S. P. SRIVASTAVA, J. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and Sh. Sudhir Agrawal, learned counsel representing the contesting respondents. 2. Perused the record. While disposing of a writ petition filed by the petitioner being Writ Petition No. 2926 vide the judgment and order dated 2-2-1995 a Division Bench of this Court had directed that the appeal filed by the petitioner under Regulation 23 (2) of the U. P. Electricity Supply (Consumers) Regulations 1984 be decided by the Superintending Engineer, the respondent No. 2 within two weeks from the date of the filing of the appeal. 3. The Superintending Engineer, the respondent No. 2 disposed of the appeal of the petitioner directed the assessment made by the Executive Engineer. Distribution Division, Chandausi for Rs. 3,32,419. 50 by a one line order to the effect that the appeal had been carefully examined and was rejected. 4. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid appellate order, dated 24-3-1995 the petitioner had approached this Court again seeking redress praying for the quashing of the aforesaid order. 5. The sole contention urged in support of this writ petition by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the order dismissing the appeal of the petitioner stands vitiated in law as the appellate authority, while disposing of the appeal has not disclosed any reason and has totally disregarded the statutory provisions contained in Regulation 23 of the Electricity Supply (Consumers) Regulations, 1984. The assertion is that the appellate authority was bound under the law to give reason in support of its conclusions. Further assertion is that taking into consideration the nature of the controversy raised in the memorandum of appeal filed by the petitioner as evident from the grounds taken therein, the impugned order discloses a total non-application of mind of the real controversy raised in the case. 6. The learned counsel for the petitioner has further contended that the appellate authority has not afforded any opportunity of hearing to the petitioner, with the result the petitioner was seriously prejudiced a the couldnt represent his case in support of his claim before the appellate authority. 7. The learned counsel representing the respondents has stated that apart from the impugned order dated 24-3-1995 no other had been passed by the appellate authority separately containing any reasons. 7. The learned counsel representing the respondents has stated that apart from the impugned order dated 24-3-1995 no other had been passed by the appellate authority separately containing any reasons. The learned counsel for the respondents has further stated that since the petitioner had not made any request for personal hearing, no information regarding any date having been for disposal of the appeal was communicated to him. 8. The provisions relevant for deciding the controversy raised in this case as contained in Regulation 23 of the Electricity Supply (Consumers) Regulations, 1984 are to the following effect: "23 (iii) The appellate authority shall dispose oil the appeal after consi dering the submission of the appellant in the memorandum of appeal, the material placed before him by the appellant and the enquiry records. It shall not be obligatory for the Appellate Authority to give a personal hearing, but if a request is made in that behalf he may grant such hearing to the appellant. The appellant may be represented at such hearing by a legal practi tioner or any person duly authorised in that behalf. (iv) The appellate authority may: (a) confirm, reduce, enhance or annul the assessment, or (b) set aside the assessment and order fresh disposal of the case with or without further enquiry, or (c) conduct a further enquiry itself or call for a report from the lower authorities and dispose off the appeal in the light of such further enquiry or report, or (d) pass such other orders as it deems fit: Provided that no orders adverse to the consumer shall be passed without giving notice and opportunity for a written representation to the consumer: Provided further that if the consumer fails to turn-up in spite of giving reasonable opportunity of being heard the appellate authority may proceed ex parte and decide the case on merits. (v) The appellate authority shall give reasons for his conclusions except in cases where the appeal is allowed in toto. The order in appeal shall be final and binding on the consumer. " 9. It is apparent from the perusal of the provisions referred to herein-above that the appellate authority is required under the law to give reasons for his conclusions except in cases where the appeal is allowed in toto. The order in appeal shall be final and binding on the consumer. " 9. It is apparent from the perusal of the provisions referred to herein-above that the appellate authority is required under the law to give reasons for his conclusions except in cases where the appeal is allowed in toto. It is further apparent that while it is not obligatory for the appellate authority to give a personal hearing but if a request is made in that behalf he may grant such hearing to the appellant and the appellant may be represented at such hearing by a legal practitioner or any person duly authorised in that behalf. 10. The impugned order passed by the appellate authority appears to be in flagrant disregard of the statutory requirements envisaged under Regula tion 23 (5) of the Electricity Supply (Consumers) Regulations, 1984. In its decision in the case of Union of India v. M. L. Kapoor, reported in AIR 1974 SC 87 , the Honble Supreme Court has observed thus : ". . . . . . Reasons are the links between the materials on which certain conclusions are based. They disclose how the mind is applied to the subject-matter for a decision, whether it is purely administra tive or quasi-judicial, they should reveal a rational nexus between the facts considered and the conclusions reached. Only in this way can opinions or decisions recorded be shown to be manifestly just and reasonable. . . . . . " 11. Disclosure or recording of reasons guarantees consideration and introduces clarity excluding or minimising arbitrariness. An order which does not disclose the points which were considered and the reasons for rejecting them was not approved of by the Honble Supreme Court in several cases, emphasising the necessity to give sufficient reasons which disclosed proper appreciation of the problem to be solved and the mental process by which the conclusion is reached. 12. In its decision in t he case of S. N. Mukherjee v. Union of India, reported in AIR 1990 SC 1984 , the Apex Court again emphasised that even an administrative action must be supported by reasons. In the above case while holding that the rule requiring reasons to be given in support of an order was, like the principle of audi alterant partem, a basic principle of natural justice, the Apex Court observed as follows : ". . . . . In the above case while holding that the rule requiring reasons to be given in support of an order was, like the principle of audi alterant partem, a basic principle of natural justice, the Apex Court observed as follows : ". . . . . . Keeping in view the expanding horizon of the principles of natural justice, we are of the opinion, that the requirement to record reason can be regarded as one of the principles of natural justice which govern exercise of power by administrative authori ties. . . . . . " In view of what has been stated above, I am clearly of the opinion that the impugned order stands vitiated in law and has resulted in manifest miscarriage of justice. 13. In view of my conclusions indicated hereinabove, this writ petition succeeds. The impugned order passed by the appellate authority is hereby quashed with a direction to restore the appeal to its original number and decide the same in accordance with law. It is further, observed that in case the petitioner makes a request for personal hearing, he may be granted such hearing after due communication to him of the date fixed for the purpose. 14. There shall, however, be no order as to costs. Petition allowed. .