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1995 DIGILAW 577 (RAJ)

Aruny Piyari v. State

1995-07-11

V.S.KOKJE

body1995
JUDGMENT 1. - These petitions are a sequel to the decision given by this Court in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 3450 of 1994 Ghewar Ram v. State of Rajasthan and others, decided on January 31, 1995. In that petition reservation of posts in favour of the female candidates without there being any provision in the Rules governing the recruitment was under challenge. This Court held that no reservation in favour of female candidates or any other candidates could be made by mere executive instructions without amending the Rules governing the recruitment to the concerned service. All reservation against the Rules incorporated in the advertisement concerned in that case were quashed and the respondents were directed to continue the process of selection without applying the provision for reservation in the advertisement which were against the Rules. 2. After this decision, the respondents by a Circular dated April 5, 1995 directed all the Chief Executive Officers and Secretaries to all the Zila Parshads in the State, not to prepare in future different merit lists of male and female candidates and to prepare a common merit list. The Circular also contained a direction to review the merit lists prepared separately for the year 1993-94 and if separate merit lists were prepared for male and female candidates, then to prepare a combined merit list. It was further directed that appointments of such candidates whose name does not figure in the combined merit list should be terminated. 3. The directions contained in the above Circular in respect of incomplete selection possess and having effect in the future are not in dispute. The only question is whether on the basis of the decision is Ghewar Ram's case (supra), the respondents could set the clock back and take away the appointments of those who had already been appointed through different selection processes adopting the same reservation policy which was held to be illegal in Ghewar Ram's case (supra). In other words, the question is as to whether retrospective effect could be given to the decision in Ghewar Ram's case by undoing what was already done. 4. It is no doubt true that interpretation of a particular Rule by a Court does not bring about a new situation to come into existence on the day of the decision. It only interprets the Rule as it always had been. 4. It is no doubt true that interpretation of a particular Rule by a Court does not bring about a new situation to come into existence on the day of the decision. It only interprets the Rule as it always had been. But this does not mean that a later interpretation of the Rule would automatically wipe out all the actions taken under the Rules till the date of its latest interpretation. As regards the recruitment processes already completed by issuing appointment letters to the candidates, the respondents would be bound by the principles of estoppel. The candidates who applied for a post have a legitimate expectation and are entitled to presume that the employer has taken all the care to see that the process of selection is not vitiated by any illegality or any irregularity. When the process is complete and appointment letters are issued, atleast the employer himself is not expected to turn round and tell the successful candidates, who have already been appointed, that the process of selection was wrong and therefore, the appointments were illegal and non est. It is a different thing that the process of selection is challenged by an unsuccessful candidate and such direct challenge to a particular selection process succeeds and the Court strikes down the selection and appointments. If no unsuccessful candidates had challenged the particular selection and appointment orders have been issued by the employer, and as in some of these cases, the appointees have served the employer for a couple of years, the employer cannot be allowed to reverse the process on the basis of the decision given in some other case invalidating an identical selection process adopted by the employer. It is true that the later decision may prove the selection process adopted earlier to be faulty but that does not mean that the employer can take advantage of his own wrong by upsetting an accomplished recruitment process. Even if an unsuccessful candidate in earlier selection challenges now the process of selection which has taken place a couple of years back, in all likelihood, his petition would be liable to be dismissed for unreasonable delay in approaching the Court. In the matters of public employment there has to be a reasonable certainty. In fact certainty and stability of employment is the very soul of public employment. In the matters of public employment there has to be a reasonable certainty. In fact certainty and stability of employment is the very soul of public employment. If such employment is allowed to be taken away on the basis of decisions of Courts given in subsequent cases, stability and certainty in public employment would be lost. No public servant would be sure about his job even after a decade of his service as the process by which he was selected for the post may be held to be illegal in some case subsequently. This would introduce an element of uncertainty and instability in public employment which would be neither just nor fair. 5. Moreover, candidates competing for employment have many options before them. When they are selected and offered employment, they have to finally decide whether to take up the job or not. Some may be already in another employment and some may be hoping to get into other employments. When appointment letters are issued such candidates make their final choice on a legitimate expectation and not of precarious tenure. The employer in such a case would be estopped from taking a stand later on that the selection was illegal and from terminating the service on that ground. It would be extremely unjust and unfair to allow the employer to terminate the services of employees on such a ground when the employees have altered their situation irretrievably by accepting the job. Many of them might have crossed the maximum age limit for public employment also with no hopes for future employment. 6. For the aforesaid reasons, it has to be held that a process of selection completed by issuing appointment orders to the successful candidates cannot be reversed on the basis of some decision relating to a different selection process subsequently rendered by the Court holding a similar procedure adopted at the selection of such candidates to be illegal. 7. Applying this test, it can be concluded that decision of Ghewar Ram's case (supra) would apply only to cases in which selection process was not complete and no appointment orders were issued to the successful candidates. It shall not apply to the cases in which recruitment process was completed by issuing letter of appointments to the selected candidates. 8. 7. Applying this test, it can be concluded that decision of Ghewar Ram's case (supra) would apply only to cases in which selection process was not complete and no appointment orders were issued to the successful candidates. It shall not apply to the cases in which recruitment process was completed by issuing letter of appointments to the selected candidates. 8. The petitioners also contend that in Ghewar Ram's case the relief was restricted to the selection under challenge in the group of cases before the Court only. A bare reading of the operative portion of the order in that case bears this out. Moreover, the Court has discretion in the matter of grant of relief and the relief can be moulded to suit the circumstances of each case, in order to do complete justice between the parties. This is settled law and no case need be cited on the point. The court could not have decided the fate of candidates at earlier selections while deciding Ghewar Ram's case (supra), and it has not done so. The directive was only given for selection processes which were not complete. The court could not have and has not in that case interfered with vested rights of others who were not concerned with the selections involved in that case.For the aforesaid reasons, the petitions are allowed. The Circular dated April 5, 1995 issued by the respondents in so far as it directs termination of services of the candidates duly appointed after selections as also orders of termination of service are quashed. The petitioners and similarly situated persons shall be treated to be in continuous employment as if the termination of their services had not taken place irrespective of whether such persons had filed petitions or not and obtained stay orders or not.There shall, however, be no order as to costsPetitions allowed. *******