Judgment : AR. Lakshmanan, J. The plaintiff and the defendants 1 and 2 are the sole hereditary trustees of the temple and the plaintiff is a joint hereditary trustee, along with defendants 1 and 2. One Chinna Ramanuja Iyengar, who was a common ancestor of the plaintiff and the defendants 1 and 2 was the sole hereditary trustee of the said temple throughout his life. Before him, his ancestore were the hereditary trustee. Chinna Ramanuja Iyengar owned considerable lands in many villages and major portion of the lands belonging to the temples were endowed by Chinna Ramanuja Iyengar and his forefathers. Chinna Ramanuja Iyengar died in 1867, and left him surviving his five sons. Besides the hereditary trusteeship of the three suit temples, the family owned a big temple in Katteri and was performing a large number of Charities, Mandahappadis etc., in several places. Several valuable properties were endowed for the said purpose and Chinna Ramanuja Iyengar was managing and administering all these as hereditary trustee. After his death, disputes arose between his sons regarding the division of the family properties and disqualification of the 5th son Iyyasami Iyengar and division and devolution of the various trusteeship and the performance of the trusts and management of the trust properties. All these disputes were referred to sole arbitration of one Vakil C.Ramaswami Iyer of Mannargudi, who made and passed an award dated 20.9.1985 and the same was marked as Exhibit A-1 in the suit on the side of the plaintiff. It is the specific case of the plaintiff that the said award was accepted by all the parties and was acted upon eversince the date of the award. Under the terms of the said award some properties were allotted to the share of Iyyasami Iyengar, inspite of his disqualification and that bulk of the properties were allotted to his other four brothers. Hereditary trusteeship of the three temples was as per para 21 of the Award vested in one son and two grandsons of Chinna Ramanuja Iyengar and their branches i.e., Srinivasa Iyengar, the second son, and his descendants who came to be designated as ‘B’ branch, they being entitled to half share in the management. Likewise, Rajagopala Iyengar and Ramanuja Iyengar sons of the 4th son Venkatachariar came to be designated as ‘B’ branch, they have been entitled to other half share in the management of hereditary trusteeship. Likewise, Rajagopala Iyengar and Ramanuja Iyengar sons of the 4th son Venkatachariar came to be designated as ‘B’ branch, they have been entitled to other half share in the management of hereditary trusteeship. It is also the specific case of the plaintiff that the devolution of the hereditary trusteeship in accordance with the provision was also accepted and acted upon by al l the parties and never questioned and therefore the same is perfectly legal, valid and binding on all the parties. It is also the specific case of the plaintiff that all the shares have effected a partition of the family properties, by way of accepting and implementing the award by partition arrangement dated 6. 1903, marked as Exhibit A-2 on the side of the plaintiff expressly agreeing and stipulating there-in that the trusteeship vested in each of them should not be alienated. They have again agreed and provided that the share of the hereditary trustees vested in their branches should be enjoyed by each having a half share therein and that the temples should be administered properly. The first defendant is the sole representative of ‘B’ branch entitled to half share of the hereditary trusteeship. The plaintiff being the only son of Chinna Ramanuja Iyengar and the second son being the only son of Rajagopal entitled to ‘D’ branch are each entitled to one half share. As to the other half share of the hereditary trusteeship, it is stated that the plaintiff and defendants 1 and 2 are the joint hereditary trustees. However, no arrangement has been arrived at in regard to the ir turn of management and administration of the temples. The plaintiff states that his father Ramanuja Iyengar has sold his hereditary trusteeship to one Ethirajammal, paternal grandmother of first defendant by sale deed dated 211. 1924 together with his other private properties. According to family custom, trusteeship and hereditary trusteeship cannot be sold and the trustees cannot sell the same. It is also contended that the sale of the trusteeship to Ethirajammal is also contrary to the partitions by way of family arrangement dated 6. 1903 and 19. 1913. However, the plaintiff has not filed the sale deed dated 211. 1924 According to the plaintiff his father died on 10. 1969 and he being the only son is entitled to succeed and has succeeded to all rights of joint hereditary trusteeship. 1903 and 19. 1913. However, the plaintiff has not filed the sale deed dated 211. 1924 According to the plaintiff his father died on 10. 1969 and he being the only son is entitled to succeed and has succeeded to all rights of joint hereditary trusteeship. Several demands made by the plaintiff on the first defendant, who is in exclusive possession of the hereditary trusteeship to recognise the joint rights of plaintiff with a view to ensure the plaintiffs effective and active participation in all the rights, functions and duties of the office and administration and management of the properties attached to the temple was not acceded to, by the first defendant. The denial on the part of the first defendant in refusing to acceed to the said demand of the plaintiffs right is against law and untenable. The plaintiff has also impleaded the second defendant, who is also a joint hereditary trustee being the son of the Rajagopal Iyengar of the ‘D’ branch. The third defendant. Deputy Commissioner, H.R. & C.E. Thanjavur was also impleaded as a party defendant for proper and final adjudication of the matter in question. According to the plaintiff, the suit is not hit by the provisions or Section 63 (b) or section 108 or any other provisions of Act 22 of 1959. There is no dispute at all about the trusteeship for the religious institution and in fact the proceedings in OA. No. 18 of 1968 have been taken by the Department only on the hereditary trusteeship. The only dispute trusteeship. The only dispute is purely a private dispute between the plaintiff and the first defendant and therefore the plaintiff has instituted the suit in the lower court, which alone has jurisdiction to decide the matter. 2. The suit was resisted by the first defendant. He has filed a written statement. It is partinent to point out that the first defendant has not specifically denied as incorrect some of the allegations made in paras 2 to 5 of the plaint. The first defendant has simply stated in the written statement that the allegations in the plaint paras 2 to 5 are not correct and false and are not admitted. Thus, the specific allegations made by the plaintiff in paras 2 to 5 of the plaint remain unchallenged since it has not been specifically denied. The first defendant has simply stated in the written statement that the allegations in the plaint paras 2 to 5 are not correct and false and are not admitted. Thus, the specific allegations made by the plaintiff in paras 2 to 5 of the plaint remain unchallenged since it has not been specifically denied. Para 2 of the plaint mentions about the vast extent of the landed properties owned by Ramanuja Iyengar who was the ancestor of the plaintiff and the denfendants 1 and 2 who was the sole hereditary trustee of the said temple throughout his life time. Para 3 of the plaint refers to the dispute and difference of opinion between the sons of the trustees and the devolution of the family properties by reference to Arbitration and the Award passed by the Arbitrator on 20.11.1895 which was accepted by all the parties and has been acted upon evensince the date of the award. Para 4 of the plaint refers to the award dated 20.11.1895 and allotment of some properties to the share of Iyyasamy Iyengar. Inspite of his disqualification, and the allotment of bulk of the properties to the other sharers. It also refers to para 21 of the award and the allotment of shares to each of the branch and the devolution of the hereditary trusteeship in accordance with the provisions made in para 21 of the award, which was accepted and acted upon by all the parties and never questioned by any one. Para 5 of the plaint refers to acceptance and implementation of the award by all the sharers and partition of family properties mentioned in family partition dated 6. 1903 expressly agreeing and stipulating that the trusteeship in each one of them should not be alienated. As mentioned above, the first defendant who was also a trustee has not specifically denied the averments. The written statement only refers to customs set up in para 7 of the plaint and a bald denial that the document is not valid and binding on the plaintiff and second defendant. It is stated that the plaintiff is not entitled to succeed to all rights of joint hereditary trustee and therefore he has no right to be in joint possession. It is stated that the plaintiff is not entitled to succeed to all rights of joint hereditary trustee and therefore he has no right to be in joint possession. Para 5 of the written statement refers to some proceedings in O.A. No. 18 of 1968 and pendency of the same before the Deputy Commissioner H.R. & C.E. Thanjavur. According to the defendant, the period of limitation has been calculated by the plaintiff and the provision of the Limitation Act relied on by the plaintiff is incorrect. Act 107 of limitation Act alone will apply the suit claim is clearly barred by limitation. The right if any, had been lost by adverse possession and the suit is liable to be dismissed on that score. 3. The third defendant. Deputy Commissioner, H.R. & C.E. Thanjavur has filed a written statement stating that the first defendant is under suspension and an Executive Officer has been appointed in the temple and that O.A. No. 18 of 1968 is still pending on the file of the Department. 4. The trial court on the basis of the above pleadings, framed the following issue: 1) whether the plaintiff is entitled to joint trusteeship? 2) Whether the first defendant has prescribed himself as the sole trustee by adverse possession? 3) Whether the suit is bad for want of Section 80 C.P.C. Notice? 4) Whether the suit is barred by time? 5) To what relief, if any, the plaintiff is entitled? 5. As stated above, though the first defendant filed a written statement he remained exparte and did not choose to contest the proceedings even though he raised the plea of limitation and adverse possession etc., As mentioned above, he has also not specifically denied very many important averments made in paras 2 to 5 of the plaint, but simply denied any knowledge of it., Learned Subordinate Judge therefore proceeded to decide the suit on the basis of the materials and evidence placed before him, on the side of the plaintiff. The plaintiff examined himself as P.W. 1 and three documents viz., Exhibits A-1 to A-3 were marked, Ex. A-1 is the registration copy of the award by C. Ramasami Iyer. Ex A-2 is Registration copy of partition deed dated 6. 1903 is and Ex.3 is also the registration copy none was examined on the side of the defendants and no document has been marked on their side. A-1 is the registration copy of the award by C. Ramasami Iyer. Ex A-2 is Registration copy of partition deed dated 6. 1903 is and Ex.3 is also the registration copy none was examined on the side of the defendants and no document has been marked on their side. Therefore the learned Subordinate Judge proceeded to consider the case of the plaintiff on the basis of the available evidence before him. Learned Subordinate Judge after referring to the dispute between the shares and of the arbitration proceedings and the award passed thereon and the subsequent partition deed and repartition deed under Exhibits A.2 and A.3 between the plaintiff and the defendants 1 and 2 decreed the suit exparte on the basis of the available oral and documentary evidence. He has also held that the plaintiff is entitled to be in joint possession of the properties in question in his capacity as joint trustee. Therefore he found issues 1 to 4 in favour of the plaintiff. He also held that the third defendant has no objection for declaring the plaintiff as a joint trustee provided that the plaintiff is able to prove his claim. The first defendant has now filed the appeal challenging the judgment and decree of the court below. 6. We have heard Mr. G. Subramaniam, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant/first defendant and Mr. T.R. Rajaraman, learned counsel appearing for the first respondent/plaintiff. No one appeared on behalf of the respondent No. 2. P.M. Bhaskaran appeared for R.3 Department. 7. Mr. G. Subramaniam, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant submits that the lower court has not considered the evidence in a proper perspective as provided under Order 17 Rule 2 and 3 of C.P.C. and in the absence of any discussion by the court below on the dispute in question, the Judgment cannot be allowed to stand and therefore the same has to be set aside and remitted back to the lower Court for a fresh finding. He also contended that the standard of proof required in exparte case has not been satisfied in the instant case. 8. On the other hand, Mr. He also contended that the standard of proof required in exparte case has not been satisfied in the instant case. 8. On the other hand, Mr. T.R. Rajagopalan, Learned Senior counsel appearing for the contesting first respondent/plaintiff invited out attention to the nonspecific denial of the plaint averments made in paras 2 to 5 and also the averments made in the written statement of the first defendant that the plaintiff is not entitled to succeed or succeed to all rights of the joint hereditary trusteeship. According to Mr. T. R. Rajagopalan, when there is no substantial denial in the written statement as provided under Order 8, Rules 3 and 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the same has to be taken as admission of the plaintiff’s case and in the absence of such specific denial, no further proof is necessary to be placed before the court by the plaintiff. He also added that P.W.1 has also deposed before the court below as proof of his contention Exhibits A-1 to A-3 were marked, there is no cross examination on the side of the contesting parties. On the basis of the available evidence, the learned Subordinate Judge decreed the suit, and therefore the same should be confirmed by this court. He also invited our attention to para 6 of the written statement. Wherein even though the plea of limitation and the plea of adverse possession has been specifically raised, the first defendant has not chosen to enter into the box and establish his case by letting any oral or documentary evidence. Having miserably failed to prove his case in the written statement, Mr. T.R. Rajagopalan, would contend that the plaintiff will have no say in the matter in this first appeal and he shall not be allowed to raise any new points which have not been raised earlier. We see much force in the contention of the learned counsel appearing for the first respondent/plaintiff. We are of the view that the appeal can be disposed of on the short ground in view of the non compliance of the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure under Order 8, Rules 3 and 5. Order 8, Rules 3 and 5 of C.P.C. reads as follows:- “3. We are of the view that the appeal can be disposed of on the short ground in view of the non compliance of the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure under Order 8, Rules 3 and 5. Order 8, Rules 3 and 5 of C.P.C. reads as follows:- “3. DENIAL TO BE SPECIFIC: -It shall not be sufficient for a defendant in his written statement to deny generally the grounds alleged by the plaintiff, but the defendant must deal specifically with each allegation of fact of which he does not admit the truth, except damages.” “5. SPECIFIC DENIAL: (1) Every allegation of fact in the plaint if not denied specifically or by necessary implication, or stated to be not admitted in the pleading of the defendant, shall be taken to be admitted except as against a person under disability; provided that the court may in its discretion require any fact so admitted to be proved otherwise than by such admission. (2) Where the defendant has not filed a pleading it shall be lawful for the Court to pronounce judgment on the basis of the facts contained in the plaint, except as against a person under a disability, but the Court may, in its discretion, require any such fact to be proved. 3) In exercising its discretion under the proviso to sub rule (1) or under sub rule (2), the Court shall have due regard to the fact whether the defendant could have, or has engaged a pleader. 4) Whenever a judgment is pronounce under this rule, a decree shall be drawn up in accordance with such judgment and such decree shall bear the date on which the judgment was pronounce.” .9. In the instant case, the first defendant had simply stated that the allegations in paras 2 to 5 of the plaint are not admitted. In our view, mere denial is not sufficient to satisfy the requirement of order 8, Rules 3 5 of Code of Civil Procedure. There must be a specific denial and if the defendant did not admit the correctness of the statement contained in paras 2 to 5 of the plaint, he ought to have stated in what respect he disputed those allegations. The first defendant has not done so, as required under law. .10. There must be a specific denial and if the defendant did not admit the correctness of the statement contained in paras 2 to 5 of the plaint, he ought to have stated in what respect he disputed those allegations. The first defendant has not done so, as required under law. .10. In Badat and Company, Bombay v. East India Trading Company ( AIR 1964 SC 538 ) the Supreme Court has observed as follows:- .“Rules 3, 4 and 5 of the Order 8 of C.P.C. form an integrated code dealing with the manner in the allegations of fact in the plaint should be traversed and the legal consequence, flowing from its non compliance. The written statement must deal specifically with each allegation of fact in the plaint and when a defendant denies any such fact, he must not do so evasively but answer the point of substance. If his denial of a fact is not specific but enasive, the said fact shall be taken to be admitted. In such an event, the admission itself being proof, no other proof is necessary”. .11. In Sheikh Abdul Sattar v. Union of India ( AIR 1970 SC 479 ) there was failure to specifically deal with the facts alleged in the plaint. While considering the case, the Supreme Court has held that .“According to the law of pleadings, the defendant is bound to deal specifically with each allegation of fact, the truth of which is not admitted. It certain para in the plaint is merely not admitted but the facts there in are not specifically dealt with, it cannot be said that they are denied. Where the truth of the facts alleged in the plaint, thought not specifically dealt with in the corresponding para of the written statement were dealt with in the additional pleadings, held, the allegations in the plaint must be considered to have been traversed.” 12. In Ram Singh v. Col. Ram Singh ( AIR 1986 SC 3 at 48), a reference to Para 183 can be usefully referred to in this context. The said case relates to an election petition. In Ram Singh v. Col. Ram Singh ( AIR 1986 SC 3 at 48), a reference to Para 183 can be usefully referred to in this context. The said case relates to an election petition. While dealing with the case of the non denial in relation to an incident the Supreme Court has observed as follows: “There is no denial much less any specific denial of this allegation in the written statement of the respondent though it is a material fact which ought to have been denied specifically if it was not admitted. Therefore under Order 8, Rule 5 of the Civil P.C. which applies to proceedings in election petitions it must be deemed to have been admitted by the respondent.” 13. A recent decision of the Apex Court in Lohia Properties (P) Ltd. v. Atmaram Kumar ( 1993 (4) SCC 6 ) can also be beneficially looked into in this context. In the above said decision, it is stated as follows:- “Rule 5 Provides that every allegation of fact in the plaint, if not denied in the written statement shall be taken to be admitted by the defendant. What this rule says is, that any allegation of fact must either be denied specifically or by a necessary implication of there should be at least a statement that the fact is not admitted. If the plea is not taken in that manner, then the allegation shall be taken to be admitted. Non traverse would constitute an implied admission in this case. 14. A Division Bench of this High Court in Dayanandammal @ Dayalamma and Another v. St. Thomas Tamil Church, Ect., & Another (1993 (2) Law Weekly 328), in an identical matter has observed as follows:- “The defendant is bound to make a specific denial of every allegation in the plaint. Order 8, Rule 3 C.P.C. reads that it shall not be sufficient for a defendant in his written statement to deny generally the grounds alleged by the plaintiff, but the defendant must deal specifically with each allegation of fact of which he does not admit the truth, except damages.” 15. A Division Bench of this Court in A.S. No. 65 of 1984 dated 210. A Division Bench of this Court in A.S. No. 65 of 1984 dated 210. 1994, in which one of us (Abdul Hadi, J) was party has expressed that the specific non denial in the written statement will amount to admission of the case of the plaintiff as pleaded in the plaint. 16. In A Subramania Iyer v. R.H. Hitchcock (AIR 1925 Madras 950 at 957), while elaborately dealing with the scope of Order 8, Rules 3 and 5 of Code of Civil Procedure, a Division Bench of this Court has observed as follows:- “That rule gives directions how denials are to be made, defendant No. 4’s denial of publication in his written statement has to be found, if anywhere, in para 1 of that statement. In that paragraph he says that he “does not admit all or any of the allegations in the plaint except such as have been expressly admitted,” and as regards the unadmitted allegation he “puts the plaintiff to the proof.” No one can contend that this paragraph contains a specific denial of publication The paragraph is clearly a general denial such as the rule states to be insufficient; Rule 5 of the order goes on to state the consequence of a defendant failing to observe the directions of R.3. It states that every allegation of fact in the plaint is not denied specifically or by necessary implication, or stated to be not, admitted in the pleading of the defendant shall be taken to be admitted (Except as against a person under disability). Now it is clear that the allegation in the plaint, that defendant No. 4, among other wrote and published and caused to be published the report in question is not specifically denied, in defendant No .4’s written statement. Nor in my opinion, can that allegation be said to have been denied by defendant No. 4 in his written statement “by necessary implication” within the meaning of R.5 on the ground that a general denial includes the particulars with the purview; as that would be to construe R.5 in a sense inconsistent with R.3. Similarly the words “stated to be not admitted” in R.5 must be taken to mean if we are to read the two rules together, as we must “specifically stated to be not admitted”. Similarly the words “stated to be not admitted” in R.5 must be taken to mean if we are to read the two rules together, as we must “specifically stated to be not admitted”. There are absolutely no merits in the appeal and, therefore, we have no hesitation in dismissing the appeal with costs. 17. In the result, the appeal is dismissed with costs.