R. B. MEHROTRA, J. Sri Paras Math Verma, was appointed as Principal in Shahganj, Public Inter College, Shahjang, Jaunpur (hereinafter referred to as the Institution) in the years 1976 after the death of the then Principal, Sri Ram Lakhan Misra, in a clear vacancy of a permanent basis. The institution is a recognised institution in accordance with the provisions of the U. P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921. The administration of the institu tion is run in accordance with the approval scheme of Administration, under Section 16 of the U. P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921. The U. P. Secondary Education Service Commission and Selection Board Act, 1982 (hereinafter referred to as 1982 Act) has superseded the provisions of U. P. intermediate Education Act, 1921 and the institution is within the purview of 1982 Act. 2. On 15tb January, 1990, the Committee of Management of the institution lodged an FIR against Sri Paras Nath Verma, respondent No. 2 in the present writ petition (hereinafter referred to as the Principal ). ID the FSR it was alleged that the Principal of the institution has forged the service 0 book of the one Ram Dhani, a retired peon of the institution. On the basis of the aforesaid report the Committee of Management of the institution on 14-1-1990 decided to hold that an enquiry into the charges against the Principal and appointed a sub-committee for holding that an enquiry into the alleged charges against the principal of-the institution. The Sub committee drew a charge-sheet which was sent to the principal and was served on the principal of the institution. The principal submitted his reply to the charges framed against him. It is alleged that the principal did not appear before the sub-committee as the stand of the principal was that one of personnel of the Sub Committee is prejudiced against the principal and he has contended that he is not likely to get fair enquiry from the Sub-Committee. For this reason he abstained himself from appearing before the Sub-Com mittee. The Sub-Committee holding enquiry submitted that its report on 7-3-1990. The meeting of the Committee of Management was convened on 14-3-1990 and the principal of the institution was informed to the place of the meeting. The information of the aforesaid meeting was also sent to the District Inspector of Schools by registered post. The Sub-Committee holding enquiry submitted that its report on 7-3-1990. The meeting of the Committee of Management was convened on 14-3-1990 and the principal of the institution was informed to the place of the meeting. The information of the aforesaid meeting was also sent to the District Inspector of Schools by registered post. The Committee of Manage ment in its meeting resolved that the services of the principal be terminated and a proposal be sent for approval to the District Inspector of Schools. Accordingly, along with a letter, the proposal seeking approval of termination of the services of the principal of the institution was sent to the District Inspector of Schools. The management also suspended the principal of the institution. The suspension was, however, not approved by the District Inspector of Schools, who directed, vide letter, dated 20-3-1990 to the Manager of the Institution, that Sri Paras Nath Verma, should be treated as Principal of the Institution and is emoluments etc. may be paid in accordance with law. The aforesaid order of the District Inspector of Schools was challenged by the Committee of Management by means of a writ petition being writ petition No. 10062 of 1990. The said Writ petition was disposed of by a direction of this Court, dated 6-4-1990 in the following language : ". . . . . . The Commission shall thereafter endeavour to dispose of the matter as expeditiously and possible keeping in view the fact that the institution is without a permanent principal these days. If the Commission fails to decide the matter within four months from the date of receipt of the papers, it will be open to Sri Varma, respondent No. 3, to approach this court may moans of a writ petition for issuing a proper direction. . . . . . " 3. In pursuance of the aforesaid direction the Sub-Committee constitu ted by the Commission, considered the matter at length and discussed all aspects of the matter including the documents relied upon by the both the sides and recorded a finding that the findings recorded by the Inquiry Sub- Committee is unilateral and has not taken into consideration the reply of the principal of the institution. The principal of the institution Sri Paras Nath Varma, was present in the institution on 17-1-1990 and further held that in the absence of proof and documents. The principal of the institution Sri Paras Nath Varma, was present in the institution on 17-1-1990 and further held that in the absence of proof and documents. the charges against the principal of the institution are not made out. All the records are with the clerk of the office and only Cheque Books and Pass Books are with Sri Varma. The audit of the institution has been completed from 20-9-1988 to 26-9- 1988 for the years 1987-1988. The principal of the institution has produced some extracts from the said audit report in his defence. It was obligatory on the part of the committee of the institution to have got the account of the institution audited before levelling the charges against the principal of the institution for embezzlement. There is absolutely no evidence for the charges framed against the principal. Only stress is on Charge No. i which has not been made out. The matter is still under investigation of the police and the same should be decided by a competent court. With the aforesaid conclusion, the Sub- Committee constituted by the commission submitted its report that the proposal for seeking approval of the dismissal of the services of the principal of the institution be disapproved. The Commission, vide its order, dated 5-10-1990, disapproved the proposal of termination of the principal of the institution. The said order was communicated by the commission to the District Inspector of Schools by letter, dated 6- 10-1990, copy whereof forward ed to the Manager of the institution. 4. The aforesaid order has been impugned in the present writ petition. 5. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner Sri P. K. Jain and the learned counsel appearing for the respondent Sri D. K. Sahai holding the brief on behalf of the Sri R. N. Singh. Nobody has appeared on behalf of the Commission. 6. The counsel for the petitioners has challenged the impugned order on the following grounds : (1) The Commission was not properly constituted as required under Section 4 of the 1982 Act, as such the order of the Commission was no order in the eye of law and is liable to be quashed on this ground alone. 6. The counsel for the petitioners has challenged the impugned order on the following grounds : (1) The Commission was not properly constituted as required under Section 4 of the 1982 Act, as such the order of the Commission was no order in the eye of law and is liable to be quashed on this ground alone. (2) The procedure of hearing the parties adopted by the Commission deprived the petitioners from an opportunity of meeting the submissions made by the principal of the institution and thereby the impugned order is in failure of principles of natural justice and is liable to be quashed on the said ground. (3) The Commission has committed manifest error apparent on the face of the record in passing the impugned order on the grounds which are wholly unsustainable in law and are contrary to the records. 7. The submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioners are being examined in the same seriatim in which they have been contended. First ground : 8. Section 4 of the 1982 Act provides for composition of the Com mission. The requirement of the aforesaid election is that the Commission shall consist of a Chairman and not less than six and not more than eight other members to be appointed by the State Government. The contention of the petitioners is that at the relevant time, the Commission constituted of less than six members and as such the Commission as required under the 1982 Act was not in existence, as a result of which the impugned order is ab initio void and without authority of law and cannot be said to be an order passed by the Commission under the 1982 Act. 9. Section 26 of the 1982 Act mandate that no act or proceeding of the Commission or the Board shall be deemed to be invalid merely on the ground of any vacancy or defect in the Constitution of the Commission or the Board. In view of the aforesaid provision, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that since the Commission did not come into existence, it cannot be termed as defect in the Constitution of the Commission. 10. The submission is patently misconceived. In view of the aforesaid provision, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that since the Commission did not come into existence, it cannot be termed as defect in the Constitution of the Commission. 10. The submission is patently misconceived. Section 26 has been enacted for saving the proceedings or acts of the commission or the Board on the ground of any technicality or lack of forum or any defect in the constitution of the Commission. The Commission having been less than six members at a time was only a defect in the Constitution of the Commission and Section 26 immunes the action and the proceedings of the Commission on the ground of defect in the constitution of the Commission. 11. Besides that in the present case, the petitioners cannot be permitted to raise the aforesaid grievance as the Commission in the present matter was acting under the direction of this court to decide the issue of approving or disapproving the proposal of termination of the services of the principal of the institution. The petitioners cannot be heard objecting to the decision of the commission as the direction was given by this Court in the writ petition filed by the petitioners themselves. The said direction was binding on the petitioners and they cannot be permitted to challenge the same. 12. The order passed by the Commission which has been impugned in the present writ petition does not show that the any objection regarding the constitution of the Commission was taken by the petitioner before the Com mission itself. The petitioner having acquiesced to the jurisdiction of the Commission, cannot be permitted to agitate the issue of the defect in the constitution of the Commission after the Commission has passed order in accordance with the direction of this Court. 13. In Dr. N. D. Tahiliani v. Dr. R. P. Misra and others, reported in 1987 UPLBEC page 361, a Division Bench of this Court while considering the language of Section 66 of the U. P. State Universities Act, 1973 which was in part materia with Section 26 of the 1982 Act, held : "from the definition of word quorum and the opinion expressed by Shackleton it is clear that quorum is a rule made by the body itself regulating its own procedure. Since the question of quorum is a matter of procedure and does not affect the merits of the case, the decision of the body is clearly protected by Section 66 of the Act. It cannot, therefore, be said that the decision taken in the meeting held on 26th of April, 1986 by the Board of Studies was not valid in Law. " 14. The first submission has been thus no merits and is accordingly rejected. Second Ground: 15. On second count, the grievance of the petitioner is that the commission heard the matter on two dates i. e. 10th and llth July, 1990. The commission heard the petitioner on 10th of July, 1990 and heard the principal of the institute Ion llth of July, 1990. The principal of the institution has filed certain documents, on which the commission has placed reliance, the copies of the aforesaid documents were not given to the petitioners and the petitioners could not reply to the documents filed by the principal of the institution as such the procedure adopted by the Commission violated the norm of fair hearing and principles of natural justice. 16. Section 21 of the 1982 Act mandates that "no teacher specified in the schedule shall be dismissed or removed from service. . . . . . nor he may be given notice of removal of from service by the management unless prior approval of the commission has been obtained". It is also not disputed that the teacher detailed in the schedule of the 1982 Act includes a principal of an intermediate college. 17. Earlier the Management had full hand in terminating the services of the teachers without any reservation. The managements were arbitrarily behaving and were exploiting the teaching class, taking note of the aforesaid situation, a provisions was made long back in U. P. Intermediate Education Act. 1921 which was part materia with the provision of Section 21 of the 1982 Act. The Legislature has intervened primarily to safeguard the interest of teachers from the arbitrary action of the management. The section has to be construed as to serve the cause of the teachers. However, for granting approval on the proposal of termination of the services of a teacher, the commission is required to hear the concerned teacher as well as also take into consideration the view point of the Management. No personal hearing is contemplated in these proceedings. The section has to be construed as to serve the cause of the teachers. However, for granting approval on the proposal of termination of the services of a teacher, the commission is required to hear the concerned teacher as well as also take into consideration the view point of the Management. No personal hearing is contemplated in these proceedings. The view point of the Management and the principal can be examined on the basis of the documents submitted by both of them. The Commission is not supposed to act as a court and comply with the strict procedure of providing opportunity of hearing and cross-examination to the concerned parties. Over ail purposes of the enactment is that if on the face of the record available, the Commission is satisfied that the proposal to terminate the services of a teacher by the Management is either illegal, contrary to law or contrary to record, the Commission can disapprove the proposal, consequence of (his is that the matter again is writ large before the Committee of Management consider again if necessary in the light of the observation made by the Commission for disapproving the proposal. The argument of strict observance of the principles of natural justice is not attracted. The procedure adopted by the Commission cannot be termed as unfair. It is settled proposition of law that no strait jacket is prescribed for the observation of the principles of natural justice. No hard and fast rule can be laid down for testing the question as to whether the principles of natural justice has been complied with or not. It depends on the nature of the proceedings and the procedure adopted by the Court or Tribunal. In the present case, the commission was in effect examining the record placed before it by the Management of the institution and the record placed by the principal of the institution. The entire record relating to the termination of the services of the principal of the institution was before the Commission and on examining the entire records, the commission arrived on the findings that no charge has been made out against the principal of the institution and the mandatory procedure for terminating the services of the teacher has not been complied with the principal concerned has not been afforded opportunity to defend ; the commission has disapproved the proposal. The merits of the Commissions order is to be considered in the third grounds submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 18. The petitioners have also not taken any objection regarding the procedure adopted by the Commission in the grounds of writ petition nor any grievance has been made that the petitioner was in any way prejudiced by non-supply of the copies of the documents filed by the principal of the institution before the Commission or the said documents were non existent. In view of the above, I am of the view that the second submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioners has also no substance. The impugned order cannot be held to be bad on the court of being passed in violation oi the principles of natural justice on the ground that of the order being in violation of the principles of fair play. 19. In Managing Director, EC1l, Hyderabad v. B. Karunkar reported in JT 1993 (6) SC 1, the Court held : ". . . . The theory of reasonable opportunity and the principles of natural justice have been evolved to uphold the rule of law and to assist the individual to vindicate his just rights. They are not indications to be invoked nor rites to be performed on all and sundry occasions. Whether in fact, prejudice has been caused to be the employee or not on account of the denial to him of the report, has to be considered on the facts and circumstances of each case. . . . . " 20. The petitioner has failed to demonstrate that in what manner the petitioner was prejudiced by the procedure adopted by |the commission. However, the decision on third ground will clinch the issue against petitioner. Third ground : 21. For examining the third submission, it is necessary to refer to the grounds on which the commission has disapproved the proposal of termina tion of the services of the principal of the institution. 22. On the forefront, the commission found that the proposal for termination of the services of the principal of the institution suffers from following infirmities in law :- (i) The charge-sheet has been submitted to the principal of the institution by the Manager of the Institution whereas the charge-sheet could have been served only by the Inquiry Sub-Committee. 22. On the forefront, the commission found that the proposal for termination of the services of the principal of the institution suffers from following infirmities in law :- (i) The charge-sheet has been submitted to the principal of the institution by the Manager of the Institution whereas the charge-sheet could have been served only by the Inquiry Sub-Committee. The non-Submission of the charge-sheet by the Inquiry Sub-Committee, has clearly violated the mandatory provisions of Regulation 36 (1) (Chapter III) of the Regulations framed under the U, P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921. (ii) The punishment has been proposed in the inquiry report itself which is in violation of the mandatory provisions of Regulation 36 (1) (Chapter III) of the Regulations framed under the U. P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921. The requirement of the aforesaid regulation is that the inquiry officer will submit a separate recommendation regarding the proposed punishment. (iii) The principal of the institution has not been served with a show cause notice as required by the mandatory provision of Regulation 37 (Chapter III) framed under the U. P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921. (iv) The Committee of management has recommended for the dismissal of the services of the principal of the institution whereas under the provisions of the U. P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921, there is no punishment contemplated as dismissal from service. 23. Before examining the merits of the charges found not to be proved by the Commission, the legal infirmities found by the commission, in the pro posal of the Management for terminating the services of the Principal of the Institution require a consideration. 24. So far as objection No. (iv) is concerned, it is too technical an objection to be sustained as the words removal from service and dismissal from service are almost part materia in broad sense through in strict sense, there are different consequences of a person having been removed from service and a person having been dismissed from service. In the present context, it the said distinction is not relevant. The language used in proposal for dismissal of the services of the principal of the institution actually meant removal from services as that is the punishment provided under the 1982 Act and the said proposal has been disapproved on the grounds of the using wrong words. In the present context, it the said distinction is not relevant. The language used in proposal for dismissal of the services of the principal of the institution actually meant removal from services as that is the punishment provided under the 1982 Act and the said proposal has been disapproved on the grounds of the using wrong words. The substance of the order is to be taken note of in the light of the provisions of the Act 1982. 25. Likewise the second objection pointed out by the commission in the impugned order providing that the report of the Inquiry Sub-Committee and the proposal for punishment should have been forwarded separately, can hardly be a ground for refusing to grant approval as assuming the same to be a requirement of the regulation, the said requirements was only directly i nature and could not have been passed into service for disapproving the proposal for termination of service of the principal of the institution. 26. Now legal infirmities pointed out by the Commission on points No. (i) and (iii) require consideration. 27. Regulations have been framed under the U. P. Intermediate Educa tion Act, 1921 providing conditions of service of the teachers and employees of the institution up to the intermediate. The aforesaid regulations are also applicable to the employees now governed by the provisions of 1982 Act. The provisions of the U P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921 and the regulations framed thereunder stand superseded only to the extent where contrary provi sion has been made in the 1982 Act or the rules framed thereunder. It is not disputed between the parties that the aforesaid regulations are applicable in the present case. Chapter III of the Regulations provide for service conditions of the teachers and employees governed by 1982 Act. Regulation 35 of Chapter III provides that if a complaint or an adverse report is received by the committee of management of the institution against a teacher or a principal of the institution, the Manager, in the case of a teacher and in the case of the principal of the institution, a sub-committee will be constituted to require into the charges and submit the report. In the aforesaid background, a sub-com mittee was constituted by the Manager of the institution to enquire into the charges levelled against the principal of the institution and submit the report. 28. In the aforesaid background, a sub-com mittee was constituted by the Manager of the institution to enquire into the charges levelled against the principal of the institution and submit the report. 28. Regulation 36 of the Regulations provides : "the grounds on which it is proposed to take action shall be reduced in the form of a definite charge or charges which shall be commu nicated to the employees charged and which shall be so clear and precise as to give sufficient indication to the charged employee of the facts and circumstances of against him. The inquiring authority conducting the enquiry may also, separately from these proceedings, make his own recommendation regarding the punishment to be imposed on the employee. " 29. The language of Regulation 35 read with Regulation 36 makes it clear that it is obligation in the case of the allegations against a principal, that a sub-committee should be constituted to enquire into the charge. The said sub-committee is required to reduce in the form of a definite charge or charges the grounds on which it proposes to hold enquiry. So it is the duty of the sub-committee to frame charge and the Manager of the institution has no such power. 30. The charge-sheet served on the principal of the institution has been filed by the petitioners as Annexure 2 to the Writ Petition. The Manager of the institution, vide letter dated 22-1-1990 addressed to the principal of the institution informed that following charges are levelled against him. He was asked to submit his explanation. Thereafter the charges are enumerated and at the end, the charge-sheet has been signed by the Manager of the institution, Namely, Sri Ashok Kumar Sinha, copy of the charge-sheet had been forwarded to the inquiry sub-committee constituted for holding enquiry into charges levelled against suspended principal Sri Paras Nath Varma. The aforesaid document clinchingly established that the charge-sheet was neither framed nor served by the inquiry sub-committee. The Manager of the institution had no authority to frame charges or serve the same as under; the mandatory provisions of Regulations 35 and 36. He had no authority to do either. This issue stands concluded by a Division Bench decision of this court in Civil Misc. The Manager of the institution had no authority to frame charges or serve the same as under; the mandatory provisions of Regulations 35 and 36. He had no authority to do either. This issue stands concluded by a Division Bench decision of this court in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 9962 of 1988 Committee of Management S. B. Inter College, lahua Kalan, district Azamgarh v U. P. Secondary Education Service Commis sion, Allahabad and others, decided on 10th of October, 1988 where in a Division Bench of this Court upheld the orders of the Commission which dis approved the proposal for termination of services of the principal of the college on the ground that the charge-sheet was served by the Manager of the institution and not by the sub-committee, The Division Bench held : ". . . . . . . . It is thus clear that the charge-sheet had not been given by the sub-committee. This is enough to sustain the impugned order. " 31. I am Abound by the aforesaid decision and the impugned order of the Commission can be sustained only on this ground alone and no other ground used be examined in the matter. 32. The counsel for the petitioner has also tried to submit that the charge-sheet was actually framed by the Committee of Management but it was served by the Manager which was permissible in law. It has also been sub mitted on behalf of the petitioners counsel that the Regulations 35 to 37 wore only directory in nature and the entire proceedings of the inquiry sub-com mittee cannot be defeated merely on the ground of wrong serving of the charge-sheet by the Manager. The principal of the institution has been failed to demonstrate that he has been prejudiced by serving the charge-sheet by the Manager instead by the Inquiry Sub-Committee. 33. f he learned counsel for the petitioners has placed reliance on a Full Bench decision of this court in Hindu National School Manager Trust Society, Dehra Dun and another v. Deputy Director of Education, Pauri Garhwal, Region Pauri and others, 1980 UPLBEC 175. 33. f he learned counsel for the petitioners has placed reliance on a Full Bench decision of this court in Hindu National School Manager Trust Society, Dehra Dun and another v. Deputy Director of Education, Pauri Garhwal, Region Pauri and others, 1980 UPLBEC 175. The Full Bench in this case was considering a situation where under Regulation 35 in regard to the com plaint against a teacher instead of entrusting the enquiry to the Head Master or Principal or Manager of the institution, the Committee of Management decided to form a sub-committee to hold the enquiry. The Full Bench in the aforesaid facts held that the interest of the teacher concerned was more safe guarded if a small sub-committee hold an inquiry instead of an individual like the principal or the manager of the institution and the interest of the teacher is in no way prejudiced, by appointing a sub-committee, instead of entrusting the enquiry to the Principal or the Headmaster of the institution. In the aforesaid facts, it was observed that Regulations 35 to that extent cannot be read as mandatory provisions for vitiating the enquiry held by the sub- committee instead of principal or the Manager of the institution. In Ramesh Chandra Mishra v U. P. Secondary Education Service Commission, Allahabad and others, (1990) 1 UPLBEC 488, a Division Bench of this court distinguished the aforesaid Full Bench decision and held that the provisions oi Regulations 35 and 36 are mandatory in character, and if in the matter of constitution of a sub-committee the requirements of Regulations 35 and 36 has be not been followed, the entire proceedings initiated against the teacher must vitiate. In paragraphs 291 of the aforesaid decision, the Division Bench considered the aforesaid Full Bench decision and held that in the aforesaid Full Bench decision, the Full Bench held that Regulation 33 is mandatory to the extent that an enquiry has to be held on the basis of the charges framed against a teacher though it is of no consequence whether it is done by the named officer or by a sub-committee. Then relying on the decision of the Honble Supreme Court in Marathawada University v. Sashrao Balwant Rao Chavan, JT 1989 (2) SO 276, the Division Bench held ; "in our opinion the above principle also applies to the present case. There is mandate that charge against principal have to be enquired into. Then relying on the decision of the Honble Supreme Court in Marathawada University v. Sashrao Balwant Rao Chavan, JT 1989 (2) SO 276, the Division Bench held ; "in our opinion the above principle also applies to the present case. There is mandate that charge against principal have to be enquired into. This can be done only a sub-committee, as there is no other alternative available to the Managing Committee to exercise its discretion as it could do in the case of a teacher. The power to enquire can only be delegated to a sub-committee viz. a com mittee consisting of member of the Management Committee. . . . . ". The Division Bench held that the provision of Regulations 35 and 36 are of mandatory character and violation of the aforesaid regulations vitiated the entire proceedings. In this case, the Division Bench held that the committee was not properly constituted as required by the Regulations and on this ground quashed the order of the commission approving the termination of service of the principal of the college. 34. In view of the above decision, I am of the view that the ration of the full bench decision relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners has no application in the present case. The regulations thus provide for safeguarding the interest of the teacher in the matter of the inflicting punish ment to him. They have been engrafted to ensure proper enquiry meeting the requirement of the principles of natural justice and are of mandatory character, any violation of the aforesaid mandatory provision is liable to result in vitiat ing the entire disciplinary proceedings against the principal of the College. I am fortified in my view by a Division Bench decision of this court in the case of Committee of Management. S- B. Inter College, Lahua Kalan district Azamgarh (supra ). I am fortified in my view by a Division Bench decision of this court in the case of Committee of Management. S- B. Inter College, Lahua Kalan district Azamgarh (supra ). Though on a reading of Regulation 36 it is clear that the inquiry sub-committee should submit a separate proposal for punishment, but to that extent the requirement of the aforesaid provisions can be held to be directly and in case the inquiry sub- committed proposes the punishment along with its report this itself may not result in vitiating the entire proceedings against the principal of the institution unless it is demonstrated that the principal of the institution was prejudiced in any manner by submitting the recommen dation for punishment along with the enquiry report and on this ground I have already held that the impugned order of the Commission cannot be upheld to that extent. Since the Manager of the institution has no authority to either frame charge-sheet or serve it, the entire proceedings of the inquiry Sub-Committee in the present case, stand vitiated and they were in violation of mandatory provisions of the Regulation 36 regarding framing and serving of the charge-sheet by the inquiry sub-committee. 35. The third objection on the basis of which the Commission has held that the proceedings to be vitiated in law, is non-compliance of the Regula tion 37 of Chapter III of the Regulations, referred to above. Regulation 37 provide procedure after submission of the report by the Inquiry Sub-Committee. The said provisions is being quoted below : "37. Soon after the report of the proceedings and recommendation from the inquiring authority are received, the Committee of Management shall after notice to employee meet to consider the report of the proceeding and recommendation made and take decision on the case. The employee shall be allowed, if he so desires, to appear before the committee in parson to state his case and answer any question that may be put to him by any member present at the meeting. The committee shall then send a complete report together with all connected papers to the Inspector or Regional Inspector, as the case may be, for approval of action proposed by it. " 36. The committee shall then send a complete report together with all connected papers to the Inspector or Regional Inspector, as the case may be, for approval of action proposed by it. " 36. The aforesaid provision has been enacted to provide an opportunity to the concerned teacher to have his say before the Committee of Management against the report of the Inquiry Sub-Committee and for compliance of the aforesaid provision, it is obligatory that the Committee of Management while giving notice to the employee concerned to be present before the Committee of management and be heard in the matter, should also furnish the copy of the inquiry report to the concerned teacher or principal so that he may put his point of view and point out the fallacious or inaccuracies in the inquiry report. In the form of Regulation 37, the safeguards provided under Article 311 (2) of the Constitution of India has bean engrafted. In Ram Kumar Dixit v. Dy. Director of Education, Bareilly, 1980 UPLBEC 110, a Division Bench of this court, has held that the procedure provided in Regula tions 36 and 37 of the Regulations framed under the U- P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921 are of mandatory character and violation thereof vitiates the proposal of punishment. 37. Learned counsel for the respondent has placed reliance on (1) (1991) 2 UPLBEC 1160. Kanhaya Lal v. District Inspector of Schools, Bareilly and others, and (ii) JT 1993 (5) SC 1, Managing Director ECTL, Hyderabad v. B. Karaunakar, for contending that since the inquiry sub-committee and the disciplinary authority were two different bodies, it was obligatory on the Com mittee of Management, which was the disciplinary authority, to forward the report of the inquiry sub-committee providing an opportunity to the principal of the institution to have his say on such report. 38. In Kanhaiya Lals case (supra), this court held : "the next question to be considered is whether the order impugned in the writ petition is vitiated for non-compliance of the principles of natural justice. It is not disputed before me that the petitioner was not afforded opportunity of hearing by the Committee of Management and that the report, if any, of the Enquiry Com mittee was not supplied to him, not any evidence which could be read against him was made available to him. It is not disputed before me that the petitioner was not afforded opportunity of hearing by the Committee of Management and that the report, if any, of the Enquiry Com mittee was not supplied to him, not any evidence which could be read against him was made available to him. This in my consi dered view has violated the principles of natural justice besides the procedural safeguard contemplated by Regulation 37 of Chapter III of the Regulations made under the Act. The action on the part of the respondents was not in consonance with the principles. of fair play. As such the impugned order is liable to bo quashed on this ground as well. " 39. In the case of Managing Director. ECTL, Hyderabad (supra) the Constitution Bench of the Honble Supreme Court held i "hence it has to be held that when the Inequity Officer is not the disciplinary authority, the delinquent employee has a right to receive a copy of the inquiry officers report before the disciplinary authority arrives at its conclusion with regard to the guilt or innocence of the employee with regard to the charges levelled against him. That right is a part of the employees right to defend himself against the charges levelled against him. A denial of the inquiry officers report before the disciplinary authority takes its decision on the charges, is a denial of reasonable opportunity to the employee to prove his innocence and is a breach of the principles of natural justice. " 40. In the present case, the notice which was sent to the principal of the institution by the Committee of Management for considering the report of the Inquiry sub-committee has not been filed with the writ petition. In para graphs 17 of the writ petition only this much has been stated that the meeting of the Committee of Management was convened for I4th of March, 1990 for considering the recommendations of the inquiry sub-committee and Sri Paras Nath Verma, was also conveyed the date and place of the meeting Committee of Management and was afforded an opportunity to present case finally before the Committee of Management on 14th of March, 1990 The said statement has, however, been denied in the counter-affidavit but that is out of context. The finding of the commission that the report of the inquiry sub-committee was not forwarded to the principal of the institution by the Committee of Management before considering his submission stands un-controverted. 41. I am of the view, that in view of the decisions cited above for complying with the requirements of Regulation 37, it is obligatory on the Committee of Management also to forward the report of the inquiry sub committee for affording the principal of the teacher concerned, an opportunity to have his way in the matter. The said requirement should be read in under Regulation 37 which is of mandatory character. I am also clearly of the view that for non-compliance of the supply of the report of the Inquiry Sub-Committee, the principal of the institution was deprived of proper opportunity of defending himself before the Committee of Management and the proposal of terminating the services passed by the Committee of Management without affording such an opportunity to the principal of the institution is in violation of Regulation 37 of the Regulations. The order of the Commission is also sustained on the aforesaid ground. 42. The third point concerns the merits of the order of the Commission wherein the Commission has examined each and every charge against the principal of the institution and on a detailed consideration of the evidence available on record has held that the charges against the principal of the institution are not made out. I have scrutinised the impugned order of the commission on merits also. There may be some fallacies in the order on the court; and may suffer from some incorrect approach, but taking over all situation of the matter, I am not inclined to interfere in the impugned order in exercise of my discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, as by and large I am satisfied that the order of the commission on merits i. e. the charges against the principal are not made out over all it is also just and proper, technicalities apart and it does not call for any inter ference by this court under Articles 226 of the Constitution of India. This is in addition to what I have said earlier that the order of the commission deserves to be sustained on points No. (i) and (iii) the legal infirmities pointed out by the commission in the proposal of the Committee of Management seeking approval of the termination of the services of the principal of the institution. 43. Lastly, it may be mentioned that the learned counsel for the peti tioners has contended that the principal of the institution respondent No. 3, has filed as a false certificate Annexure T to his counter- affidavit. Respon dent No. 3 was afforded an opportunity to file the original of the aforesaid document which respondents No. 3 has filed and looking into the original. I am satisfied that the allegations that Annexure T to the counter-affidavit is a forged document is incorrect. The original document tallies with the Annexure 1. There is HO inaccuracy in Annexure !. The allegation of forgery made by the petitioners is baseless. 44. The Counsel for the respondent No. 2 has also submitted that the petitioners in the present matter no locus standi for filing the writ petition as the term of the Committee of Management, which filed the writ petition, has expired and new Committee of Management has been elected regarding which a dispute is going on in another writ petition. In view of the findings recorded above, I am not inclined to entertain this objection. 45. Accordingly, I am of the view of that the points urged by the peti tioners have no substance. 46. However, before parting with the case, I would like to mention that the Committee of Management, Shahganj, Public Inter College, Shahganj, Jaunpur, the petitioner in the present writ petition, had earlier filed a writ petition in this court being Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 10062 of 1990 against the order of the District Inspector of Schools, Jaunpur dated 20-3-1990 directing the Management to treat Sri Paras Nath Vanna as principal of the Institution and pay his emoluments etc. The District Inspector pi Schools, vide his order dated 20-3-1990 held that the order of suspension, passed against Sri Paras Nath Varma having not been approved by tde District Inspector of Schools, automatically ceases to be in operation in view of the Section 16-G (7) of the U. P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921. The District Inspector pi Schools, vide his order dated 20-3-1990 held that the order of suspension, passed against Sri Paras Nath Varma having not been approved by tde District Inspector of Schools, automatically ceases to be in operation in view of the Section 16-G (7) of the U. P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921. The afore said order also directed that Sri Paras Nath Vartna should be given charge of his post and he should be paid his salary. By the aforesaid orders the District Inspector of Schools expressed his inability to forward the resolution of the Committee of Management proposing to terminate the services of Sri Paras Nath Varma on the ground that the resolution was not accompanied by required documents as per Rules. , 47. A Division Bench of this Court, decided the aforesaid writ petition on 6-4-1990 directing that the Committee of Management will remove the defects, if any, and submit the papers again to the District Inspector of Schools, within ten days from the date of the order. The District Inspector of Schools shall forward the papers to the Commission within a week from the date of receipt of the papers. The Commission shall thereafter endeavour to dispose of the matter as expeditiously as possible. It was, however, also observed in the judgment that the Management shall pay to Sri Varma his entire salary and emoluments etc. as a principal with effect from 15th January, 1990 but it is open to the Management either to take work or not to take work from Sri Paras Nath Varma. This order exhausted itself, as soon as the Commission passed the order dated 5-10-1990 impugned in this petition. In the present matter at the time of passing of the interim order, it was disputed as to whether Sri Paras Nath Varma, is working in the institution or not. On 29th of December, 1990,1 directed that if respondent No. 1 (Sri Varma) is functioning as principal, he will continue* to function but he will not be permit ted to function on the basis of the order passed on 29-12-1990. Thus it is not clear as to whether the respondent No. 2 functioned as a principal of the college or not for five long years in the institution i. e. during pendency of this petition or he has only been getting salary as per orders of the Division Bench. Thus it is not clear as to whether the respondent No. 2 functioned as a principal of the college or not for five long years in the institution i. e. during pendency of this petition or he has only been getting salary as per orders of the Division Bench. The present writ petition filed by the Committee of Management has finally been dismissed today. Under the U. P. High Schools and Intermediate College (Payment of Salaries of Teachers and Other Employees) Act, 1971. The liability of making payment of salary of the principal, teachers and other employees of the colleges is on the State Government and the salaries of the teachers, principal and other employees working in the aforesaid institution are now paid by the State Government. For all these five years, the State exchequer has been burdened for paying the salary of Sri Paras Nath Varma, respondent No. 2. Section 10 of the aforesaid Act is relevant for the purposes and the same is reproduced herein below : 10. Liability in respect of salary.- (I) The State Government shall be liable for payment of salaries of teachers and employees of every institution due in respect of any period after March 31, 1971. (2) The State Government may recover any amount in respect of which any liability is incurred by it under sub-section (1) by attachment of the income from the property belonging to or vested in the institution as if that amount were an error of land revenue due from the institution. (3) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to derogate from the liability of the institution for any such dues to the teacher or employee. " 48. The aforesaid section authorises the State Government to recover the amount paid towards salary of a teacher from the Management, if for the default of the Management, the State Government bad to pay the salary of the teacher concerned There was absolutely no justification for not permit ting respondent No. 2 from working in the institution on the basis of the order passed by this court in earlier writ petition, referred to above. The District inspector of Schools, Jaunpur is accordingly directed to hold enquiry in the matter and if ultimately it is found that respondent No. 2 has not been permitted to work during the pendency of the present writ petition, he will forward the necessary papers to the State Government or to the authority to whom the powers are delegated for recovering the amount of salary paid to respondent No. 2 by the State Exchequer from the Committee of Management. 49. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed with costs with the afore said direction. The interim order passed by this Court is vacated forthwith. Petition dismissed. .