JUDGMENT - N.D. VYAS, J. :---The present writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is in the nature of a public interest litigation whereby the petitioners are challenging allotment of Government land in favour of the respondent No. 4, who is the wife of the respondent No. 5, who was at the relevant time a Member of Legislative Assembly. The controversy in this petition thus centres around the allotment of land admeasuring 8,000 sq. ft. out of Survey No. 6470, situated at Phaltan, District Satara. 2. It is the case of the petitioners in the petition that the petitioners are well known citizens and are engaged in public life; that the petitioner No. 1 is well known for his agricultural research; that the petitioner No. 2 is a freedom fighter and has been honoured by the Central Government and the State Government, that the petitioner No. 3 is a President of Mahila Samajik Parishad, Phaltan and has been taking active part in various social, educational, political activities for last 20 years and in her capacity as a President of the said Mahila Samajik Parishad, she has been seeking allotment of the land in question for the said Institution and that the petitioner No. 4 is a secretary of Vidyaprasarak Sanstha, Phaltan and is connected with other institutes like I.T.I., Phaltan and several newspapers. It is the grievance of the petitioner in the petition that the said land being a very valuable and strategic Government land, had been allotted in the name of one Yashodabai Shamrao Patil, but in fact, subsequently the same was allotted/transferred in the name of the respondent No. 4 who is, as stated earlier, the wife of the then M.L.A. The petitioners had made several attempts to persuade the Government to cancel the said allotment which, according to the petitioners, was illegal and fraudulent and to the extent that questions were asked on the floor of the Legislative Council to which, although the Government was aware of the manner in which the said allotment had taken place, the Government refused to cancel the same. It is the petitioners case that the said Yashodabai, being a widow of a freedom fighter, was allotted the said land by allotment letter dated 30th November, 1983. It is the petitioners case that the said Yashodabai, being a widow of a freedom fighter, was allotted the said land by allotment letter dated 30th November, 1983. However, she had expired on 2nd June, 1983, i.e. more than five months prior to the allotment and that somehow, the said land was transferred in favour of the respondent No. 4, being a daughter of the said Yashodabai. The petitioners although tried their best to get more information regarding the original allotment in favour of the said deceased Yashodabai and subsequent allotment/transfer in favour of the respondent No. 4 which was done by an order dated 8th November, 1984, they could not get any information from the respondent Nos. 1 to 3. It is the contention of the petitioners that the said allotment is contrary to the provisions of law, and therefore, illegal and mala fide. It is the further contention of the petitioners that as the respondent No. 5 was the then M.L.A., he has, by abusing his official position, managed to grab the said piece of land although the said respondent No. 5 and the respondent No. 4 have large pieces of land with them in the vicinity, the particulars whereof are given in para 23 of the petition. The respondent Nos. 1 to 3 have disputed the challenge to the legality of the said allotment in favour of Yashodabai and allotment/transfer in favour of the respondent No. 4 and have on affidavit stated that the allotment in favour of Yashodabai was done by virtue of section 40 of the Land Revenue Code (hereinafter referred to as the Code) and Rule 28(2) of the Maharashtra Land Revenue (Disposal of Government Lands) Rules, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the said Rules) and that in favour of respondent No. 4 under Rule 26(2) of the said rules read with section 40 of the Code. In short, it was contended that there was nothing wrong in the said allotment. As far as the respondent No. 4 is concerned, she has taken the stand that the sanction to grant the said land in favour of her mother was done as per law and allotment in her favour was also done in accordance with law. She has, in fact, relied on provisions of section 40 of the Code and Rule 26(2) of the said rules. 3. She has, in fact, relied on provisions of section 40 of the Code and Rule 26(2) of the said rules. 3. The affidavit in reply which is filed on behalf of the State makes an interesting reading. It is inter-alia stated in the said affidavit that Yashodabai had applied on 6th October, 1981 for grant of land in question on the ground that the climate at Phaltan was suitable to her health and further that her daughter was at Phaltan to look after her; that the revenue record showed that the land bearing C.T.S. No. 6470 was a Government Forest Land and the Forest Department had constructed Forest Guard quarters in the area admeasuring 10,500 sq. ft. and the remaining area of 8,000 sq.ft. ft. and the remaining area of 8,000 sq.ft. (i.e. the land in question) was shown as Government waste land; that the said piece of land was demanded by officers of 22 Maratha Battalion for construction of pair building of their N.C.C. unit; that however, taking into consideration the awkward triangular shape of the land, the N.C.C. unit cancelled its request; that thereafter the land was again demanded by Forest Department for construction of building for Plants Distribution Centre and hence the proposal recommending the request was submitted to the State Government on 9th April, 1981 and an order of the Collector, granting the land to the Forest Department, was issued on 30th September, 1981 : that thereafter the then Honble Minister for Revenue (State) granted stay of handing over possession of the land to the Forest Department by a phone message and accordingly, the Revenue Department under its endorsement No. O/A/1530/G/8 dated Nil October, 1981 instructed to submit a detailed report about the request of the applicant Yashodabai for grant of land and the report was submitted to the Government through the Commissioner, Pune Division, Pune on 4th May, 1982; that the Commissioner by his report stated that the land "should not be granted to Yashodabai and others on various grounds" and the Government thereafter, issued an order refusing the application of Yashodabai on 24th November, 1982 and also directed the Collector to handover possession of the land to the Forest Department; that the Government granted telephonic stay for handing over possession of the land to the Forest Department on 25th January, 1983 and directed to resubmit the case papers to the Government which was submitted by the Collector on 9th February 1983; that in the meanwhile, the Mahila Samajik Samata Parishad, Phaltan applied on 10th June, 1983 for being granted the said land in question, but the request was refused on 17th June, 1983 on the ground that the land was then granted to the Forest Department and that the report to the Government had been submitted and that the Government thereafter communicated their sanction for the grant of land to Yashodabai under its Memorandum dated 30th November, 1983 and the same was to be done on payment of occupancy price equal to the current market value of the land. It is further stated on affidavit that it had been disclosed in the enquiry prior to the grant of land to Yashodabai, a widow of freedom fighter; that she did not hold any landed property at Undale; that however, on disclosure that Yashodabai had expired, the grant of land was made on 8th November, 1984 as a special case in the name of her legal heir viz. her daughter-respondent No. 4 as Smt. Dubal (her sister) had given up her claim under Rule 26(2) instead of Rule 28 of the said Rules and that the grant in favour of Yashodabai was under section 40 of the Code and Rule 26(2) of the said Rules as a special case. It is categorically stated in the said affidavit that the State Government has a supreme right in disposing off its properties. Paragraph 15 of the said affidavit contains some particulars about applications made and the allotments which were earlier made and cancelled prior to the allotment in favour of Yashodabai. 4. It is categorically stated in the said affidavit that the State Government has a supreme right in disposing off its properties. Paragraph 15 of the said affidavit contains some particulars about applications made and the allotments which were earlier made and cancelled prior to the allotment in favour of Yashodabai. 4. As far as the respondent No. 4 is concerned, on affidavit it has been inter-alia stated that when Yashodabais application for allotment of the said land was under process, Yashodabai died leaving behind the respondent No. 4 and her sister Smt. Vijayadevi Sampatrao Dubal as her only heirs; that an application was made by them to the State Government informing that Yashodabai had expired after allotment but before possession could be given and therefore, they being the daughters and only heirs of Yashodabai and as the land in question was adjoining their other land and therefore useful to them, the allotment be changed to their names and that the allotment in favour of the respondent No. 4 was done on 8th November, 1984 as her sister had no interest in the said land and that the allotment in her favour was done under section 40 of the Land Revenue Code and Rule 26(2) of the said Rules after thorough application of mind; that by the order dated 30th November, 1983 the State Government accorded its sanction in favour of Yashodabai; that by order dated 21st February, 1984 again the State Government accorded its sanction in favour of the two heirs; that by its order dated 8th November, 1984 the said land was allotted in favour of the respondent No. 4 as heir of Yashodabai and that there was no allotment in favour of a dead person. However, the said affidavit is significantly silent as to the allegations made in the petition about the holding of other adjoining land by the respondent Nos. 4 and 5. No doubt, there are denials to the averments made in the petition in this respect, but the denials are either evasive or cryptic. There is also no reference in the affidavit filed by the respondent No. 4 to the earlier attempts made by the respondent No. 5. 4 and 5. No doubt, there are denials to the averments made in the petition in this respect, but the denials are either evasive or cryptic. There is also no reference in the affidavit filed by the respondent No. 4 to the earlier attempts made by the respondent No. 5. The main contentions which are raised in the said affidavit are that the petition is motivated inasmuch as the petitioners are disgruntled because of non-allotment of the said land to Mahila Samajik Samata Parishad, Phaltan as demanded by them; that the petition suffers from laches as although the allotment in favour of Yashodabai was done as far back as in November, 1983 and the same was finally transferred in the name of the respondent No. 4 in November, 1984, the petition was filed only in March, 1988. Significantly again, none of the affidavits in reply deny the averments made in the petition as regards the efforts made by the petitioners to find out the facts regarding the said allotment in favour of Yashodabai and the respondent No. 4. The respondent Nos. 1 to 3 in their affidavit have gone on to admit the averments as to the questions being asked on the floor of the Maharashtra Legislative Council. It is the petitioners contention, which is borne out by the newspaper cuttings which are annexed to the petition, that the then Revenue Minister inter-alia stated in reply that as per the wishes of the deceased Yashodabai, the land was transferred in respondent No. 4s name and that neither the allotment was illegal nor irregular. 5. Section 20 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966 provides for vesting of title in the State in respect of all lands/roads etc. which are not properties of others and also provides that it shall be lawful for the Collector, subject to the order of the Commissioner, to dispose them in such manner as may be prescribed by the State Government in this behalf. which are not properties of others and also provides that it shall be lawful for the Collector, subject to the order of the Commissioner, to dispose them in such manner as may be prescribed by the State Government in this behalf. Section 31 of the said Code provides that it would be lawful for the Collector, subject to such rules as may from time to time be made by the State Government in this behalf, to require the payment of a price for unalienated land or to sell the same by auction, and to annex such conditions to the grant as may be prescribed by such rules before land is entered upon under section 30 which provides for occupation of unalienated land. Section 36 of the Code prescribes for transferability and heritability of occupation subject to certain restrictions. Section 40 of the Code provides :-- "Nothing contained in any provision of this Code shall derogate from the right of the State Government to dispose of any land, the property of Government, on such terms and conditions as it deems fit." Section 328 and its relevant portion is reproduced below :-- "328(1). The State Government may make rules not inconsistent with the provisions of this Code for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of this Code. 328(2). In particular and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing provisions, such rules may provide for all or any of the following matters :- 328(2)(iv). Under sub-section (i), the manner of disposal of the property of the State Government and under sub-section (5) of section 20, the rules to be made for giving notice; 328(2)(x). Under section 31, the rules for the grant of unalienated land including provision for payment of price, auction and conditions to be annexed to such grant." The said Rules of 1971 made under section 328 read with inter-alia sections 20, 31 and 40 of the Code provide for disposal of lands. Part IV of the said rules deals with grant of land for non-agricultural purposes and sub-part B thereof deals with grant of land for residential use. The relevant rule in this part are, for the sake of convenience, reproduced below :-- "26. Part IV of the said rules deals with grant of land for non-agricultural purposes and sub-part B thereof deals with grant of land for residential use. The relevant rule in this part are, for the sake of convenience, reproduced below :-- "26. Disposal of building sites:-- 1) Except as otherwise provided in these rules, the occupancy rights in building sites shall be disposed of by the Collector under section 20 read with section 31 by public auction to the highest bidder, unless for reasons to be recorded in writing, the Collector thinks that in any particular case, there is good reason for granting the land without auction. 2) Where a building site is to be disposed of without auction under sub-rule (1), the Collector shall dispose of the site in occupancy rights under section 20 read with section 31 on inalienable tenure with the sanction of the Commissioner, if the occupancy price determined under sub-rule (3) does not exceed Rs. 10,000/- and with the sanction of the State Government, in other cases. 3) The Collector shall determining the occupancy price of the site, regard being had to the following factors, that is to say:-- (a) the sale prices of similar lands in the locality. (b) the situation of the building site. (c) the availability of, and demand for, similar lands; and (d) factors which are taken into account in determining the value of land under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. 28. Grant of land to freedom fighters, members of armed forces, goldsmiths and Government servants:--- (1) Subject to the provisions of this Rule, building sites of suitable sizes may, on receipt of an application in that behalf, be granted for residential use by the Collector, with the previous sanction of the State Government to freedom fighters serving members of the armed forces and ex-servicemen who are ordinarily residents in the State for not less than fifteen years, goldsmiths, who are ordinarily residents in the State for not less than fifteen years immediately before the commencement of the Gold Control Order made under the Defence of India Act, 1962 and to Government Servants of the State Government, without auction in occupancy rights under section 20 read with section 31. 2. 2. Such grant may be made on inalienable tenure on payment of occupancy price which may be determined having regard to the factors specified in Sub-Rule (3) or Rule 26, if the Collector, after necessary inquiries, is satisfied that these persons do not own any building plot or a building either in their own name or in the name of any member of their family anywhere in any urban area of the State or outside the State. (3) A serving member of the armed forces or an ex-serviceman (or if he is dead or is unable to write for any reason, then his wife, major son, father, mother or brother in an undivided family) may make an application for grant of land for residential use to the Collector. Such application shall be made through the Chairman, District Sailors, Soldiers and Airmens Board. (4) Except with the previous permission of the State Government, no land shall be granted under this Rule in favour of any person who having three or more than three children on the 15th day of August, 1968 or having three or less children on that date has exceeded that number after that date." 6. We are in this petition dealing with States power to dispose off Government land. It can be taken as settled law that the State is not and cannot be as free as an individual in selecting the recipient for its largess. A democratic Government cannot lay down arbitrary and capricious standards for the choice of persons with whom alone it will deal. Whatever its activity, the Government is still the Government and will be subject to restraints, inherent in its position in a democratic society. The Supreme Court in the case of (Ramanna Dayaram Shetty v. The International Airport Authority of India and others)1, reported in A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 1628 inter alia held that:-- "It must, therefore, be taken to be the law that where the Government is dealing with the public, whether by way of giving jobs or entering into contracts or issuing quotas or licences or granting other forms of largess, the Government cannot act arbitrarily at its sweet will and, like a private individual, deal with any person it pleases, but its action must be in conformity with standard or norm which is not arbitrary, irrational and irrelevant. The power or discretion of the Government in the matter of grant of largess including award of jobs, contracts quotas, licences etc. must be confined and structured by rational, relevant and non-discriminatory standard or norm and if the Government departs from such standard or norm in any particular case or cases, the action of the Government would be liable to be struck down, unless it can be shown by the Government that the departure was not arbitrary, but was based on some valid principle which in itself was not irrational, unreasonable or discriminatory." It was further observed by the Supreme Court in the said judgment that the Government must act in public interest, it cannot act arbitrary or without reason and if it does so, its action would be liable to be invalidated. The Supreme Court again in the case of (Ram and Shyam Co. v. State of Haryana and others)2, reported in 1985(3) S.C.C. 267 , reiterated the above view and further held that the State need not deal with anyone but if it does so, it must do so fairly and without exercising absolute and unfettered discretion and without unfair procedure. Thus, the position qua Government property which is in essence public property, is that it cannot be squandered away for a song by person in power who hold the position of trust. In the light of the aforesaid decisions of the Supreme Court, let us see whether in the case before us, the allotment in favour of Yashodabai and allotment/transfer in favour of the respondent No. 4 can be held valid and legal and the burden is on the State to show that its action was not arbitrary. 7. The order dated 30th November, 1983, a copy whereof was produced in Court, inter alia states "in cancellation" of the Government orders issued under Government Memorandum, Revenue and Forests Department dated 16th July, 1981, it was directed to convey the sanction of Government to the grant of Government land admeasuring 8000 sq. ft. 7. The order dated 30th November, 1983, a copy whereof was produced in Court, inter alia states "in cancellation" of the Government orders issued under Government Memorandum, Revenue and Forests Department dated 16th July, 1981, it was directed to convey the sanction of Government to the grant of Government land admeasuring 8000 sq. ft. i.e. the land in question, out of C.T.S. No. 6470 "to Smt. Yashodabai Shamrao Patil, a widow of a freedom fighter, without auction as a special case for residential purpose, on payment of occupancy price equal to the current market value to be determined from the Assistant Director of Town Planning----" It is further provided by the said order that pending determination of the final occupancy price, there would be no objection for handing over advance possession of the land in question to the grantee on payment of provisional occupancy price at the rate of Rs. 9.75 per sq. mtr. subject to certain conditions provided therein. Thus, it is apparent from the plain reading of the said order that the earlier order was cancelled and Yashodabai was allotted the land as she was a widow of a freedom fighter and that too without public auction and as a special case. It is undisputed that Yashodabai expired an 2nd June, 1983. Although the petitioners could not, despite efforts, get full information from any of the respondents, the learned Counsel for the State was directed to produce the application if any made by the respondent No. 4 after 30th November, 1983 in respect of the said land. As the respondent No. 4, after having referred to her application dated 21st January, 1984 in her affidavit in reply could not produce a copy thereof, we asked the learned Government Pleader to produce a copy of the said latter. He produced a copy of this letter as well as a copy of another letter dated 4th February, 1984. Both were addressed to the then Revenue Minister of the State of Maharashtra. The learned Government Pleader also produced a copy of the order dated 18th February, 1984 passed by the Revenue and Forests Department of the State Government. He produced a copy of this letter as well as a copy of another letter dated 4th February, 1984. Both were addressed to the then Revenue Minister of the State of Maharashtra. The learned Government Pleader also produced a copy of the order dated 18th February, 1984 passed by the Revenue and Forests Department of the State Government. From the copy of the letter dated 21st January, 1984, it is clear that both the respondent No. 4 and her sister Smt. Vijayadevi Sampatrao Dubal, claiming to be the only legal heirs of Yashodabai, applied to the State stating therein that in respect of the land in question, the Collector, Satara had been given orders for allotment thereof to Yashodabai, that after the issuance of the allotment in favour of Yashodabai and before possession thereof could be taken, their mother expired; that the said two applicants were the daughters and the only heirs of the deceased after verification; that the land in question was adjoining to their original land and was only useful to them; that the same was allotted to Yashodabai and that as Yashodabai had expired and as they were the heirs who were desirous of constructing a house thereon, the same may be allotted to them. The other letter dated 4th February, 1984, addressed by respondent No. 4 and her sister to the then Revenue Minister, State of Maharashtra, virtually repeated the request contained in the application referred to above. An order dated 18th February, 1984, was passed by the State of Maharashtra. The copy of the order dated 18 February, 1984, inter alia stated that in suppression of the order dated 30th November, 1983, the Collector of Satara was directed to accord the sanction to the grant of the said land to the respondent No. 4 who was the legal heir of Yashodabai in whose name the other adjacent plot owned by Yashodabai had already since been transferred and that the Collector should grant the same on usual terms and conditions and a specific condition mentioned therein to the effect that the Collector must satisfy himself that respondent No. 4 was the only legal heir. The said order further provided that there should not be any objection to possession being given to her payment of provisional occupancy price mentioned therein. The said order further provided that there should not be any objection to possession being given to her payment of provisional occupancy price mentioned therein. Now coming to the last order dated 8th November, 1984, it was passed by the Collector, Satara and inter alia stated that the land in question was granted after due enquiry, by the Government order dated 30th November, 1983 to the applicant Yashodabai as per her application dated 6th October, 1981 for residential purpose; that the said sanction was accorded to Yashodabai who was a widow of freedom fighter without auction as a special case, on payment of occupancy price; that during the process of implementation of the said Government orders, the Government under its memorandum dated 18th February, 1984 issued orders superseding the earlier memorandum dated 30th November, 1983 and the Government further accorded sanction to the grant of the said land to Smt. Shardadevi Suryajirao Kadam (respondent No. 4) of Phaltan being the legal heir of the deceased in whose name even the other adjacent land bearing Survey No. 6472A/1 owned by the deceased Yashodabai has already been transferred; that this was done after necessary enquiries about the legal heirs of Yashodabai having been made; that it was reported that Smt. Vijayadevi Sampatrao Dubal i.e. sister of the respondent No. 4 having given her consent, the respondent No. 4 was entitled to the allotment and thus the land be granted in favour of the respondent No. 4. It was further ordered that the Government had no objection of giving possession on respondent No. 4 paying the provisional fixed occupancy price and on her giving an undertaking to pay the occupancy price finally fixed and that she had paid the provisional occupancy price and furnished the necessary undertaking and therefore there was no objection to putting her in possession of the said land. The said order of the Collector went on further to state than in exercise of powers under section 20 of the Code read with section 32 thereof and Rule 26(2) of the said Rules, the Collector granted advance possession to respondent No. 4 for residential purpose as directed by the Government on terms and conditions mentioned therein. 8. The said order of the Collector went on further to state than in exercise of powers under section 20 of the Code read with section 32 thereof and Rule 26(2) of the said Rules, the Collector granted advance possession to respondent No. 4 for residential purpose as directed by the Government on terms and conditions mentioned therein. 8. The Supreme Court in the case of (Mohinder Singh Gill and another v. The Chief Election Commissioner and others)3, reported in A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 851 inter alia held:-- "When a statutory functionary makes an order based on certain grounds, its validity must be judged by the reasons so mentioned and cannot be supplemented by fresh reasons in the shape of affidavit or otherwise. Otherwise, an order bad in the beginning may, by the time it comes to Court on account of a challenge, get validated by additional grounds later brought out." The Supreme Court referred to its earlier decision in the case of (Commissioner of Police, Bombay v. Gordhandas Bhanji)4, reported in A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 16. Thus the orders dated 30th November, 1983, 21st February, 1984 and 8th November, 1984 have to be tested on the touchstone of what they state than on the stand the respondents have now taken before us. From the above orders, it is apparent that despite other applications and despite orders of allotment earlier passed in favour of the Revenue and Forest Department, the order dated 30 November, 1983, was passed in favour of Yashodabai cancelling earlier order dated 16th July, 1981, on the basis that she was a widow of a freedom fighter and as a special case, without auction. The order dated 18th February, 1984 by the Government directed the Collector to accord sanction in favour of respondent No. 4 who was the legal heir of Yashodabai. Lastly, the order dated 8th November, 1984 of the Collector is also on the basis that the respondent No. 4 was the legal heir of the deceased Yashodabai, the other heir i.e. her sister having given up her claim. The said order dated 30th November, 1984 was passed after the death of Yashodabai i.e. in June, 1983. It is nobodys case that at the time of issuance of this order, the State was unaware of the fact of death of Yashodabai. The said order dated 30th November, 1984 was passed after the death of Yashodabai i.e. in June, 1983. It is nobodys case that at the time of issuance of this order, the State was unaware of the fact of death of Yashodabai. The normal Rule which is laid down by the said Rules is for auction of Government land which is provided under Rule 26 of the said Rules. Rule 26(1) provides that except as otherwise provided in these Rules, the occupancy rights in building sites shall be disposed off by the Collector under section 20 read with section 31 of the Code, by public auction to the highest bidder, unless for reasons to be recorded in writing, the Collector thinks that in any particular case, there is good reason for granting the land without auction. The said order dated 30th November, 1983, apart from the same having been issued in favour of a dead person and therefore ineffective, does not show any reason as to why auction had to be dispensed with. The object of holding an auction is well settled and the Supreme Court has, in the case of Ram and Shyam Company v. State of Haryana and others, reported in 1985(3) S.C.C. 267 inter-alia observed that the object of holding an auction is generally to raise the highest revenue. Moreover, it is apparent that in order to somehow get the case of Yashodabais application within four corners of the Rules, reference has been made to her status as being a widow of a freedom fighter. The Government, however, ignored the fact that Rule 28 specifically deals with disposal of land inter alia in favour of a freedom fighter. It also deals with disposal of land in favour of members of the armed forces, goldsmiths and Government servants and significantly, although sub-rule (3) of Rule 28 provides for allotment in favour of widow of an exserviceman who is dead, there is no provision in Rule 28 for allotment in favour of a widow of a freedom fighter. The allotment/transfer in favour of the respondent No. 4 is stranger than the allotment in favour of Yashodabai. She could not claim to be even a widow of freedom fighter, yet the allotment has been done in her favour. The allotment/transfer in favour of the respondent No. 4 is stranger than the allotment in favour of Yashodabai. She could not claim to be even a widow of freedom fighter, yet the allotment has been done in her favour. It is apparent that the respondent No. 5, making use of his official position has succeeded to get the allotment in favour of the respondent No. 4 on the basis that she was a heir of a widow of a freedom fighter. The reason for taking shelter under this pretext is not far to seek. The Government, at the behest of the respondent No. 5 threw to wind all settled provisions of law as well as the provisions of the said Code and the said Rules. It is elementary that inheritance opens only on the death of a person and therefore, the respondent No. 4 could not have been allotted/transferred the said land as the legal heir of Yashodabai, when the allotment in favour of Yashodabai took place after five months of her death. On the day Yashodabai died, there was no allotment in her favour and therefore, there was no question of the respondent No. 4 or her sister inheriting the same. Realising this difficulty and in order to surmount any possible difficulty, the respondent No. 4 and her sister in their letters dated 21st January, 1984, and 4th February, 1984, adverted to earlier, inter-alia emphasised that after passing of orders for grant of land and before possession thereof could be taken, their mother Yashodabai expired. Ex facie, this was a falsehood trotted out by the respondent Nos. 4 and 5 in order to somehow get the said land. It was obligatory on the State to follow the Rules and not to have allotted the land in question in favour of Yashodabai or the respondent No. 4. From the affidavit in reply filed by the State, it is clear that Yashodabai herself had earlier applied for allotment of the said plot and the respondent No. 5 has also applied for allotment of the said plot, but none of them succeeded and the allotment was made in favour of the Revenue and Forests Department. The dubious manner in which allotments have been made and cancelled by orders issued telephonically/telegraphically, speaks volume for the arbitrary manner in which the State has acted. The dubious manner in which allotments have been made and cancelled by orders issued telephonically/telegraphically, speaks volume for the arbitrary manner in which the State has acted. We have no doubt in our mind that the action of allotting land in favour of Yashodabai and then allotting/ transferring the same in favour of the respondent No. 4 legal heir of Yashodabai is totally illegal and wrong. 9. Mr. Rane, the learned Government Pleader, submitted that allotment in favour of Yashodabai was under section 40 of the Code and Rule 28 of the rules, and in favour of the respondent No. 4 allotment was under Rule 26(2) of the said Rules. In fact, Mr. Rane and Mr. Singhavi submitted that under section 40 of the Code, the State had absolute discretion to dispose off its land. The reliance, in our opinion, placed on section 40 of the Code is not at all well placed. Although the said provision empowers the State Government to dispose off any land on such terms and conditions as it deems fit, the said discretion, in our opinion, given to the State Government is not an absolute or unbridled discretion. The same has to be exercised in a just, fair and reasonable manner. The excerpt from the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Ramana Dayaram Shetty, reproduced earlier, makes it very clear that no State can claim unlimited powers to dispose off its properties and assets or to distribute its larges in whatever manner it likes. Section 20 and section 31 of the Code while dealing with the subject of disposal of Government land, speak of rules as may be prescribed by the State Government. Under Rule 328, the State is given power to make rules not inconsistent with the provisions of the Code for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of the Code. Sub-rules (2)(iv) and (x) thereof inter-alia provide for prescribing rules for disposal of property of the State and for the grant of unalienated land. Thus, under the Code, power of delegated legislation is given to the State. It is true that at the first blush, provisions of section 40 of the Code appear to give complete discretion to the State. Sub-rules (2)(iv) and (x) thereof inter-alia provide for prescribing rules for disposal of property of the State and for the grant of unalienated land. Thus, under the Code, power of delegated legislation is given to the State. It is true that at the first blush, provisions of section 40 of the Code appear to give complete discretion to the State. However, when the Legislature does not lay down standards, the State can seek to lay down standards, which is done in the present case by using its powers of delegated legislation. Thus, we have the Maharashtra Land Revenue (Disposal of Government Land) Rules, 1971 which are enacted in exercise of powers conferred upon the State inter-alia under Clauses (iv) and (x) of sub-rule of section 328 of the Code read with inter-alia sections 20, 31 and 40 of the Code. The said Rules lay down the criteria with respect to which the discretion apparently given under section 40 of the Code is to be exercised. The said rules, in our opinion, are made for prudent disposal of Government lands for receiving the maximum benefit for the community. It is settled law that in the matter of State action in giving larges in the form of contracts or jobs or land, the State must act reasonably, fairly and without discrimination. Thus, the discretion must be exercised in accordance with law. Implied limitations viz. to act fairly and reasonably are required to be read into the provisions of section 40 of the Code as concept of absolute discretion is anathema to the rule of law. 10. From the above discussion of facts as well as law, the conclusion is irresistible that the allotment firstly in favour of Yashodabai and subsequently in favour of the respondent No. 4 is illegal. The allotment in favour of Yashodabai was done on 30th November, 1983, i.e. after she had died which in our view, cannot be termed as allotment at all. Otherwise also, from the said impugned order dated 30th November, 1983, it is obvious that the Government had made the said allotment only on the ground that she was a widow of a freedom fighter. Otherwise also, from the said impugned order dated 30th November, 1983, it is obvious that the Government had made the said allotment only on the ground that she was a widow of a freedom fighter. Even if Yashodabai was alive on 30th November, 1983, the said allotment would have been still held invalid as it did not fall under Rule 28 of the said Rules nor it would have been argued that the same would have fallen under section 40 of the Code. As indicated above, although there is a provision for allotment of inalienated Government land in favour of a widow or other near relatives of a serving member of the armed forces or an ex-serviceman, there is no such provision for allotment in favour of either a widow or near relatives of a freedom fighter. The emphasis again in the said order is on the words "as a special case". However, there is nothing to suggest as to what other factors were taken into consideration by the Government. Neither any report is shown nor any material is placed before the Court. Even if such a material had been produced, reading the order as it is, it is difficult to understand as to on what basis the allotment had taken place. Coming to the allotment in favour of the respondent No. 4 it is significant to note that the respondent No. 4 has staked her claim alongwith her sister on the basis of being heirs of Yashodabai. Moreover, although in fact the allotment had taken place on 30th November, 1983 in favour of Yashodabai i.e. after about five months of her demise, the applications dated 21st January, 1984 and 4th February, 1984 made by the respondent No. 4 and her sister, tried to give an impression that Yashodabai had died after allotment and before actual possession could be given. The order dated 18th February, 1984 of the Government also proceeds on the basis that the respondent No. 4 and her sister were the only heirs of Yashodabai and as a special case, the said allotment had been done. Similarly, the order dated 8th November, 1984 passed by the Collector is also on the same basis. Nowhere in the said two orders in favour of the respondent No. 4 and her sister, one is to find any other reasons except that both of them were heirs of Yashodabai. Similarly, the order dated 8th November, 1984 passed by the Collector is also on the same basis. Nowhere in the said two orders in favour of the respondent No. 4 and her sister, one is to find any other reasons except that both of them were heirs of Yashodabai. The respondents lost sight of the position in law that allotment could not have been made in the name of the deceased and that inheritance opened on death. In these circumstances, we have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the allotment in favour of Yashodabai and then in favour of the respondent No. 4 is arbitrary and for extraneous reasons and those extraneous and non-germane reasons are not far to seek. The respondent No. 5, at the relevant time, was a Member of the Maharashtra Legislative Assembly and it is obvious that at his instance, the allotment has taken place. Needless to say that the State action is required to be taken in good faith without any ulterior motive and should be transparent. Instead, we find the impugned action shrouded in mystery and smacking of arbitrariness. 11. Mr. Singhavi, the learned Counsel appearing for the respondent Nos. 4 and 5, submitted and in our view, as a last ditch effort, that the petition was motivated as the petitioners who were disgruntled as they were not allotted the land in question. 12. Mr. Singhavi, the learned Counsel appearing for the respondent Nos. 4 and 5, submitted that the petitioners were guilty of delay and therefore, on that ground along, the petition should be dismissed. Mr. Singhavi further submitted that the impugned allotment in favour of Yashodabai had taken place on 30th November, 1983 and in favour of the respondent No. 4 on 8th November, 1984; that the petitioner No. 3 in fact had given a notice under section 80 of the C.P.C. in respect of a proposed suit which in fact has not been filed and that the petition has been filed only in March, 1988. According to him, these laches in themselves are enough for dismissing the petition. Mr. According to him, these laches in themselves are enough for dismissing the petition. Mr. Singhavi submitted that the speedy remedy provided under Article 226 of the Constitution is not intended to supersede completely the modes of obtaining relief by an action in Civil Court and that power to give relief under Article 226 being discretionary power, among the several matters which the High Court takes into consideration, the delay is also a major factor. He relied on the decisions of the Supreme Court reported in (State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bhailal Bhai)5, A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1006, (M/s. Tilokchand Motichand v. H.B. Munshi, Commissioner of Sale Tax, Bombay)6, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 898, (State of Maharashtra v. Digamber)7, 1995(4) S.C.C. 683 , and (State of Orrisa v. Dhobei Sethi)8, 1995(5) S.C.C. 583 . On the other hand, Miss Iyer, the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners, submitted that in fact there was no delay on the part of the petitioners inasmuch as that from the letters annexed to the petition, it is apparent that the petitioners had all the time disputed the legality of the allotment in question in favour of Yashodabai and the respondent No. 4; that the petitioners even tried to get necessary information and documents from the respondents which were denied to them; that the petitioners agitated the question of legality of the said allotment on the floor of the Maharashtra Legislative Assembly/Council which is an admitted fact that the final refusal to cancel the allotment was conveyed only on the floor of Maharashtra Legislative Council on 4th December, 1986 and thus, there was no delay. In fact, the petitioners have gone to the length of narrating in detail the efforts they have made in the petition itself, especially in paragraphs 32 to 34 of the petition. In our opinion, the above submission of Mr. Singhavi cannot be accepted for more than one reasons. Firstly, in our view, we do not think that the petitioners are at all guilty of delay. Apart from that, by the petition the petitioners have not agitated their personal right but have ventilated their dismay at the illegal manner in which Government property has been disposed off by the Government. We are also satisfied that the arbitrariness is writ large on the impugned action. Apart from that, by the petition the petitioners have not agitated their personal right but have ventilated their dismay at the illegal manner in which Government property has been disposed off by the Government. We are also satisfied that the arbitrariness is writ large on the impugned action. Moreover, the petition is in the nature of a public interest litigation and cannot be equated with a petition where a person approaches the Court for ventilating his personal rights. The Supreme Court has in the decision of (M/s. Dehri Rohtas Light Railway Company Ltd. v. District Board, Bhojpur and others)9, reported in A.I.R. 1993 S.C. 802 observed as follows :--- "The Principle on which the relief to the party on the grounds of laches or delay is denied is that the rights which have accrued to others by reason of the delay in filing the petition should not be allowed to be disturbed unless there is reasonable explanation for the delay. The real test to determine delay in such cases is that the petitioner should come to the writ Court before a parallel right is created and that the lapse of time is not attributable to any laches or negligence. The test is not to physical running of time. Where the circumstances justifying the conduct exists, the illegality which is manifest cannot be sustained on the sole ground of laches." In our opinion, as regards the lapse of time, that would be considered as constituting delay, no hard and fast rule can be laid down in a matter and each case is required to be decided according to its circumstances without adhering to any fixed period, long or short, especially when the order complained of is manifestly erroneous or without jurisdiction. The Court would be loath to reject the petition simply on the ground of delay unless owing to laches inconsistent, legal or equitable considerations have arisen which cannot be ignored as for example where the other party is induced to alter its position. The Court cannot be precluded from rectifying a grave injustice simply because the petitioner did not move in the matter earlier. 13. In the above circumstances, the petition requires to be made absolute. Petition is allowed in terms of prayer (b) of the petition. The respondent Nos. The Court cannot be precluded from rectifying a grave injustice simply because the petitioner did not move in the matter earlier. 13. In the above circumstances, the petition requires to be made absolute. Petition is allowed in terms of prayer (b) of the petition. The respondent Nos. 1 to 3 are hereby ordered and directed to take necessary steps to take back possession from the respondent No. 4. Looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs Certified copy expedited. Petition allowed. *****