Judgment : This writ petition weeks to quash the notifications under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act in respect of the lands mentioned at the bottom of the G.O.Ms .No. 1235, Industries (MIJ 1), dated 211. 1988, published in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette, supplement to Part II, Section 2, dated 12. 1988, under G.O.Ms.No.1248, Industries (MIJ 1), dated 30.11.1988, published in Part II, Section 2 of the Gazette dated 112. 1988, under G.O.Ms.No.,173 and 174, Industries (MIJ 1), dated 13. 1989, published in Part II, Section 2 of the Gazette, dated 4. 1989, under G.O.Ms.No.359 Industries (MIJ 2), dated 16. 1989, Published in Part II Section 2, dated 26. 1989 and the subsequent notification issued under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, published in G.O.Ms.No.469 Industries (MID 2), dated 12. 1991, published in Part II, Section 2, of the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette Extra-ordinary dated 12. 1991, in respect of the same lands. 2. The purpose for which the lands are notified for acquisition as set out in the notification is that for the expansion of Industrial Complex, Sponsored by State Industrial Promotion Corporation of Tamil Nadu, Madras. 3. It is admitted that the members of the petitioners’ society Purchased the portions of the survey number, from a firm known as Krishna Traders, which had lay out the sides and had obtained approval from the Panchayat Union, Gummidipoondi, some time in the year 1987. Petitioners claim to have purchased the plots between the years 1987 and 1989. 4. The petitioners’ predecessor in title-Krishna Traders by its partner had challenged the notification issued under Section 4(1) of the Act in W.P.No. 14398 of 1989. At about the same time, an association styled as Indira Nagar Welfare Association, also challenged the same notification in W.P.No. 14584 of 1989. A third writ petition by one K. Kurusamy for quashing the very same notification had also been filed in W.P.No. 12653 of 1989. All those writ petitions came to be dismissed by a learned single Jud ge of this Court on 28. 1991. A third writ petition by one K. Kurusamy for quashing the very same notification had also been filed in W.P.No. 12653 of 1989. All those writ petitions came to be dismissed by a learned single Jud ge of this Court on 28. 1991. It had been urged before this Court by the petitioners in those writ petitions that the lay-out of the lands in question had been approved as early as in 1987 and the plans had also been drawn in the year 1988, earlier to the date of 4(1) notification and that at an earlier point of time a proposal to acquire these lands has been disposed. It had also been urged that the notification was vague inasmuch as the purpose set out was not sufficiently specified and therefore did not also constitute a public purpose. .5. All the afore said contentions were negatived by the learned single Judge of this Court. These petitioners thereafter filed Writ Appeals in W.A.Nos.52, 63 and 196 of 1992. The Division Bench in he course of the judgment in those writ appeals observed as follows:- .“The impugned Notifications only set forth this purpose, namely, expansion of industrial complex sponsored by the forth- respondent. That the business of the fourth respondent is expansion of Industrial Complex cannot be questioned. Its purpose has got to be served also cannot be questioned. That purpose could be served by acquiring further lands also cannot be questioned. That there was a need felt for development of additional area in the Industrial complex at Gummidipoondi i evident from the Note ext racted above, and which was received upon at the 140th Meeting of the Board of Directors of the 4th respondent on 29. 1983. The language in the impugned notifications is sufficiently explicit of the public purpose for which acquisition is being made. It is not possible to set forth therein the entire factual gamut behind the public purpose. The law cannot be stated to require any such factual thesis over the public purpose. It is sufficient if the public purpose is set forth with adequate definiteness so that the persons concerned could object effectively, if they so desired. It is not possible to set forth therein the entire factual gamut behind the public purpose. The law cannot be stated to require any such factual thesis over the public purpose. It is sufficient if the public purpose is set forth with adequate definiteness so that the persons concerned could object effectively, if they so desired. We do not think that on the facts of the case, any further expatiation of the pubic purpose more than that set forth in the impugned notifications, can be demanded and it is not possible for the Court to frown upon the impugned notifications as suffering from the vice of vagueness or indefiniteness.” 6. The appeals were thereafter dismissed. After the dismissed of the writ appeals, further notification under Section 6 of the Act was issued on the dates which have been set out in the earlier paragraphs. 7. After the publication of the notification under Section 5 of the Act, this writ petition came to be filed by the group styled as “Indira Nagar Residents’ Benefit Society”. .8. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that even though in his view the judgment rendered in the earlier writ petitions and writ appeals do most constitute res judicata , the petitioners do accept that the notifications issued under Section 4(1) of the Act has been rightly upheld. The further submission was that the petitioners are nevertheless entitled to question the validity of the notification under Section 6 of the Act which was issued subsequently even if it could be presumed that the petitioner were aware of the proceedings that had taken place with regard to the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act. 9. Learned Counsel high-lighted the plight of the innocent purchasers, who had purchased lands from a developer who after selling the plots to the petitioners and others, who had invested their savings, left them in lurch. Counsel therefore submitted that the State has a duty not to deprive the petitioners of their small bits of land. 9. Learned Counsel high-lighted the plight of the innocent purchasers, who had purchased lands from a developer who after selling the plots to the petitioners and others, who had invested their savings, left them in lurch. Counsel therefore submitted that the State has a duty not to deprive the petitioners of their small bits of land. It was also contended that by reason of the approval having been granted for the lay out, the state was estopped from disturbing the petitioners from the lands which they had purchased for the purpose of building their dwelling units thereon, It was submitted that the State, by the application of the principles of the promissory estoppel, is barred from acquiring the land from the petitioners. 10. So far as the public purpose is concerned, the submission was that even if the purpose of the present acquisition is a public purpose, nevertheless, the petitioners by constructing their dwelling units on these sites would also be serving a public purpose, and that purpose cannot be lost sight of, while adjudicating upon the legality of the notification concerning these lands. .11. Counsel for the petitioners Mr. Krishna Raju, relied upon the decision of the Andhra Predesh High Court, reported in K. Rangaiah v. State ( AIR 1980 AP 165 ) in support of his submission that the principles of res judicata are not applicable if different persons challenge the very same notification on different grounds. That decision is of no assistance to the petitioners. In that case, the Court took the case to point out that it was not dealing with the case of a person who was claiming through the person who had come to court earlier. In this case, it is not in dispute that the petitioners’ predecessor in title was the writ petitioner in the earlier writ petition, wherein the notification under Section 4(1) was unsucc essfully challenged. The petitioners are bound by the decision therein and it will not be open to the petitioners to contend that notwithstanding that judgment they can attack the same notification, even if it be on other grounds. As rightly pointed out by Mr. Somayaji, Learned Counsel for the eighty respondent, the principles of constructive res judicata are applicable. The petitioners are bound by the decision therein and it will not be open to the petitioners to contend that notwithstanding that judgment they can attack the same notification, even if it be on other grounds. As rightly pointed out by Mr. Somayaji, Learned Counsel for the eighty respondent, the principles of constructive res judicata are applicable. Even if the predecessor in title had omitted to raise any ground, that might have been and ought to have been raised nevertheless the successors in interest are bound by the judgment rendered earlier and cannot go behind the adjudication that has already been taken place. 12. It was suggested by the learned counsel for the petitioner the the principles of res judicata are not applicable to proceedings under Art.226 of the constitution of India, as Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, does not in terms apply to such proceedings. It is too late to advance arguments of this nature. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the principles enshrined in Section 11 of the Civil Procedure Code is applicable even if Section of Code of Civil Procedure , in terms is not applicable to a case, as the principle of res judicata is founded on principles of public policy, namely the binding character of judgments of Courts of competent jurisdiction, which in this essence is a part of rule of law. It has been so held by the Supreme Court in more than one case. Two such decisions Forward Construction Co. v. Prabhat Mandal ( AIR 1986 SC 391 ) and the decision of the Constitution Bench in Direct Recruit Class II Engineering Officers’ Association v. State of Maharashtra ( AIR 1990 SC 1607 ). The adjudication effected earlier on the petition of the petitioner’ predecessor in title binds the petitioners. 13. Counsel for the petitioners referred to the decisions reported in (1) Bhavising Kandhaji v. Bapalbhai Mastibhai (AIR 1982 Gujara 111); (2) Indo American Hybrid Seeds v. Chandigharh I and I.D. Corporation (AIR 1995 P & H 134); and (3) Delhi Administration v. Friends Housing Society (AIR 1981 Delhi 30) in support of his submission that the principle of estoppel is applicable to the Governmental actions. There can be no quarrel about the proposition that the State is also bound by the principle of estoppel. There can be no quarrel about the proposition that the State is also bound by the principle of estoppel. That principle however can have no application where a statutory power is exercised in terms of the statute, and for the purpose of the statute, and there is no promise on that part of the Government not to exercise such a statutory power. It is not the case of the petitioners that the Government at any point of time promised that they will not acquire the land by invoking the power of compulsory acquisition. The decisions relied on by the learned counsel are decisions rendered in the context of facts which are altogether different from those that arises for consideration here. 14. Reliance was placed by the counsel on the decision of the Supreme Court in Ghaziabad Sheromani Sahkabi Avas Samiti Ltd v. State of U.P. ( AIR 1990 SC 645 ), as also on the decision of a learned single Judge of this Court in the case of Saroja Sethu v. State of Tamil Nadu etc. others (1993 W.L.R 241), in support of the submission that, those persons who are economically weak had after the approval of the lay out, acquired plots for construction of houses for their living, such lands should be deleted from the area proposed for acquisition. Here the acquisition is not for purpose of housing but for the setting up of industries. The Supreme Court had on the special facts of the case before it directed the deletion of a limited area to enable the low paid Government employees who had, through their co- operative society, acquired lands for their housing, as the purpose of acquisition was only the construction of houses. The Court however did not rule that in all cases where the petitioners plead that they belong to economically weaker sections, their lands should be exempted from acquisition. The decision of this Court relied on by counsel also cannot be read as laying down such proposition. 15. In this case, the fact that the acquisition is for a public purposes is beyond dispute. Even if the difficulties that the petitioners are likely to suffer are weighed against the benefits of the proposed acquisition, it is clear that the benefits accruing from the expansion of industrial area out-weights the loss that the petitioners suffer. As pointed out by the learned Special Government Pleader Mr. Even if the difficulties that the petitioners are likely to suffer are weighed against the benefits of the proposed acquisition, it is clear that the benefits accruing from the expansion of industrial area out-weights the loss that the petitioners suffer. As pointed out by the learned Special Government Pleader Mr. P. Sathasivam the present acquisition is, for the second phase of the area, which is contiguous to the first phase wherein infrastructure for industry has been established, and which will now be extended to the acquired are, and it is not possible to give up the acquisition of the petitioners’ land, which is in the middle of the area ear-marked for such industrial development. 16. There is no legal infirmity in the impugned notifications. The writ petition is therefore dismissed but in the circumstances, without costs.