DEEPAK VERMA, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner has filed this petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution cf India, challenging the legality and validity of his transfer order dated 23-1-1992 (Ann. T) passed by the Managing Director of the respondent no. 1 transferring him from Ujain Dugdha Sangha Maryadit, ujjain to Gwalior Dugdh a Sangha, Gwalior as also the relieving order dated 4-12-1992. Show cause notices against admission of the petition were issued to the respondents who have filed their return. ( 2 ) THE facts material for deciding the petition are mentioned herein below : The petitioner contends that he is an emplyee of the respondent no. 2 ujjain Dugdha Sangh Sahakari Maryadit (for short 'the respondent no. 2)which is a registered society. He has further averred that he was appointed as Stenographer on 9-12-79 vide Ann. A. All through he had deligently and honestly worked in that capacity and held meritorious service record. There were no complaints againsd him. The further contention is that the respondents 1 and 2 are 'state' within the meaning of Art 12 of the Constitution of india and as such they are amenable to writ jurisdiction. ( 3 ) ACCORDING to the petitioner he belongs to non-cadre employees and for that he relies on circulars which are Ann. 'b' and 'c' to the petition. The respondent no. 4 had been working as senior Stenographer with Gwalior dugdha Sangha Sahakati Maryadit, Gwalior. The transfer of the respondent no. 4 to respondent no 2 had been objected to by the respondent no. 2. Thus, in any case the petitioner could not have been transferred in place of respondent no. 4. The transfer of the respondent no. 4 is dated 29-9-1992 (Ann F)to the petition. The petitioner is aggrieved by these orders by which he has been sent to Gwatior and in his place the respondent no. 4 has been sent. ( 4 ) THE petitioner attacks the said order of transfer on the ground that the transfer order Ann, 1' was never served on the petitioner and it was tried to be executed much after the then Managing Director Mr. Mousing was already relieved from the said office and he was no more the Managing Director of respondent no. 1, His further contention is that only on the basis of photo copy of the said order, the same could not be implemented. Mousing was already relieved from the said office and he was no more the Managing Director of respondent no. 1, His further contention is that only on the basis of photo copy of the said order, the same could not be implemented. He has also attacked the said transfer on the ground that the same is without jurisdiction and without any authority of law as the respondent no. 1 is neither competent nor the proper authority to pass such an order. His submission is that he being an employee belonging to noncadre category therefore, the transfer order could have been effected by the ujjain Dugdha Sangh where he is working and none else. On various other grounds also the said order is sought to be challenged. ( 5 ) IN reply, the respondents have opposed the petition and have submitted that the respondents are not the 'state' with the meaning of Art. 12 of the Constitution. For such a preposition the respondents have relied on. a decision reported in M. P. No. 1578/92 Narendra Patsingh v. U. P. Dugdha songha Satiakari Maryadit Bhopal and others, (F B) decided on 22-6-1993, The submission of the respondent is that in view of the Full Bench judgment the respondents are not amenable to writ jurisdiction. The operative part of the judgment reads as follows :"in the result, we dispose of the reference made in the two petitions by giving our answer to question no. 1 in negative. However, we answer to question no. 2 as follows : even if the respondents-Societies cannot be characterised as 'state' within the meaning of Art. 12 of the Constitution and as such are not amenable to challengs writ jurisdiction, if the Society or its Officers act in violation, of statutory public duty, a writ would lie for enforcement of staturory obligations and public duty. "thus, on this ground it has been mentioned that no relief can be granted to the petitioner. ( 6 ) IT has further been submitted in reply that mere signing of the transfer order as a 'true copy' by respondent no. 3 would not mean that the petitioner was transferred at his instance. The petitioner's contention with regard to cadre and non-cadre employees is incorrect and without correct factual basis. Further submission is that even the non-cadre employees are selected by the respondent no. 1 The respondent no. 3 would not mean that the petitioner was transferred at his instance. The petitioner's contention with regard to cadre and non-cadre employees is incorrect and without correct factual basis. Further submission is that even the non-cadre employees are selected by the respondent no. 1 The respondent no. 2 only issues formal appointments already made by the respondent no. 1 and it also fortified from the Circulars 'b and C'. It has also been submitted that the said circular's will not have any retrospective effect as they were issued in the year 1. 984 whereas the petitioner was appointed in the year 1979. ( 7 ) THE respondents have further mentioned that the petitioner was relieved on 4-12-1992. After transfer order was received from the respondent no. 1, copy of the transfer order was duly served on petitioner and the said fact has also been admitted by him. Even assuming that the same could not be served immediately but on account of lapse of time it would not affect its validity. The sigpatures of the respondent no. 3 on the impugned transfer order Ann. 'i' only testified and verifies the authenticity of the said order. Only by signing as 'true copy' on it, he would not become the author of the said document Apart, from above, the respondents have denied all other allegations and have submitted that it is sole domain of the employer to transfer its employee from one place to another on account of administrative exigencies. ( 8 ) IT has also been mentioned in the return that after passing of the order of stay in the instant petition by this court, the petitioner appears to have left Ujjain. He has not reported for duty to the answering respondents after the said order of stay. Consequently he would not be entitled to any other consequential reliefs even if he succeeds in the petition. ( 9 ) I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record, ( 10 ) IN view of the Full Bench decision of this Court as mentioned above a writ against such society can be issued only if the impugned order has been passed in violation of statutory provisions or is mala fide. ( 9 ) I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record, ( 10 ) IN view of the Full Bench decision of this Court as mentioned above a writ against such society can be issued only if the impugned order has been passed in violation of statutory provisions or is mala fide. Here in the instant ease the counsel for the petitioner has not been able to convince me that the said transfer order is against any statutory provisions or the same has been passed with some mala fide intentions. T am afraid, in absence of any malic the petitioner shall not be in a position to challenge the said orders and consequently no writ can be issued against the respondents. Transfer it an exigence of service condition. ( 11 ) COUNSEL for the respondents has also submitted that the ratio of the full Bench judgment of the High Court his been approved of by the Supreme court in S. L. P. No. 6866-67/94 in its judgment dated 16-3-1994, and a photo copy of the same has been filed during the course of hearing While dismissing the said S. L P, it has been held by the Supreme Court that ordinarily the High Court should not have interferred with the order of employer transferring one employee from one place in its administrative control to another place under the same administration, but no other observations have been made. Perusal of Ann. T shows that the same was passed by the then Managing director of the respondent no. 1 but the same could not be executed immediately for some reason. Even though the copy of the same was endorsed to the petitioner also and it is inconceivable to believe that he had not received it, more so, when the same has been filed in this petition as Aim. 'i'. In the mean while, the then Managing Director of the respondent no. 1 was transferred. Since the service of the said transfer order on the petitioner had taken place when there was some other Managing Director working for the respondent no. 1 therefore the respondent no. 3 had written 'true copy' on the same. He had in no way mandated the same. He was only trying to get the said order executed, through its copy. Since the service of the said transfer order on the petitioner had taken place when there was some other Managing Director working for the respondent no. 1 therefore the respondent no. 3 had written 'true copy' on the same. He had in no way mandated the same. He was only trying to get the said order executed, through its copy. ( 12 ) ON this ground also I do not deem it fit to come to the conclusion that on account of this lapse the order would become nonest. As the order of transfer passed by the then Managing Director of the respondent No. 1 was neither revoked nor cancelled at any time, the same continued to be in force was in existence, the respondent No. 3 had a right to serve it upon the petitioner. Thus, on this ground also I do not find any infirmity which may render the said transfer order unexecutable. ( 13 ) THE last contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that in view of the circulars as also in view of the fact that the petitioner belongs to noncadre category, there fore, it was only the respondent No. 2 who could have transferred him. It is admitted that the respondent no. 1 is the Apex body of all these Sanghs and has got an over all administrative contol over them. In the circulars and the Bye-laws, on which the petitioner is placing reliance do not even deal with regard to transfers of employees. The said sangh's have no power or jurisdiction ia the matter of transfers. Thus, this contention is also devoid of any merit and substance and it is held that the respondent no. I has authority to pass an order of transfer. ( 14 ) YET, another important factor in the matter is that after the passing of the order of stay in favour of the petitioner on 3-2-1993, he has not reported for duty. His whereabouts, are not known. A statement has been made in this regard, which has been supported by an affidavit. There is no rebuttal of the same by the petitioner. The petitioner has not denied the said fact that he has been going on duty even after the stay order was passed, thus, in any case the equity does not swing in favour of the petitioner. There is no rebuttal of the same by the petitioner. The petitioner has not denied the said fact that he has been going on duty even after the stay order was passed, thus, in any case the equity does not swing in favour of the petitioner. On the one hand the petitioner is attacking the said order by filing the instant petition and after the grant of stay in his favour, he has not reported for duty this conduct clearly shows that he is not serious about the whole affair It is not proper for the petitioner to have adopted such tactics ( 15 ) COUNSEL for the petitioner has relied on a decision reported in dinesh Kumar v. M. P. Dugdha Sangha (1994 M. P. L. J.- 92 ). This judgment stipulates that the transfer order can be challenged if it is in violation of statutory provisions or is mala fide. I have already held apove that the petitiner's transfer is neither mata fide nor it violates any of the statutory provisions. ( 16 ) IN the instant case I do not find that any such material fact has been placed before me or could be highlighted during the course of hearing. ( 17 ) IN the judgment reported in Union of India v. S. L. Abbas ( AIR 1993 sc 2444 ) it has been held that guidelines issued by the Government do not confer on any employee illegally enforceable right. If that be so, the petitioner has no right to challenge the order of transfer. It is also held in the laid judgment as to who should be transferred where, is a matter for the appropriate authority to decide. Unless the order of transfer is vitiated by mala fides or is made inviplation of statutory provisions, the court cannot' interfere with it. Thus, this judgment also does not support the contention of the petitioner and he cannot get any advantage from it. ( 18 ) THUS, for all these reasons I am satisfied land convinced that there is no reason to quash the impugued order Ann. 'i' and the relieving order dated 4-12-1992. Thus the petition is devoid of any merit and substance and is accordingly dismissed, with no order as to costs, petition dismissed .