JUDGMENT Bhawani Singh, J.—This writ petition is off-shot of Civil Writ Petition No. 707 of 1992 and 42 of 1990 decided by the Full Bench of this Court on May 9, 1994, AIR 1995 HP 15, Mohinder Pal v. State of H P Narration of the essential facts of Writ Petition No 707 of 1992 would be necessary to understand the matter and appreciate the submissions advanced before us by the learned Counsel for the parties. 2. The petitioner claims to be the descendant of the Pal family of Kutlehar, a small principality in Katigra hills, now forms part of the State of Himachal Pradesh from November 1, 1966 It came into existence 300-400 years ago and was ruled by his ancestors. It was divided into sixteen Tappas (chunks of land), four were Jagir ‘Tappas and 12 Khalsa Tappas. In four Jagir Tappas5, laad revenue to the extent of Rs. 10,000 was assigned to his forefathers by way of Jagir. In addition to these four Tappas, about twenty thousand acres of land belonged to Bartandars (right-holders). It was not used for agriculture purposes. The forefathers of the petitioner had grown large number of trees over it from period before 1868 A.D. They protected and maintained these trees while Bartandars’ were granted certain rights—right to get timber on concessional rates for their domestic requirements, the right to graze their cattle etc Obviously, for planting and managing these trees, substantial investments were made The forefathers of the petitioner were dealing with these trees as proprietors of the forest and it was on account of this background that as early as 1869 during the Settlement operation of Civil District of Kangra Mr. James Lyall, Settlement Officer, made proposal through his letter No. 12, dated February 12, 1868 that the management of the forests in four Tappas termed as Jagir Tappas, be granted to the Raja of Kutlehar. The Government of Punjab approved this proposal not only in respect of four ‘Jagir Tappas’ but also for all the sixteen Tappas —twelve Khalsa Tappas, It is contained in letter No. 49, dated January 11, 1869 and since then the predecessors of the petitioner started managing the forest subject to the conditions contained in the approval. 3. However, the Government stated laying claim to the trees grown on this land after about four decades (1915). 3. However, the Government stated laying claim to the trees grown on this land after about four decades (1915). It was resisted and another round of correspondence took place between the parties. The matter was set at rest by Lt Governor of Punjab. It is clear from letter No. 124 (Forest), dated May 25, 1916 by Honble H.D. Craik, officiating Revenue Secretary of Punjab to the Junior Secretary to the Financial Commissioner of Government of Punjab The view of the Lt. Governor of Punjab is ascertainable from out of this letter which records that: "His Honour considers that the Raja has established his claim with regard to the trees on the four jagir tappas at least to this extent that Government having divested itself of most of its rights in favour of the Raja, is no longer the absolute owner The present entry in the record of rights to that effect is, therefore, not in strict accordance with facts, He is accordingly pleased to direct that for the first sentence of Clause ill of the record of rights the following entry should be substituted as suggested unofficially by Mr Diak. All trees growing in the protected forests, subject to the right of Bartandars and to the other conditions and exceptions hereinafter specified, belong to Government, but have been assigned by Government to the Raja so long as he abides by the conditions of management hereunto appended, " So far as twelve Khalsa Tappas are concerned, Lt. Governor observed as under: "In practice, the Rajas position has been recognised as being the same with regard to both the Khalsa and Jagii tappas and in these circumstances Sir Michael O Dwyer is willing to allow the entry to be made regarding the trees in the Khalsa tappas as he had approved for the trees in the Jagir tappas." 4. The petitioner submitted that the finding of the Governor depicts the precise nature of the rights which the forefathers of the petitioner had in the forest in question It had been accepted that the forefathers of the petitioner had established their claim to the said forest and in case the then Raja had asked for the assignment of the trees in his favour, absolute right in them could have possibly been granted. The right of management of the forest was not the result of any ordinary or formal bilateral agreement but was the result of recognition of superior right of the forefathers of the petitioner in these forests Other wise, there could be no decision of entrusting the possession and management of these forests to the fore-B fathers of the petitioner. 5. After the matter was finally set at rest, the Lt. Governor of Punjab, in exercise of powers vested in him under sections 28, 29 (a) and 31 of the Indian Forest Act, 1878, issued Notifications dated August 31, 1915. By the first notification under section 28, Chapter IV of the Act was made applicable to all the waste and forest lands within the limits of Jagirs of Rajas of Guler, Dada Siba, Nadaun and Kutlehar in the Kangra District or under the management of any of the Rajas in respect of which it is declared in the record of land revenue settlement of 1910-15 that trees standing on it belong to the Government, By this notification, certain areas specified in the statement appended thereto, were declared to have been demarcated and also demarcated protected forests 6. By Notification under section 29 (a), Lt- Governor declared all trees to be reserved from the date of Notification in the forest declared protected by Notification No. 2&.9-A of the same date. And by Notification No. 2839-E of the same date, rules were framed in exercise of the powers under section 31 of the Act 1878. These rules contained detailed provisions relating to the matters pertaining to administration of forests including a declaration regarding the rights of ‘Bartandars’, Khatedars’, etc. These rules also contained the details of the terms and conditions subject to which the management was assigned to the Rajas of Guler, Dada Siba, Nadaun and Kutlehar respectively. Condition Nos. I to VIII read as follows: “I. The management of the protected forests will continue in the hands of the Raja, subject to the recorded rights of use and to the following rules. II. The Raja shall be bound by the general directions issued by the Forest Department. III. The Raja shall keep a register of all leases to break up land which have been given by him Such leases shall only be granted under the following conditions : (1) That there are no trees standing on the land. II. The Raja shall be bound by the general directions issued by the Forest Department. III. The Raja shall keep a register of all leases to break up land which have been given by him Such leases shall only be granted under the following conditions : (1) That there are no trees standing on the land. (2) That the land adjoins an existing main block of cultivation. (3) That other Khewatdars and bartandars do not object. (4) That the land has been inspected by a Forest Officer, who has satisfied himself that the above conditions have been observed. In the Khalsa villages of Taluka Kutlehar whenever the Raja refuses an application to break up land, he shall refer the case for the confirmation of the Deputy Commissioner. IV. The Raja shall keep such registers as the Deputy Commissioner may direct in which to record the trees and bamboos granted to right-holders. In these registers the Raja shall record all trees and bamboos cut for the use of himself and his family. V. The Raja will dispose of applications made by traders or others for the purchase of trees or other forest produce, subject to the following conditions: (a) He may sell to traders only the trees that have been marked for this purpose by the Forest Department. (b) He shall keep the sales of bamboos within the limits in regard to number and locality fixed by the Forest Department. (c) He shall sell trees only at the rates approved by the Forest Department. VI. The Raja will continue to realise the grazing fees from Gaddies at the rate fixed by Government or by mutual agreement between the Raja and Gaddies, subject to the approval of Deputy Commissioner, as the case may be. The Raja shall be entitled to all such fees except as provided in Rule XIII. VII. The Raja shall keep a register showing all receipt from the sale of timber bamboos and other forest produce, whether to Zamindars or to traders. Of this income the Raja shall: (a) In the case of Nadaun and Guler receive one-half and Government one-half. (b) In the case of Kutlehar receive three-fourth and Government one fourth; Note.—In the case of Dada Siba, the division of receipts is governed by Rule XIII. VIII. The Raja shall continue to maintain the Establishment." 7. Of this income the Raja shall: (a) In the case of Nadaun and Guler receive one-half and Government one-half. (b) In the case of Kutlehar receive three-fourth and Government one fourth; Note.—In the case of Dada Siba, the division of receipts is governed by Rule XIII. VIII. The Raja shall continue to maintain the Establishment." 7. The petitioner stated that it would be apparent that certain provisions of the Forest Act were made applicable to the Kutlehar Forest by about the time when the Lt. Governor had finally pronounced upon the rights of the petitioners predecessors Joint interest of the Government and private individual in forests was for the first time recognised by the Legislature while enacting section 79 of the Indian Forest Act, 1878. It was a time when the Government was attempting to establish its control over forests and other State properties. Presumably, in order to settle subsiding and impending controversies, section 79 was incorporated in the Indian Forest Act, 1878. Although the decision of Lt Governor in regard to the entries in the record of rights declare the Government as owner of the forest, the fact remains that there could be no assignment of management in favour of private individuals unless such private individuals had some rights or interest in the forest. Section 79 of the Forest Act, 1878 envisages that: "79 Management of forests the joint property of Government and other persons.—(I) If the Government and any person be jointly interested in any forest or waste-land, or in whole or any part of the produce thereof, the State Government may either—. (a) undertake the management of such forest waste-land or produce according to such person for his interest in the same ; or (b) issue such regulations for the management of the forest, waste-land or produce by the person so jointly interested as it deems necessary for the management thereof and the interests of all parties therein. (2) When the State Government undertakes under Clause (a) of sub-section (1) the management of any forest, waste-land or produce, it may, by notification in the official Gazette, declare that any of the provisions contained in Chapters II and IV shall apply to such forest, waste-land or produce, and thereupon such provisions shall apply accordingly," "80. (2) When the State Government undertakes under Clause (a) of sub-section (1) the management of any forest, waste-land or produce, it may, by notification in the official Gazette, declare that any of the provisions contained in Chapters II and IV shall apply to such forest, waste-land or produce, and thereupon such provisions shall apply accordingly," "80. Failure to per form service for which a share in the produce of Government forest is enjoyed—If any person be entitled to share in the produce of any forest which is the property of Government or over which the Government has proprietary rights or to any part of the forest produce of which the Government is entitled, upon the condition of duly performing any service connected with such forest, such share shall be liable to confiscation in the event of the fact being established to the satisfaction of the State Government that such service is no longer so performed : Provided that no such share shall be .confiscated until the person entitled thereto, and the evidence, if any, which he may produce in proof of the due performance of such service, have been heard by an officer duly appointed in that behalf by the State Government." 8. These provisions form part of the Indian Forest Act, 1927 as sections 80 and 81. They provide for the management of forest either by the Government or by a person in case they have joint interest in it. Sharing of the income is also contemplated and it is only in case of failure to perform service by the person that the share is liable to be confiscated that too when it is established to the satisfaction of the local Government. But opportunity to establish to the contrary by the person concerned has been made part of the provisions of section 80 before confiscation of the share is actually resorted to. The entrustment of the management of the forest contemplated by the Forest Act of 1927 was an acknowledgment of the co-ownership in the corpus of the forest and its produce between the Government and the right-holders. The Settlement operations in the Civil District of Kangra, of which Kutlehar was a part, was started in 1868 A D. The Settlement Officer Mr. The Settlement operations in the Civil District of Kangra, of which Kutlehar was a part, was started in 1868 A D. The Settlement Officer Mr. James Lyall had taken note of the fact that the petitioners forefathers were in possession of the forest in question and were managing the same in their capacity as proprietors of the trees. Accordingly, a proposal was made vide letter No 12, dated February 2, 1868 for the management of the said forest by the petitioners forefathers and the proposal was accordingly approved wide letter No 49, dated January 11, 1869 by the Government of Punjab. The terms and conditions, subject to which the management was agreed upon, were as follows: "(a) Zamindars to continue to exercise their rights in enjoyment of Bartan. (b) Grazing fee paid by Shepherds, Gujjars and herdmen to go to Raja as before according to custom and entries in settlement, and these should not be enhanced without sanction of the Government. (c) In case of sale of timber to Zamindars, or other residents, at nominal prices, the whole of the income therefrom would go to the Raja and in case of sale of timber to merchants or contractors, the Raja would pay I/4th of the income so realised into Government Treasury. (d) In case of continued mismanagement of the forests, the Government is entitled to take management into its own hands and charge the cost of the management against 3/4th share of the income of the Raja," The agreement between the parties was rather provisional since the matter had not been set at rest completely. It is clear from the fact that even during 1869-1882 when the petitioners predecessors-in-interest were in possession and management of the forest, their claim for higher rights continued to be enquired into The memorandum dated July 27, 1882 of Mr. Anderson, Forest Settlement Officer, addressed to Col W. G. Davies, ICS, Commissioner and Superintendent, Jalandhar Division to the Senior Secretary to the Financial Commissioner, Punjab, throws a complete light on the rights of the petitioners forefathers in regard to the aforesaid forest. The following extracts from the letter of Col. Anderson, Forest Settlement Officer, addressed to Col W. G. Davies, ICS, Commissioner and Superintendent, Jalandhar Division to the Senior Secretary to the Financial Commissioner, Punjab, throws a complete light on the rights of the petitioners forefathers in regard to the aforesaid forest. The following extracts from the letter of Col. W.G. Davies, ICS, Commissioner and Superintendent, Jalandhar to the Senior Secretary to the Financial Commissioner, Punjab, No 2462, dated November 27, 1882 would substantiate the submissions: "The next question relates to the division of the income from the Kutlehar Forests between the Government and the Raja. To understand it properly, it is necessary to know something of the previous history of this Jagir and this I will give in a few words as possible. Chauki Kutlehar was one of the many small principalities into which these hills were formerly divided, and in 1825 was taken from the father of (he present Raja by Ranjit Singh, who conferred on him a Jagir of Rs. 10,000 in the Hoshiarpur District. In 1868 Mr Lyall, as Settlement Officer, in his No. 12 of 2nd February, 1868, proposed that the Jagir should be transferred to the Kangra District and that 4 out of the 16 Tappas of which the Kutlebar Taluka consists should be assigned to the Raja. In sending up this recommendation he further proposed that the Government confer on the Raja its rights in the forests in the Jagir villages on certain conditions, one of which was that the whole of the sale proceeds of timber to the Zamindars should go to the Raja, while the sale proceeds of timber to merchants or contractors, the Raja should pay one-fourth to Government After some correspondence these proposals were sanctioned by Government. In carrying them out the Deputy Commissioner of Kangra appears to have understood that the orders applied to the forests in the whole Taluka and not only to those of the four Jagir-Tappas, and the result has been that the Raja has since 1868 received three-fourths of the income from all the forests in the Taluka. The question is whether this mistake should now be corrected, or to remain as they are. It will be seen that the reporting Officers are at issue on this question, and have recorded separate memos on it. The question is whether this mistake should now be corrected, or to remain as they are. It will be seen that the reporting Officers are at issue on this question, and have recorded separate memos on it. Colonel Stenrouse is in favour of literally carrying the original proposals, and while acknowledging the good management of the forests by the Raja, represents that a larger share of the forest revenues of his Jagir was conferred on him that was given to the other Rajas, and farther, that the Raja has been altogether a gainer by the mistake made, as his receipts from Khalsa villages, to which he is not entitled, must have considerably exceeded the quarter share of sale proceeds of timber to Zamindars, which has hitherto been erroneously paid to Government. Mr. Anderson, on the other hand, takes a more liberal view of the question He would leave matters as they are, on the grounds that the forests were once part of Rajas ancestral Estates and under more favourable circumstances, he would have been declared proprietor of the whole Taluka (See paragraph 10 of Mr. Lyall’s No. 12 of 2nd February, 1868) ; that in some respects the Raja of the Nadaun is similarly situated as regards the Khalsa villages in his Jagir ; that the forests in the Khalsa villages owe no small part of their present value to the Rajas good management ; and that although this proposal, if accepted, will confirm to the Raja more than he is entitled to receive under the orders of the Government part of excess, would be given by way of compensation for loss of the share of sale proceeds of timber sold to Zamindars, which has hitherto gone to Government, and part was a reward for good services in managing these forests and as Honrary Magistrate and Civil Judge of the Taluka. These arguments appear to me to possess great force, especially the last, and it would, in my opinion, be a most ungracious act on the part of Government to make any change now in an arrangement made so long ago as 1860, during the minority of the Raja, by the officer in-charge of his estate, and would, in the eyes of the Raja at least, have the appearance of a breach of faith. These existing division of the income from these forests is, moreover, a much simpler one than that originally proposed and the loss to Government involved in it is very trifling. This is admitted by the Deputy Conservator of Forests. I, therefore, recommend that no change be made.” 9. The petitioner submitted that the decision of the Lt. Governor of Punjab conveyed by letter dated May 25, 1916 finally resolved the dispute between the predecessor-in interest of the petitioner and the Government of Punjab and the conditions contained therein are similar to those which had been laid down in 1868. They are reproduced hereunder: I. The management of the protected forests will continue in the hands of the Raja, subject to the recorded rights of use and to the following rules. II. The Raja shall be bound by the general directions issued by the Forest Department. III. The Raja shall keep a register of all leases to break up land which have been given by him. Such leases shall only be granted under the following conditions:— (1) That there are no trees standing on the land. (2) That the land adjoins an existing main block of cultivation. (3) That Khewatdars and Bartandars do not object. (4) That the land has been inspected by a Forest Officer, who has satisfied himself that the above conditions have been observed. In the Khalsa villages of Taluka Kutlehar whenever the Raja refuses an application to break up land, he shall refer the case for the confirmation of the Deputy Commissioner. IV. The Raja shall keep such registers as the Deputy Commissioner may direct in which to record the trees and bamboos granted to right holders. In these registers the Raja shall record all trees and bamboos cut for the use of himself and his family.. V. The Raja will dispose of applications made by traders or other for the purchase of trees or other forest produce, subject to the following conditions :— (a) He may sell to traders only the trees that have been marked for this purpose by the Forest Department. (b) He shall keep the sales of bamboos within the limits in regard to number and locality fixed by the Forest Department. (c) He shall sell trees only at the rates approved by the Forest Department, VI. (b) He shall keep the sales of bamboos within the limits in regard to number and locality fixed by the Forest Department. (c) He shall sell trees only at the rates approved by the Forest Department, VI. The Raja will continue to realise the grazing fees from Gaddis at the rate fixed by Government or by mutual agreement between the Raja and the Gaddis, subject to the approval of Deputy Commissioner as the case may be. The Raja shall be entitled to all such fee except as provided in Rule XIII. VII. The Raja shall keep a register showing all receipts from the sale of timber, bamboos and other forest produce, whether to Zamindars or to traders. Of this income the Raja shall— (a) in the case of Nadaun and Guler receive one-half and Government one-half. (b) In the case of Kutlehar receive three-fourth and Government one-fourth; Note.—In the case of Dada Siba, the division of receipts is governed by Rule XIII. VIII. The Raja shall continue to maintain the Forest Establishment, B—Dada Siba only IX. The Raja shall keep registers showing the income from grazing fees and sales of forest produce in all protected forests. He will receive all income from undemarcated forests and half the net income from demarcated forests, the remaining half being credited to Government. C—In Kutlehar only X. The Raja may continue to give licences to non-right-holders— (1) to take dry wood ; (2) to take grass and patra ; (3) to graze their own cattle ; (4) to take leaves of chil for tanning ; (5) to take taur leaves ; (6) to take stones for grinding-mills ; (7) to take limestone. XI. The Raja shall keep a register showing the income derived from these licences, and shall receive three-fourth of such income, the remaining fourth being credited to Government. XII. The Raja shall pay to Government, on account of Gaddis fees in the Khalsa villages, Rs 60 or such-other sum as may be decided at the revision of the land revenue settlement, XIII. XII. The Raja shall pay to Government, on account of Gaddis fees in the Khalsa villages, Rs 60 or such-other sum as may be decided at the revision of the land revenue settlement, XIII. The Raja Mankotia may graze his cattle and take forest produce for his own agricultural domestic purposes without payment, but may not cut green wood without the Rajas permission." 10 Therefore, the arrangement between the parties was compatible with the scheme of management provided under sections 79 and 80 of the Forest Act, 1878 and sections 80 and 81 of the Indian Forest Act, 1927. This arrangement does not confer bounty on a private individual. It recognizes the competitive rights of an individual on the one hand and those of the Government on the other. This kind of arrangement was unique since no other similar arrangement has been there in the State of Punjab and Himachal Pradesh. Even between the States inter se, the State of Kutlehar was given a distinction presumably because of the higher claims of the Ruler to the proprietary rights over the trees as compared to the Rulers of the States of Nadaun, Dada Siba and Guler who were granted only one-half share in the total produce derived from the forests. 11. The Government of Punjab passed the Punjab Resumption of Jagirs Act, 1957. Action was taken under this Act everywhere in the State, however, the forest in question continued to remain under the management of the petitioner uninterruptedly on the same terms and conditions. No effort was made by the Government of Punjab to set at nought the arrangement primarily for the reason that the petitioner and his forefathers had 3/4th interest in the forest in the form of proprietary right though the records of rights described the State of Punjab as the owner. All this suggested the real and unassailable rights of the petitioner which culminated in the arrangement between the two sides and in case of any kind of hurdle, resort to legal remedies could be there to establish the right of sole proprietorship to these forests, as evidenced from the report of Mr. Anderson, Forest Settlement Officer, 1869. This arrangement continued in operation. Only modification made in it was that instead of l/4th share of the gross receipts, 1/4th share of the net receipt was made payable to the State in case of resin. Anderson, Forest Settlement Officer, 1869. This arrangement continued in operation. Only modification made in it was that instead of l/4th share of the gross receipts, 1/4th share of the net receipt was made payable to the State in case of resin. On the reorganisation of the State of Punjab in 1966, District Una, of which Kutlehar is a part, came to Himachal Pradesh. The Punjab Resumption of Jagirs Act, 1957 was made applicable in this State. 12. On January 19, 1990, the Government of Himachal Pradesh issued Notification No. Rev/D (F) 7-1/90 whereby the management and possession of Kutlehar Jagir Forest was ordered to be taken over by the Principal Chief Conservator of Forest with the assistance of the Collector of Una This power was exercised under sub-clause (i) of sub-section (i) of sections 2 and 3 of the Punjab Resumption of Jagirs Act, 1957. It was challenged in this Court through Civil Writ Petition No 42 of 1990 on the grounds, inter alia, that the Punjab Resumption of Jagirs Act, 1957 has no application to this case; that the forest land was neither au estate nor a Jagir; that the Notification was mala fide. The operation of this order had been stayed by this Court. 13. Thereafter, the Himachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly passed The Himachal Pradesh Kutlehar Forest (Acquisition of Management) Act, 1992. It was submitted to the President under Clause (2) of Article 254 and Article 31-A of the Constitution. Assent was granted and the Act came to force. 14. The petitioner challenged the constitutional validity of the Himachal Pradesh Kutlehar Forest (Acquisition of Management) Act, 19 >2 on grounds, inter alia, that the Legislation was not valid being opposed to Article 300-A of the Constitution ; besides, it violated the principles contained in Articles 14f 19 thereof and was not protected by Articles .H-A, 11-B and 31-C Deletion of Articles 31 and 1-9 (1) (f) from Part III of the Constitution has protected the property rights of a parson by including it in Article 300-A of the Constitution. The State could not assert that this property was Jagir and came to an end after Punjab Resumption of Jagirs Act, 1957. The provisions of this Act and Articles 31-A and 31-C of the Constitution were, inapplicable in this case. 15. The State could not assert that this property was Jagir and came to an end after Punjab Resumption of Jagirs Act, 1957. The provisions of this Act and Articles 31-A and 31-C of the Constitution were, inapplicable in this case. 15. The petitioner claimed that the Legislation was violative of the Constitution since it did not provide for the payment of compensation equivalent to market value and that the compensation intended to be given was wholly illusory and amounted to fraud on the power In case it was found that the Legislation was protected by Article 31-C, the petitioner could question the Legislation and seek market value of the property under Article 300-4 of the Constitution and the principle laid down by the apex Court in numerous decisions starting from State of West Bengal v. Mrs Bella Banerjee and others AIR 1954 SC 170, supported by the views of the eminent authors like Professor P K. Tripathi and Shri H M. Seervai. 16. The State opposed the challenge stating, inter alia, that the lands in dispute were recorded as "Shamlat Tikka Hasab Mundraja Shajra Nasab" in the revenue records for the year 1955 and before. The area vested in village Panchayats under the provisions of the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961 and thereafter in the State of Himachal Pradesh under the Himachal Pradesh Village Common Lands (Vesting and Utilisation) Act, 1974. All the rights, title and interest in it were vested in the State Government including the trees and other propertics. Consequently, the property ceased to be the property of any person including the petitioner who could not continue to manage the forest standing over the land. The petitioner was not owner of the trees but was managing the same subject to certain conditions. The arrangement could be dispensed with at any time. 17. After the advent of Sikh Rule around 1825, the principalities of Kangra, of which Kutlehar family was a smaller principality, were seized by Maharaja Ranjit Singh. This family was conferred a Jagir in Hoshiarpur District to the extent of Rs 10,000 Later, with the consent of British Government, this Jagir was shifted in four Tappas of Kutlehar in accordance with the arrangement. The Jagir’ was assignment of land revenue and nothing more. It is denied that any right was vested in the petitioner or his predecessors-in-interest by the said grant. The Jagir’ was assignment of land revenue and nothing more. It is denied that any right was vested in the petitioner or his predecessors-in-interest by the said grant. So far as the grant of ‘Jagir’ is concerned, the same came to an end under the provisions of Resumption of Jagirs Act, 1957. The petitioner received compensation under this Act and all rights, title and interest which the petitioner possessed in these four ‘Tappas’ came to an end. However, he continued to manage the forests, the proprietary rights of which vested in the Government in accordance with the arrangement arrived at with the then State of Punjab. It is, however, admitted that the present dispute relates to 16 Tappas of land known as Kutiehar Forest which were declared protected forest and the petitioner and his predecessors-in-interest were assigned the management of this forest as a Manager and certain powers under the Indian Forest Act and other Forest Laws were conferred on him Out of 16 Tappas’ 4 were Jagir Tappas and 12 were Khalsa Tappas5. The management was to be carried on in accordance with the conditions contained in letter dated May 25, 1916 There is separate records of lights for each village included in the Tappa, therefore, they are estate within the meaning of Article 31-A of the Constitution of India and also under the provisions of the Punjab Land Revenue Act and the H P. Land Revenue Act. 18. The right to property was no longer the Fundamental Right. State took step of taking over the management for achieving agrarian reforms and utilize the property for the benefit of the society. There was no violation of Articles 14, 19 and 300-A of the Constitution by passing of the Act. It has been denied that any improvements were made by the forefathers of the petitioner in growing these trees or that they were felled or disposed of from time to time being the proprietors of the same. Pioprietary rights over the soil or the trees never vested in the petitioner. It has been denied that any improvements were made by the forefathers of the petitioner in growing these trees or that they were felled or disposed of from time to time being the proprietors of the same. Pioprietary rights over the soil or the trees never vested in the petitioner. He had been felling the trees in accordance with the arrangement made by the then Punjab State and these conditions are mentioned in the Forest Department Notification No 73 at page 45 of Forest Settlement Report by Sheep Shank It is thus clear what was assigned to the petitioner or his forefathers vide amendments made on July 30, 1945, was the management of the trees on terms and conditions of management appended thereto or such other conditions which might be substituted for them The petitioner was given only a licence to work the forest in accordance with the terms and conditions of management and at best a grant of services which could be resumed at any time by the State Government Although the State Government could have taken over these rights by an executive order, however, it has done so by virtue of valid legislation enacted by the State Assembly with the prior consent of the President of India. 19. All the arrangements or the interest of the parties in the forest are to be deciphered from the Forest Settlement Report of Mr. Sheep Shank and Mr. A. Anderson relating to Kangra Valley. It is denied that arrangement was provisional in nature. As a matter of fact, all the claims of the petitioner were rejected by the Lt. Governor of Punjab. The petitioner was required to pay 1/4th of the amount realised from the sale of the forest produce by way of royalty and retain 3/4th for himself. The arrangement to manage the forest was de hors to Indian Forest Act, 1878 or the Indian Forest Act, 1927. The 3/4th share receivable by him was in the nature of quid pro quo for the services to be rendered in the management of the forest. It was at best a service grant which could be resumed when these services were no longer required by the State. The 3/4th share receivable by him was in the nature of quid pro quo for the services to be rendered in the management of the forest. It was at best a service grant which could be resumed when these services were no longer required by the State. This kind of arrangement was not only with the petitioner since similar arrangement existed with rulers of Nadaun, Dada Siba and Guler and the higher share received by the petitioner did not make any difference between him and the other rulers. 20. Under the Punjab Resumption of Jagtrs Act, 1957, all the Jagirs in Kutlebar, Dada Siba, Nadaun and Guler came to an end and the management had nothing to do with the ‘Jagirs’ so granted. The public was demanding the taking over of these forests, income of which was being utilised by an individual The forests were not worked on social lines. In these circumstances, it was in public interest that the management has been taken over through validly enacted legislation and by virtue of section 4, all rights, titles and interest of the grantee in the forest or waste land held by him, stood vested in the Government free from all encumbrances. The Act has been enacted as a measure of agrarian reforms as well which is covered by Article 31-A (l) (a) of the Constitution Kutlehar Forest is an estate within the meaning of Article 31 (1) (a) of the Constitution as well as section 4 (5) (a) (b) (c) of the H. P. Land Revenue Act. The definition of estate under Article 31 (I) (a) is wide enough to cover Kutlehar Forest inasmuch as this falls within the definition of local area, namely, Himachal Pradesh Land Revenue Act of which is a separate record of rights has been maintained and would have been assessed to land revenue in case it had not been realised/compounded/redeemed. Even otherwise, it squarely falls within the definition of Article 2 (a) (b> of Article 31 (1) (a) of the-Constitution Therefore, the provisions of Article 31-A are clearly applicable to the present legislation. By virtue of repeal of Clause (f) of Article i9 (1), no Fundamental Right to properties is available to the petitioner and the legislation cannot be impugned on that basis. 21. By virtue of repeal of Clause (f) of Article i9 (1), no Fundamental Right to properties is available to the petitioner and the legislation cannot be impugned on that basis. 21. The petitioner was allowed 75% of the gross income taking into consideration that a part of the income was to be invested in the maintenance, preservation and management of the forest and out of that income, the petitioner had constructed various infra-structures stated by him. The buildings which are personally owned by him in his own land, are not subject-matter of acquisition. The petitioner and his forefathers have appropriated crores of rupees and only fraction of it has been invested by them. The State has been paid only 1 /4th of the gross income by way of royalty. The personal property of the petitioner has not been taken over. However, such properties which were used in connection with the management of the forest, are to be taken over by the State Government Only such properties which fall within the protected forest and demarcated forest are taken over by the impugned legislation and not the personal properties of the petitioner He is being compensated adequately as he had only a right of management which could be taken over without even paying compensation. 22. Even otherwise, inadequacy of compensation is not challengeable. There has not been violation of Article 14 of the Constitution. The petitioner is a class by himself, as such, arrangements have already been taken over from the Rulers of Nadaun, Guler and Dada Siba, therefore, the action is neither arbitrary nor unreasonable. He is being adequate compensation even for terminating the management without any proprietary interest in the trees. Even the inadequacy of compensation can be decided by the Arbitrator under the Act. The allegation of uon-application of mind by the State enacting this legislation has been denied. The legislation is a measure of agrarian reforms and is squarely covered by the Directive Principles of State Policy mentioned in Article 39 (a) and (b) of the Constitution. Taking over of a huge forest, the income of which in crores of rupees was being appropriated by one person, is itself a measure in public interest. Since Article 31 of the Constitution stands repealed, no grievance can be made by the petitioner. No private property of the petitioner is being acquired. Taking over of a huge forest, the income of which in crores of rupees was being appropriated by one person, is itself a measure in public interest. Since Article 31 of the Constitution stands repealed, no grievance can be made by the petitioner. No private property of the petitioner is being acquired. The legislation takes over the management of a forest which had been entrusted to the petitioner at some stage. He had no right, title or interest in it and even if he had some, the same has been acquired by the legislation. The legislation cannot be challenged on the ground of motivation or mala fide There was no pressure from any Member of Legislative Assembly of Kutlehar constituency for taking over the management of the forest In any case, no malice can be attributed to the Legislative Assembly which passed the Act. The petitioner had been using and exploiting the forest commercially not from the point of view of social forestry. The correctness of the report published in the Indian Express has been denied and it has been stated that the same is irrelevant. The State has taken over the forest in the interest of the revenues of the State as well as for social, ecological and environmental reasons. All other allegations of the petitioner have also been denied. 23. The Full Bench of this Court held that the Himachal Pradesh Kutlehar Forest (Acquisition of Management) Act, 1992 fell within the ambit of Articles 31-A and 3l-C of the Constitution and the management of the forest was taken over competently through this legislation. In para 62 it has been held that: "62, Therefore, we hold that it is a case of management grant in favour of the petitioner and the retention of 3/4th share is not only by way of managerial charges but also for meeting the expenses towards the plantation/maintenance and management of the trees. The legislation seeks to take over the management from the petitioner against payment of amount that may be determined in accordance with section 5 of the Act " 24. Again, in para 68 it has been held that : "68. The forest in question is owned by the Government, therefore, it is a public property. It is being managed by an individual. Again, in para 68 it has been held that : "68. The forest in question is owned by the Government, therefore, it is a public property. It is being managed by an individual. The Constitution envisages a socialistic pattern of society, therefore, management of the forest by the Government for the welfare of the people in general and village community in particular on social lines and from ecological angle is undoubtedly a public purpose, ft also seeks to achieve the principles enunciated in Articles 38 and 39 of the Constitution of India, It does not suffer from legislative competence since we find that the legislation falls under Entry 17-A and Entry 18 of List II and Entry 42 of List III of the 7th Schedule of the Constitution. The items in the 7th Schedule to the Constitution enumerate broadly the subjects over which the Parliament or the State Legislature can competently legislate. They have to be given broad and meaningful interpretation and, therefore, while enacting laws on particular topics, competent legislature can enact laws covering wider field without going completely out of the assigned arena We think, the State Legislature has not attempted to cross the fence while enacting the impugned legislation to cover the subject-matter." In para 73 the Full Bench also held that: "73. Article 300-A is not a Fundamental Right, it is only a legal right requiring the acquisition of property by legislation in place of executive fiat, therefore, the contention raised in this regard is completely unsustainable. The forest under acquisition is an estate under Article 3I-A (1) (a) as defined under Article 3i (2) (a) Assistance from the Land Revenue Code is relevant since it defines it and not from the Tenancy Act. Alternatively, it falls under (i). It is a Jagir or in any case, a management grant and can be acquired. The case does not fall under (iii). The submission touching Article 31-C is that the legislation is intended to give effect to the policy of the State towards securing the principles laid down in Articles 38 and 39 of the Constitution since it intends to take the management of the forest from the petitioner for the purpose of managing it on social lines and in the interest of the public and environment," In para 78 it has been held that: "78. Article 31-A (2) gives a wide definition of "estate". Article 31-A (2) gives a wide definition of "estate". This definition is inclusive in nature. It not only defines "estate" being one which has been defined in the existing law relating to land tenure in force in the area but also others falling under items (i) to (iii). In our opinion, in order to give meaningful and functional interpretation to it in the context of the local area, the Tenancy Laws as well as the Revenue Law will have to be read together and if so read, we can definitely conclude that the land and the forest is an estate within the meaning of H. P Land Revenue Act, 1953, the H. P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, 1972 and the H. P. Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972. There is also a separate record-of-rights for it, It would have been assessed to land revenue had it not been assigned for management on special terms and conditions between the parties. We find that four Tappas formed Jagir which was resumed by Punjab Government under the Resumption of Jagirs Act, 1957 against payment of compensation, though ttie petitioner continued to manage the forest thereafter also with other twelve Tappas which conjointly formed the total management grant in favour of the petitioner in acknowledgement of his interest therein by the Government. la any case, it was not a cash grant as sought to be made out by the petitioner. The matter does not fall under (iii) since this provision requires that it must be held or let for purposes of agriculture or for purposes ancillary thereto in view of the apex Court decisions referred to above." 25. The Full Bench further said in paras 81 to 83 that: "81. We, therefore, hold that it is an estate within the meaning of Articles 31-A (I) (a), 3! (2) (a) and 31-A (2) (a) (i) of the Constitution and is, therefore, protected from challenge on the ground that it is inconsistent with or takes or abridges any of the rights conferred by Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution of India. "82. Going over to the next question, we entertain no doubt about the fulfilment of objective contained in Articles 38, 39 (b) and (c) of Directive Principles of State Policy contained in Part IV of the Constitution, through the impugned legislation. "82. Going over to the next question, we entertain no doubt about the fulfilment of objective contained in Articles 38, 39 (b) and (c) of Directive Principles of State Policy contained in Part IV of the Constitution, through the impugned legislation. We have held that the management interest of the petitioner in the forest is a property which the legislation intends to acquire and not choses in action or cash grant being received by the petitioner for the management of this forest Simply because the petitioner is likely to lose 3/4th gross income from the forest on account of this legislation, it does not mean that his money or cash is being acquired The legislation seeks to acquire the management of forest extinguishing whatever right, interest the petitioner has in it. Therefore, the loss of 3/4th income of the petitioner, cannot be taken to be the object of the legislation " "83. The forest belongs to the Government, though, its management has been assigned to the petitioner on settled terms. In a socialistic pattern of society, such a huge forest cannot be allowed to be managed through an individual. It has to be used for the good of the general public and managed on scientific lines. The contention that it does not achieve agrarian reforms, is not sustainable in view of the stand of the respondents that the forest is being taken over for social, ecological and environmental reasons in addition to the revenue of the State and to do away with the individual management avoiding concentration of wealth in the hands of an individual and utilise the same for common good.” In para 92 it has been said that : "92. In the light of the aforesaid discussion, we hold that the Act falls within the ambit of Articles 31-A and 31-C of the Constitution and the challenge of the petitioner is rejected. Even otherwise, the State Legislature can competently take over the management through the present legislation/ 26. However, the Court struck down section 5 of the Act. On the question of payment of compensation, precise submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioner was: "93. Even otherwise, the State Legislature can competently take over the management through the present legislation/ 26. However, the Court struck down section 5 of the Act. On the question of payment of compensation, precise submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioner was: "93. Now, we propose to deal with the contention of Shri D. D. Thakur that the impugned legislation is violative of the Constitution since it does not provide for the payment of compensation equivalent to market value and that the compensation intended to be given is wholly illusory and amounts to fraud on the power. It was also, submitted that in case it is found that the impugned legislation is protected by Article 31 -C and deletion of Article 19 (I) (f) and Article 31 (I), the right of the petitioner to question the legislation and seek market value of the property is fortified by Article 300-A of the Constitution. By this change, decision of the Supreme Court in 1954 SCR 558 : AM 1954 SC 170, State of West Bengal v. Mrs. Bela Banerjee, Interpreting "compensation" being equivalent to the market value of the property, becomes applicable. Besides making reference to these decisions, our attention was drawn to the views of eminent authors like Professor P K Tripatht and H M Seervai exposing opinion on the effect of the deletion Article 31 from Part III of the Constitution and enactment of Article 300-A.” The Court found and held that (paras 98 to 100): "98. Now, we look at the impugned Act, Section 5 provides that the Government shall pay to the petitioner an amount equiva-lent to 1/5th of the net income after deduction of all lawful expenses incurred by him in the management dunug the financial year 1988-89 and the said amount shall be paid in five instalments payable on the first day of Juue every year with interest at the rate of 9 per cent per annum. It was strongly contended by Shri D.D Thakur that the compensation intended to be paid is thoroughly unreasonable and illusory. Lean year of 1988-89 has been selected intentionally without any reasonably acceptable criteria. The total annual gross receipts of the fores were ranging between rupees forty to sixty lacs. 3/4th share of that amount would be between thirty to forty lacs. Lean year of 1988-89 has been selected intentionally without any reasonably acceptable criteria. The total annual gross receipts of the fores were ranging between rupees forty to sixty lacs. 3/4th share of that amount would be between thirty to forty lacs. After deducting the amount of expenses on the maintenance of the forest, net saving would come to rupees twenty to twenty five lacs, la case compensation is determined according to the method of capitalisation the multiplier cannot be less than twenty as is generally done in acquisitions under the Land Acquisition Act Reference to the following Paragraph of Rustom Cavasjee Cooper v. Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 564, was made (p. 609): The important methods of determination of compensation are-(i) market value determined from sales of comparable properties proximate in time to the date of acquisition, similarly situate and possessing the same or similar advantages and subject to the same or similar disadvantages. Market value is the price the property may fetch in the open market if sold by a willing seller unaffected by the special needs of a particular purchase ; (ii) capitalization of the net annual profit out of the property at a rate equal in normal cases to the return from gilt-edged securities. Ordinarily value of the property may be determined by capitalizing the net annual value obtained in the market at the date of the notice of acquisition ; (iii) where the property is a house, expenditure likely to be incurred for constructing a similar house, and reduced by the depreciation for the number of years since it was constructed ; (iv) principle for reinstatement, where it is satisfactorily established that reinstatement in some other place is bona fide intended, there being no general market for the property for the purpose for which it is devoted (the purpose being a public purpose) and would have continued to be devoted, but for compulsory acquisition. Here compensation will be assessed on the basis of reasonable cost of reinstatement ; (v) when the property has out-grown its utility and it is reasonably incapable of economic use, it may be valued as land plus the break-up value of the structure. Here compensation will be assessed on the basis of reasonable cost of reinstatement ; (v) when the property has out-grown its utility and it is reasonably incapable of economic use, it may be valued as land plus the break-up value of the structure. But the fact that the acquier does not intend to use the property for which it is used at the time of acquisition and desires to demolish it or use it for other purpose is irrelevant ; and (vi) the property to be acquired ordinarily to be valued as a unit. Normally an aggregate of the value of different components will not be the value of the unit Therefore, it was asserted that none of these methods have been made use of while enacting the provisions of section 5 of the impugned Act, so the provisions are not only arbitrary but also confiscatory in nature and, therefore, liable to be struck down." "99. We see great substance in this contention for the reasons stated by the learned Counsel. In addition to them, we feel that a proper and reasonable mode of assessing the compensation should have been provided for assessing the compensation intended to be payable to the petitioner (see Statement of Objects and Reasons) The petitioner may not have proprietary interest in the forest but he had substantial interest in it that is why the management of the forest has been assigned to him since the time of his ancestor It has been maintained efficiently throughout It would not be wrong to accept the contention that it is one 6f the best maintained forest in the country, The petitioner and his ancestors have not only been looking after the existing trees but had been planting trees from time to time making the property quite valuable. It was on account of this onerous task that out of the gross income of the forest, 3/4th share was receivable by him. Out of it, the petitioner has constructed numerous establishments, passages, roads and has utilized even his private property in this endeavour. It was on account of this onerous task that out of the gross income of the forest, 3/4th share was receivable by him. Out of it, the petitioner has constructed numerous establishments, passages, roads and has utilized even his private property in this endeavour. It is also recordable that the whole family is engaged in the management of the forest and taking over the management of the forest would, obviously, affect his living adversely for the whole future, making them to depend on the small private property including those retained by the petitioner under the Ceiling Laws and those not forming part of the subject-matter of the present action We see no reasonably justifiable reason for selecting year of 1988-89 for setting the amount and not averaging of some years of the best year or adopting other well-known method(s) for determining it. Therefore, in the totality of the circumstances, it is held that section 5 of the impugned Act is totally unjust and unreasonable. The same is accordingly struck down since it is severable from the other provisions of the Act." "100. Even if Article 14 has been made inapplicable in the context of Articles 31-A and 31-C, fairness and reasonableness of the statute is open to examination on the ground whether the impugned Act is just, fair and reasonable or arbitrary in nature; but alternative submission that Article 31-C is violative of basic features of the Constitution, does not survive since the constitutional validity of this amendment has already been upheld by the Supreme Court long back." 27. Both the parties did not take the matter to the apex Court thereby accepting the findings recorded by the Full Bench of this Court on all the questions which were raised before it. Consequently, the State Government passed the Himachal Pradesh Kutlehar Forest (Acquisition of Management) Amendment Act, 1994 whereby the State Legislature re-enacted section 5 of the Act. For understanding the controversy between the parties, it is necessary to quote section 5 in the original and amended form: 28. Section 5 of the Himachal Pradesh Kutlehar Forest (Acquisition of Management) Act, 1992 reads thus : “5. For understanding the controversy between the parties, it is necessary to quote section 5 in the original and amended form: 28. Section 5 of the Himachal Pradesh Kutlehar Forest (Acquisition of Management) Act, 1992 reads thus : “5. (1) In consideration of the vesting in the Government the right, title and interest of any person under section 4 the Government shall, subject to the provisions of this Act, pay to such person an amount equivalent of one fifth of the net income, after deduction of all lawful expenses incurred by him in the management, accrued to him during the financial year 1988-89. (2) The amount payable under sub-section (1) shall be paid on the 1st day of June, every year for a period of five years from the appointed day and shall bear interest at the rate of 9 per cent per annum from the date such amount becomes payable till the date of payment.* 29. Section 5 of the Himachal Pradesh Kutlehar Forest (Acquisition of Management) Amendment Act, 1994 is as follows : "5. Amount to be paid by the Government.—(1) In consideration of the vesting in the Government the right, title and interest of any person under section 4, the Government shall, subject to the provisions of this Act, pay to such person an amount equivalent to the net income, after deduction of all lawful expenses incurred by him in the management, accrued to him during the five financial years, preceding immediately the publication of this Act in the official Gazette, in five annual equal instalments. (2) The amount payable under sub-section (1) shall be paid on the 1st day of June, every year for a period of five years from the appointed day and shall bear interest at the rate of 10 per cent per annum from the date such amount becomes payable till the date of payment " 30. The question for determination is whether the enhanced amount of compensation by the Amended Act of 199 \ suffers from the same invalidity with which this provision was -afflicted before amendment for reasons recorded by the Full Bench while striking down this section. Shri D D. Thakur, learned Senior Counsel, contended vehemently that the amended provision does not make much improvement in the position that existed before nor does it provide any purposeful relief to the petitioner. Shri D D. Thakur, learned Senior Counsel, contended vehemently that the amended provision does not make much improvement in the position that existed before nor does it provide any purposeful relief to the petitioner. Assuming that Fundamental Right to property has ceased to exist but its incorporation under Article 300-A of the Constitution immunes it from the checks to which it had been subjected to prior to Forty-fourth Amendment to the Constitution. The result of this change, therefore, is that the State is required to pay compensation to an ex-propriated owner at the market rate meaning thereby the rate which the property can fetch at present in the market Consequently, the principles laid down by the apex Court in decisions like 1950 SCR