Judgment (1.) M. C. Agarwal, J. In this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioners pray for a writ of certiorari to quash an order of dispossession in Form 'd' under the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Rules, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Rules') and also a writ of prohibition prohibiting the respondent Nos. 3 and 4 from taking any steps to dispossess the petitioners from the accommodation in dispute, i.e. building No. 24/34 Mahatama Gandhi Marg, Civil Lines, Allahabad. (2.) THE petitioners are the tenant occupants of the said building and respondent No. 4 is the owner landlord. Respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3 are the public functionaries, i e., State Government officers acting under the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (herein after referred to as 'the Act'). Counter and rejoinder affidavits have been exchanged between the petitioners and respondent No. 4. The learned Standing Counsel Sri R. D. Gupta stated that the State authorities do not have any interest in this litigation between the tenant and the landlord and, therefore, they would not contest the writ petition. The matter has been argued at length between the petitioners and the respondent No. 4 and, therefore, I propose to dispose of this writ petition finally at the stage of admission itself. (3.) THE petitioners are in actual physical possession of the aforesaid property which is being used for commercial purposes. It was initially taken or rent by Sheo Bux Roy, the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners, some where in the year 1937 and, at present, they are in occupation thereof and business under the name and style of M/s. B. N. Rama and Company is being carried on in the said premises. Somewhere in the year 1976, Ganpat Roy, the father of the petitioner No. 2, Ramesh Roy, had taken his son-in-law Swarup Kailash as a partner and started carrying on the business in a portion of the said business premises in the name and style of M/s. B. N. Rama and Company (Textitles). Somewhere in the year 1976, Ganpat Roy, the father of the petitioner No. 2, Ramesh Roy, had taken his son-in-law Swarup Kailash as a partner and started carrying on the business in a portion of the said business premises in the name and style of M/s. B. N. Rama and Company (Textitles). (4.) THE Rent Control and Eviction Officer by an order dated 18th November, 1981, declared the said premises to have fallen vacant within the meaning of Section 12 of the Act, as the said Ganpat Roy (sic) allowed the building to be occupied by the said Swarup Kailash, who was not a member of his family. The petitioners challenged the said order by filing a writ petition in this Court. The writ petition was dismissed on the view that it was not maintainable. The petitioners then filed a Special Leave petition before the Hon'ble Supreme Court and by order dated 29th March, 1985, the Hon'bie Supreme Court directed this Court to re-hear the writ petition filed by the petitioners on merits. The Hon'ble Supreme Court further said that pending disposal of the writ petition before the High Court, there shall be a stay of further proceedings in respect of allotment of the premises in question and the petitioners shall not be dispossessed therefrom. The writ petition was, ultimately, allowed by this Court vide order dated 21st September, 1992, and the order declaring the premises to have fallen vacant was quashed. The landlord respondent No. 4 then approached the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 574 of 1993 and by judgment dated 5th January, 1995, the Hon'ble Supreme Court allowed the landlord's appeal and setting aside this Court's order, the Hon'ble Supreme Court restored the order passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the last ordered as follows in para 29 of its order : - "29. However, respondents shall not be evicted from the premises in question upto 30th June, 1995 if they file usual undertaking before this Court within four weeks from today. "In pursuance of the judgment dated 5th January, 1995, a decree was prepared by the Hon'ble Supreme Court which stated as under : "The Appeal above mentioned being called on for hearing before this Court on the 30th day November, 1994. "In pursuance of the judgment dated 5th January, 1995, a decree was prepared by the Hon'ble Supreme Court which stated as under : "The Appeal above mentioned being called on for hearing before this Court on the 30th day November, 1994. Upon perusing the record and hearing counsel for the appearing parties above mentioned, the Court took time to consider its judgment and the appeal being called on for judgment on the 5th day of January, 1995, this Court doth in allowing the appeal order: (1) That the Judgment and order dated 21st September, 1992 of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 14310 of 1981 be and is hereby set aside and instead the Orders dated 13th August, 1981 and 18th November, 1981 of Court of A. D. M. (Civil Defence) Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Allahabad in Case No. 194/81 be and are hereby restored ; (2) That the Respondent Nos. 5 to 19 herein shall not be evicted from the premises in question upto 30th June, 1995 subject to their filing in this Court an undertaking within four weeks from this the 5th day of January, 1995 to the following effect; (i) That the Tenants/respondent Nos. 5 to 19 herein shall not induct any other person in the suit premises and shall handover vacant and peaceful possession of the said premises to the Landlord/appellant/herein on or before the 30th June, 1995. (ii) That the Tenants/respondent Nos. 5 to 19 herein shall pay to the Landlord Respondent herein arrears of rent, if any, within one month from this the 5th day of January, 1995 and shall pay to the Landlord/appellant herein future compensation for the use and occupation of the suit premises month by month before the 10th of every month. (3) That in the event of the Respondents Nos. 5 to 19 herein failing to comply with any one or more of the conditions stated above or if the undertaking is not filed as required within the stipulated time the decree for eviction shall become executable forthwith: (4) That there shall be no order as to costs of this appeal in this Court; And this court doth further order that this order be punctually observed and carried into execution by all concerned. " (5.) IN pursuance of the aforesaid decree, the Additional District Magistrate (Civil Supplies) acting as the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Allahabad, issued an order dated 26th April, 1995 in Form 'd' directing the respondent No. 3 to evict the petitioners within 24 hours and deliver possession of the premises to Sri Harish Tandon, respondent No. 4. The said order reads as under: "form d Officer in charge of the police station, Civil Lines, Allahabad. Whereas Shri Sampat Roy and others are in unauthorised occupation of the building described below despite service of order (decree) of Hon'ble Supreme Court of India dated 5-1-1995, they have failed to vacate and deliver possession of the same to landlord. (2) Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers under sub-section (3) of Section 18 of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, I, S. N. Pandey, A. D. M. (Civil Supplies) R. C. and B. O., Allahabad, hereby order that the said Shri Sampat Roy and others and every person claiming through him be evicted as far as possible within 24 hours of the receipt of this order from the said building by using such force or breaking open the locks and doors as may be necessary and possession over the same be delivered to the landlord Sri Harish Tandon. (3) The Station Officer shall submit the compliance report by 9-4-1995 If any specific property is found in the building and same is not taken possession of by the owner thereof, the Section Officer shall follow the procedure laid down in Rule 26 of the Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Rules, 1972 under intimation to the undersigned. S. N. Pandey A. D. M. Civil Supplies/r. C. and E. O., Alld. Sd/-26-4-1995 Description of Building Municipal No. 24/34, M. G. Marg, Allahabad. Mohalla : Civil Lines, Allahabad. Station : Thana Civil Lines, Allahabad. Portion of the building from which ejectment is sought: NORTH : By Kapoor Footwear (Shop of Shri V. N. Kapoor). SOUTH : By private road. " (6.) THE petitioners filed this writ petition on 27th April, 1995, claiming that it was a case of extreme emergency as they had shortly before come to know of the aforesaid order of dispossession, In the writ petition, they have narrated the history of the case. SOUTH : By private road. " (6.) THE petitioners filed this writ petition on 27th April, 1995, claiming that it was a case of extreme emergency as they had shortly before come to know of the aforesaid order of dispossession, In the writ petition, they have narrated the history of the case. It is alleged that in pursuance of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, they did not file any undertaking before it. It is pointed out that an application for release of the building in his favour had been moved by the landlord respondent No. 4 and after the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the landlord approached the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. Allahabad, to revive the proceedings for release THE petitioner No. 1 fired a detailed affidavit in those proceedings and by an order dated 20th March, 1995, the Rent Control and Eviction Officer ordered release of half portion of the disputed building. Against that order, the land lord filed a revision petition before the District Judge in which the petitioners also moved an application for impleadment. THE petitioners also claimed to have moved an application for clarification of the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court on 5th January, 1995. It was claimed that no notice for delivering possession to the landlord was ever served on the petitioners io From 'c' as required under the Rules, end the landlord in collusion with the authorities concerned got an order of dispossession in Form 'd' issued although the landlord in an affidavit dated 17th January, 1995, filed before the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Allahabad, had stated that he under takes to evict the tenants only in accordance with the above directions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in case the building in question is released in his favour. It is on these allegations that the aforesaid reliefs have been claimed. In the counter affidavit, it has been stated that the present writ petition is not maintainable because the matter has already been decided by Hon'ble Supreme Court by its judgment dated 5th January, 1995, and the conduct of the petitioners in filing the present writ petition is contemptuous. A portion from the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, referred to above, has been quoted in the counter affidavit. A portion from the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, referred to above, has been quoted in the counter affidavit. It is then stated that in pursuance of the said judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the landlord moved an application under Section 16 (1) (b) of the Act for release of the building in his favour and by order dated 20th March, 1995, the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Allahabad, accepted the bonafide and genuine need of the landlord and released half portion of the build lag. Thereafter, by order dated 24th April, 1995, reviewing the earlier order dated 20th March, 1995, the whole of the building was released in favour of the landlord respondent No. 4 and, accordingly, Form 'd' was issued on 26th April, 1995, under Section 18 (3) of the Act in view of the decree passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. It is claimed that in order to implement the binding directions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, necessary instructions were issued to the Additional City Magistrate, Allahabad, to provide all facilities, including police force, to effect the eviction. It is claimed that the said order was executed by the S. H. O. between 2. 00 p. m. and 3. 30 p. m. on 27th April, 1995, and the goods belonging to the present petitioners were removed from the said building. However, the S. H. O. suddenly disappeared from the site and returned at about 4. 15 p. m. and informed the landlord that this Court had restrained the authorities from evicting the petitioners. An order dated 27th April, 1995 passed by Hon'ble Mr. Justice B. K. Singh was also shown to the landlord. It was thereafter that the petitioners were put back in possession and their entire goods were put in the accommodation in dispute. It is claimed that since the petitioners did not furnish any undertaking before the Hon'ble Supreme Court, they became liable to eviction. It is claimed that in the proceedings for release, the prospective allottee or the tenant has no right to be heard. It is further claimed that by virtue of the judgment of the Hon'bie Supreme Court, the petitioners became trespassers and were not entitled to any notice, either in the proceedings for release or before the issue or order for their eviction in Form 'd'. It is further claimed that by virtue of the judgment of the Hon'bie Supreme Court, the petitioners became trespassers and were not entitled to any notice, either in the proceedings for release or before the issue or order for their eviction in Form 'd'. (7.) AS already stated, the premises m question were deemed to have fallen vacant under Section 12 of the Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 12 gays that in the case of a non-residantial building, where a tenant carrying on business in the building admits a person who is not a member of his family as a partner or a new partner, as the case may be, the tenant shall be deemed to have ceased to occupy the building. It is under these provisions that the Rent Control and Eviction Officer had passed An order dated 18th November, 1981, declaring the building to have fallen vacant and the tenant deemed to have ceased to occupy the building. This order was sub-judice and became final On 5th January, 1995, when the writ petition filed by the petitioners and some others challenging the said order was, ultimately, dismissed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. (8.) SECTION 16 of the Act deals with the allotment and release of vacant buildings. Under the provisions of this section, the District Magistrate or the officer authorised by him known as the Rent Control and Eviction Officer has the authority allot the building to a prospective tenant and require the landlord to let the building to such allottee or he may release the whole or any part of such building in favour of the landlord. Sub-section (4) of SECTION 16 of the Act provides that where the allottee or the landlord has not been able to obtain possession of the building, allotted to him or, as the case may be released in his favour. . . . . . . . . . he may by order evict or cause to be evicted any person named in the order as well as every other person claiming under him or found in occupation, and may for that purpose use or cause to be used such force as may be necessary and put of cause to be put the allottee or the landlord in possession of the building or part thereof. Section 18 of the Act makes provision for appeal against an order of allotment or release and sub- section (3) thereof provides for restitution in case an order under Section 16 or Section 19 of the Act is rescinded. (9.) RULE 14 of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Rules, 1972 framed under the Act provides for the procedure to be followed in the enforcement of the order of allotment or release. It says that where any building about to fall vacant is allotted or released under Section 16 (1), proceeding for putting the allottee or the landlord, as the case may be, in possession shall be taken by the District Magistrate only after the building has actually fallen vacant or is held by him through an inquiry conducted in that behalf to have fallen vacant, and an order in Form 'g' shall be served upon the person or persons found in unauthorised occupation of the building directing him or them to vacate the same and deliver vacant possession thereof to the person named in the order within such period as may be specified in the order, which shall in no case be less than a week from the date of service of the order upon him, and on his failure to comply with the order within the time allowed, the District Magistrate shall issue an order to the officer-in-charge of the Police Station in Form 'd' directing him to get the building vacated and to put the allottee or the landlord in possession of the building. The aforesaid are the relevant provisions which will have to be considered in disposing of the present writ petition. (10.) ONLY two points were strenuously argued before me to challenge the order of eviction issued against the petitioners in Form 'd', a copy of which is Annexure 9' to the writ petition and the relevant portion of which has been quoted above. The said order states that it is issued for the enforcement of the orders (decree) of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India dated 5th January, 1995. The first point that was agitated between the parries, therefore, was whether there is any order or decree of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in pursuance of which Form 'c' could be issued to put the landlord in possession of the building. The first point that was agitated between the parries, therefore, was whether there is any order or decree of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in pursuance of which Form 'c' could be issued to put the landlord in possession of the building. The other point is whether the issue of Form 'd' without having first issued Form 'c', as prescribed in Rule 14, referred to above, was legal. The Act is a complete Code dealing with the relationship of landlords and tenants inter se as well as the rights and obligations of other persons who may claim allotment of the buildings in their favour. Section 12 of the Act deals with deemed vacancy of buildings in certain cases and provides that, as in the circumstances of the present case, where a tenant has admitted a person who is not a member of his family as a partner, the tenant shall be deemed to have ceased to occupy the building. This is a deeming provisions and what would happen to a building whish is deemed to have fallen vacant by virtue of the tenant deemed to have ceased to occupy the building is provided in Section 16 of the Act which makes provision for allotment of the building to a prospective tenant or its release to the landlord. There is no third alternative provided in the Act except that in some Case, the building may partly released and partly allotted. When a building is deemed to have fallen vacant within the provision of Section 12 of the Act, there is no provision in the Act which may provide for the interim management and possession of the building till it is actually allotted or released in favour of a tenant or the landlord. The provisions of Section 16 (4) of the Act and Rule 14 of the Rules, referred to above, clearly indicate that they contemplate delivery of possession only to the allottee or to the landlord and to none else and there is no provision which may entitle a landlord to be put in possession of a building which has not been released in his favour. (11.) ON behalf of the respondents, it was contended that the landlord has paramount right of possession by virtue of his ownership of the property. (11.) ON behalf of the respondents, it was contended that the landlord has paramount right of possession by virtue of his ownership of the property. Reliance was placed on judgment of this Court in Triloki Nath Trivedi v. Rent Control and Eviction Officer, 1983 ARC 857, in which such a proposition was advanced. But the facts of that case were entirely different. In that case, the accommodation was in the tenancy of the post office which vacated in and handed over possession to the landlord. Thereafter, proceedings for allotment of that accommodation were commenced and an allotment order was passed in favour of one Sushil Kumar Sharma who was put in possession of the accommodation. Latter, the allotment order was set aside by the District Judge on a revision petition filed by the landlord. A writ petition filed by the allottee was dismissed by this Court and it was in these circumstances that the landlord was held to be entitled to be put back in possession after the cancellation of the allotment. It was contended in that case that since there was no release order in favour of the landlord, he was not entitled to the possession of the accommodation. This contention was negatived. As is evident, the situation was entirely different inasmuch as it was the landlord who was in possession of the property and who was dis-possessed by virtue of the allotment order and, in the circumstances, he was entitled to be put in possession when the order of allotment was set aside. As a matter of fact, there is specific provision under Section 18 (3) of the Act to this effect and, therefore, this authority cannot support the argument of the respondent No. 4 that on a mere declaration of the vacancy under Section 12 of the Act, the landlord was entitled to possession of the property. (12.) THEREFORE, the order passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer declaring the vacancy had necessarily to be followed by an order either of allotment or of release and that explains the reason why the Hon'ble Supreme Court while passing its judgment dated 29th March, 1985, directed that in the pending writ petition before the High Court, there shall be a stay of further proceedings in respect of the allotment of the premises in question. That is also the reason why the landlord actually applied for the release of the building and contends that an order of release has, ultimately, been passed in his favour. 8 Form 'd' in question was patently not issued to enforce the order of release purporting to have been passed in favour of the landlord on 24th April, 1995. The order in Form 'd' has been issued for the enforcement of the so-called decree of the Supreme Court of India dated 5th January, 1995. As already stated, the question is whether the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court amounts to a decree, as the respondent No. 4 vehemently contends that it is so. 19. The order passed under Section 12 of the Act declaring a vacancy is an order merely to that effect and, as observed above, it cannot be enforced in itself. The order that the Act contemplate to be enforceable is an order either of allotment or of release. THEREFORE, an order passed under Section 12 of the Act merely declaring a vacancy is not an executable order and cannot amount to a decree. The order passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, ultimately, dismissing the writ petition filed by the present petitioners and some others and restoring the order passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer under Section 12 of the Act did not add anything further to the effect of the said order and, therefore, could not normally amount to a decree for eviction. 20. On behalf of the respondents, stress is laid to Paragraph 29 of the judgment which allowed the petitioners to file an understanding and if they filed the undertaking, it directed that they shall not be evicted from the premises in question. The decree prepared in pursuance of this judgment stated the conditions of the proposed undertaking and stated that if the undertaking was not filed, the decree of eviction shall become executable forthwith. Which is that decree that becomes executable forthwith is not mentioned in the decree. There is no decree under which the petitioners were obliged to deliver possession of the premises in question to any one. THEREFORE, reading the judgment and the decree together, one is unable to find any order of the Hon'ble Supreme Court by which the petitioners were obliged to put the landlord in possession of the property. 21. There is no decree under which the petitioners were obliged to deliver possession of the premises in question to any one. THEREFORE, reading the judgment and the decree together, one is unable to find any order of the Hon'ble Supreme Court by which the petitioners were obliged to put the landlord in possession of the property. 21. Learned counsel for the respondent contended that the Hon'ble Supreme Court cannot be assumed to have added Paragraph 29 in the judgment without any purpose and that the putting of the condition of filing undertaking shows that the Hon'ble Supreme Court wanted that the landlord should be put in possession. Certainly, Paragraph 29 is, not without purpose. But the purpose is evident from the judgment which deals with the history of the litigation between the parties. 22. An order of allotment or release could be passed any time after the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Such an order could have been made on 6th January, 1995, itself and thereafter within about ten days, the occupants could have been dispossessed. It was to avoid such a contingency that the Hon'ble Supreme Court felt that some breathing time should be allowed to the occupants so that they are not ousted in haste. The aforesaid observation in Paragraph 29 were only by way of giving an option to the occupants and not by way of a condition because it cannot be assumed that the Hon'ble Supreme Court was not aware or alive to the situation that ultimate eviction of the occupants could follow only an order of allotment or of release. The decree prepared in pursuance of the judgment dated 5th January, 1995, incorporated in the decree the usual condition and the effect, of not filing the undertaking, the decree did not create a decree for eviction when there was none. If the Hon'ble Supreme Court wanted, which in my view, it did not in the circumstances of the case, it would have before Paragraph 29 made a specific order directing the respondent before it to deliver possession to the landlord and then given to occupants sometime by requiring them to file the usual undertaking. This was not done and the Hon'ble Supreme Court stopped at merely restoring the order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. 23. This was not done and the Hon'ble Supreme Court stopped at merely restoring the order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. 23. In this case, after the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court dated 5th January, 1995, referred to above, the petitioners, who were respondents before the Supreme Court, moved an application dated 28th January, 1995, before it seeking clarification of the judgment dated 5th January, 1995, to effect that the said judgment does not order the eviction of the respondents (now petitioners). 24. When the present writ petition was filed in this Court on 27th April, 1995, it came up, before Hon'ble B. K Singh, J. and an order was passed that very day prohibiting eviction of the petitioners on the basis of Form 'd' (Annexure 9' to the writ petition). Aggrieved by the said order, the respondent No. 4 moved a contempt petition before the Supreme Court contending that Justice B. K. Singh had committed contempt of that Court by staying eviction that was being done in pursuance of the decree of that Court. 25. The said clarification and contempt petitions have been dismissed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court vide order dated 8th May, 1995, saying merely that "I A. No, 2 as well as contempt petition No. 113/95 are dismissed. " 26. Learned counsel for the respondent No. 4 contended that by the clarification application, the petitioners had sought to get it clarified that the judgment dated 5th January, 1995, did not order their eviction and that the Hon'ble Court having dismissed the said application, it has to be assumed that the judgment dated 5th January, 1995 does order the eviction of the petitioners. It is further contended that the Hon'ble Supreme Court having dismissed the clarification application, it is not open to this Court to clarify or interpret what the judgment and decree of the Supreme Court amount to. 27. Reliance is placed on a Division Bench judgment of this Court in M/s. Munna Industries v. State, AIR 1994 All 191, in which it was held that when a relief was not granted in a writ petition, a subsequent writ petition, for the same relief is not maintainable. 28. 27. Reliance is placed on a Division Bench judgment of this Court in M/s. Munna Industries v. State, AIR 1994 All 191, in which it was held that when a relief was not granted in a writ petition, a subsequent writ petition, for the same relief is not maintainable. 28. Reliance was also placed on Vikram Singh v. District Judge, 1978 ARC 416, in which a learned Single Judge held that when an appeal or revision is dismissed as barred by time, the order of the trial Court should be taken to have been confirmed. None of these rulings is opposite to the point. The dismissal of the clarification application does not mean that the Hon'ble Supreme Court did not agree to the interpretation of the judgment by the petitioners and reject their claim that the judgment did not order their eviction. What it simply meant is that the Hon'ble Supreme Court did not find any ambiguity which necessitated clarification and it, therefore, declined to make any clarification. Otherwise as contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners, the rejection of the contempt petition should also be interpreted to mean that the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that its judgment had not actually ordered the eviction of the petitioners. Neither-approach is correct, Paragraph 29 of the judgment dated 5th January, 1995, and the aforementioned averments in the decree, therefore, have to be appreciated in the light of the nature of the dispute before the Supreme Court and the relevant provisions of the Act and Rules. 29. In view of the above discussion, I hold that the Hon'ble Supreme Court has not passed any decree for the eviction of the petitioners and, therefore, no Form 'd' could be issued in compliance of the decree of the Supreme Court made in pursuance of the judgment dated 5th January, 1995. The order for the eviction of the petitioners by issue of Form 'd' a copy of which is Annexure 9' to the writ petition, is, therefore, without any sanction of law and is liable to be quashed. 30. The next question is whether Form 'd' can be issued without first issuing a direction in Form 'd' as has, admittedly, been done in this case. As already stated, Rule 14 prescribes the procedure for enforcement of an order of allotment or release. 30. The next question is whether Form 'd' can be issued without first issuing a direction in Form 'd' as has, admittedly, been done in this case. As already stated, Rule 14 prescribes the procedure for enforcement of an order of allotment or release. It requires that first an order of Form 'c' shall be served and a minimum period of one week has to be allowed to the unauthorised occupant to vacate to the accommodation and deliver vacant possession to the allottee or landlord. It is on failure of the unauthorised occupant to comply with the order in Form 'c' that an order in Form 'd' has to be issued to the officer-m-charge of police station to get the building vacated and to put the allottee or the landlord in possession of the building. Form 'c' and 'd' are statutory forms. The relevant part of Form 'c' reads:- "Whereas the building described below has been allotted/released under sub-section (1) of Section 16 of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, in favour of Sri. . . . . . . . . . (allotee/landlord; by order No. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . dated. . . . . . . . . . . . . . ; And whereas the undersigned has reasons to believed that you are in unauthorised occupation of the said building ; THEREFORE, I. . . . . . . . . . District Magistrate,. . . . . . . . in exercise of the powers vested in me under sub-section (4) of Section 16 of the said Act, hereby direct you to vacate the said building and deliver vacant possession thereof to Sri. . . . . . . . (allottee/landlord) on or before. . . . . . . . . . . failing which you will be ejected by force. " The Form clearly shows that it can be issued only after the building has been allotted or released and not on a mere declaration of vacancy. Form 'd' shows that the officer-in-charge of police station has to comply with and enforce the order within 24 hours. Thus, Form 'd' leaves almost no time for the occupant to make arrangements for vacation or for challenging the action. Form 'd' shows that the officer-in-charge of police station has to comply with and enforce the order within 24 hours. Thus, Form 'd' leaves almost no time for the occupant to make arrangements for vacation or for challenging the action. This be because Form 'c' was already served. These provisions, therefore, clearly indicate that service of an order in Form 'c' is mandatory and issue of Form 'd' without service of order in Form 'c' would be clearly illegal. 31. Learned counsel for the respondent No. 4 contended that in this case, the vacancy was declared on 18th November, 1981, and for about 14 years, the petitioners have been in illegal occupation of the building and hence in such a case, issue of Form 'c' should not be insisted upon and the omission to issue the same could be ignored as a mere technical defect. I am unable to pursued myself to such a lenient view. Firstly, in the absence of an order of allotment or release, the petitioners were not liable to eviction in spite of the order dated 18th November, 1981. Then, in the litigation culminating in the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court on 5th January, 1991, there are no traces of frivolity or of a mere mala fide dilatory tactics. The point in issue seems to have been raised bona fide and the petitioners had their share of success when the Hon'ble Supreme Court held their writ petition to be maintainable and this Court accepted the contention of the petitioners. therefore, there is no reason why the petitioners should not have the benefit of statutory procedure by the service of an order in Form 'c'. I, therefore, held that the issue of Form 'd' (Annexure 9' to the writ petition) was illegal also for the reason that no notice in Form 'c' was served upon the petitioners. 32. For the above reasons, the writ petition for quashing Form 'd' dated 26th April, 1995, (Annexure 9' to the writ petition) deserves to be allowed. There was apparently an attempt to evict and dispossess the petitioners in a stealthy and illegal manner. THEREFORE, a writ of prohibition, as claimed in relief (c) would also be justified. 32. For the above reasons, the writ petition for quashing Form 'd' dated 26th April, 1995, (Annexure 9' to the writ petition) deserves to be allowed. There was apparently an attempt to evict and dispossess the petitioners in a stealthy and illegal manner. THEREFORE, a writ of prohibition, as claimed in relief (c) would also be justified. As regards relief (d) claiming an absolute direction prohibiting the respondents from taking any steps to evict/dispossess the petitioners from the disputed building, the same cannot be allowed because no one can be prohibited from taking recourse to legal procedure. The respondent No. 4 claims to have got the building released in his favour and the parties are free to have their remedies according to law. 33. In this case, the petitioners have moved several interim applications which were heard along with the writ petition and which I dispose of by this very order. They are being taken up in the end because otherwise same of what has been stated above may have had to be repeated. 34. The first is Application No. 23792 of 1995 filed on 9th May, 1995. By this application, the petitioners want massive amendments in the writ petition to challenge the release order dated 24th April, 1995, The present writ petition was filed to challenge the order of eviction which as issued on the basis of the supposed decree of the Supreme Court and not on the basis of the release order dated 24th April, 1995. Release of the building is a separate proceedings and if the petitioners have any locus to challenge the said order, they may take independent separate action against ii and there is no justification to introduce that controversy in the present writ petition and convert it into a writ petition claiming entirely different relief and involving different controversy. There was serious argument between the parties about the locus of the petitioners to challenge the release order an several ruling were cited on either side. I do not think it necessary to discuss the issue here because it does not actually arise. The amendments sought are not necessary for the disposal the writ petition. The application No. 23792 is, accordingly, rejected. 35. There are applications to summon the record and to implead Mr. S. N. Pandey, A. D. M. (Civil Supplies)/rent Control and Eviction Officer, Allahabad, who signed the eviction order in Form 'd'. The amendments sought are not necessary for the disposal the writ petition. The application No. 23792 is, accordingly, rejected. 35. There are applications to summon the record and to implead Mr. S. N. Pandey, A. D. M. (Civil Supplies)/rent Control and Eviction Officer, Allahabad, who signed the eviction order in Form 'd'. The controversy has been decided as above and there was no need either of the record or of the presence of Mr. S. N. Pandey. These applications could only add frills to the litigation and delay the same. They are, accordingly, rejected. 36. The last is an application for issue of a commission to assess the damage alleged to have been caused to the goods of the petitioners while attempting to evict the petitioners. In the petition, no claim for damages or compensation was made. They can have their remedy, if any, under the law, independently of this petition. Therefore, there is no need for such exercise as well and the said application is also rejected. 37. The applications for amendment, impleadment, summoning record and issue of commission for local inspection are hereby rejected. 38. The writ petition is partly allowed. The impugned order dated 26th April, 1995, in Form 'd' (Annexure 9' to the writ petition) is hereby quashed and the respondents are prohibited from evicting the petitioners from the premises No. 24/34, Mahatama Gandhi Marg, Civil Lines, Allahabad, otherwise than in accordance with law. 39. The petitioners will get their costs of this writ petition from respondent No. 4. Such costs are assessed at Rs. 10,000 (Rupees Ten Thousand) only. Petition allowed.