Judgment N.Pandey and Amir Das JJ. 1. Petitioner, who is the proprietor of VIP Home, situated at Anand Bazar, Main Road, Ranchi has by means of this writ application under Article 226 questioned the validity of seizure, conducted on 10.10.1995 by respondent Nos. 3 to 6, of several documents including books of accounts, sale register etc., relating to various transactions, as also for quashing the notice issued under Section 33(5)(a) of the Bihar Finance Act. (in short the Act), whereby the petitioner was asked to show cause as to why a penalty be not imposed as per the provisions of law. By an amendment petition, a prayer has also been made for quashing the order dated 16.10.1995, whereby, respondent No. 4 in exercise of his power, conferred under Sec. 33(5)(b) of the Act has imposed penalty to the extent of three time, amounting to Rs. 19,068.00 (rupees nineteen thousand and sixty eight only). 2. The grievance of the petitioner is that the business premises admittedly situated within the jurisdiction of East Circle, Ranchi, the Commercial Taxes Officers, South Circle and West Circle, had no jurisdiction to raid the shop and make seizure. It has been stated that a bare reference to the notification, contained in Annexure-3, would reveal that the territorial jurisdiction of the various authorities as per the provisions of Sec. 9 of the Act, has been specifically carved out. The shop of the petitioner is lying within the jurisdiction of East Circle and the authorities empowered under Sec. 9 of the Act are Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Ranchi East Circle, Assistant Commissioner, Commercial Taxes, Ranchi East Circle and Commercial Taxes Officer, Ranchi East Circle. Similarly with respect to other circles different officers have been delegated with such power. Therefore, respondents 5 and 6 has no jurisdiction to take part in seizure of different articles of the shop in question and to issue notice etc. 3. Apart from the aforesaid grievances, it was also alleged that entire raid conducted by the respondents was per se mechanical and malafide, as would appear from perusal of the so called report that one A.S.Gupta Advocate has been mentioned as owner of the shop whereas in fact, he has got no concern. 4. 3. Apart from the aforesaid grievances, it was also alleged that entire raid conducted by the respondents was per se mechanical and malafide, as would appear from perusal of the so called report that one A.S.Gupta Advocate has been mentioned as owner of the shop whereas in fact, he has got no concern. 4. A counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the respondents, stating that in view of the final order, having been passed under Sec. 33(5)(b) of the Act, the petitioner has got equally efficacious and alternative remedy of statutory appeal under Sec. 45 of the Act, therefore, the present writ application is not maintainable. 5. Learned Government Advocate submitted that the petitioner has deliberately suppressed this fact before this Court that on 12.10.1995 he appeared before the Assessing authority through an advocate and by filing a petition, made a prayer for time to file show cause. 6. He further contended that apart from what has been noticed above, even the final order under Sec. 33(5)(b) of the Act, imposing penalty, was passed on 16.10.1995 and the writ petition was filed on 17.10.1995. But it is really unfortunate that this fact has also been suppressed only to mislead the Court. 7. Apart from the question of maintainability of the writ application, it was also submitted by the State Counsel that the raid in question was conducted by the Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes (Investigation Bureau), Ranchi Division, Ranchi and the Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes (Investigation Bureau), Ranchi Division, Ranchi who had full authority to make inspection and conduct raid within the Commercial Taxes Division of Ranchi. These authorities were also legally entitled to take assistance of respondents 5 and 6 in terms of the provisions of Secs. 33(5) and (7) of the Act, which contemplates that an authority appointed under Sec. 9, may require the assistance of any public servant or police officer in making search and seizure or for safe-custody of goods seized under this section and such public servant will have to render necessary assistance in the matter. 8. 33(5) and (7) of the Act, which contemplates that an authority appointed under Sec. 9, may require the assistance of any public servant or police officer in making search and seizure or for safe-custody of goods seized under this section and such public servant will have to render necessary assistance in the matter. 8. It was also contended that the petitioner has unnecessarily tried to mislead the court even on the point of jurisdiction inasmuch as by a bare reference to the notification, contained in Annexure-3, it would appear that the Joint Commissioner, Commercial Taxes, Ranchi Division, Deputy Commissioner, Commercial Taxes (Administration), Ranchi Division, Deputy Commissioner, Commercial Taxes (Vigilance and Monitoring) Ranchi Division, Assistant Commissioner, Commercial Taxes (Investigation Bureau), Ranchi Division, have been authorised under Sec. 9 of the Act to investigate, search and seize any premises in the district of Ranchi. Therefore, the raid in question, which was conducted by the Deputy Commissioner (respondent No. 3), Assistant Commissioner (respondent No. 4) with assistance of respondents 5 and 6 was fully justified. Therefore, in these backgrounds also the petitioner can not be allowed to question the jurisdiction of such authorities. 9. It was lastly contended that in view of several authorities of this Court as well as the Supreme Court, even assuming for the sake of argument but not conceding that seizure in question was illegal, the proceeding under Sec. 33 as well as the order, passed under Sec. 33(5)(b) of the Act can not vitiate. Reliance in this regard has been placed to the case of Jib Narain Sao and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Ors. 1974 B.L.J.R. 396 and a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Punjab V/s. Balbir Singh -- . 10. Mr. Sen, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, besides the submissions, what he has already made, while replying the argument of the learned State counsel contended that in view of different authorities of the Supreme Court as well as this Court. It is well settled that an alternative remedy is not an absolute bar to the maintainability of a writ petition, when an authority has acted without jurisdiction. The High Court, therefore, should not refuse to exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 on the ground of existence of an alternative remedy of appeal or revision. It is well settled that an alternative remedy is not an absolute bar to the maintainability of a writ petition, when an authority has acted without jurisdiction. The High Court, therefore, should not refuse to exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 on the ground of existence of an alternative remedy of appeal or revision. In support of his contention, he placed reliance over a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Dr. Smt. Kuntesh Gupta V/s. Management of Hindu Kanya Mahavidyalaya, Sitapur (U.P.) and Ors. -- and a Bench decision of this Court in the case of Narendra Kumar Singh V/s. National Co-operative Consumers Federation of India Ltd. Ors. 1994 (2) B.L.J. 232 11. He further contended that with regard to a similar question to that of the present case, in the case of Commissioner of Sales Tax. U.P. V/s. Sarjoo Prasad Ram Kumar (1976) 37 S.T.C. 535 (SC), the Supreme Court held that Assistant Sale Tax Officer of one sector had no jurisdiction to assess the dealers of other Sector. If the jurisdiction of such officers is specifically defined, any order of such officer, having no jurisdiction over the other sector would be without jurisdiction. 12. From the facts, noticed above, there is no dispute that final order, as required under Sec. 33(5)(b) of the Act, has already been passed after giving due notice to the petitioner. It is also admitted that on 12.10.1995 the petitioner appeared before the concerned authority through his Advocate and filed application for time. But unfortunately when the matter was taken up on 16.10.1995 for final hearing, nobody appeared on behalf of the petitioner nor any show cause was filed. Therefore, the appropriate authority had no option but to dispose of the proceeding on the basis of the material, available before him. 13. This is also not in dispute that there is specific provision of appeal under Sec. 45 of the Act against the order, passed under Sec. 33(5)(b) of the Act) Therefore, there appears sufficient force in the submission of the learned Government Advocate that in view of exhaustive and efficacious remedy available against the impugned order, the present writ application is not maintainable. 14. 14. Coming to the question of jurisdiction of the authorities as urged on behalf of the petitioner, there can not be any dispute that an assessing authority of another circle will have no jurisdiction to search and seize a business establishment, which is lying in different circle. 15. It is also not in dispute that an alternative remedy of appeal or revision is not an absolute bar to the maintainability of a writ petition, when an authority has acted wholly without jurisdiction. But a bare reference to the copy of the inspection report, contained in Annexure-4, would indicate that the inspection of the shop as well as the search and seizure of the documents were made by the Deputy Commissioner, Commercial Taxes (respondent No. 3) and Assistant Commissioner, Commercial Taxes (respondent No. 4), who were admittedly duly authorised by the notification, contained in Annexure-3,as per the provisions of Sec. 9 of the Act to inspect all the establishments lying within the jurisdiction of Ranchi District. Therefore, simply because two other officers, namely, respondents Nos. 5 and 6 had assisted the above-mentioned authorities at the time of inspection, it can not be said that search and seizure was made by an authority who had no jurisdiction. 16. Apart from what has been stated above, even a bare reference to the provisions of Sec. 33(7) of the Act would reveal that an authority appointed under Sec. 9 can have assistance of any public servant or police officer in making search and seizure or for safe-custody of goods seized under this section and such public servant or police authority shall have to render necessary assistance as required by the inspecting authority. 17. Besides the facts, noticed above, there can not be any dispute that the petitioner has deliberately suppressed before this Court that he had already appeared before the competent authority on 12.10.1995 and filed application for time. That apart even the final order was pass on 16.10.1995 before the filing of the writ application. But it is really unfortunate that all these facts were deliberately suppressed. Therefore, on this ground also this Court should refuse to exercise its writ jurisdiction in favour of such a person, who has not come to the Court with a clean hand. 18. But it is really unfortunate that all these facts were deliberately suppressed. Therefore, on this ground also this Court should refuse to exercise its writ jurisdiction in favour of such a person, who has not come to the Court with a clean hand. 18. In view of the facts, noticed above, I have no option but to hold that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief in the present writ application, But, I must observe that the present order would not stand against the petitioner to avail the remedy of appeal or revision before the appropriate authority and raise all the questions, which are legally available to him. 19. In the result, subject to the observation, made above, this writ application is dismissed. But in the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.