of hearing. The case was posted for enquiry before the first respondent on various dates and finally the award was passed on 21. 1983. The petitioner was fully aware of the award. It is further contended that after the publication of the award in the official gazette, the first respondent became functus officio and he had no jurisdiction to pass orders in I.A. Nos.452 and 453 of 1984 having regard to Sec.17 of the Act. According to the second respondent, Rule 48(2) of the Tamil Nadu Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958 (for short, ‘the Rules’) has no application to the facts of the present case. Under the circumstances, the second respondent has prayed for the dismissal of the writ petition. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the impugned order is unsustainable as the first respondent failed to take note of Rule 48(2) of the Rules. The decision relied upon by the first respondent in dismissing the applications filed by the petitioner was the one passed without reference to Rule 48(2) of the Rules. According to her, it is one thing to say that the delay could not be condoned, but it is yet another thing to say that the first respondent had become functus officio and as such he had no jurisdiction to pass orders. She prayed that the writ petition may be allowed, the impugned order be set aside and the first respondent be directed to dispose of the applications on merits having regard to Rule 48(2) of the Rules. 7. Per contra, learned counsel representing the second respondent submitted that having regard to the plain and clear language of Secs.17 and 17-A of the Act, after publication of the award in the official gazette, the first respondent became functus officio and he had no jurisdiction to entertain the applications in LA. Nos.452 and 453 of 1984. 7. Per contra, learned counsel representing the second respondent submitted that having regard to the plain and clear language of Secs.17 and 17-A of the Act, after publication of the award in the official gazette, the first respondent became functus officio and he had no jurisdiction to entertain the applications in LA. Nos.452 and 453 of 1984. According to him, the benefit of Rule 48(2) was available to the petitioner until the time the award became enforceable, and if the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is to be accepted, then Rule 48(2) of the Rules will have over-riding effect on Secs.17 and 17-A of the Act, which is not permissible. Thus, the impugned order, according to the learned counsel for the second respondent, is perfectly valid and justified. In support of his submissions he placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of "Grindlays Bank" referred to and relied on in the impugned order itself." 8. I have considered the submissions of the learned counsel. The facts which are not in dispute are: Ex parte order was passed by the first respondent on 1. 1983 and thereafter an award was passed on 21. 1983 pursuant to the ex parts order. The award was punished in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette on 3. 1983. The applications I.A.Nos.452 and 453 of 1984 were filed by the petitioner before the first respondent on 26. 1984 for condonation of delay and for setting aside the ex parte award respectively. The said applications were dismissed by the first respondent by order dated 211. 1984. 9. Sec. 17(1) of the Act states: "Every report of a Board or Court together with any minute of dissent recorded therewith, every arbitration award and every award of a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal shall, within a period of thirty days from the date of its receipt by the appropriate Government, be published in such manner as the appropriate Government thinks fit." The award having been received, the same was published in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette on 3. 1983 as stated above in the case on hand. 10. 1983 as stated above in the case on hand. 10. Sec.17(2)states, "Subject to the provisions of Sec.17-a the award published under Sub-sec.(l) shall be final and shall not be called in question by any Court in any manner whatsoever." As per Sec.17-A of the Act, the award shall become enforceable on the expiry of thirty days from the date of its publication under Sec.17 of the Act subject to certain conditions mentioned under Sec. 17-A. But none of those conditions exist in this case. In other words, the award became enforceable on 4. 1983. This being the position, the first respondent had become functus officio inasmuch as even the ex parte award could not be called in question before the first respondent tor setting aside the same. 11. Rule 48(2) of the Rules reads thus: "The Board, Court. Labour Court, or Tribunal or an Arbitrator may, for sufficient cause, set aside, after notice to the opposite party, the ex parte decision either wholly or in part, on an application made within 15 days of the ex parte decision: Provided that an application may be admitted after the said period of 15 days, if the applicant satisfies the Board, Court, Labour Court or Tribunal or Arbitrator, as the case may be, that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the application within that period." As could be seen from the rule extracted above, the Board, Court or Tribunal may, for sufficient cause, set aside ex parte decision after notice to the opposite party on an application made within 15 days from the date of the ex parte decision, provided that an application may be admitted after the said period of 15 days, if the applicant satisfies that he had sufficient cause for the delay. This rule does not advance the case of the petitioner to state that such an application for condonation of delay can be filed even after the award was published in the official gazette and became enforceable. 12. A harmonious construction has to be made be-tween Secs. 17, 17-A and 20(3) of the Act and Rule 48(2) of the Rules. The application has to be filed under Rule 48(2) of the Rules before she award became enforceable under Sec.17-A of the Act. in the instant case, having regard to the dates mentioned above, the award became enforceable on 4. 17, 17-A and 20(3) of the Act and Rule 48(2) of the Rules. The application has to be filed under Rule 48(2) of the Rules before she award became enforceable under Sec.17-A of the Act. in the instant case, having regard to the dates mentioned above, the award became enforceable on 4. 1988 The petitioner could not make the applications I A. Nos.452 and 453 of 1984 before the first respondent. I in as much as the first respondent had become funcus officio. This view gets support from the decision the Supreme Court in the case of Grindlays Bank v. Central Government Industrial Tribunal and others, (1981) 1 L.L.J. 327 . 13. Sub-sec.(3) of Sec.20 of the Act reads thus: "Proceedings before an arbitrator under Sec.10-A or before a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal shall be deemed to have commenced on the date of the reference of the dispute for arbitration or adjudication, as the case may be, and such proceedings shall be deemed to have concluded on the date on which the award becomes enforceable under Sec.17-A." In this regard it is useful to extract a portion of paragraph 14 of the judgment in "Grindlays Bank Limited" referred to above, which reads as follows: "The contention that the Tribunal had become functus officio and, therefore, had no jurisdiction to set aside the award and that the Central Government alone could set it aside, does not commend to us Sub-sec.(3) of Sec.20 of the Act provides that the proceedings before the tribunal would be deemed to continue till the date on which the award becomes enforceable under Sec.17-A. Under Sec. 17-A of the Act, an award-becomes enforceable on the expiry of 30 days, from the date of its publication under Sec.17. The proceedings with regard to a reference under Sec.10 of the Act are, therefore, not deemed to be concluded until the expiry of 30 days from the publication of the award. Till then the Tribunal retains jurisdiction over the dispute referred to it for adjudication and up to that date it has the power to entertain an application in connection with such dispute. That stage is not reached till the award becomes enforceable under Sec. 17-A. 14. Till then the Tribunal retains jurisdiction over the dispute referred to it for adjudication and up to that date it has the power to entertain an application in connection with such dispute. That stage is not reached till the award becomes enforceable under Sec. 17-A. 14. Under Rule 48(2) the Board, the Court, Labour Court or Tribunal or an Arbitrator may, for sufficient cause, set aside, after notice to the opposite party, the ex parte decision either wholly or in part, on an application made within 15 days of the ex parte decision, provided that an application may be admitted after the said period of i 5 days on satisfaction that the applicant had sufficient cause for not preferring such application within that period. The reference in this Rule is to the ex parte decision and not the Award. In view of Sec.17 (2), subject to the provisions of Sec.17-A, the award published under Sub-sec.(i) becomes final and shall not be called in question by any Court in any manner whatsoever. Further as per Sec.17-A, the award becomes enforceable on the expiry of 30 days from the date of its publication under Sec.17 of the Act subject to certain conditions. As already stated above, none of the conditions are attracted to the facts of this case. In the instant case the award became enforceable on 4. 1983 as it was published under Sec.17(1} of the Act on 3. 1983. 15. Thus having regard to the facts of the case on hand, in the light of the provisions of the Act and Rules extracted above, and in the light of the decision of the Supreme Court aforementioned, without any hesitation. I hold that the benefit of Rule 48(2) of the Rules cannot be availed after the award became enforceable in terms of Sec. 17-A of the Act. The proceedings before the first respondent (The Presiding Officer, First Additional Labour Court, Madras) could be deemed to continue under Sec.20(3) of the Act till the. Award became enforceable on 4. 1983. Thus the first respondent retained jurisdiction over the dispute referred to it for adjudication until the expiry of 30 days from the publication of the Award and not beyond that date. In this view the first respondent was right in dismissing the applications LA. Nos.452 and 453 of 1984 by the impugned order which is unassailable. 16. 1983. Thus the first respondent retained jurisdiction over the dispute referred to it for adjudication until the expiry of 30 days from the publication of the Award and not beyond that date. In this view the first respondent was right in dismissing the applications LA. Nos.452 and 453 of 1984 by the impugned order which is unassailable. 16. In the result, for the reasons stated above, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed. Accordingly, it is dismissed, but with no order as to costs. 17. At this stage, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the second respondent is gainfully employed in some other cinema theatre. If that is so, it is open to the petitioner to raise such plea and establish the same when the second respondent makes a claim for back wages. 18. The learned counsel for the respondent No.2 submitted that in W.M.P.Nos.6043 of 1985 and 282 of 1987 this Court passed an order on 24. 1987 making the interim stay absolute subject to the con- dition that the petitioner deposited to the credit of I.D. No.322 of 1981 a sum of Rs. 15,820 stated to represent the arrears of salary, bonus etc., upto date within four week from that date. It is stated that the petitioner had deposited the said amount. If that be so, in view of the order passed dismissing the writ petition, the second respondent is entitled to withdraw the said amount with accrued interest.