Honble SINGHAL, J. – The petition has challenged the notification dated 8th January 1991, issued under section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act published in the Rajasthan Gazette on 17th October 1991 and also the declaration dated 17th April 1993 issued u/s 6 of the Land Acquisition Act published on 19th April 1993. A prayer has been made that the said notifications and further proceedings taken u/ss. 7, 9 and 10 be quashed. (2) Brief facts of the case are that the petitioner company purchased 23,000 sq.yds. land in respect of Khasra No. 6472 to 6479, 6483, 6384 and 6387 near Kanak Vrindawan, village Badanpura, Amer Road, Jaipur from Gangaram son of Bali and Babulal Son of Bhura by registered sale-deed dated 11th January 1990 and 27th January 1990 respectively and the mutation of the said land has also been effected by the Assistant Settlement Officer, Amer on 23rd January 1991 and 24th March 1990. The case of the petitioner is that the petitioner want to construct Holiday Resort with other facilities and for that purpose submitted an application to the Collector, Revenue, for conversion and regularisation of the land on 21.1.1991. The report as required by the Collector from the Tehsildar dated 4.5.1990 was received and the notified committee recommended the matter to the Jaipur Development Authority on 28.4.1990 and the matter is still pending with the Jaipur Development Authority. (3) The State Government on the desire of the JDA for implementing Jal Mahal Yojan issued a notification u/s 4 of the Land Acquisition Act on 8.1.1991 which was published in the gazette on 17th October 1991 and in the news papers on 5.4.1992. The public notice was issued on 25.4.1992. (4) A declaration u/s 6 dated 17.2.1993 was published in the Gazette on 19.4.1993 and in news papers on 24.12.1993 and the public notice was given on 2.1.1994. It is stated that the notice was served on Shanker Lal Son of Gangaram and no notice was issued to Babulal or to the petitioner. The petitioner made a representation on 23.4.1992 to the Land Acquisition Officer stating that Gangaram and Babulal have already sold the said land which have been mutated in the name of the company. The company desires to develop a hotel and resort. The petitioner made a representation on 23.4.1992 to the Land Acquisition Officer stating that Gangaram and Babulal have already sold the said land which have been mutated in the name of the company. The company desires to develop a hotel and resort. The NDC from the Notified Area Committee Amer and Tehsildar Amer have been obtained and the land would be developed in accordance with the JDA Plan. It is not possible that the construction of crores of rupees of the area could be removed and, therefore, the land should not be acquired. In accordance with the Master Plan of 1971-76, Amer town is to be developed for tourists and resort town and since the petitioner is intending to construct a hotel, the land may not be acquired. The objections submitted by the petitioner company were taken on record on 27.5.1992 and next date was fixed for 16.6.1992 and again on 27.6.1992 when the Director of the Company Shri Ramavtar was present and the next date was adjourned to 16.7.1992. On this date nobody was present and it was further adjourned to 27.7.1992. On different dates which were adjourned from time to time no one appeared on behalf of the petitioner. The decision of Farid Ahmed Abdul Samad vs. The Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad and another, (1) is an au- thority that personal hearing u/s 5A of the Land Acquisition Act is mandatory and does not rest on a persons demand for personal hearing. Even the language of the section is clear. However when this contention is examined in the present case it cannot be found that the petitioner was present before the Land Acquisition Officer after 27.6.1992 on which date the Land Acquisition Officer was absent. The dates were adjourned thereafter on number of times but the petitioner has not taken care in finding out as to which of the dates have been given. It was adjourned to 16.7.1992, 23.7.1992, 3.8.1993, 11.8.1993, 25.8.1993, 14.9.1993, 29.9.1993, 30.9.1993, 8.10.1993 and 14.10.1993. The petitioner has faild to availe opportunity and, therefore, I do not feel that this contention has any force. It was adjourned to 16.7.1992, 23.7.1992, 3.8.1993, 11.8.1993, 25.8.1993, 14.9.1993, 29.9.1993, 30.9.1993, 8.10.1993 and 14.10.1993. The petitioner has faild to availe opportunity and, therefore, I do not feel that this contention has any force. (5) It is stated that the notice dated 1.1.1994 was issued to Gangaram and Bhura u/s 9 and 10 of the Land Acquisition Act and without specifying any date on which they are required to appear before the Land Acquisition Officer and on the back of the notice it is wrongly reported that Khatedar has refused to take notice and, therefore, it is served by affixing. The representation dated 12.4.1993 was sub- mitted to the Secretary Urban Development and Housing Department, Government of Rajasthan, Jaipur, requesting to exclude the land from Jal Mahal Scheme and to grant NDC for conversion of the land. A copy of the representation was also sent to the Commissioner, JDA on 9.11.1993 for de-acquisition of the land and to grant NDC. The representation was also sent to the Honble Chief Minister and the Com- missioner JDA has submitted his report that the land is under acquisition and NDC was not given for construction of the hotel as it falls under the Jal Mahal Development Scheme. The scheme of beautification of Jal Mahal Scheme was first submitted by Hindustan Charitable Trust with certain conditions and the matter is pending with the Minister of Local Self Government. According to the instructions issued by the Minister on 24.2.1992, the scheme is to be implemented by the JDA Water Works Department, Forest Department, PWD, Electricity Board and Municipal Corporation, Jaipur. It was admitted that the scheme of the petitioner was recommended by the Tourism Department and the work which the petitioner want to under take is similar to Jal Mahal development scheme in which it is proposed that the bigger building may not be constructed and major portion may remain open and green so that public in general may utilise it for recreation. The matter was left to be decided by the Government. (6) Learned counsel for the respondents has raised a preliminary objection that the notification u/s 4 was published in Gazette on 17th October 1991 and the writ petition has been filed on 9.2.1994 as such it suffers from laches. The matter was left to be decided by the Government. (6) Learned counsel for the respondents has raised a preliminary objection that the notification u/s 4 was published in Gazette on 17th October 1991 and the writ petition has been filed on 9.2.1994 as such it suffers from laches. (7) The challenge of the learned counsel for the petitioner is based on the ground that the notification u/s 4 of the Land Acquisition Act was published on 17.10.1991 while the declaration u/s 6 was made on 19.4.1993 and as such it is not within one year of the publication of the notification. So far as this point is concer- ned, it may be noted that the three modes which have been given u/s 4 are that the publication of the notification is by publishing it in the gazette, news paper and by public notice and it is contemplated that last of such mode would be taken for the purpose and computation of the limitation. The declaration dated 17.2.1993 was published on 19.4.1993 which is within one year from the last mode of publication of notification by public notice i.e. 25.4.1992. This position of law is also supported by the decision of the Apex Court in Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti vs. Mukand Singh and others (2), wherein it was observed that publication in the official gazette already made under clause (1) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of Sec. 6 is complete, as soon as the declaration u/s 6(1) was published in the official gazette. That will be the date for the purpose of computation of one year period from the last date of publication of notification u/s 4(1). In view of this direct authority on the point, the contention which has been raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner has no force. (8) It is submitted that the land is acquired for Jal Mahal Yojana, but there is nothing on record to prove or establish what is Jal Mahal Yojana. The land cannot be said to be acquired for any public purpose. It is also stated that the land is acquired for Hindustan Charitable purposes and the object for which the JDA want to use the land will be fulfilled by the petitioner. The acquisition for a private person (in this case Hindustan Charitable Trust) cannot be considered to be a public purpose. It is also stated that the land is acquired for Hindustan Charitable purposes and the object for which the JDA want to use the land will be fulfilled by the petitioner. The acquisition for a private person (in this case Hindustan Charitable Trust) cannot be considered to be a public purpose. So far as the objection is concerned, in the report of the Commissioner, JDA, a reference has been made that Hindustan Charitable Trust has submitted certain scheme which are pending with the Government, but the entire scheme is clearly stated to be implemented by different departments jointly and, therefore, it cannot be considered that the land is not acquired for public purpose. In the said report, it has clearly been stated that the large buildings are not proposed to be erected on the site and the area is to be left open for greenery and for recreation purposes of general public. This shows that the proceedings for acquisition of land were taken in public interest. (9) Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that there is no scheme and this is a mandatory requirement u/s 38. Unless, the scheme is framed, the land cannot be acquired. Reliance has been placed on the decision of this court in the case of Narain and 27 others vs. State of Rajasthan & Others (3), wherein relying on the decision of Gandhi Grah Nirman Sahkari Samiti Ltd. and others. vs. State of Rajasthan & others, the case of State of Tamil Nadu and another vs. A. Mohammed Yousef and others (4), was considered. The decision of Indore Development Authority vs. Madan Lal and others, (5), was also considered, and on the basis of these decisions it is submitted that since the JDA has not framed the scheme, the entire acquisition proceedings fails. On the other hand the decision of Aflatoon vs. Lt. Governor Delhi (6), has also been relied upon wherein it was observed by the Apex Court that in the case of acquisition of a large area of land comprising several plots belonging to different persons, the specification of the purpose can only be with reference to the acquisition of the whole area. Section 52 of the UIT Act provides the power of compulsory acquisition of land, & the power to frame Sche- me u/s 29 of the Act. Section 52 of the UIT Act provides the power of compulsory acquisition of land, & the power to frame Sche- me u/s 29 of the Act. The equivalent section under the JDA Act are contained u/s 39 for preparation of projects and schemes and u/s 45 to acquire the land. The power of acquisition of land can be exercised under the JDA Act, 1982 or it can be under the Land Acquisition Act. The provisions of Section 52(1) of the UIT Act, it was contemplated that when on a representation from the Trust or other wise it appears to the State Government that any land is required for the purpose of improvement or for any other purpose under the said Act, it may acquire such land by publishing in the official gazette a notice specifying the particular purpose for which such land is required and stating that the State Government has decided to acquire the land in pursuance of that section. It was on the basis of the language of the section that the case of Gandhi Grah Nirman (referred to above) it was considered by the Apex Court that the State Government has power to acquire the land either for the execution of the scheme framed by trust or for any other public purpose, under the Act. Section 45 of the JDA Act has contemplated the exercise of power where on any representation from the Authority, it appears to the State Government that, in order to enable the Authority to perform any of its functions or to discharge any of its duties or to exercise any of its powers, or to carry out any of its projects or schemes or development programmes, it is necessary that any land in any part of the Jaipur Region should be acquired, the State Government may acquire the land by publishing in the Official Gazette a notification to the effect that State Government has decided to acquire the land in pursuance of this section. If Sec. 45 of the JDA Act and Sec. 52 of UIT Act are compared, it is evident that in the first line `or otherwise have been ommitted in the JDA Act which was earlier existing in UIT Act. If Sec. 45 of the JDA Act and Sec. 52 of UIT Act are compared, it is evident that in the first line `or otherwise have been ommitted in the JDA Act which was earlier existing in UIT Act. The result of this change would be that it is only on the represen- tation from the JDA that the State Government can exercise power u/s. 45 whereas earlier the power u/s 52 of the UIT Act could be exercised on the representation of the trust or even otherwise. In para 11 of Gandhi Grah Nirman (referred to above) it was observed by the Apex Court that the expression `where it appears to the State Government in section 52(1) of the Act shows that it is not necessary for the State Government to frame a detailed scheme or development plan before exercising powers under the said provisions. It is sufficient if a decision in that respect is taken and the detailed scheme is left to be worked out at the stage of execution of the plan. (10) Learned counsel for the respondents has also placed reliance on the deci- sion of the Constitutional Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Arnold Rodricks and another vs. State of Maharashtra and others (7), wherein it was observed in para 23, "it is true that the Government has not up till now prepared any scheme for the utilisation of the developed sites but the notification it self shows that the sites could be used as residential and industrial sites. There is no law that requires a scheme to be prepared before issuing a notification under S.4 or S.6 of the Act. It was also observed that `we have, however, no doubt that the Government will, before disposing of the sites, have a scheme for their disposal. (10-A). The provisions of sec. 38 of the JDA Act are as under :– 38. Making and contents of Projects and Schemes :- (1) Subject to the provisions of this Act or any other law for the time being in force, the authority for the purpose of implementing the proposals in any plan, may make such projects and schemes for the integrated development of Jaipur Region or any part thereof, as may be considered necessary. Making and contents of Projects and Schemes :- (1) Subject to the provisions of this Act or any other law for the time being in force, the authority for the purpose of implementing the proposals in any plan, may make such projects and schemes for the integrated development of Jaipur Region or any part thereof, as may be considered necessary. (2) A project or scheme may make provisions for all or any of the following matters, namely :- (i) any of the matters specified in sections 21 & 22; (ii) acquisition, development, reservation and scale or leasing of land for purpose of public utilities such as roads, streets, open spaces, par- ks, gardens, recreation and play grounds, hospitals, dispensaries, educational institutions, green,-belts, dairies, housing development, development of markets, shopping centres, commercial complexes, cultural centres, administrative centres, transport facilities and public purposes of all kind; (iii) acquisition, laying out or relaying out of land either vacant or already built upon, re-building or re-locating areas which have been badly laid out or which have developed or degenerated into a slum or kachhi basti, the filling up or re- clamation of low laying, swampy or unhealthy areas or levelling up of land; (iv) acquisition and development of areas for commercial, industrial, transpiration, agricultural mandies and other similar purposes; (v) acquisition of land and its development for the purpose of laying out or re-modelling of roads and streets pattern, lay out of new streets or roads, construction, diversion, extension, alteration, improvement and closing up of streets and roads and discontinuance of communications; (vi) re-construction of plots for the purpose of building, roads, drainage inclusive of sewerage, surface or sub soil drainage, sewerage disposal and other similar amenities; (vii) the construction, alteration and removal of building, bridges and other structures; (viii) lighting and water supply. (ix) the preservation of objects of historical or national interest or natural beauty and of buildings actually used for religious purposes. (ix) the preservation of objects of historical or national interest or natural beauty and of buildings actually used for religious purposes. (x) the reservation of land in any scheme to such extent as may be provided by regulation for the purpose of providing housing accom- modation to the members of Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, Backward Classes and weaker sections of the society; (xi) the imposition of conditions and restrictions in regard to the open space to be maintained around buildings, the percentage of building area for a plot, the number, size, the purposes to which buildings or specified areas may or may not be appropriated, the sub-division of plots, the discontinuance of objectionable uses of lands in any area in specified periods, parking space and loading and unloading space for any building and the sizes or locations of projections, advertisements signs and hoardings; (xii) the suspension, so far as may be necessary for the proper carrying out of the schemes, of any rule, bye-law, regulation, notification or order made or issued under any law for the time being in force which the legislature of the State is competent to make; Provided, that any suspension under this clause shall cease to oper- ate in the event of the withdrawal of the scheme or on the coming into force of the final scheme. (xiii) any other work of the nature such as would bring about environmental improvements which may be taken up by the Authority and all such other matters not inconsistent with the objects of this Act. (xiii) any other work of the nature such as would bring about environmental improvements which may be taken up by the Authority and all such other matters not inconsistent with the objects of this Act. (3) The draft project or scheme shall contain the following particulars, namely:– (a) the area, ownership and tenure of each original plot; (b) the particulars of land allotted or reserved under clause (ii) of the sub-section (2) with a general indication of the uses to which such land is to be put and the terms and conditions subject to which such land is to be put to such uses; (c) the extent to which it is proposed to alter the boundaries of original plots; (d) the estimate of the net cost of the scheme to be borne by the appropriate authority; (e) a full description of all the details of the scheme under sub-section (2) as may be applicable; (f) the laying out or relaying out of land either vacant or already built upon; (g) the filling up or reclamation of low laying; swampy or unhealthy areas or levelling up of land and; (h) any other particulars as may be determined by regulations. The above section does not contemplate that the power to prepare a scheme has to be exercised before the land is acquired. The exact scheme can be prepared only after the land is acquired because Sec. 4 only proposes to give the intention of the Government for taking steps for acquisition and declaration is made under Sec. 6. In between, the report of the Land Acquisition Officer is to be prepared under Section 5-A and there may be certain areas which he may not consider proper for acquisition or on the report of the Land Acquisition Officer, the Government may consider not to acquire a part of the area for which the notification has been issued. If the scheme is made at the initial stage, there can be an objection that there could not be any change in it. It is, therefore, proper that the scheme is prepared only after the land is acquired as at that time, the entire area which may be available to the Government is known to it and, therefore, a proper scheme could be prepared. It is, therefore, proper that the scheme is prepared only after the land is acquired as at that time, the entire area which may be available to the Government is known to it and, therefore, a proper scheme could be prepared. The view which has been taken in the case of Arnold Rodricks (referred to above) makes the position of law clear, though the decision of Division Bench in the case of Narain and 27 others (referred to above) has not taken note of the said decision, but the same is binding. (10 B) In Aflatoon vs. Lt. Governor (8), it was observed that the notification u/s 4(1) must specify the particular purpose for which the land is needed or likely to be needed. But with regard to the contention of preparation of scheme, it was observed that it is true that there could not be planned development except in accordance with the provisions of Delhi Development Act (which was in dispute); after that Act came into force. But there was no inhibition in acquiring land for planned development of Delhi under the Act before the Master Plan was ready. It was further observed, in other words the fact that the actual development is permissible in an area other than a development area with the approval or sanction of the local authority did not preclude the Central Government from acquiring the land for planned development under the Act. Sec. 12 is concerned only with the planned development. It has nothing to do with acquisition of property; acquisition generally precedes development. Though planned development in an area other than a development area it is only necessary to obtain the sanction or approval of the local authority as provided in Section 12(3). The Central Government could acquire any property and develop it after obtaining the approval of the local authority. Though planned development in an area other than a development area it is only necessary to obtain the sanction or approval of the local authority as provided in Section 12(3). The Central Government could acquire any property and develop it after obtaining the approval of the local authority. (10 C) In Narayan & 27 Others vs. State of Rajasthan (supra) the Division Bench while considering the decision of State of Tamil Nadu and Another vs. Mohammed Yousef & others (supra) took note of the observation of the Apex Court, "however to avoid unnecessary controversy we are hereby clarifying the position that a ground based on the present judgment shall be available to the land owners only for such land acquisition proceedings, which are under challenge and a re still pending decision." It was observed that Chapter-VII of the Madras State Housing Board Act 1961 contains Section 35 to 69, which deals with the framing of the scheme and separate procedure for different types of scheme according to necessity and suitability have been provided therein. Some of them did not require acqui- sition of land which is essential for constructing the residential buildings under the Housing Scheme. The contention of the learned counsel for the JDA was rejected who placed reliance on Gandhi Grah Nirman Sahkari Samiti vs. State of Rajasthan (supra). It was observed that this decision has not taken note of the decision of A. Mohammed Usuf and the case of Gandhi Grah Nirman Sahkari Samiti Ltd. has not laid down that even in a case where the land is acquired by the State Government on the representation of the Trust, the framing of the scheme is not necessary. In the case of A. Mohammed Usuf, the word "particular purpose" were taken to mean that unless the scheme is framed the land cannot be acquired. The decision of "Aflatoon vs. Lt. Governor (supra)" has taken note of the fact that even the Master plan was not prepared, a contention was raised there could not be planned development till the Master Plan is prepared. In the present case the Master Plan has already been prepared and the land has been shown for recreational/resort purposes as stated by the petitioner himself. Thus, there is no deviation from the Master Plan. In the present case the Master Plan has already been prepared and the land has been shown for recreational/resort purposes as stated by the petitioner himself. Thus, there is no deviation from the Master Plan. The purposes have also been specified and according to the judgment of Apex Court in Arnold Rodricks, which has also not taken nor of even by the Division Bench in Narayan Case. It is not necessary that the scheme should be prepared before the acquisition. The purpose for which the land is acquired clearly mentioned in the notification which fulfills the requirement and the land is inten- ded to be utilised for the said purposes. (11) The observation of the Apex Court in the case of Gandhi Grah Nirman Sah. Samiti (referred to above), makes it clear that it is not necessary for the State Government to frame a detailed scheme for development plan for exercising the power u/s. 52(1). It was considered that it is sufficient if a decision in that respect is taken and a detailed scheme is left to be worked out at the state of execution of the plan. The power of acquisition of land can be exercised under the JDA Act or under the Land Acquisition Act. If the power is exercised under the JDA Act, then in view of the decision of the Apex Court it will not be necessary to frame the scheme, but a decision to frame the scheme if taken would be sufficient and detail- ed scheme would be worked out at a later stage. If the power is exercised under the Land Acquisition Act, then it will not be necessary even for taken a decision and only thing to be seen is that the land is acquired for the public purpose. The notification which has been issued in the present case is under the Land Acquisition Act and it is mentioned in the notification dated 8.1.91 that the land and buil- dings are required for public purposes i.e. for implementation of Jal Mahal Yojana by the JDA. This shows that by the time the notification under section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act was issued, a decision was taken to formulate the Scheme Jal Mahal Yojana as contemplated by the Apex Court in the case of Gandhi Grah Nirman Sahkari Samiti (referred to above). This shows that by the time the notification under section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act was issued, a decision was taken to formulate the Scheme Jal Mahal Yojana as contemplated by the Apex Court in the case of Gandhi Grah Nirman Sahkari Samiti (referred to above). The detailed scheme has not been fra- med, but it was not considered to be necessary. The decision in the case of Narain and others (referred to above) in respect of notification which was issued u/s 52(1) of the UIT Act are not on the interpretation of Sec.4 of the Land Acquisition Act. The view which has been taken by the Apex Court in the case of Arnold Rodricks (referred to above) is a direct authority as the said judgment is based on the inter- pretation of Sec. 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act and it has been held by the Constitutional Bench that there is no law which requires a scheme to be prepared before issue of notification u/s 4 and 6 of the Act. Therefore, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the scheme should have been framed has no substance. It may also be observed that the case of Himmat Jain vs. State of Rajasthan and others, (9) a Division Bench of this Court considered the case of Narain vs. State of Rajasthan and others referred to above with regard to the submission that framing of the scheme is a condition precedent for acquisition of the land. In the aforesaid case it was observed that - "In our opinion, there is no such competition in between the two Acts. Section 52(1) of the Improvement Act preserves the power of the State Government to acquire the land for improvement or for any other purpose. The Improvement Act would apply only to cases of Improvement in accordance with the scheme, but where the State Government finds that the acquisition could be more effectively made by notifications under section 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, it will have a right to do so. In State of Rajasthan vs. Mukun Chand ( AIR 1964 SC 1633 ), the principles for determination of validity of an Act have been laid down. As to when the acquisition should be made under the Land Acquisition of under the Improvement Act is a matter of discretion of the State Government. In State of Rajasthan vs. Mukun Chand ( AIR 1964 SC 1633 ), the principles for determination of validity of an Act have been laid down. As to when the acquisition should be made under the Land Acquisition of under the Improvement Act is a matter of discretion of the State Government. That or discretion is to be exercised by the State Government for relevant purposes. Moreover, Section 52(1) of the Improvement Act permits acquisition by the State Government for public purpose. Consequently, the field of operation of the Land Acquisition Act is wider. In some cases, it may over lap, but that will not result in invalidating the Act. The Improvement Act was passed by the State Legislature, whereas the Land Acquisition Act by the par- liament." The above Division Bench decision has made distinction with regard to acquisition of land under Land Acquisition Act and acquisition under JDA Act/Improvement Act and came to the conclusion that it is not necessary that the acquisition should be made under Improvement Act alone. If the acquisition is made under the Land Acquisition Act then framing of the scheme was not considered necessary. (12) A contention has been raised that the acquisition is not as per master plan . Learned counsel for the respondents has submitted that in the master plan the area has been shown for tourist recreation purpose and it cannot be said that the purpose for which the land is acquired is different than the use as has been shown in the master plan. In view of the submission of the learned counsel for the respondents, I do not consider that this point requires any further adjudication. (13) It is also submitted that the petitioner is implementing the same scheme and, therefore, the respondents should issue the notification for de-acquisition of the land as has been shown in similar other cases. The submission of the learned counsel for the respondents is that the petitioner has not made any development and no hard-ship would be caused as no constructions have been made. The plan has not been approved. (14) I have considered over the matter. So far as this area is concerned, there is no de-acquisition of the land in favour of any other person who want to imple- ment the scheme for development of the land as holiday resort. The plan has not been approved. (14) I have considered over the matter. So far as this area is concerned, there is no de-acquisition of the land in favour of any other person who want to imple- ment the scheme for development of the land as holiday resort. If the land is de-acquired in any other area in a different notification, it may be on the facts and circumstances of a particular case but it cannot be a general proposition that in all the cases where a person wants to implement the scheme in accordance with the object of the JDA, then instead of acquiring the land, the said person should be allowed to implement the scheme by de-acquiring the land. De- acquiring the land of other scheme cannot be a case of discrimination and since in the present scheme, there is no other land which has been de-acquired for the purpose of resort, the petitioner cannot be granted any relief in respect thereof. This contention has also no force. (15) It is submitted that there is no satisfaction in the notification issued u/s 6. This contention has also no force. (15) It is submitted that there is no satisfaction in the notification issued u/s 6. The language of the notification dated 17.4.1993 is as under :- la[;k i-6¼21½ ufovk@3@82%& pwafd jktLFkku ljdkj dks ,slk izrhr gksrk gS fd lkoZtfud iz;kstukFkZ vFkkZr t;iqj fodkl izkf/kdj.k] t;iqj dks vius d`R;ksa ds fuoZgu tyegy ;kstuk ds fØ;kUo;u ds fy;s ljdkj }kjk Hkwfe yh tkuk visf{kr gSA blfy;s blds }kjk ?kks"k.kk dh tkrh gS fd uhps foLr`r fooj.k esa of.kZr Hkwfe mijksDr iz;kstu ds fy;s visf{kr gSA ;g ?kks"k.kk Hkwfe vokfIr vf/kfu;e] 1894 ¼1984 dk dsUnzh; vf/kfu;e 1½ dh /kkjk 6 ds izko/kkuksa ds varxZr Hkwfe vokfIr vf/kfu;e] 1894 dh /kkjk 5, ds varxZr Hkwfe vokfIr vf/kdkjh] t;iqj fodkl izkf/kdj.k] t;iqj ls izkIr gq, izfrosnu ij fopkj djus ds ipkr mu O;fDr;ksa ds fy;s dh x;h ftlls fd bldk laca/k gks ldrk gSA dsUnzh; Hkwfe vokfIr vf/kfu;e dh /kkjk 7 ds varxZr Hkwfe vokfIr vf/kdkjh] t;iqj fodkl izkf/kdj.k] t;iqj dks Hkwfe vokfIr dh vfxze dk;Zokgh fd;s tkus gsrq vf/kd`r fd;k tkrk gSA Hkwfe ds uDks dk fujh{k.k Hkwfe vokfIr vf/kdkjh] t;iqj fodkl izkf/kdj.k] t;iqj t;iqj ds dk;kZy; esa fd;k tk ldrk gSA (16) From be above language it is evident that it was on the basis of the report under section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Officer that the State Government has applied its mind and thereafter the Land Acquisition Officer was authorised u/s 7. The satisfaction u/s 6 of the Land Acquisition Act of the Government could be after considering the report u/s 5-A(2) that the particular land is needed for public pur- pose. This condition is satisfied in the notification issued as the report u/s 5-A was received by the Government and it was only after considering the report that the notification was issued and further powers were given u/s 7 of the Act. There may not be a specific language used, but the presumption goes in favour of the respondents and more particularly when a reference is made that the report in accordance with Sec. 5-A was received and after receiving the report authorisation u/s 7 is done. The satisfaction under Sec. 6 therefore, was there. This contention has also no force. There may not be a specific language used, but the presumption goes in favour of the respondents and more particularly when a reference is made that the report in accordance with Sec. 5-A was received and after receiving the report authorisation u/s 7 is done. The satisfaction under Sec. 6 therefore, was there. This contention has also no force. (17) Learned counsel for the respondents has raised an objection that the writ petition suffers from laches as the objections with regard to the notification u/s 4 were available when the notification was issued. It is further submitted that the object of the Sec. 5-A was to raise the objections which have to be decided by the Land Acquisition Officer and if no objections have been raised, on any point, then the petitioner cannot be allowed to raise this objection which could have been raised and not raised u/s 5-A. The decision of Col. Sher Singh vs. State of Raj. & Ors. (10) was relied. The decision of Hastimal vs. State of Rajasthan (11), was also relied where it was observed as under :- "We propose to examine the question of delay first. It has been laid down in para 43 of Durga Prasads case (12), that the relief under Article 226 is discretionary and on e ground for refusing relief under Art. 226 is that the petitioner has filed the petition after delay for which there is no satisfactory explanation. Sikri J. (as he then was) has extracted certain observations of Gajendra gadkar C.J. from an unreported decision in Smt. Narayani Devi Khaitan vs. State of Bihar deserve a recall. They read :- ``It is well settled that under Art. 226 the power of the High Court to issue an appropriate writ is discretionary. There can by no doubt that if a citizen moves the High Court under Art. 226 and contends that his fundamental rights have been contravened by any executive action, the High Court would naturally like to give relief to him; but even in such a case, if the petitioner has been guilty of laches, and there are other relevant circumstances which indicate that it would be inappropriate for the High Court to exercise its high prerogative jurisdiction in favour of the petitioner, ends of justice may require that the High Court should refuse to issue a writ. No hard and fast rule can be laid down as to when the High Court should refuse to exercise its jurisdiction in favour of a party who moves it after considerable delay and is otherwise guilty of laches. What is a matter which must be left to the discretion of the High Court and like all matters left to the discretion of the Court, in this matter too discretion must be exercised judiciously and reasonably; The plea of laches came to be examined closely in M/s Tilokchand Motichand vs. H. B. Munshi, Commissioner of Sales Tax, Bombay (13). Hidayatullah c.J. expressed the view that the party claiming fundamental rights must move the Court before other rights emerge by reason of delay on the part of the person moving the Court. In para 8 it observed :- "The English & American practice has been outlined in Halsburys Laws of England and Corpus Juris Secundum. It has been mentioned by my brethren in their opinions and I need not traverse the same ground again except to say this that Court of Common Law in England were bound by the Law of Limitation but not the Court of Chancery. Even so the Chancery Courts insisted on expedition. It is trite learning to refer to the maxim `delay defeats equity or the latin of it that the Courts help those who are vigilant and do not lumber over their rights. The Courts of Chancery, therefore, frequently applied to suits in equity the analogy of the law of limitation applicable to actions at law and equally frequently but a special limitation of their own if they thought that the suit was duly delayed . . . . . . . . . . The party aggrieved must move the Court at the earliest possible time and explain satisfactorily all semblance of delay. I am not indicating any period which may be regarded as the ultimate limit of action for that would be taking upon myself legislative functions. In England a period of six months has been provided stattutorily; but that could be because there is no guaranteed remedy and the matter is one entirely of discretion. In India I will only say that each case will have to be considered on its own facts. In England a period of six months has been provided stattutorily; but that could be because there is no guaranteed remedy and the matter is one entirely of discretion. In India I will only say that each case will have to be considered on its own facts. Where there is appearance of avoidable delay and this delay affects the merits of the claim this Court will consider it and in a proper case hold the party disentitled to invoke the extra-ordinary jurisdiction." In Purshottam Lal vs. The State of Rajasthan (14) Tyage; J. has examined a large number of cases on the question of delay and held that in case under the Land Acquisition Act a challenge of the notification under Sec. 6 after four years of waiting disentitles the petitioner to any relief. This case came up before a Division Bench of this Court in D.B. Special Appeal No. 265/1972 (decided on 25th July 1972) and decision of the learned Single Judge was confirmed and the appeal was dismissed in limine. The matter was taken up to the Supreme Court by Special Petition No. 2250 of 1972 and the same was dismi- ssed on 22nd September, 1972. From the discussion of the aforesaid authorities, it is clear that not withstanding that violation of a fundamental right is alleged the delay disentitles a petitioner from seeking a relief in the exercise of extra ordinary jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution. No rigid rule could be laid down but discretion will have to be exercised having regard to the facts and circumstances of each cases." (18) The decision of Ramjas Foundation and others vs. Union of India and others (12), has also been relied. The decisions of Smt. Ratni Devi and another vs. Chief Commissioner, Delhi and others (13), and Aflatoon vs. Governor of Delhi (supra), have also been relied. (19) Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the decision in the case of Navin R. Kamani & Others vs. State of Rajasthan & others, D.B. Spl. Appeal No. 73/95 decided on 9.3.1995 (14). (20) I have considered over the matter. All the points which have been raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner have been considered on merit and, therefore, the question of any delay and laches is not required to be considered. Appeal No. 73/95 decided on 9.3.1995 (14). (20) I have considered over the matter. All the points which have been raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner have been considered on merit and, therefore, the question of any delay and laches is not required to be considered. It may be observed that the decision of Navin R.Kamani vs. State & Others (supra) is based on the point that the writ petition should not be dismissed when in respect of same land and same notification the other writ petition is pending, as it would cause no prejudice to the respondents even if the writ petition is filed after considerable delay. It is also submitted that the State Government was under obligation to specify the public purpose with sufficient particularity to enable repre- sentation under section 5-A and for the purpose the decision in the case of Munshi Singh and others vs. Union of India (15) has been relied. The notification which has been issued u/s 4 of the Land Acquisition Act clearly mentions public purpose i.e. the Jal Mahal Yojana and, therefore ,this contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner has no force. (21) An objection was taken that the notice which has been issued is not in the name of the petitioner company and a decision in the case of Hindustan Oil Mills Ltd. and another vs. Special Deputy Collector (Land Acquisition), has also been relied. In the present case the notification was in the name of earlier land owners. This matter was considered by this court in RIICO vs. Sudesh D.B. Special Appeal No. 674/92 decided on 1.6.94 (16). Besides this Apex Court in the case of Hindustan Oil Mills Ltd. (referred to above) has observed as under :- "Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act contemplates the publication of a notice not only in the gazette but also at convenient places in the locality in which the land proposed to be acquired is situated. Besides this Apex Court in the case of Hindustan Oil Mills Ltd. (referred to above) has observed as under :- "Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act contemplates the publication of a notice not only in the gazette but also at convenient places in the locality in which the land proposed to be acquired is situated. Though it is true that the notification need not precisely define the nature of the land proposed to be acquired or the persons to whom it is considered to belong, there should be a clear indication in the notification of the land that is proposed to be acquired, from which the owners or occupiers of the land can get a fair idea as to the details of the acquisition and the impact on their rights." (22) Besides the observations of the Apex Court, the petitioner has himself participated and filed the objections and, therefore, this objection has no force. (23) In the result, all the points which have been raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner are devoid of any force. The writ petition having no force is there- fore dismissed.