Judgment S.K.Chattopadhyaya, J. 1. The petitioner, widow of Sriram Mishra, an erst-while employee of Bihar State Road Transport Corporation (hereinafter referred to as the Corporation) has moved this application for payment of legal dues to her. She has also prayed for a direction to the Corporation to deposit the rent collected up-to 28.2.1990 by the Corporation to the Bihar State Housing Board. 2. The basic facts, which require to be stated for the disposal of this case with consent of the parties, are that the husband of the petitioner retired on 28.2.1990 from the service. As retirement benefits were not paid to him, he moved this Court in CWJC No. 1943/90 (R) and the same was disposed of on 4.9.1991 by the learned Single Judge of this Bench directing the Corporation to pay provident fund and gratuity to the husband of the petitioner. The Corporation filed SLP No. 17242-A/92 against the said order. However, during pendency of the said SLP, the husband of the petitioner died on 27.10.1991 without receiving the aforesaid amount and as such, the petitioner moved this Court in contempt in MJC No. 276/92(R). On 14.1.1993 the said contempt application was disposed of as cheque was handed over to the petitioner in Court. This Court, however, observed that - Let it be recorded that, if the petitioner feels any difficulty, she may approach the Court again. 3. On the basis of disposal of the MJC application, the Supreme Court dismissed the said SLP by following order: Since the Corporation has already made the payment of provident fund and gratuity, there is no reason for us to interfere in this matter. The petitions are dismissed. Thus, as far as the payment of amount towards provident fund and gratuity, the matter has already been concluded. 4 In this application, the petitioner has expressed her apprehension that payment towards gratuity has not been properly calculated, as the Corporation was giving gratuity only on basic pay. The petitioner has demanded for a detail of calculation of the said amount from the Corporation. The petitioner has also detailed the balance due which are yet to be paid by the Corporation. The petitioner, however, is not very sure for the dues inasmuch as in paragraph 4 of her petition, she has stated that all these dues are according to her knowledge. The petitioner has also detailed the balance due which are yet to be paid by the Corporation. The petitioner, however, is not very sure for the dues inasmuch as in paragraph 4 of her petition, she has stated that all these dues are according to her knowledge. The second string of grievances ventelated by the petitioner is that in view of the policy decision of the Housing Board, the petitioner understands that her husband applied for allotment of quarter of the Housing Board already occupied by him and house rent collected from his salary every month by the Corporation was not deposited with the Housing Board. According to the petitioner, this amount was for Rs. 10,000.00 and unless the same is deposited with the Housing Board by the Corporation, the present petitioner will not be able to get the house transferred to her. On this ground, a prayer has been made to direct the Corporation to deposit the amount collected from her husbands salary every month with the Housing Board. 5. The Corporation has filed a counter affidavit stating therein that the matter has been finally decided by the High Court in the aforesaid writ application, namely, CWJC No. 943/90 (R) and as such, the present claim of the petitioner is barred by res-judicata. It is also stated that the present petitioner has not yet vacated the quarter in question and as such, there is no change in the circumstances of the case. The Housing Board in its detailed counter affidavit has narrated the circumstances under which the quarters of the Housing Board are/were given to the employees of the Corporation. Under Subsidised Industrial Housing Scheme, a number of flats belonging to the Board have been allotted to the Corporation. The husband of the petitioner being an employee of the Corporation, was allotted a quarter No. 321/2/3 at Adityapur Housing Colony by his employer, i.e. the Corporation. On 5.3.1991 the employees Union of the Corporation wrote a letter to the Executive Engineer of the Board intimating therein deduction of house rent from the salaries of the employees of the Corporation till December, 1990 and for which clearance certificate of such deduction were submitted. On 5.3.1991 the employees Union of the Corporation wrote a letter to the Executive Engineer of the Board intimating therein deduction of house rent from the salaries of the employees of the Corporation till December, 1990 and for which clearance certificate of such deduction were submitted. Under these circumstances, a request was made to the Board for a further direction to the effect that the employees of the Corporation be allowed to make direct deposit of rent from January, 1991 onwards and an information in this regard may be given to the Corporation with a request to stop deduction of rent from the monthly salary from January, 1991 by the employer. Further request was made through this letter that the Corporation be directed to deposit the rent already collected from its employees till December, 1990 to the Board so that the employees may not face difficulties in registering the flats in their respective names. On the basis of this letter dated 5.3.1991, the Corporation was directed by the Housing Board to deposit the entire amount so collected from its employees till December, 1990 in the account of the Board other-wise the said would be realised with 18% interest apart from other legal consequences. The Corporation issued an office order dated 16.3.1991 intimating that as the deposit was being made directly to the Board since January, 1991 by the employees/the monthly deduction of rent from salary of its employees should not be made hence forth. The employees, who were directly depositing their rent to Housing Board from January, 1991, were advised to submit monthly rent receipts in the office of the Corporation by the 15th of each month. According to the Housing Board, the amount of dues from the Corporation comes to Rs. 12,20,172.61 (approx). The Divisional Manger of the Corporation again informed the Board by its letter dated 26.11.1993 that the Head Quarter has already been informed about the aforesaid standing due. The Housing Board has sent a letter on 15.9.1995 for realisation of the amount from the Corporation. As far as the petitioner is concerned, the Housing Board has stated that she has also started depositing the monthly rent as against the quarter allotted to her husband directly to the Board since January, 1991. The Housing Board has sent a letter on 15.9.1995 for realisation of the amount from the Corporation. As far as the petitioner is concerned, the Housing Board has stated that she has also started depositing the monthly rent as against the quarter allotted to her husband directly to the Board since January, 1991. However, in absence of papers the exact position of rent deposited by her and/or dues, the Board is not in a position to give the correct information in this regard. 6. Mr. N.C. Ganguli, learned Counsel for the petitioner has strongly contended that in view of the Supreme Court decision in the case of Anirudh Pandey V/s. Bihar State Road Transport Corporation and Anr. in Civil Appeal No. 9096 of 1994 decided on 07th December, 1994, the petitioner cannot be refused other legal dues on the ground that she has not vacated the quarter allotted to her deceased husband. 7. Mr. Pandey, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Corporation, on the other hand, has submitted that the matter has already been decided by a learned Single Judge of this Court in the aforesaid writ application filed by the husband of the petitioner, which has been ultimately concluded finally before the Supreme Court and as such, the petitioner cannot make any grievance before this Court. 8. In order to appreciate the argument of the learned Counsel, we have to look into the claim made by the husband of the petitioner in CWJC No. 1943 of 1990 (R). In paragraph 13 of the said judgment, the claims have been noticed. It appears that the question of retaining the quarter by retired employees and non-payment of retirement dues in consequence thereof was also agitated by the parties before the learned Single Judge. However, the learned Single Judge felt it not necessary to decide as to whether the husband of the petitioner was illegally occupying the quarter or not and held that in any event the petitioner was entitled to amount of provident fund as well as gratuity. It was held that the amount of provident fund and gratuity cannot be attached by the respondent-Corporation for any reason whatsoever. However, in paragraph 22 of the judgment, the learned Single Judge observed as follows: The respondent-Corporation may however be entitled not to pay any other amount to an employee who did not file a proper no dues certificate. 9. It was held that the amount of provident fund and gratuity cannot be attached by the respondent-Corporation for any reason whatsoever. However, in paragraph 22 of the judgment, the learned Single Judge observed as follows: The respondent-Corporation may however be entitled not to pay any other amount to an employee who did not file a proper no dues certificate. 9. Admittedly, the petitioner did not challenge this part of the finding of the learned Single Judge at any time. As slated above, the Corporation moved the Supreme Court against the judgment of this Court, which was ultimately dismissed, as because the amount of gratuity and provident fund was paid to the petitioner. Another striking feature of this case is that the petitioner has not annexed any document to show that her deceased husband ever applied for purchase of the quarter on the basis of policy decision of the Board. Mr. Ganguli has failed to point out with reference to any document on record as to whether the petitioner has given her option to purchase the said quarter and in pursuant thereto she is depositing the monthly rent to the Housing Board. The learned Counsel also could not hay land on any document to show that the Corporation was deducting monthly rent from the deceased husband of the petitioner and which was not deposited to the Housing Board accordingly. The Board also in its counter affidavit has categorically stated that in absence of any document filed by the petitioner, it is not possible to ascertain as to whether any such amount was deducted from the salary of the husband of the petitioner and was deposited to the Board. Under these circumstances, in our considered opinion, it is a pure disputed question of fact and the writ court is not the proper forum to decide the same. 10. As far as the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Anirudh Pandey (supra), in our view, this order does not help the petitioner. The case before the Supreme Court was that Anirudh Pandey was allotted a house by the Corporation which belonged to the Board, when the Corporation did not pay the post retirement benefits, said Anirudh Pandey moved this Court in the said writ application. The case before the Supreme Court was that Anirudh Pandey was allotted a house by the Corporation which belonged to the Board, when the Corporation did not pay the post retirement benefits, said Anirudh Pandey moved this Court in the said writ application. The stand was taken by the Corporation that the said employee had not vacated the house which was allotted to him while he was in service of the Corporation and further that the Corporation was ready to pay all the legal dues to said Pandey after he vacates the quarter. This Court directed the said petitioner to Vacate the house and handover the vacant possession to the Corporation. The Corporation was directed to pay the post retrial benefits to the said petitioner after taking vacant possession of the said house. Against this order said Anirudh Pandey moved the Supreme Court. During pendency of the said appeal before the Supreme Court, the Housing Board cancelled the allotment of the house which was in occupation of Anirudh Pandey and the same was allotted by the Board in favour of one Sharda Kumar Pandey, son of said Anirudh Pandey. Being noticed, the Housing Board clarified the position before the Supreme Court. It appears that the Divisional Manager of the Corporation was required to pay the dues as alleged and the same having not been paid, the Board cancelled the allotment of the said quarter and ultimately was allotted in favour of M/s. Ambika Rubber Products for the residence of their employees, of which Sharda Kumar Pandey was an employee. This was allotted on rental basis. On the basis of aforesaid premises, the Supreme Court has observed that since the allotment of the house which was in possession of the appellant namely, Anirudh Pandey, has been cancelled by the Board on account of failure on the part of the Corporation to pay the rent and other charges for the same, it was not open to the Corporation to blame the appellant for not having surrender the house to the Corporation. It was further observed that in those circumstances, the Corporation was not justified in withholding the post retiral benefits of the appellant, on the ground that he failed to surrender the possession of the house to the Corporation. Under these circumstance, appeal of Anirudh Pandey was allowed by the Supreme Court. 11. It was further observed that in those circumstances, the Corporation was not justified in withholding the post retiral benefits of the appellant, on the ground that he failed to surrender the possession of the house to the Corporation. Under these circumstance, appeal of Anirudh Pandey was allowed by the Supreme Court. 11. This is not the position in the instant writ application. It is true that the Housing Board has directed the Corporation to deposit the due rent to the Housing Board within a specified time but there is nothing on record to show that due to non-compliance of this direction the Board has cancelled the allotment of the house. Under these circumstances, the argument of Mr. Ganguli on the basis of the decision of the Supreme Court is misconceived. 12. On the other hand, under similar circumstances, in the case of Lakhan Singh v. Bihar State Road Transport Corporation and Anr. CWJC No. 1183/90(R), the Division Bench of this Court by its order dated 7.3.1991 dismissed the writ application on the ground that the petitioner of that case did not vacate the quarter which was allotted to him. In that case also no document was filed on behalf of the petitioner showing the allotment of the quarter by the Housing Board and that he was the tenant of it. Moreover, as we have already pointed out that the learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of husband of the petitioner has categorically held that the Corporation is entitled not to pay any other amount except the amount of provident fund gratuity to an employee who did not file a proper no dues certificate. 13. We can take judicial notice of the fact that in several cases employees either of a private sector or of a public sector do not vacate the quarter allotted to them by their employer as a condition of service even after retirement, which ultimately causes difficulties to the employers to accommodate their new employees. 14. In the result, we do not find any merit in this application, which is accordingly dismissed. N.Pandey, J. 15 I agree.