Honble RAVANI, CJ. – Petitioner No. 1 is an existing company within the meaning of the Companies Act, 1956. Petitioner No.2 is a share holder thereof. Petitioners have challenged the legality and validity of the action of seizure of stocks of the following articles made on June,9 1990 under the provisions of Essential Commodities Act, 1957 and under Rajasthan Trade Articles (Licensing and Control) Order, 1980 (for short `the Order): Hanuman Vanaspati 15 kg. 3978 Tins Ashoka Vanaspati 15 kg. 10081 Tins Hanuman Vanaspati 10 kg. 540 poly packs Hanuman Vanaspati 5 kg. 800 poly packs Hanuman Vanaspati 1 kg. 188 Pouches Ashoka Vanaspati 1 kg. 96 pouches Refined Mustard Oil Ashoka 15 kg. 5772 Tin (2). The seizure was effected in exercise of powers conferred upon the appropriate officers of the Civil Supplies Department of the Govt. of Rajasthan under the provisions of the Essential Commodities Act, 1957 read with `the Order. The petitioners have also challenged the constitution validity of Rajasthan Trade Articles (Licensing and Control) Order, 1980. (3). The petition was filed on July 28, 1990. On August 3, 1990 it was moved before learned Single Judge (I.S. Israni J.) who passed an ad interim ex-parte order. The operative portion of the said order reads as under: ``In the facts & circumstances, I am inclined to stay the operation of order dated 9.6.90 (Annexure `F) regarding seizure of the edible oil and the petitioners shall be allowed to remove/ dispose of the goods, provided they furnish a bank guarantee in the sum of Rs. 85 lacs, the said value of the Articles, to the satisfaction of the Additional Registrar (Judicial) of this court within a period of seven days. The learned counsel also gives out that if, in any case, at any stage, the petitioners are required to replace the seized quantity of edible oil, they will be prepared to do that also. The Bank guarantee shall, in the first instance, be given for a period of three months. After the notices were served upon the respondents, arguments were heard with regard to the ad interim order. The learned Single Judge, as per his order dated November 1, 1990, confirmed the ad interim ex parte order passed on August 3, 1990. The operative portion of the order dt. After the notices were served upon the respondents, arguments were heard with regard to the ad interim order. The learned Single Judge, as per his order dated November 1, 1990, confirmed the ad interim ex parte order passed on August 3, 1990. The operative portion of the order dt. November, 1, 1990, reads as under: ``The stay order dated 3.8.90 is, therefore, confirmed and the Bank guarantee given by the petitioners shall continue till the writ petition is decided finally. It is further directed that if the petitioners have not given an undertaking regarding replacing the seized quantity of edible oil, the same shall be given by the petitioners to the Additional Registrar (Judicial) Rajasthan High Court Bench, Jaipur, within a period of ten days, failing which, this stay order shall stand automatically vacated. Keeping in view the importance of the matter, it is also directed that the petition may be put up before the regular bench for final disposal on December 13, 1990. (4). Against the aforesaid order the respondents filed D.B. Civil Spl Appeal No. 24/91. However, the same was dismissed for default on 23.4.1993. (5). Meanwhile in a similar matter filed by other dealers, challenging the legality & validity of the order, the question was raised as to whether the term `Rules occurring in Rule 55 (XI) of Raj. High Court Rules, 1952, would also cover the orders passed under appropriate provisions of a statute. This question arose in F.B. Civil Writ Petitions No. 2721/90 and 2723/90. The question referred to the Full Bench was as under: ``whether phrase `rules used in rule 55(XI) of the Rajasthan High Court Rules, 1952, as contained in the notification dated April 27, 1989 should receive a narrow construction so as to exclude all other statutory provisions e.g. Ordinances, Regula- tions, Orders or Bye laws framed under some Act or should it receive a wider meaning so as to include such statutory provisions. The Full Bench after considering the position of law, answered the question as follows: ``Consequently, we answer the point referred to us by the Division Bench as under :– The phrase `rules used in clause XI of rule 55 of the Rajasthan High Court Rules, 1952 as inserted by notification dated April 27, 1989 should receive a wider meaning and should be cons- trued in such a manner so as to include all other statutory provisions e.g. Ordinances, Regulations, Orders, Notifications or Byelaws framed under some Act and having the force of law and should not be given a restricted meaning. We are of the opinion that the view taken by the Division Bench in the case of M/s. Kumar Swastik Enterprises vs. Union of India and Ors. D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 4684/89, decided on November 20, 1989 is not the correct view. (6). Full Bench decided the aforesaid case on April 3, 1991. Thereafter, on May 14, 1991, learned Single Judge directed that the matter be transfe- rred to Division Bench. (7). After the aforesaid ad interim ex-parte order dated 3.8.90 and interim order dated 1.11.1990, passed by the learned Single Judge, the petitioners have furnished bank guarantee of Rs. 85 lacs and the same has been kept alive till today. As per the endorsement made in the order-sheet dated 16.5.1995, the bank guarantee has been extended upto August 7, 1995. However, the matter itself was not placed before the division bench. It is not clear from the record why and for what reasons the matter did not come up before the division bench. In facts of the case, we need not go into this question. (8). Some time in February, 1995 the respondents herein, filed application and inter alia prayed as follows: `` It is, therefore prayed that the status of the said SBCWP No. 3239/90 as of now and that of the said invalid security bonds lapsed or extended, as the illegal holding of seized goods may kindly by looked into, considered and necessary orders passed and next date if any be intimated to the Sate in the matter, for which we shall be grateful. The aforesaid application came up for hearing before a Division Bench of this High Court on May 12, 1995. The Court passed on order to the effect that the main writ petition deserves to be disposed of finally. The aforesaid application came up for hearing before a Division Bench of this High Court on May 12, 1995. The Court passed on order to the effect that the main writ petition deserves to be disposed of finally. The application does not deserve to be decided separately. The Court further ordered that the matter be listed for final disposal on July 6, 1995. (9). To day when the petition came up for hearing, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that as the prayers made in the petition, it was not entertainable by learned Single Judge of this Court, The ad interim ex-parte order dated August 3, 1990 as well as the interim order dated November 1, 1990 passed by the learned Single Judge, are without jurisdic- tion. Till today the petition has not been registered as DB Civil Writ Petition. The learned Single Judge when passed the order dated May 14, 1991 transferring the matter to Division Bench, had no jurisdiction to pass such orders. The matter could be placed before Division Bench only after it is properly registered as DB Civil Writ Petition or the matter is placed before the Chief Justice on administrative side and the Chief Justice passes an order on the administrative side that the matter be placed before Division Bench. (10). Learned counsel for the petitioners has submitted that when the petition was filed, a view prevailed that orders could be challenged in SB Writ Petition. That was the reason why Full Bench was required to be constituted. Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the orders passed by learned Single Judge on August 3, 1990 and November 1, 1990 should not be disturbed. He further submitted that the petitioners have now been served with a show cause notice under Section 6-A of the Essential Commodities Act, as to why the goods seized pursuant to the seizure dated June 9, 1990 should not be confiscated and why further action as stated in the show cause notice, be not taken against them. These proceedings are pending before the Collector, Jaipur. (11). In view of the decision of Full Bench dated April 3, 1991, in Writ Petitions No. 2721/90 and 2723/90, referred to hereinabove, the position of law is clear. These proceedings are pending before the Collector, Jaipur. (11). In view of the decision of Full Bench dated April 3, 1991, in Writ Petitions No. 2721/90 and 2723/90, referred to hereinabove, the position of law is clear. The petitions in which the constitutional validity of statutory orders issued in exercise of powers conferred under a statute are challenged, would be covered by the term `rules occurring in clause (XI) of Rule 55 of the Rajasthan High Court Rules, 1952. In view of this position, the principle laid down by the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Pandurang vs. State of Maharashtra (1), would be attracted, In that case the question arose regarding Rule 1 read with Rule 2-II(e) of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules, 1960. As per the said rule acquittal appeals against certain judgments and orders passed by lower courts, could be heard by Division Bench of the High Court. However, appeal was heard by a learned Single Judge of Bombay High Court. In this context, the question arose as to whether the judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge of Bombay High Court was legal and valid or not. In para 4 of the decision, the Honble Supreme Court observed as follows: ``When a matter required to be decided by a Division Bench of the High Court is decided by a learned Single Judge, the judgment would be a nullity, the matter, having been heard by a Court which had. no competence to hear the matter, having been heard by a Court which had. no competence to hear the matter, it being a matter of total lack of jurisdiction. The accused was entitled to be heard by at least two learned Judges constituting Division Bench and had a right to claim a verdict as regards his guilt or innocence at the hands of the two lear- ned Judges. This right cannot be taken away except by amending the rules. So long as the rules are in operation it would be arbitrary and discriminatory to deny him this right regardless of whether it is done by reason of negligence or otherwise. Deliberately, it cannot be done. Negligence can neither be invoked as an alibi, nor can cure the infirmity or illegality, so as to rob the accused of his right under the rules. Deliberately, it cannot be done. Negligence can neither be invoked as an alibi, nor can cure the infirmity or illegality, so as to rob the accused of his right under the rules. What can be done only by at lest two learned Judges cannot be done by one learned Judge. Even if the decision is right on merits, it is by a forum which is lacking in competence with regard to the subject matter. Even a `right decision by wrong a forum is no decision. It is non-existent in the eye of law. And hence a nullity. The judgment under appeal is therefore no judgment in the eye of law. (12). As per the aforesaid law laid down by the Honble Supreme Court, the matter which could be entertained by Division Bench cannot be entertained by Single Bench and if any order is passed by the Single Bench in such matter, it would be an order lacking in competence. (13). Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that it was a matter decided in respect of the rules of the Bombay High Court and it pertains to a criminal matter, therefore, the decision of Honble Supreme Court would not be applicable in this case. We see no force in this argument. Whether the matter is decided in respect of the appellate side rules of the Bombay High Court in respect of a criminal matter, makes no difference, as far as the principles laid down therein are concerned. (14). Learned counsel for the petitioners has submitted that even if no proper order is passed by the learned Single Judge while transferring the matter to Division Bench and even if no proper registration is made as DB matter, now when the matter is before Division Bench, the Division Bench can entertain the matter and pass appropriate order. It is submitted that the petitioners have been protected by the interim order of this Court imposing reasonable conditions of furnishing bank guarantee. The petitioners have furnished bank guarantee of Rs. 85 lacs in favour of the Addl. Registrar (JudI.) of this court. The proceedings initiated against the petitioners under the provisions of Sec. 6A of the Essential Commodities Act, have not been still concluded. They are in progress before the Collector, Jaipur. The petitioners have furnished bank guarantee of Rs. 85 lacs in favour of the Addl. Registrar (JudI.) of this court. The proceedings initiated against the petitioners under the provisions of Sec. 6A of the Essential Commodities Act, have not been still concluded. They are in progress before the Collector, Jaipur. In view of this background it is submitted that the question with regard to the legality and validity of the seizure may be decided by this Court. The petitioners may be permitted to agitate the question on facts and law as regard validity of the seizure. It is further submitted that the petitioners do not press the challenge to the constitutional validity of the Rajasthan Trade Articles (Licensing and Control) Order, 1980, at this stage. (15). Having regard to the over all facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the opinion that if the petition is disposed of by giving following directions, it would meet the ends of justice. (16). The interim order passed by learned Single Judge of this Court on November 1, 1990 be treated as an interim order passed by Division Bench. The said order shall remain in operation for a period of three months from today i.e. upto September 9, 1995. It will be open to the petitioners to move the Collector, Jaipur, before whom the proceedings under Section 6-A of the Essential Commodities Act are pending in respect of the seizure of the goods effected on June 9, 1990. The Collector, Jaipur will decide the application for interim relief which may be filed by the petitioners within a period of one month from the date of submission of the application. The petitioners are permitted to file the application latest by August 7, 1995. Thereafter, within a period of one month, the Collector, Jaipur shall decide the application for grant of interim stay on merits and in accordance with law, without in any way being influenced by the fact that this petition was filed in this court and that this court had protected the petitioners by way of interim relief and that this Court has further protected the petitioners to enable them to approach the Collector. In short, the Collector shall not, in any way, be influenced by the orders passed by this Court in these proceedings while deciding the application for interim relief that may be filed by the petitioners and also while deciding the main proceedings under section 6-A of Essential Commodities Act, 1957 pending before him. It is further directed that the entire proceedings pending before the Collector, Jaipur under Section 6A of the Essential Commodities Act, in respect of the goods seized on June 9, 1990 shall be decided by the Collector preferably before December 16, 1995. Provided, however, the petitioners cooperate in the expeditious disposal of the proceedings. It is further clarified that if the Peti- tioners do not file application for interim relief as stated above latest by August 7, 1995, the interim relief granted herein, which is ordered to remain in force till September 9, 1995, shall automatically stand vacated without any further order of this Court. (17). Subject to the aforesaid observations and directions, the petition stands disposed of.