JUDGMENT - Dr. B. P. SARAF, J.:--The petitioner is a tenant of a premises owned by the respondent. The respondent had filed a suit against the petitioner for recovery of rent and possession of the premises. The suit was dismissed by the Joint Civil Judge, Junior Division, Nasik on the ground that the statutory notice under section 12(2) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 ("Act") had not been served on the petitioner (tenant). It may be mentioned at this stage that the notice in question had been sent by the respondent-landlord by registered post which was received back by him with the postal endorsement "refused". According to the landlord, the return of the notice with the above endorsement amounted to deemed service of the notice. The tenant (petitioner herein) denied on oath the correctness of the endorsement. According to her on the material date viz., 11th September, 1974, when she is alleged to have refused to accept the registered letter, she was not even in Nasik. She had left for her maternal uncles place on 2nd September, 1974 for Shaban and had stayed there for two months. It was contended that in such circumstances, the question of refusal of registered letter on 11th September, 1974 could not arise. The above statement of the petitioner was corroborated by one Shabira, who is her neighbour. The trial Court observed that there was nothing to disbelieve the evidence of the petitioner. The trial Court also took note of the fact that the statement of the petitioner in regard to her absence from Nasik from 2nd September, 1974 had been corroborated by her neighbour Shabira (D.W. 2). The trial Court therefore held that the presumption of service, in such a situation, stood rebutted and the onus shifted to the landlord to prove the service of the notice. It was therefore held that the respondent-plaintiff failed to prove that the statutory notice under section 12(2) had been refused by the defendant-petitioner and hence the suit was not maintainable. The suit was accordingly dismissed. 2. On appeal by the landlord, the Appellate Court reversed the above finding of the trial Court. It was therefore held that the respondent-plaintiff failed to prove that the statutory notice under section 12(2) had been refused by the defendant-petitioner and hence the suit was not maintainable. The suit was accordingly dismissed. 2. On appeal by the landlord, the Appellate Court reversed the above finding of the trial Court. While doing so, the Appellate Court observed that "it is very convenient for anybody to say after the lapse of about five years to circumvent the consequences of refusal of the registered envelope that she had gone to a particular place". The Appellate Court also observed that in the pleading the petitioner had made her say that the postman had never come to her and that she had never refused the notice. According to the Appellate Court she should have said in the pleading that she had gone to her maternal uncles place during that period. The Appellate Court did not give credence to the evidence of Shabira, who had corroborated the statement of the petitioner about her absence, on the ground that she was quite friendly with the petitioner and that she was not next door neighbour but residing at some distance from the petitioners house. The Appellate Court, therefore, held that in such circumstances the statutory presumption of service could not be said to have been rebutted. In view of its above finding, the Appellate Court set aside the judgment of the trial Court and decreed the suit and directed the petitioner-tenant to deliver vacant possession of the premises to the respondent-landlord. Aggrieved by the above order of the Appellate Court, the petitioner has come to this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India by filing the present writ petition. The only point for determination is whether in the instance case the Appellate Court was justified in reversing the finding of the trial Court in regard to rebuttal of presumption of service of notice under section 12(2) of the Act. 3. The learned Counsel for the petitioner contended that service of notice is a statutory requirement under section 12(2) of the Act. It is a condition precedent for instituting a suit by a landlord against a tenant for recovery of possession on the ground of non-payment of the standard rent etc. 3. The learned Counsel for the petitioner contended that service of notice is a statutory requirement under section 12(2) of the Act. It is a condition precedent for instituting a suit by a landlord against a tenant for recovery of possession on the ground of non-payment of the standard rent etc. In that view of the matter, according to the counsel, it is incumbent on the part of the respondent to prove the service of the notice. It is contended that the statutory presumption under section 27 of the General Clauses Act about the service of a notice sent by registered post is a rebuttable presumption which was duly rebutted by the petitioner in the instant case. Counsel submits that in the facts and circumstances of this case, the trial Court was fully justified in law in holding that the presumption of service was rebutted by the petitioner by adducing necessary evidence which could not be held to be unreliable and which was duly corroborated by another resident of the same place. According to the learned Counsel, the Appellate Court was not justified in reversing the said finding. The reversal, according to him, is based on pure conjectures and surmises. It is submitted that the Appellate Court failed to appreciate the true nature of the presumption of service of notice under section 27 of the General Clauses Act. In reply to the observations of the Appellate Court about vagueness of the pleadings in regard to the non-service of the notice, the counsel submitted that the service was denied by the petitioner at the earliest possible opportunity in her written statement and the delay of five years in examination of the witnesses was the usual delay for no fault of the petitioner and in no way the same can be used as a factor to reject the evidence of the petitioner and Shabira as "misconstrued and afterthought" and rejecting the same. Learned Counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, relied on the reasoning of the Appellate Court in support of the same. 4. I have carefully considered the rival submissions. There is no controversy about the fact that the service of notice under section 12(2) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 is a condition precedent for filing of a suit for recovery of possession on the ground of non-payment of rent. 4. I have carefully considered the rival submissions. There is no controversy about the fact that the service of notice under section 12(2) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 is a condition precedent for filing of a suit for recovery of possession on the ground of non-payment of rent. Section 12(2) provides: "No suit for recovery of possession shall be instituted by a landlord against tenant on the ground of non-payment of the standard rent or permitted increases due, until the expiration of one month next after notice in writing of the demand of the standard rent or permitted increases has been served upon the tenant in the manner provided in section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882". Section 106 of Transfer of Property Act provides the following manner of service of notice: "Every notice under this section must be in writing signed by or on behalf of the person giving it, and either be sent by post to the party who is intended to be bound by it or be tendered or delivered personally to such party, or to one of his family or servants at his residence, or (if such tender or delivery is not practicable) affixed to a conspicuous part of the property." It is evident from the above provision that service by post is an expressly authorised form of service. Section 27 of the Indian General Clauses Act lays down the general rule governing references to service by post. It provides : "27. Meaning of service by post.--Where any (Central Act) or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act authorizes or requires any document to be served by post, whether the expression "serve" or either of the expressions "give" or "send" or any other expression is used, then, unless a different intention appears, the service shall be deemed to be effected by properly addressing, pre-paying and posting by registered post, a letter containing the document, and, unless the contrary is proved, to have been effected at the time at which the letter would be delivered in the ordinary course of post." In identical terms is section 28 of the Bombay General Clauses Act, 1904 which reads: "28. Meaning of service by post.--Where any Bombay Act or Maharashtra Act made after the commencement of this Act authorizes or requires any document to be served by post, whether the expression "serve" or either of the expressions "give" or "send" or any other expression is used, then, unless a different intention appears, the service shall be deemed to be effected by properly addressing, prepaying and posting by registered post, a letter containing the document, and, unless the contrary is proved, to have been effected at the time at which the letter would be delivered in the ordinary course of post." The presumption of service under the above provisions obviously is a rebuttable one. The presumption applies "unless a different intention appears" and "unless the contrary is proved." One more provision needs reference in this connection and that is section 144, Illustration (f) of the Indian Evidence Act. It provides : "114. Court may presume existence of certain facts.--The Court may presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened, regard being had to the common course of natural events, human conduct and public and private business, in their relation to the facts of the particular case. Illustrations * * * * * (f) that the common course of business has been followed in particular cases. But the Court shall also have regard to such facts as the following in considering whether such maxims do or do not apply to the particular case before it:- * * * * * As to illustration (f).--The question is, whether a letter was received. It is shown to have been posted, but the usual course of the post was interrupted by disturbance." 5. There is no controversy in this case about the fact that a notice was sent by the respondent landlord to the petitioner by registered post on 10th September, 1974 which was returned to him with the remark "refused". The remark appears to have been put on 11th September, 1974. There is also no controversy about the legal position that in the ordinary course these facts might have given rise to a presumption of service. The real dispute is about the nature of evidence required to rebut this presumption. The remark appears to have been put on 11th September, 1974. There is also no controversy about the legal position that in the ordinary course these facts might have given rise to a presumption of service. The real dispute is about the nature of evidence required to rebut this presumption. According to the petitioner, the presumption stands rebutted by her evidence about her absence from the town at the material time which was also corroborated by the evidence of another lady from the same place. According to the respondent, the presumption does not stand rebutted merely by such statement- something more is needed to be proved for that purpose. 6. The law is well-settled that the presumption of service under section 27 of the Indian General Clauses Act, section 28 of the Bombay General Clauses Act, and under section 144 of the Indian Evidence Act is a rebuttable presumption that the notice was delivered to the addressee or that on being delivered, it was refused by the addressee. Where a notice is sent to a defendant by registered post and the cover containing the same returned with the postal endorsement "refused", undoubtedly it is for the defendant to adduce evidence to satisfy the Court that the same was not tendered to him. But once the defendant does so by making statement on oath and adducing other evidence, unless such denial is found to be prima facie incorrect, the onus will shift to the plaintiff. It would be for the plaintiff in such a situation to prove the contrary by examining the postman who tendered the letter containing the notice to the defendant or by adducing some other evidence. In the absence of such evidence, the statement of the defendant made on oath remains uncontroverted which would amount to rebuttal of the presumption of service. However, as held by the Supreme Court in (Anil Kumar v. Nanak Chandra Verma)1, A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 1215, there could be no hard and fast rule in this regard. It would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. Unchallenged testimony of a tenant in certain cases may be sufficient to rebut the presumption unless such testimony itself is inherently unreliable. 7. It would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. Unchallenged testimony of a tenant in certain cases may be sufficient to rebut the presumption unless such testimony itself is inherently unreliable. 7. In the instant case, the trial Court was satisfied with the statement of the tenant on oath that she was not in the town when the letter containing the notice was allegedly "refused" by her which was also corroborated by the evidence of Shabira. The trial Court categorically observed that there was nothing to disbelieve the testimony of the defendant that at the material time she had gone to her uncles house. The Appellate Court reversed the above finding merely on suspicion and conjectures. There is nothing on record to justify the rejection of the testimony of the defendant or to regard it as "inherently unreliable". In such a situation, I am of the clear opinion that the trial Court was justified in accepting the unchallenged testimony of the tenant which was duly corroborated by another lady from the same place that she was away from her residence at the material time and in holding that the presumption or service stood rebutted. In my view, the Appellate Court was not justified in reversing the said finding without any material basis. In view of the above, I set aside the judgement and order of the Appellate Court and restore that of the trial Court. 8. In the result, this writ petition is allowed. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. Petition allowed. *****