M. F. SALDANHA, J. ( 1 ) THESE two petitions have been filed by two dismissed employees of the canara bank. I shall refrain from going into an elaborate narration of the facts because the issue involved is identical in both cases. Both the petitioners had joined the services of the bank several years earlier and had been employed by the institution on the ground that they belong to the reserved category. In this case, they had represented that they belong to scheduled caste category insofar as their caste was kotegara. There is no dispute about the fact that persons belonging to kotegara caste come within the category of scheduled castes and consequently, the bank treated them as such. Several years had elapsed and in the year 1987, since it had come to the notice of the bank that these two persons had allegedly misrepresented their caste, after verification with the authorities who confirmed that the petitioners belong to the ramakshatriya caste and not to kotegara caste, the bank charge-sheeted the employees in question. An enquiry proceeded which resulted in an adverse finding and the disciplinary authority accordingly passed an Order dismissing the petitioners from service. The two petitioners have filed separate petitions but the orders and the facts being identical, the two petitions have been heard together and are being disposed of through a common judgment. The defence of the bank in this case is of some significance. In the first instance, it is pointed out that since there has been large-scale abuse of the special facilities afforded to persons belonging to scheduled caste and scheduled tribe, that the government of India itself has directed the institutions both educational and otherwise to verify these claims and to take appropriate action in those cases where the claims were found to be incorrect. The bank points out that in the present instance it received documentary confirmation from the authorities to whom the matter was referred, that the school records of the petitioners very clearly indicate that they belong to ramakshatriya caste which does not come in the list of scheduled caste and that they were required to institute disciplinary proceedings because it was very clear to the bank that the petitioners misrepresented their caste at the time when they secured employment. The disciplinary authority has recorded an adverse finding and the bank contends that since this was a clear case of fraud that was established after the holding of an enquiry, that the Order of dismissal from service was fully justified. It is also contended that the bank has followed the requisite procedure and that therefore no interference is required. A subsidiary contention that was raised was that since there is a dispute with regard to certain aspects of the enquiry that was held particularly the validity of the enquiry officer's Order, that the employee concerned is entitled to raise an industrial dispute and that since an alternative remedy is available, this court must refuse to exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 of the constitution. ( 2 ) AS far as this last aspect of the matter is concerned, it is in the nature of a preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of the petition. The respondents' learned Advocate has relied on a recent decision of this High Court in Mohini K. V. General Manager, Syndicate Bank, Manipal and others, wherein an employee of the Syndicate Bank had been dismissed from service and the Order was sought to be challenged through a writ petition under Article 226 of the constitution of india. The learned single judge of this court held that the respondent-bank is an industry within the meaning of the industrial disputes ACT and that a comprehensive remedy other than the one available under Article 226 of the constitution was available to the petitioner and that therefore, this court would refuse to exercise jurisdiction. Respondents' learned Advocate submits that in the light of that decision the present petitions are liable to be dismissed on the ground that a clear alternative remedy is available and that consequently, if the petitioners are aggrieved they can avail of that alternative. I need to note here that undoubtedly this court has taken the view that an alternative remedy under the industrial disputes ACT is available in such cases. There is no dispute about the correctness of this position in law. There is no bar on the High Court in exceptional cases entertaining a petition under Article 226 of the constitution even if an alternative remedy is available, though it is well settled law that the court will normally not invoke its extraordinary jurisdiction in such cases. There is no dispute about the correctness of this position in law. There is no bar on the High Court in exceptional cases entertaining a petition under Article 226 of the constitution even if an alternative remedy is available, though it is well settled law that the court will normally not invoke its extraordinary jurisdiction in such cases. The question however arises as to the stage at which the court will take such a decision. It needs to be noted that if a litigant has approached a wrong forum or an inappropriate forum, that it is certainly open to that forum or authority to redirect the litigation to the most appropriate or the correct one. This presupposes the fact that the objection will be canvassed by the office or the opponent at the very threshold and the court will decide it. One needs to take cognizance of the time factor and the other significant aspect involved and it is equally good law that in those of the cases where a petition has been admitted, in other words where the court has exercised jurisdiction and where the case has come up for final hearing after several years, that the court would not at that late point of time redirect the litigation elsewhere. Apart from the wastage of judicial time, appropriateness and the timing of the Order are all of consequence in such instances. Therefore, the objection must be raised at the earliest point of time so that if it is pointed out to the court that a clear alternative is available, the petitioner can be directed to go there. I do not in the circumstances of this case and at this late stage consider it either proper or appropriate to uphold such an objection at the final hearing of the petition. ( 3 ) THE petitioners' learned Advocate has attacked the validity of the dismissal Order principally on the ground that the petitioners in this case had both obtained the requisite caste certificate from the competent authority namely the tahsildar. ( 3 ) THE petitioners' learned Advocate has attacked the validity of the dismissal Order principally on the ground that the petitioners in this case had both obtained the requisite caste certificate from the competent authority namely the tahsildar. Guidelines issued by the government of India are eloquent with regard to the reason for the choice of this particular officer and briefly stated what is set out there is that the authority having revenue jurisdiction over the area where the applicant is normally a resident or hails from is the most appropriate authority competent to examine issues relating to caste or community because there are several local circumstances such as relatives, the community, education and employment background etc. , all of which require to be looked into and it is for this reason that the powers are specially designated to this authority. Petitioners' learned Advocate submits that once a caste certificate is issued, that it has presumptive value but more importantly certain rights flow from that document. The certificate issued by the legally designated authority is presumed to be not only valid but correct. Therefore in matters of education, employment etc. , it is not only permissible but it is obligatory for the concerned officers and authorities to respect such certificates and give effect to these. It was for this reason that the bank accepted the certificates and employed the two petitioners'. ( 4 ) PETITIONERS' learned Advocate proceeds to contend that the certificate which is presumed to be correct and which is a valid one continues to be so unless and until it is revoked or set aside. He therefore submits that as far as the facts of the present case are concerned that it was wholly outside the jurisdiction of the bank to hold an enquiry and to record a finding with regard to the validity or otherwise of the caste certificate which proceeds on the footing that insofar as even if the allegation was that the petitioner misrepresented his caste, that the only authority competent to revoke was the one designated by the government for purposes of issuance of a caste certificate and not the bank. In this regard learned Advocate has placed strong reliance on a decision of the Madras High Court in the case of Sakthi Devi v. Collector of Salem. In this regard learned Advocate has placed strong reliance on a decision of the Madras High Court in the case of Sakthi Devi v. Collector of Salem. The division bench of the Madras High Court had occasion to examine the law on this point and has conclusively laid down two principles which the petitioners' learned Advocate relies on. The first of them is that it is the designated authority alone who has the right to determine issues such as the right caste to which an applicant belongs and to issue certificates to that effect. The division bench has also laid down that the right to issue certificates would under the general clauses ACT include the right to revoke them and as a necessary consequence held that once a certificate has been issued by such an authority, it continues to be valid unless it is revoked by the competent authority. It is in the background of this decision that the petitioners' learned Advocate submits that the enquiry held by the bank is completely without jurisdiction. ( 5 ) THE respondents' learned Advocate has defended the action from several angles. Firstly he relies on the guidelines issued by the government of India which the bank has observed. He states that having regard to the large scale misrepresentation and the fact that in a large number of cases it is disclosed that such caste certificates are wrongly issued, that the government had directed the institutions to verify the claims in question. It is his contention that the matter was referred to the district commissioner who has confirmed in writing on 13-3-1987 that in both the cases, an examination of the school record indicates that the petitioners belong to ramakshatriya caste and that this caste does not appear in the schedule. He therefore submits that the bank was more than fully justified in having issued a charge-sheet to the petitioners. Very heavy reliance is placed by the learned Advocate on the reply that has been filed to the charge-sheet. Both the petitioners have admitted that their caste in the relevant school record has been shown as ramakshatriya and that they belong to that caste. It is their contention that the kotegara caste is equivalent for all intents and purposes to several others and that the name ramakshatriya is a synonym of kotegara caste. Both the petitioners have admitted that their caste in the relevant school record has been shown as ramakshatriya and that they belong to that caste. It is their contention that the kotegara caste is equivalent for all intents and purposes to several others and that the name ramakshatriya is a synonym of kotegara caste. Respondents' learned Advocate submits that in the light of this admission, the enquiry officer was more than fully justified in holding that misrepresentation has taken place. He defends the action of the bank because he submits that in serious matters such as employment if it is demonstrated that the caste has been misrepresented, but that the petitioners has usurped a position which he is not entitled to and conversely that he has deprived of a deserving reserved category candidate of the opportunity of employment by having got into that position and that therefore the Order of dismissal is more than fully justified. I need to observe in passing that, that if the facts disclose that in matters of employment such as this a grave misrepresentation has taken place, the only inference would be that the applicant has been guilty of a fraud and in such circumstances the employer would be more than fully justified in dismissing him from service. ( 6 ) THE petitioners' learned Advocate has placed strong reliance on a recent division bench decision of this court in the case of Paduthota Ramachandra and others v. Union of India and others. The controversy in that case related once again to the kotegara caste and the division bench of this court has held that even though it was specified that there was considerable substance in the contention that the various castes that are referred to are synonyms for the kotegara caste that it was neither open to the court nor to the state government to take any action in the matter insofar as it was the prerogative of the central government to recommend to the president for modification/correction of this synonym in the schedule. For these reasons, the court directed that action should not be taken for a period of one year as far as all those candidates are concerned. Only the state government could move the authority for appropriate corrective action. For these reasons, the court directed that action should not be taken for a period of one year as far as all those candidates are concerned. Only the state government could move the authority for appropriate corrective action. Petitioners' learned Advocate submits that this decision very clearly indicates that the division bench of this court has upheld the theory of equivalents or synonyms and it is just a matter of time before the necessary corrective steps are taken. He submitted that he has brought sufficient material to satisfy this court in this regard but I do not consider it necessary to go into that material. Suffice it to say that the division bench did accept on a detailed scrutiny of the material before it that the various castes one of which is the present one are all synonyms for the kotegara caste and it was for this reason that punitive action against the persons belonging to those categories has been stopped. In the light of this background, there can be no dispute about the fact that the consequences of the action taken by the bank will have to be reviewed. ( 7 ) COMING to the basic issue namely the question as to whether the bank was justified in holding a domestic enquiry with regard to the aspect of the petitioners' castes, I need to record that where the bank has gone wrong is that it ought to have referred the matter to the competent authority and once this was done and the authority confirmed that there was something wrong with regard to the petitioners castes, the matter should have been referred to the designated authority for revocation of the caste certificates. That procedure has invariably been followed in the subsequent cases but it is possible at the point of time when the present cause of action arose, that this aspect of the matter was overlooked. That is far more crucial because the power to issue certificates and the power to revoke them is limited to the designated authorities and that power could not have been exercised by the enquiry authority appointed by the bank. The finding recorded by enquiry officer in effect virtually overruled the caste certificate that was issued by the competent authority or in other words, that he has had through his findings revoked that caste certificate. The finding recorded by enquiry officer in effect virtually overruled the caste certificate that was issued by the competent authority or in other words, that he has had through his findings revoked that caste certificate. It was impermissible for him to do either of those and it is for this reason that the action taken by the bank will have to be struck down. It is true that the learned Advocate has pointed out that there was adequate ground for the bank to have commenced the enquiry into the matter since it did appear that the petitioners did not belong to the kotegara caste. He has defended the action on the ground that the matter was referred to the district commissioner of the shimoga district from where the petitioners hail. He contends that it was not for the bank to thereafter follow up the nature of action taken by that authority because the bank received written confirmation dated 13-3-1987 from the district social welfare officer confirming the fact that the petitioners did not belong to the kotegara caste. He has made a two fold submission, the first of them being that this letter by impucation has the effect of nullifying the caste certificate and the second submission that once such a finding has been recorded in writing by an authority superior to the tahsildar, that the original caste certificate is deemed to have been overruled. I am unable to accept both these contentions for the simple reason that there may be no dispute about the fact that the bank had referred the matter to the district commissioner. The question is not with regard to the higher rank of the authority to whom the dispute was referred to but the issue is as to who was the designated authority and the competent authority to take the action in question. Under the scheme of the law as it then existed, the certificate had been issued by the tahsildar and in a given case, it is even permissible for the appellate authority above the tahsildar to have interfered with that decision. In the present instance however, all that has happened is that a private enquiry was made and some factual reply has been received but this under no circumstances, not even by implication, can have the effect of either revoking or overruling the caste certificate that has earlier been issued. In the present instance however, all that has happened is that a private enquiry was made and some factual reply has been received but this under no circumstances, not even by implication, can have the effect of either revoking or overruling the caste certificate that has earlier been issued. We are therefore virtually brought back to the position that the caste certificate in question which the petitioners possess had not at any point of time, been revoked and in the face of that document the contrary findings of the enquiry officer that they do not belong to the castes mentioned by them cannot be held to be valid. An additional dimension that has subsequently emerged in this case is the division bench decision referred to by me supra. This is a recent development but the petitioners are entitled to get the benefit of this decision by necessary implication where the division bench has upheld the theory of synonyms, the action of the bank even if looked at retrospectively can never be upheld. We are therefore left with the situation that if the action of the bank were to be sustained, the petitioners who have been divested of their jobs will have to be held to have wrongly lost their jobs. This position cannot be sustained in this point of time when the court is hearing the matter. The only view that is correct and permissible would be that the petitioners would have to get the benefit of the division bench decision. ( 8 ) THERE is only one other aspect of the matter that I need todeal with and this is with regard to the Order passed by the disciplinary authority. Petitioners' learned Advocate has seriously assailed this Order on the ground that it suffers from total non-application of mind. The order is a very cryptic one and the manner in which it has been worded virtually smacks of imperious tones. In situations where an employee is sought to be divested of his employment through the imposition of a major penalty, the scheme of the law is of significance. Petitioners' learned Advocate has relied on a decision in S. N. Mukharjee v. Union of India, wherein the Supreme Court has castigated arbitrariness in the exercise of quasi judicial functions holding that adequate reasons must be given. An Order of this type was struck down in that case. Petitioners' learned Advocate has relied on a decision in S. N. Mukharjee v. Union of India, wherein the Supreme Court has castigated arbitrariness in the exercise of quasi judicial functions holding that adequate reasons must be given. An Order of this type was struck down in that case. The Order of the disciplinary authority virtually consists of two sentences. The first of them narrates the fact that the petitioner was charge-sheeted and that an enquiry was held and the second sentence proceeds to state that the disciplinary authority agrees with the findings of the enquiry officer and that therefore, the petitioner is dismissed from service. The Order does not even so much as state in the narration that the authority has been good enough to peruse the record of the case, go through the entire material that was on record and had come to the conclusion. It is abundantly clear, since it is now well settled law, that where an Order does not reflect the application of mind, that no amount of padding up through affidavit in subsequent arguments can cure such a basic and vital infirmity. Petitioners' learned Advocate has relied on one more decision in the case of Ramchandra Keshav Adke (Dead) by L. rs. V. Govind Joti Chavari and others, wherein the Supreme Court had occasion to hold that strict compliance with procedure is absolutely necessary. He contends that the principles of service law are now well-defined and that where the disciplinary authority has demonstrated that it has not applied its mind that the Order will straightaway have to be quashed. ( 9 ) AS far as this aspect is concerned, I must say that the respondents' learned Advocate has made a valiant effort to defend the Order in question. He has pointed out to this court that situations do arise where the enquiry officer may produce a near perfect enquiry report. Learned Advocate submits that if the evidence has been reproduced and well discussed where the findings are 100% correct and where even the recommendation regarding the type of punishment and the quantum of punishment are once again absolutely faultless, that a disciplinary authority does not have to go through the second repetitive exercise of once again recording the same reasons in an elaborate order. In this regard he has placed heavy reliance on two decisions of the Supreme Court, the first of them being in the case of Ram Kumar v. State of Haryana, wherein the Supreme Court has observed that where a punishing authority agrees with the findings of the enquiry officer and accepts the reasons given by him in support of that finding, it is not necessary for the punishing authority to again discuss evidence and go on to give the same reasons for the finding. The second decision relied on by the respondents' learned Advocate is the one in the case of State Bank of Bikaner v. Prabhu Dayal, wherein the Supreme Court once again held that it is unnecessary for a disciplinary authority to record reasons in respect of an Order of punishment where it concurs with the findings of the enquiry officer. The Supreme Court went on to observe as follows :"even if we proceed on the basis that such an application is implicit, still the Order of the disciplinary authority cannot be held to be bad as a perusal thereof, we find that before concurring with the findings of the enquiry officer it has gone through the entire proceedings and applied its mind thereto. In our considered opinion, when the disciplinary authority agrees with the findings of the enquiry officer and accepts the reasons given by him in support of such findings it is not necessary for the punishing authority to reappraise the evidence to arrive at the same findings". ( 10 ) THE debate is not really with regard to the technicalitiesor the form of the Order but the real issue is with regard to the scheme of service jurisprudence in relation to such situations. The reason why a disciplinary authority is invariably an authority of higher rank and therefore presumed to be one more responsible than the enquiry officer is apparent from the fact that the enquiry officer who has held the enquiry appraises the facts and records a finding of fact and is to some extent handicapped in the matter of awarding punishment principally because he is the one who has conducted the enquiry. It is not that the enquiry officer would be incompetent but the scheme of service law requires that once an Order of punishment has serious consequences, that the record must be reappraised by a second and higher authority before the imposition of a punishment. It is the aspect of reappraisal that is of paramount importance and in those of the cases such as the present one where the Order of the disciplinary authority indicates that there has been no complete reappraisal which in legal parlance is synonymous with application of mind, the Order of the disciplinary authority cannot pass judicial scrutiny. Despite the fact that the Order of the disciplinary authority has been vehemently defended I am unable to hold that it is a valid order. ( 11 ) VIEWED at from both angles therefore, the action taken bythe bank in the case of both the petitioners' is unsustainable. The dismissal orders are accordingly quashed. As a necessary consequence, this court is required to direct that the petitioners will have to be reinstated. Having regard to the fact that the bank has obviously followed the incorrect procedure, it may have been open to them to have the matter re-examined and to decide the fate of the petitioners on the basis of the original caste certificates. Had that been the position, I would have refrained from directing the bank to pay to the petitioners backwages for the entire period during which they have been kept out of employment. The present case is however different insofar as the matter is concluded by the division bench judgment and therefore the holding of any further enquiry would be academic. In this view of the matter, the respondent-bank is directed to reinstate the petitioners in service with effect from 1-12-1995. As far as the arrears are concerned, the same shall be computed and paid to the petitioners as early as possible but latest by 31-3-1996. In the event of default on the part of the respondents in paying the arrears, interest compounded at the rate of 18% per annum shall be payable to them. ( 12 ) THE petitions accordingly succeed. Rule is made absolute to this extent. There shall be no Order as to costs. --- *** --- .