Judgment :- Heard the learned counsel for the parties. The petitioner in this writ petition has challenged the award dated December 10, 1984 passed in I.D. No. 329 of 1982 by the second respondent. 2. The facts briefly stated leading to this writ petition are the following : The respondent No. 1 herein entered the services of the petitioner as Junior Assistant on December 31, 1958. He did not suffer any punishment. His services were satisfactory, on the false allegation that the first respondent's services were not satisfactory the Management sent a letter dated April 1, 1981 that the work of the respondent No. 1 would be watched for a period of three months, and in the event no improvement in the work is found his services would be terminated. However, the first respondent was allowed to continue in service beyond the period of three months, but he received an order of termination dated February 22, 1982 in which it was stated that his services were not satisfactory and it was not possible to the management to keep him in employment. Clause (8) of the agreement dated December 16, 1969 was misread by the petitioner Management to suit its convenience and using the said clause of the agreement the services of the first respondent was terminated in an unjust and illegal manner, and in contravention of various provisions of the standing order and in violation of Section 25-G of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short the Act) 3. Under the circumstances the respondent No. 1 raised a dispute which was referred by the State Government under Section 10(1)(d) of the Act for adjudication. The petitioner filed counter contending that the respondent No. 1 was employed in a managerial or administrative and/or Supervisory capacity throughout his employment in the Mills and at the time of his termination of services he was drawing a monthly salary of Rs. 1, 405/- his duties were allocation of required labour for the work in the department, supervise the work of above 30 workmen working under him in order to ensure that the production and quality were achieved; it was also part of his duty that proper advice was given in respect of breakdown of machinery and even he was authorised to grant leave to the workmen working under him. In short, according to the management, the first respondent was not a workman and as such the reference was not tenable and that the termination order was perfectly legal and valid. 4. The Second respondent having held the enquiry including recording of evidence passed the impugned award dated December 10, 1984 holding that the non-employment of the respondent No. 1 was not justified and in that view he directed the petitioner to reinstate him in service with backwages, continuity of service and other consequential benefits. It is this award that is under challenge in this writ petition. 5. The point that arose for consideration before the second respondent was whether the petitioner was entitled to an order of reinstatement with backwages and other attendant benefits. Before the second respondent, respondent No. 1 examined himself as W.W. 1 and got marked Exs. W. 1 to W. 11 in support of this case. In support of the Management one Manickam was examined as M.W. 1 and 17 documents M-1 to M-17 were marked. 6. On an over-all consideration and appreciation of the materials placed before him the second respondent found that respondent No. 1 was a workman within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Act and passed the impugned award. 7. The learned counsel for the petitioner canvassed only one point before this court, viz., that the respondent No. 1 was not a workman within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Act as the nature of his work was supervisory one. In support of his argument he submitted that the vital document W-10 which indicted the nature of the work of the respondent No. 1 was not considered by the second respondent. Further, even the oral evidence of W.W. 1 and M.W. 1 was not properly appreciated having regard to the contentions raised. He also drew my attention to certain statements showing that respondent No. 1 although he was not required to have any technical qualification or the manual work at times of the first respondent No. 1, was only incidental, but the respondent No. 1 was mainly engaged in supervisory work. In other words the main work of respondent No. 1 was to supervise. He had number of workmen working under him and even he had power to grant leave to them. Under the circumstances, the award cannot be sustained. In other words the main work of respondent No. 1 was to supervise. He had number of workmen working under him and even he had power to grant leave to them. Under the circumstances, the award cannot be sustained. In support of his submission he relied on a decision of the Supreme Court in "Burmah Shell Oil Storage And Distribution Company Of India Ltd. v. The Burmah Shell Management Staff Association And Others" * (1970-II-LLJ-590). 8. Per contra the learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 and 3 argued in support and justification of the impunged award. He submitted that the second respondent having considered the entire material placed on record, and having appreciated the evidence has recorded a finding of fact holding that the respondent No. 1 was a workman within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Act; this Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India may not disturb the finding of fact recorded by the Labour Court-second respondent when such finding of fact is well founded and supported by evidence on record. In support of his submission he placed Reliance on the following decisions viz., (i) "Engineering Construction Corporation Ltd., Madras v. The Additional Labour Court, Madras And Others" * (1980-II-LLJ-16) (Mds) (ii) Ashok Leyland Ltd. v. A. Vijaya Kumar and Another (1981-II-LLJ-9) (Mds) (iii) The Management of Indian Bank v. The Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal (Central) Madras and Anr. (1990-I-LLJ-50) (Mds) and (iv) S. K. Verma v. Mahesh Chandra and Anr. (1983-II-LLJ-429) (SC). 9. I have considered the submission made by the learned counsel for the parties. 10. It is not in dispute that the respondent No. 1 was employed as a Spinning Assistant as can be seen from the agreement Ex. M. 4 dated August 17, 1959 and his services were periodically renewed and the last agreement between the petitioner and the respondent No. 1 is dated December 17, 1969, M. 14 Even in that agreement also the appointment of respondent No. 1 was shown as Spinning Assistant. The petitioner terminated the services of respondent No. 1 relying upon clause (8) of the agreement M. 14. The respondent No. 1 in his evidence has stated that his duties were of technical in nature and in support of this statement he has filed W-2 to W-7. The petitioner terminated the services of respondent No. 1 relying upon clause (8) of the agreement M. 14. The respondent No. 1 in his evidence has stated that his duties were of technical in nature and in support of this statement he has filed W-2 to W-7. The Management asked him to examine the machine, check the defect in the machine and to over-haul and remove the worn-out parts of other machines, and rectify the defects in the machines. The respondent No. 1 was also expected to check the quality of yarn produced in each machine under his control. The second respondent in the impugned award has observed that there was no evidence on behalf of the petitioner management as to what was the other work that respondent No. 1 had to do apart from what is stated in his evidence. 11. Of course in the cross-examination of respondent No. 1 it was elicited that he used to give directions to the workers in order to show that the type of work done by the first respondent was supervisory in nature. In his evidence the respondent No. 1 has stated that apart from giving instructions to Fitters he has not given instructions to any other persons. In his evidence he has stated there is an Officers, Club in the Mill and he could not be a member in it and the various privileges availed by the managerial staff who were in charge of the administration and supervise the affairs of the company were not enjoyed by him. There is no cross-examination of this evidence of the first respondent. In other words this part of the evidence of respondent No. 1 has remained unchallenged. 12. The petitioner has examined one Manickam, a Management staff. According to Manickam, the first respondent had no powers to appoint any one and he was not empowered to issue charge sheet against any worker. He has further stated that the Management staff has power to sanction leave, the first respondent could sanction leave for his own self, but he has further stated that there are no written instructions enabling the first respondent to sanction leave for any one worker. He has further stated that the Management staff has power to sanction leave, the first respondent could sanction leave for his own self, but he has further stated that there are no written instructions enabling the first respondent to sanction leave for any one worker. It is further to be found in the evidence of M.W. 1 that the respondent No. 1 had taken care of maintenance of machinery and necessary steps for producing yarn as per the requirement of future process, and that the respondent No. 1 had no right to take part in the policy decisions. 13. Looking to the evidence of M.W. 1 the second respondent in the award has stated that the respondent No. 1 was not employed as a managerial staff and his nature of job was purely technical. It is to be noted that M.W. 1 in the cross-examination says that the work of motor speed changing, attending defects were not actually carried out by the first respondent but he only supervised the job. Mere supervision of the above cannot convert the nature of the job done by the first respondent as supervisory one. On facts and in the light of the evidence the Labour Court has recorded a finding that substantial work of the first respondent was technical one, and not managerial or supervisory as contended by the petitioner, and as such the respondent No. 1 was a workman within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Act. 14. The decision cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner in Burmah Shell Oil Storage and Distribution Co. of India Ltd. v. Burmah shall Management Staff Association and Others (supra) is on the point that in case a person is engaged in works of different nature both managerial or supervisory and technical or otherwise, the criteria to be taken in deciding whether a workman is a workman under Section 2(s) is as to what is the main work one was required to do. There cannot be any difficulty in accepting this proposition. In this case, based on facts, the second respondent has concluded that the main work of respondent No. 1 was technical and not managerial or supervisory. 15. There cannot be any difficulty in accepting this proposition. In this case, based on facts, the second respondent has concluded that the main work of respondent No. 1 was technical and not managerial or supervisory. 15. The decisions cited by the learned counsel for respondent No. 1 indicate that when the Labour Court on facts has concluded as to the nature of the work of the first respondent that he was a workman within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Act, this Court exercising powers of judicial review under Article 226 may not interfere with that finding. Added to this even mere supervision or control incidentally would not be taken to conclude that respondent No. 1 was not a workman within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Act. I do not wish to refer to those decisions in detail as I am convinced on the facts that the finding of fact recorded by the second respondent is proper and valid and supported by materials on record. This Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 cannot re-appreciate the evidence as a Court of appeal that too in a matter like this when the finding of the Labour Court as to the nature of the work that the first respondent is a workman is fully supported by evidence on record. 16. It is also brought to my notice by the learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 that the first respondent on superannuation ought to have retired in April, 1986 but unfortunately he died on January 16, 1986 itself. His wife has come on record as the legal representative. Under the circumstances there arises no question of reinstatement of respondent No. 1. It is only granting of monetary benefits which are available under the award to the legal representative of the first respondent. 17. No other point arises for consideration. Under the circumstances, I have no hesitation to hold that there are no merits in the writ petition and the impugned award is a well-considered one. In this view, I do not find any valid or good ground to interfere with the impugned order. In the result, for the reasons stated above, writ petition is liable to be dismissed. Accordingly it stands dismissed. No order as to costs. 18. In this view, I do not find any valid or good ground to interfere with the impugned order. In the result, for the reasons stated above, writ petition is liable to be dismissed. Accordingly it stands dismissed. No order as to costs. 18. At this stage the learned counsel for the first respondent submitted that having regard to the unfortunate circumstances that the respondent No. 1 had died on January 16, 1986 and his widow is on record and the writ petition has been pending for the last ten years, a direction may be given to the petitioner to pay the backwages and other monetary benefits arising out of the award within a given time. The learned counsel for the petitioner states that once the writ petition is dismissed it follows that there is no need for such direction. In the normal course, when the writ petition is dismissed the other consequences would follow, but having regard to the facts and circumstances, and the pendency of the writ petition for ten years, I think it is appropriate that the petitioner gives the back-wages and other monetary benefits arising out the impugned award to the third respondent within a period of three months from today.