JUDGMENT - R.G. VAIDYANATHA, J. :---This is a petition directed against the Order dated 13-2-1989 in Criminal Revision Application No. 1 of 1989 on the file of the learned Sessions Judge, Nasik. Heard both the sides. 2. The few facts which are necessary for disposal of this petition are as follows : The first respondent is the divorced wife of the petitioner. When the marriage was in force, the wife filed an application under section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure claiming maintenance from her husband. The application came to be allowed by granting maintenance of Rs. 225/- per month to the wife. Subsequently, the wife filed an application before the learned Magistrate for executing the Order of maintenance in Miscellaneous Application No. 196 of 1988. At that time, the husband filed objection stating that he has divorced his wife on 11-8-1987 and in view of the new law, the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"), the wife is not entitled to claim maintenance and therefore, the execution petition is not maintainable. After hearing both the sides, the learned Magistrate rejected the husband's application and ordered issue of warrant. Being aggrieved by that Order, the petitioner wife went in Revision before the learned Sessions Judge. He moved an application for stay of the execution of the proceedings. The learned Sessions Judge granted conditional stay by directing that the petitioner should deposit Rs. 5,000/- immediately and he must furnish security for the balance amount within one month. Being aggrieved by that Order, the husband has come up with the present petition. 3. The learned Counsel for the petitioner contended that after the new Act came into force, the proceedings under section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure are not maintainable in case of Muslim women and whatever decree or order obtained by the wife against the former husband cannot be executed or enforced. It is therefore argued that the execution application should be dismissed. On the other hand, the learned Counsel for the first respondent contended that the order of maintenance obtained earlier by the wife is valid till the date of divorce and the Iddat period thereafter and that the said vested right cannot be taken away by that new Act which is only prospective in operation. On the other hand, the learned Counsel for the first respondent contended that the order of maintenance obtained earlier by the wife is valid till the date of divorce and the Iddat period thereafter and that the said vested right cannot be taken away by that new Act which is only prospective in operation. It is well known that after the judgment of the Apex Court in Shah Bano's case, there was some agitation by the Muslims and in that connection a new Act came on the statute book which is called herein as "the Act". The very name of the Act shows that it gives protection only on divorce. Therefore, the Act makes no provision about the right of a Muslim woman to take maintenance from the husband till the date of divorce. It only provides certain rights after the divorce comes into force. In the present case, the divorce was effected on 11-8-1987. It may be after the date of divorce, the new Act applies and subsequently, the wife will not be able to claim the maintenance except for the Iddat period after 11-8-1987 but the Act nowhere provides as to what the wife is entitled prior to the date of divorce. Since the Act provides for right on divorce, it must necessarily mean that the Act does not make any provision for any right upto the date of divorce or prior to the divorce. 4. Section 3 of the Act provides as to what should happen after the divorce namely that the wife is entitled to get maintenance for the period of Iddat and some other provisions are made. Section starts with a non-obstante clause "Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law, for the time being in force." It is significant to note that the section does not start with a non-obstante clause "notwithstanding anything contained in decree or order of a Court." In many social enactments such an non-obstante clause is provided like notwithstanding any decree or order of a Court. But in section 3 of the Act such a clause is not there. Therefore, we can hold that section 3 does not apply if there is a decree or order of a Court granting maintenance to a wife earlier. 5. The learned Counsel for the petitioner invited my attention to (Mohammad Yameed v. State of U.P.)1, 1992 Cri.L.J. 1804. But in section 3 of the Act such a clause is not there. Therefore, we can hold that section 3 does not apply if there is a decree or order of a Court granting maintenance to a wife earlier. 5. The learned Counsel for the petitioner invited my attention to (Mohammad Yameed v. State of U.P.)1, 1992 Cri.L.J. 1804. In that decision it is observed that a Muslim woman cannot maintain her application for maintenance under section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It is further observed that even she cannot get execution of the Order earlier obtained by her. No doubt this decision supports partly the argument of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that even if there is an earlier order in favour of the wife it cannot be enforced or executed after the Act came into force. I have already shown how the Act is prospective in nature since it does not provide anything about decrees or orders passed earlier. In the very nature of things all laws are presumed to be prospective in nature unless there is a specific provision in the Act. With great respect I am unable to subscribe to the said view. On the other hand the preponderance of decision is in favour of the view I have taken namely that the Act is prospective in nature and does not apply to any decree or order obtained prior to Act coming into force. 6. In A.I.R. 1988 Gujarat 141, (A.A. Abdulla v. A.B. Mohmuna Saiyadbhai)2, it has been clearly held that the new Act does not take away the earlier order or decree passed by a Court under section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Similar view is taken in A.I.R. 1989 Gauhati 24, (Idris Ali v. Ramesha Khathun)3, where also it has been clearly ruled that any order obtained under section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure prior to the Act coming into effect is not taken away by the new Act. Similar views are rendered by the Karnataka High Court in 1991 Cr.L.J. 247, (Abdul Khader v. Razia Begum)4. By Andhra Pradesh High Court in 1990 Cr.L.J. 96 (M.A. Hameed v. Arif Jan)5, High Court of Punjab and Haryana High Court in 1989 Cr. L.J. 1519 (Smt. Hazran v. Abdul Rehman)6, and one more decision of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in 1993 Cr. By Andhra Pradesh High Court in 1990 Cr.L.J. 96 (M.A. Hameed v. Arif Jan)5, High Court of Punjab and Haryana High Court in 1989 Cr. L.J. 1519 (Smt. Hazran v. Abdul Rehman)6, and one more decision of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in 1993 Cr. L.J. 3690 (Shaikh Raj Mohammed v. Smt. Shaikh Ameena Bee)7. In all these decisions, there is a clear pronouncement of law that the Act in question is prospective in operation and it does not take away or nulify earlier order obtained by wife under section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 7. In view of the above reasoning I have to hold that the order of maintenance obtained by the wife is valid and can be executed but however, its execution cannot be indefinitely but only till the date of divorce viz. 11-8-1987 in view of the provisions of the Act. The wife is only entitled to further maintenance for only the Iddat period after the date of divorce. The learned Counsel for the petitioner made a grievance about the correctness of the amount claimed by the respondent. According to her, the amount calculated is incorrect. In my view, this is a matter which the learned Magistrate can decide and find out as to what exactly, the amount is due to the wife from the husband as per the order of maintenance till 11-8-1987 and for a period of three months thereafter as Iddat period. The husband is granted two months time from today to make the payment. 8. In the result, the petition is dismissed. However, the learned Magistrate shall calculate the correct amount due to the wife in the light of the observations made in this order and the husband is granted two months time from today to make payment. The petitioner is directed to pay Rs. 500/- as costs of this proceeding to the first respondent. Petition dismissed. *****