Judgment S. J. Mukhopadhyay, J. 1. As in both the writ petitions common prayer has been made and common points of law are involved, for the said reason, they are being disposed of by one common order. 2. Krishna Chandra is the petitioner in C. W. J. C. No.6549 of 1995, whereas Ashok Kumar Khare is the petitioner in C. W. J. C. No.5937 of 1995. Both of them have prayed for direction to fix their seniority in the rank of Inspector of Police with effect from 10th July, 1981 on the basis of continuous officiation. They have further prayed for direction on the respondents to provide them with consequential benefits of promotion to the post of Dy. S. P. with effect from july, 1995. 3. The brief facts of both the cases are, as follows : Both the petitioners were appointed as Sub-Inspector of police on 9th February, 1975 and were confirmed to the said post with effect from 1st January, 1978. According to the petitioners, they were promoted on officiating basis to the next higher post of Inspector of Police with effect from 10th July, 1981 by common Memo No.2464 (12) dated 24th July, 1981 (Annexure-1 to the writ petition of Krishna chandra ). Further it has been stated that their promotion to the higher post of Inspector of Police was regularised in pursuance of decision of Inspector-General/director, General Selection board held in the year 1985, and in pursuance thereof, regularisation order was issued vide common Memo No.615 dated 25th January, 1986. Proceeding of the said selection Board circulated vide Memo dated 29th April, 1985 and Notification dated 25th january, 1986, have been annexed as annexures-2 and 3, respectively to the writ petition of Krishna Chandra. Further, according to the petitioners, one satyadeo Singh who was also promoted as Inspector of Police on 19th July, 1981, his case was considered and he was promoted to the post of Dy. S. P. with effect from July, 1995, but the case of the petitioners was not considered for such promotion. It has been alleged that the respondents are not counting the seniority of the petitioners to the post of Inspector of Police with effect from 10th July, 1981 (date of continuous officiation), rather they are counting the seniority on the basis of date of confirmation which, according to the petitioners, is illegal. 4. Mr. It has been alleged that the respondents are not counting the seniority of the petitioners to the post of Inspector of Police with effect from 10th July, 1981 (date of continuous officiation), rather they are counting the seniority on the basis of date of confirmation which, according to the petitioners, is illegal. 4. Mr. Giri, Senior Counsel for the petitioners relied on the decision of the supreme Court given in the case of s. B. Patwardhan and another V/s. State of maharashtra and others, reported in a. I. R.1977 S. C.2051, as well as the decision in the case of R. L. Bansal and others V/s. Union of India and others, reported in A. I. R.1993 S. C.978. It was contended that the date of confirmation being fortuitous in nature, seniority on the post of Inspector of police cannot be dependent on the same. The counsel for the petitioners further relied on some unreported decisions of this Court given in the case of Murari Krishna Prasad Sinha V/s. State of Bihar and others passed in C. W. J. C. No.8308 of 1992, disposed of on 11th november, 1992 (Annexure-6), the case of Balram Dubey V/s. State of Bihar and others, passed in C. W. J. C No.7713 of 1989, disposed of on 18th January, 1990 (Annexure-7) and, the case of Jamuna prasad Yadav and others V/s. The State of bihar and others, passed in C. W. J. C. No.2328 of 1990, disposed of on 20th december, 1991 (Annexure-8) and other cases. It was submitted by the counsel for the petitioners that all the time, this Court as well as the Supreme court held that if a person has officiated against a higher post, the period of officiation is liable to be counted for determination of seniority when a person is subsequently regularly promoted to such higher post. Much stress was given by the counsel for the petitioners on the aforesaid principle and for that he also relied on the decision of the Supreme Court given in the case of the Direct Recruit Class-II engineering Officers Association and others V/s. State of Maharashtra and others, reported in A. I. R.1990 S. C.1607. 5. Counter affidavits have been filed by the Respondents in both the cases with common stand. 5. Counter affidavits have been filed by the Respondents in both the cases with common stand. The counsel for the respondents submitted that the petitioners were never promoted on officiating basis to the post of Inspector of Police with effect from 10th July, 1981. Such promotion of petitioners were completely ad hoc in nature, by way of stop-gap arrangement. It was further contended by the counsel for the respondents that the petitioners were given the charge of the higher post of Inspector of Police with effect from 10th July, 1981, without following the procedure as laid down under Bihar Police Manual. Such order of so-called officiating promotion with effect from 10th July, 1981 was also not issued by any competent authority. The counsel for the State relied on a division Bench decision of this Court given in the case of the State of Bihar and others V/s. Rameshwar Nath Mishra and others, reported in 1994 (2) P. L. J. R.98. The counsel for the State placed reliance on Rule 649 of the Bihar police Manual and submitted that the promotion to the post of Inspector of police can only be given on the advise of Inspector-General/director-General selection Board, which was not followed when the petitioners were given charge of the higher post of Inspector of Police with effect from 10th July, 1981. It was contended that only by virtue of the recommendation of the Inspector-General/director-General of selection Board made in the year 1985 (vide Annexure-2 to writ-petition of krishna Chandra), officiating promotions were given to the petitioners vide order dated 25th January, 1986 (Annexure-3 to the writ petition of Krishna chandra ). 6. It will be evident from the annexures attached by the petitioners that they were directed to officiate as Inspector of Police with effect from 10th july, 1981. Memo No.2464 (12), dated 24th July, 1981 (Annexure-1 to the writ petition of Krishna Chandra) reads, as follows: "after declared fit by S. I. Range Selection board, the following S. Is. are allowed to officiate as Inspector with effect from 10th july, 1981. " The aforesaid order dated 24th july, 1981 (Annexure-1) clearly shows that the petitioner were asked to officiate as Inspector of Police with effect from 10th July, 81. are allowed to officiate as Inspector with effect from 10th july, 1981. " The aforesaid order dated 24th july, 1981 (Annexure-1) clearly shows that the petitioner were asked to officiate as Inspector of Police with effect from 10th July, 81. To come to a definition conclusion as to whether the date 10th July, 1981 should be treated as date of officiating promotion or not, other factors and facts are also to be looked into. The proceeding of the Inspector General /director-General Selection Board circulated vide Memo dated 29th April, 1985 (Annexure-2 to the writ petition of Krishna Chandra) clearly shows that the cases of petitioners were considered by the said D. G. Board for officiating promotion to the higher post of Inspector of Police. After the recommendation of the aforesaid D. G. Selection board, when the notification dated 25th january, 1986 (Annexure-3 to the writ petition of Krishna Chandra) was issued, therein also it was made clear that the petitioners were granted officiating promotion to the higher post of Inspector of Police. The Notification dated 25th January, 1986 (Anneuxre-3)is prospective in nature. Such being the position, the petitioners having been promoted on officiating basis to the post of Inspector of Police, vide notification dated 25th January, 1986 (Anneuxre-3), the earlier order dated 24th July, 1981 (Annexure-1), cannot be construed to be officiating promotion of petitioners to the higher post of Inspector of Police. Further it will be evident from the order dated 24th July, 1981 (Annexure-1) that such order does not speak of any promotion and was issued by the Superintendent of Police, who was not competent to grant promotion to the higher post of Inspector of Police. 7. In this background, the order dated 24th July, 1981 (Annexure- 1) is to be construed as stop-gap arrangement, by which the petitioners were asked to hold the charge of higher post of Inspector of Police and cannot be construed to be an officiating promotion to the higher post of Inspector of Police. 8. Apart from the aforesaid fact, it will be evident that the Rule 649 of bihar Police Manual was not followed while the order dated 24th July, 1981 (Annexure-1) was issued. It is only after following the procedure, as contained in Rule 649 of the Bihar Police Manual, the Notification dated 25th January, 1986 (Annexure-1) was issued. 9. 8. Apart from the aforesaid fact, it will be evident that the Rule 649 of bihar Police Manual was not followed while the order dated 24th July, 1981 (Annexure-1) was issued. It is only after following the procedure, as contained in Rule 649 of the Bihar Police Manual, the Notification dated 25th January, 1986 (Annexure-1) was issued. 9. In the case of State of Bihar and others V/s. Rameshwar Nath Mishra and others (supra), the Division Bench of this Court held, as follows : "in granting promotion to the writ petitioner, evidently mandatory procedures of the said rules were not followed and, thus, the purported promotion of the petitioner to the post of Inspector of Police, Cabinet (Vigilance) Department must be held to be wholly illegal, without jurisdiction and void ab initio being violative of Rule 649 /of the bihar Police Manual as also Article 16 of the constitution of India inasmuch as other persons who were required to be considered along with the petitioner were not and could not nave been considered for promotion by the purported Inspector-General Selection board constituted by the Cabinet (Vigilance department. In this view of the matter, the promotion granted to the petitioner by the Cabinet (Vigilance) Department is not binding upon the respondents nor the said promotion can be taken into consideration for the purpose of determining his seniority. "if the initial appointment is not made by following the procedure laid down by the rules but the appointee continues in the post uninterruptedly till the regularisation of his service in accordance with the rules, the period of officiating service will be counted. " such is not the case here, in the aforementioned decision, it has been observed that if the promotion had been granted without following the rules, the period of officiating cannot be counted. " The aforesaid judgment supports the contention of the respondents. 10 The Supreme Court in the case of Direct Recruit Class-II Engineering officers Association and others (supra) held, as follows : "to sum up, we hold that: (A) Once an incumbent is appointed to a post according to rule, his seniority has to be counted from the date of his appointment and not accordingly to the date of his confirmation. 10 The Supreme Court in the case of Direct Recruit Class-II Engineering officers Association and others (supra) held, as follows : "to sum up, we hold that: (A) Once an incumbent is appointed to a post according to rule, his seniority has to be counted from the date of his appointment and not accordingly to the date of his confirmation. The corollary of the above rule is that where the initial appointment is only ad hoc and not according to rules and made as a stop-gap arrangement, the officiating in such post cannot be taken into account for considering the seniority. (B) If the initial appointment is not made by following the procedure laid down by the rules but the appointee continues in the post uninterruptedly till the regularisation of his service in accordance with the rules, the period of officiating service will be counted. " Though the counsel for the petitioners placed reliance on Clause (g) aforesaid but, according to me, the said Clause (B) is not applicable in the case of the petitioners. It cannot be stated that the petitioners were promoted on officiating basis vide order dated 24th July, 1981 (Annexure-1) and were regularised to the said post of Inspector of Police vide subsequent notification dated 25th January, 1986 (Annexure-3 ). As stated above, the order dated 24th July, 1981 does not speak of promotion. Similarly, the Notification dated 25th January, 1986 (Annexure-3)does not speak of regularisation of promotion, but speaks of immediate prospective officiating promotion. The order dated 24th July, 1981 (Annexure-1)is to be treated to be a stop gap arrangement, which cannot be taken into account to count seniority in the rank of Inspector of Police in terms with clause (A) of the decision aforesaid of supreme Court. 11 For the reasons stated above, the claim of the petitioners to grant them seniority in the rank of Inspector of Police with effect from 10th July, 1981 cannot be accepted. However, it is made clear that the seniority in the rank of Inspector of Police cannot be determined on the basis of date of confirmation of petitioners to the said post. However, it is made clear that the seniority in the rank of Inspector of Police cannot be determined on the basis of date of confirmation of petitioners to the said post. The petitioners having been promoted to the post of Inspector of police, vide Notification dated 26th january,1986 (Annexure-3) after following the procedures, as laid down under the Bihar Police Manual, the petitioners are entitled for seniority in the rank of Inspector of Police with effect from 25th January, 1986,. Whatever the consequential benefits accrue to that effect, the petitioner are entitled for the same. 12. Accordingly, there being no merit in the writ petitions, I dismiss both the writ petitions, but with aforementioned observations. Petitions Dismissed.