Judgment B. L. Yadav, J. 1. These three analogous writ petitions have been filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India as Public Interest Litigation (for short P. I. L) and the points involved are similar in nature. Hence it is convenient to dispose them of by this common judgment. These petitions would, however, be referred as first, second and third writ petitions. 2. In the first writ petition filed by Dr. Taj Singh Lakshmana (in person ). Chairman of the Bihar Sick Industries Association the petitioners has stated that about 7000 Entreoreneurs have obtained separate loans from the bihar State Financial Corporation, Frazer Road, Patna (respondent No.2)and separate agreements have been executed in respect of all the Entrepreneurs. But those agreements have not been filed and only one of them was shown in the Court. Nothing can be ascertained with certainty from the alleged prayer made in paragraph 10 of the first writ petition. However, the prayer in the first writ petion is that this Court may treat this petition as a regular writ petition against the Bihar State Financial Corporation (for short "the b S F. C ") and to take necessary action against Shri A. K. Singh, Managing director, B. S. F C (respondent No.2), so that any allegation stated by the petitioner, if contested by the said respondent, shall bs proved by him with concrete evidence and supporting documents. Further prayer is that the b S F C. may bs restrained from taking any action against those entrepreneurs whom the B S B. C. had failed to disburse the full sanctioned loans. The next part of the relief appears to be that this Court may writ off the entire interest and other charges accumulated during the past many years against the aforesaid 7000 entrepreneurs, who have obtained loans from the B S. F C. and have not paid the amount as agreed upon and that only principal amount may be left to be paid by the promoters after deducting the amount already paid by them. 3. The aforesaid 7000 entrepreneurs obtained different loans from the b S. F C. (respondent No.2) and executed different agreements. 3. The aforesaid 7000 entrepreneurs obtained different loans from the b S. F C. (respondent No.2) and executed different agreements. It appears that part of the loan was disbursed to all the entrepreneurs, but the entiae amount was not disbursed and when they went for further relief of the loan, they were exploited as the petitioner or the entrepreneurs refused to pay bribe (vide paragraph 2 of the first writ petition ). 4. The petitioner, Or. Taj Singh Lakshmana, Chairman of the Bihar sick Industries Association has appeared in person. He strenuously contented that the respondent-BSFC is deliberately delaying to disburse the sanctioned loan for the last two years and thereafter the promoters are directed to apply for the second loan which they would sanction and would adjust against the overdues of the first loan. After failure of the entrepreneurs in these three writ petitions to make payment, proceedings under Sections 29 and 30 of the state Financial Corporation Act, 1951 (for short "the Act") are initiated and the assets in the unit are sold to the collaborators at a price equal to the total amount due from the owner. Under the said Act the B. S F. C. was to act under the Regional Development Bank for assistance to the small and the medium scale Industries of Bihar. The B S. F. C. can ascertain whether the units obtaining loans, have necessery working capital and can also have a watch on the working and performance of the unit. In paragraph 9 of the first writ petition it has been stated that the debased office of the b. S. F. C. threw all the prescribed norms and objectives to the winds and started acting worse than the traditional viilage money lenders. It was further urged that a Committee be set up by the High Court to decide all the matters pertaining to these writ petitions and Committee may submit a report. 5. When the judgment was almost dictated a detailed written argument was also filed. We have perused the same. Nothing new was added. It was in the form of a Rejoinder Affidavit. 5. When the judgment was almost dictated a detailed written argument was also filed. We have perused the same. Nothing new was added. It was in the form of a Rejoinder Affidavit. It was emphasised that the approach of the respondents including the B. S. F. C. much be project oriented rather than security oriented It was emphasised that a Three Member committee headed by a retired High Court Judge, the Managing Director and the petitioaer himself, be constituted to solve the dispute. It was further submitted that interest recoverable on different units may not be recovered. 6. In the second writ petition the prayer is to direct the B S F C. (respondent No.2) to follow strictly the guidelines laid down in Mahesh Chandra V/s. Regional Manager, UP Financial Corporation and others (A. I R 1903 S. C.935) and to direct the State Government to set up a High Level Committee or Tribunal to consider all the cases of Sick Small Scale Industries and or incipient. In this second writ petition no Counter Affidavit has been filed. 7. An averment has been made in the second writ petition that the sanctioned loan is disbursed only after the entrepreneurs have been substantial investment in the project from his own resources. Short points sharply focussed by Mr. C. M Saxena, learned counsel for the second petitioner are that the principles laid down in Mahesh Chandras case (supra) are not followed and that the total amount of sanctioned loan is never disbursed and without any notice proceedings are initiated under Sec.29 of the Act. The points focussed by Mr. Saxena was echoes with some variant note by the learned counsel appearing for the third writ petitioner. In the second and third petitions also, even though a number of entrepreneurs are involved who have executed different agreement but neither those agreements containing different conditions depending on the nature of loan and units have been filed nor complete facts have been stated. In these three writ petitions individual and separate disputes are involved, but the petitions as P. I. L. have been filed. 8. Mr. P. K. Shahi appeared on behalf of the respondent BL. FC. Mr. N Kumar and other counsel have appeared for other respondents and all of them were heard at great length. Mr. In these three writ petitions individual and separate disputes are involved, but the petitions as P. I. L. have been filed. 8. Mr. P. K. Shahi appeared on behalf of the respondent BL. FC. Mr. N Kumar and other counsel have appeared for other respondents and all of them were heard at great length. Mr. Verma urged that more than 7000 entrepreneurs have obtained separate loans and they have entered into different agreements containing different clauses depending upon the nature of the loan and the nature of the transactions and units. P. I. L in such a different individual disputes has been filed just with a view to conceal the material facts and to obtain relief, directing the respondent. B S. F. C. not to initate proceeding for recovery of the loans, pasticularly in veiw of the procedure under Sec.29 of the Act and not to initiate proceeding which are consistent with the agreements of the entrepreneurs. Specific and separate agreements executed by more than 7000 entrepreneurs have not been filed, nor the material facts have been stated. As to at which stage the proceedings are pending has not been stated. In these writ petitions (as Public interest Litigation), the petitioners have not disclosed clear facts in respect of each entrepreneurs, so that the same may be replied through counter affidavit and the correct facts may be brought before the Court to appreciate the controversy. In the P. I. L. the petitioner must come with clean hands : with clean mind and clean objective like the writ petitions filed by other petitioner. As there are individual disputes depending upon the facts with particular individual dispute, in that event there is no justification for P. I. L. nor it can be entetained. As the petitioners have concealed the material facts in these writ petitions and there are disputed questions of facts, hence no ground for interference has been made out. 9. Mr. P K. Shahi emphatically urged that there is no quarrel and/or dispute with dictum laid down and the direction given in Mahesh Chandra V/s. Regional Manger, UP. Financial Corporation and others (MR 1993 S. C.945) (supra ). But those dictum or directions or principles are based on particular facts of that case. In these three writ petitions several thousand units and entrepreneurs are involved, having executed different agreements, but the petitioners have not come with clean hands. Financial Corporation and others (MR 1993 S. C.945) (supra ). But those dictum or directions or principles are based on particular facts of that case. In these three writ petitions several thousand units and entrepreneurs are involved, having executed different agreements, but the petitioners have not come with clean hands. In the circumstances no relief can be granted to the petitioners in all the three writ petitions. 10. Having scrutinised the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties, the questions for consideration are whether the P I L. in such a way where more than 7000 applicants (entrepreneurs) and several units with varying characteristics with different individual claim are involved the writ petitions as P. I. L. can be enteratined, and whether in the circumstances of the case any relief can he granted to the petitioners of all the three writ petitions, particularly when they have not come with clean hand, clean mind and clean objective. Suffice it to say that their Lordships of the Apex Court have laid down a dictum in K. P. Shrinivas V/s. R. M. Pramchand (1994) 6 S C C.620) to ttje effect that it cannot be forgotten that a writ petitioner who comes to Court for the relief in P I. L , must come not only with clean bands like any other writ petitioner but also must further come with a clean heart, clean mind and clean objective. In these three writ petitions even after making all sincere efforts we could not ascertain the nature of the agreements executed by different entrepreneurs and units, nor copies of the same were furnished nor details were given nor necessary material facts were stated. In our considered opinion neither the petitioner in all the three writ petitions have come with clean bands nor they have come with clean mind nor with clean objective. Even the prayer of the relief sought by the petitioners is not clear as to what they actually want. Only this much can be ascertained that they want that no action need be taken against them to recover the loan obtained by them and no proceeding under Sec.29 of the Act be initiated against them and the interest on the loans advanced may be written of. 11. Only this much can be ascertained that they want that no action need be taken against them to recover the loan obtained by them and no proceeding under Sec.29 of the Act be initiated against them and the interest on the loans advanced may be written of. 11. In Dr Nandjee Singh V/s. P. G. Medical Students Association (AIR 1993 SC.2264) their Lordships of the Apex Court have ruled that an independent dispute cannot be converted into P I. L. This observation and direction were relied upon with propound respect by a Division Bench of this court in Abhit Dutjit and others V/s. Union of India and Ors (1994 (2) B LJ. R.839) Necessary facts in respect of every agreement and every entrepreneurs and units have not been stated with accuracy in the present cases nor these petitioners have come with clean mind, nor with clean objective. We have profound regards for the dictum laid down in Mahesh Chandra V/s. Regional manager, U. P. Financial Corporation and Ors (AIR 1993 S. C.905) (supra), but in the present three writ petitions necessary facts have not been indicated and nothing has been brought to our notice that how we may grant any relief to the writ petitioners or to the different entreprenuers or how may direct the respondent-B S. F. C. not to recover the unpaid amount from the petitioners, not any case of P. I. L. has been made out directing the respondent-B. S. F. C. not to initiate any proceeding under Sec.29 of the Act. 12. In our considered opinion as the petitioners in these three writ petitions have not come with clean hands not they have come with clean mind or clean objective, as directed by their Lordships of the Apex Court in (1994) 6 SCC 620 (supra ). The disputes involved in these writ petitions are individual disputes, consequently the individual disputes cannot be converted into the P. I. L, (See Nandjee Singh V/s. P. G. Medical Students association, AIR 1993 S C.2264) (supra ). 13. Half heartedly, on behalf of the petitioners, our attention was invited to the Doctrine of Promissory Estoppel and on Article 21 of the constitution and that the B S. F. C. cannot take recourse to the remedy of sections 29 and 30 of the Act. 13. Half heartedly, on behalf of the petitioners, our attention was invited to the Doctrine of Promissory Estoppel and on Article 21 of the constitution and that the B S. F. C. cannot take recourse to the remedy of sections 29 and 30 of the Act. As regards Article 21, suffice it to say that life includes right to live with human dignity, but whatever action would be taken against different entrepreneurs in these three analogous writ petitions would be in accordance with the procedure established by law, particularly the relevant provisions of the said Act. Article 21 of the Constitution is, accordingly, not attracted. 14. In our opinion the Doctrine of Promissory Estoppel comes in operation where one party by his words or conduct to a transaction makes to the others an unan b guous promise or assurance, which is intended to affect the legal relations between them and other party acts upon it, altering his position to his detriment, the party making the promise will not be permitted to act inconsisteatly with it. This is called Doctrine of Promissory estoppel, quasi-estoppel or equitable estoppel. See Isreal Cocoa Ltd V/s. Nigerian Produce Marketing Co. Ltd. (1972) AC, 741 at page 758 ; Braith waite V/s. Winwood (1960) 1 WLR, 1257 ; Durhem Fancy Goods Ltd V/s. Michae jackson (1998) 2 QB, 639 ; Smalls Principles of Equity (27th Edition) Page/ 562 ). 15. The factual foundation to attract the application of this doctrine was not laid in these petitions. Further this doctrine is suspensive in nature and does not extinguish the promisee is obligations (i, e. obligations of entrepreneurs to pay the Loan advenced by BSEC ). As the petitioners have not disclosed correct facts nor they have come with clean hands and clean objectives, nor facts necessary to apply this doctrine have been stated with sufficient clarity, the petitioners cannot be held to be entitled to this doctrine the facts of the case ( AIR 1988 SC 1247 , AIR 1980 SC 1245) are different, the dictum laid down by the Apex court applies to the facts of those cases and petitioners cannot claim the benefit, similarly. 16. In respect of other cases relied upon by the petitioners including mr. 16. In respect of other cases relied upon by the petitioners including mr. Lakshmana, we are reminded what Earl of Halsbury L. C. said long ago ia Quiun V/s. Leathsm (1901) A. C.495, to the following effect: now before discussing Allah V/s. Flood (1889) A. C.1 and what was decided therein there are two observations of a general character which I wish to make and one is to what I have very often said that every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved or assured to be proved, since the generality of the expression which may be found, they are not intended to be exposition of the whole law but governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found. The other is that a case is only an authority for what it actually decided. I entirely deny that it can be quoted for a proposition that may seem to follow logically from it. " these observations were relied upon by their Lordships of the Suprrme Court in M/s. Good Year India Ltd. V/s. State of Haryana (1989) Judgements Today (4) S. C. C.229 at P.246. 17. In our considered opinion the observations made in other cases relied upon by Mr. Lakshmana need not be referred or discussed as every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved and that a case is only an authority for what it actually decided and not what may seem logically to follow from it. 18. To sum up the dispute involved in respect of more than Seven thousand entrepreneurs are individual disputes depending upon the nature of unit, hence in such a situation the Public Interest Litigation is not maintainable. As the petitioners have not come to this Court with clean mind and clean objectives and they have not stated material facts in respect of every dispute provisions of Sec.29 of the Act can be made applicable only when the necessary facts and circumstances exist. There is no justification to write off either interest or to constitute a committee headed by a retired judge of this Court to go into the matter. Remedy under Article 226 being discretionary in nature no grounds for intereference in these three writ petitions have been made out. 19. There is no justification to write off either interest or to constitute a committee headed by a retired judge of this Court to go into the matter. Remedy under Article 226 being discretionary in nature no grounds for intereference in these three writ petitions have been made out. 19. Resultantly in view of the premises aforesaid we do not find any merit in any of these three writ petitions nor they are maintaineble as P. I. L. Hence they are dismissed without any order as to costs. Let a copy of this judgment be kept in other two analogous cases also. Writ dismissed.