ORDER 1. Short point which is to be decided in this revision is "when the private parties have filed affidavits for decision of the interlocutory application, whether any of those parties is entitled to get witness of rival party for cross-examination in context with affidavit filed by him." 2. Shri A.K. Sethi, appearing for the petitioners placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in matter of Gulab Chand Jain & ors. v. Khushalchand & ors. reported in 1992 JLJ 57 wherein this Court has held – "opportunity of cross-examination to be granted or refused is in discretion of the Court and if from the conduct and circumstances of the parties, it appears to the Court that the opportunity for cross-examination is being sought for delaying decision and for protracting the proceedings, the Court would decline to permit the cross-examination." In the said matter this Court has considered the judgment of this Court in the matter of Mithailal Gupta v. Inland Auto Finance, a Division Bench judgment reported in 1967 JLJ 864 , wherein it has been held by this Court that- "Witnesses must be examined in open Court viva-voice Exceptions are: (i) Where there is an agreement to take evidence by affidavit; (ii) when there is an order of the Court to prove certain facts by affidavit, or (iii) when there is an order by examination by interrogatories before a Commissioner." This Court further observed in the said matter that - "Rule 2 O. 19 of Code of Civil Procedure enables evidence to be given by affidavit upon an interlocutory application. An affidavit must he confined to the particular facts to be proved and such facts as the witness is able from his own knowledge to prove. An affidavit differs from a deposition inasmuch as, in the later, the opposite party has always an opportunity to cross-examine the deponent but an affidavit is taken ex-parte, where the adverse party desired production of the deponent for cross-examination the Court should ordinarily order attendance of the deponent for cross-examination." 3. Shri V.K. Shah counsel appearing for opponent placed reliance on the judgment of Gujrat High Court in the matter of Kanbi Mavji Khimju and another v. Kanbi Abjibhai and ors. Shri V.K. Shah counsel appearing for opponent placed reliance on the judgment of Gujrat High Court in the matter of Kanbi Mavji Khimju and another v. Kanbi Abjibhai and ors. reported in AIR 1968 Guj 198 wherein Single Bench of Gujrat High Court has held that - "A perusal of the wording of Rule 1 of O. 39 clearly indicates that in interlocutory applications for interim injunctions, the Court has been expressly permitted by the legislature itself to decide such applications on affidavits, if the Court on affidavit finds that any property in dispute in a suit is in danger of being wasted, damaged or alienated by any party to the suit, or being wrongfully sold in execution of a decree, the Court is entitled to grant such ad-interim injunction. Either party, therefore, cannot lay any claim or urge that it has got a right to cross-examine the deponent." Shri Shah further placed reliance on the judgment in the matter of Mysore High Court in the matter of B.N. Munibasappa v. G.D. Swamigal reported in AIR 1959 Mys. 139 in substantiating his arguments. 4. Either party, therefore, cannot lay any claim or urge that it has got a right to cross-examine the deponent." Shri Shah further placed reliance on the judgment in the matter of Mysore High Court in the matter of B.N. Munibasappa v. G.D. Swamigal reported in AIR 1959 Mys. 139 in substantiating his arguments. 4. Rule 1 O. 39 provides – "Where in any suit it is proved by affidavit or otherwise - (a) that any property in dispute in a suit is in danger of being wasted, damaged or alienated by any party to the suit, or wrongfully sold in execution of a decree, or (b) that the defendant threatens, or intends, to remove or dispose of his property with a view to (defrauding) his creditors, or (c) that the defendant threatens to dispossess the plaintiff or otherwise cause injury to the plaintiff in relation to any property in dispute in the suit), the Court may by order grant a temporary injunction to restrain such act, or make such other order for the purpose of staying and preventing the wasting, damaging, alienation, sale, removal or disposition of the property (or dispossession of the plaintiff, or otherwise causing injury to the plaintiff in relation to any property in dispute in the suit) as the Court thinks fit, until the disposal of the suit or until further orders." Rule 2 O. 39 provides: (1) In any suit for restraining the defendant from committing a breach of contract or other injury of kind, whether compensation is claimed in the suit or not, the plaintiff may, at any time after the commencement of the suit, and either before or after judgment, apply to the Court for a temporary injunction to restrain the defendant from committing the breach of contract or injury complained of, or any breach of contract of injury of a like kind arising out of the same contract or relating to the same property or right (2) The Court may by order grant such injunction, on such terms as to the duration of the injunction, keeping in account, giving security, or otherwise, as the Court thinks fit." In Mithailal Gupta v. Inland Auto Finance (supra) it has been held that- "Where the adverse party desires production of the deponent for cross-examination, the Court should ordinarily order attendance of the deponent for cross-examination." 5. After considering these judgments, this Court has further held in the matter of Gulabchand Jain v. Khushalchand (supra) that - "opportunity of cross-examination to be granted or refused is in discretion of the Court and if from the conduct and circumstances of the parties, it appears to the Court that the opportunity for cross-examination is being sought for delaying decision and for protracting the proceedings, the Court would decline to permit the cross-examination." This Court has also held that- "For the purpose of avoiding delay, the Court may put a rider for fixing the time limit during which such cross examination is to be done." 6. Keeping in view these judgments of this Court and reading the provisions of Rr. 1 & 2 of O. 39, in my view, such opportunity needs to be given to such desirous party after Court satisfying itself whether such prayer for cross-examination has been made bona fide or for playing delaying tactics. I do not agree with the views taken by Gujrat and Mysore High Courts in the judgments quoted supra in view of reasoning mentioned hereunder. Had there been a total ban to cross-examination of such deponent, the legislature would not have provided R. 2 to O. 19 after Rule. 1. In R. 1, it has been indicated that any Court may at any time for sufficient reason order that any particular fact or facts may be proved by affidavit or that the affidavit of any witnesses may be read at the hearing on such condition as Court thinks reasonable. Proviso to this rule indicates that if the Court finds that either party desires the production of witnesses for cross-examination bona fide and that such witnesses can be produced, an order shall not be made authorising evidence of such witness given by affidavit. It is to be noted that in O. 1 words as "sufficient reasons" and "Court thinks reasonable" have been used. In proviso, the words "either party bona fidely desires" have been used. Those words have been used with some specific intention and meaning. 7. Thereafter, R. 2 comes in picture which indicates that upon any application the evidence may be given by affidavit but the Court may, at the instance of either party, order the attendance of deponent for cross-examination. In proviso, the words "either party bona fidely desires" have been used. Those words have been used with some specific intention and meaning. 7. Thereafter, R. 2 comes in picture which indicates that upon any application the evidence may be given by affidavit but the Court may, at the instance of either party, order the attendance of deponent for cross-examination. Had there been a total ban for production of such deponents for cross-examination, the words which are underlined would not have been used in R. 2. 8. Keeping in view rule of natural justice also such opportunity needs to be given and more particularly when the affidavits produced are vague. In the present matter affidavits filed by rival parties are not standing to the requirements of an "affidavit" in its real spirit. In such case the Court should have given reasons for the purpose of indicating that it was satisfied that there was no need of producing a particular deponent for cross-examination as desired by the petitioners. The impugned order does not show that Court applied its mind for the purpose of satisfying itself whether there was real need of giving opportunity to the petitioners to cross-examine the deponent-Smt. Asha Dixit in context with allegations made in applications for injunction or not. It is necessary to point that Court has given the reason for rejecting the prayer made by the petitioners by saying that "said prayer is being rejected because counter affidavit may be filed." The Court has not addressed to a question whether the petitioners are desiring to cross-examine the said deponent bona fidely or for the purpose of protracting the trial. 9. While permitting such deponent for cross-examination, the Court has to be on guard to see that the opportunity of cross-examining such deponent should not be used by such party for protracting the trial and for that as it has been held by this Court in the matter of Gulabchand Jain v. Khushalchand (supra) such party should be directed to complete cross-examination of such deponent during particular time limit. 10. 10. In my view the Court should direct production of any deponent for cross-examination by rival party if Court finds that it is necessary so to be done in the ends of justice for finding out the truth when rival parties are making the chorus of the affidavits of number of deponents for achieving suitable tune to their case. If the Court finds it necessary in the interest of justice, it should even direct the parties or party to produce particular deponent or deponents suo motu for asking Court questions for finding out the truth. 11. Thus, in view of the discussion made above, I hereby allow this petition and direct the trial Court to permit the petitioners to cross-examine deponent Smt. Asha Dixit, in context with her affidavit and the allegations made in the application for injunction and no further. The impugned order is set aside. 12. A prayer was made by Shri V.K. Shah, for opponents, that such permission should be granted to opponents also. He is at liberty to move an application separately for that before the trial Court and that be decided by the trial Court keeping in view the provisions of law, without permitting the opponents too for protracting the trial. No order as to costs, keeping in view the pending litigation and vagueness of the affidavits filed by both the parties. The parties are directed to appear before the trial Court on 31.8.95, when this matter has been fixed for further hearing.