P. P. WADHWA ( 1 ) THE petitioner has challenged the order dated 5 July 1995 of the Deputy Commissioner of Police, New Delhi District, New Delhi (DCP), the third respondent, passed under section 33 of the Delhi Police Act (for short the Act ). By the impugned order the third respondent took possession of premises bearing No. 64, Scindia House, Connaugt Place, New Delhi, for a period " till 5/9/95 or till such time the title to the aforesaid plot is decided by the competent authority, whichever, is earlier". ( 2 ) THERE is a dispute as to who is in possession of this property; if it is the petitioner or the fourth respondent Mr. H. B. Tandon. The fourth respondent sent a complaint dated 30 June 1995 to the Station House Officer, Police Station Connaught Place, New Delhi, claiming to be a tenant in the property. He said he was trying to establish some business there and for that purpose M/s. P. K. Singal, Ajay Singal and Sanjay Singat of M/s. Shatabadi Finlease and Securities Ltd. , the petitioner, representing as share brokers, approached him and suggested him to start the business of share broker in the property. Mr. Tandon said there was an agreement to share commission as sub-broker from the business conducted by the petitioner and for ensuring regular payment of his share of commission the petitioner gave advance to him and that the arrangement worked for last three months. He said the business, however, could not pick up and he wanted to close the arrangement with the petitioner. He said the possession of the property was always with him. It came to his notice that the petitioner started giving advertisement in the press and also printed address of the property in the wedding cards in connection with some marriage function of Singals. Mr. Tandon complained that he had asked Singals to remove their equipments from the property and also take back the advance payment made to him after adjusting the commission payable by the petitioner to Mr. Tandon. It was also stated that the telephone counters, equipment and everything of the fourth respondent was there and that it seemed that Singals had bad intentions to cheat him and grab the prperty. Mr. Tandon, therefore, prayed that action be taken against Singals and "protect our lives and property at their hands. Tandon. It was also stated that the telephone counters, equipment and everything of the fourth respondent was there and that it seemed that Singals had bad intentions to cheat him and grab the prperty. Mr. Tandon, therefore, prayed that action be taken against Singals and "protect our lives and property at their hands. " On same very day, Mr. P. K. Singal, Managing Director of the petitioner, also gave a written complaint to the S. H. O. , Connaught Place, New Delhi. He in his complaint said that there was a function in his house on 30 June 1995 and nobody from his house had gone to the office, but the owners of the property Arvind Tandon and H. B. Tandon came to the office of the petitioner at 64, Scindia House, at that time and forcibly removed five/six staff members of the petitioner and kept four or five gunny bags containing some useless ( kabari ) material in the property and then locked the same with four locks. Mr. Singal said that costly goods of the petitioner, cash, books of accounts, etc. were lying there and that petitioner had furnished the office. He, therefore, prayed that action be taken and the property where the office of the petitioner was situated be got opened and that petitioner was suffering because of that and further that immediate action be taken in the matter. ( 3 ) ON 5 July 1995 ASI Nar Singh of Police Station Connaught Place, submitted his report to the S. H. O. He had visited the premises on information received a day before. He found Pawan Kumar Singal present there along with his workers. Mr. H. B. Tandon, the fourth respondent, was also present near the premises. On enquiry the ASI found that actual owner of the premises was Mr. Atma Ram Chadha who had given theshop on tenancy to H. 8. Tandon who further rented the premises to Pawan Kumar Singal on 6 January,1995 without any rent agreement and had received Rs. 1,10,000. 00 in cash from Mr. Singal and further rent through cheque payments. Mr. Tandon had, however, stated before him that he had given the premises on commission basis for business purposes to Mr. Singal. The ASI noted that both the parties had made complaints on 30 June 1995 in the Police Station regarding possession of the premises against each other. 00 in cash from Mr. Singal and further rent through cheque payments. Mr. Tandon had, however, stated before him that he had given the premises on commission basis for business purposes to Mr. Singal. The ASI noted that both the parties had made complaints on 30 June 1995 in the Police Station regarding possession of the premises against each other. According to the ASI there was grave apprehension of breach of peace by both the parties in respect of the premises in question. After describing the location of the premises, ASI Nar Singh said in his report as under :- Shatabadi Finlease and Securities Ltd. Vs. The Government of the National Capital Territory of Delhi Through Its Lt. Governor. 795 "now there is a danger to human life, safety and grave disturbance of public tranquillity over the disputed premises No. 64, Scindia House, New Delhi. In the light of above facts and circumstances that the premises 64 Scindia House (disputed portion) may kindly be sealed u/sec. 33 DP Act 1978. "the S. H. O. marked this report to A. C. P. , Connaught Place, and to D. C. P,, New Delhi, on 5 July 1995 itself. Thereafter, on the same day the impugned order was made. ( 4 ) ISSUE before us is if such an order could have been made by the DCP under section 33 of the Act in the circumstances narrated above. Section 33 of the Act is as under:- "33. Issue of order for prevention of riot, etc.- (1) In order to prevent or suppress any riot or grave disturbance of peace, the Commissioner of Police may temporarily close or take possession of any building or other place and may exclude all or any persons therefrom, or may allow access thereto to such persons only and on such terms as he shall deem expedient and all persons concerned shall be bound to conduct themselves in accordance with such orders as the Commissioner of Police may make and notify in exercise of his powers under this section. (2) If the lawful occupant of such building or place suffers any loss or injury by reason of the action taken under sub- section (1), he shall be entitled, on an application made therefor to the competent authority within one month from the date of such action, to receive reasonable compensation for such loss or injury, unless such action was in the opinion of such competent authority rendered either by the use to which such building or place was put, or intended to be put, or by the misconduct of persons having access thereto. (3) In the event of any dispute in relation to the amount of compensation payable under sub-section (2) or the person to whom such amount shall be payable, the matter shall be referred by the competent authority to the District Collector whose decision thereon shall be final. " ( 5 ) A bare reading of sub-section (1) of section 33 would show that the DCP to whom the powers have been delegated by the Commissioner of Police may temporarily close or take possession of any building or other place in order to prevent or suppress any riot or grave disturbance of peace. ( 6 ) THERE is no record with the DCP and none has been shown to us for him to come to the conclusion or to arrive at his subjective satisfaction that there was any danger to human life, safety or grave disturbance of public tranquillity By using high sounding words or using the language of the section will not make the order valid unless the circum. stances exist to bring the case within the four corners of section 33. By the impugned order the DCP has taken possession of the disputed property and had said that the order would "remain in force till 5/9/95 or till such time the title to the aforesaid plot is decided by the competent authority, whichever, is earlier". For one thing, the disputed property is not a plot and, two, we fail to see how the competent authority can decide the title in the matter. For one thing, the disputed property is not a plot and, two, we fail to see how the competent authority can decide the title in the matter. Competent authority is defined in clause (c) of section 2 of the Act and it is as under :- " (C) "competent authority", when used with reference to the exercise of any power or discharge of any duty under the provisions of this Act, means the Commissioner of Police appointed under Section 6 or any other police officer specially empowered in that behalf by the Central Government. " ( 7 ) PERHAPS the words "competent authority" have been loosely used and what the impugned order meant was the court of civil jurisdiction or any other authority competent to decide the question of title. The impugned order does not specify as to what will happen if competent authority is unable to decide the question of title before 5 September 1995 as that is the date upto which the order is to remain in operation. It has also not been explained to us as to how the DCP thought that after a. period of 2 months there would be no "grave disturbance of peace". ( 8 ) FROM the record which has been produced before us and referred by us to above it could at best be dispute confined to two persons claiming possession of shop, one as a tenant and the other as a sub-tenant. In our view, section 33 of the Act ordinarily is not meant for situation arising out of such local apprehended breaches of peace. Section 33 gives drastic powers to the DCP and their use is meant for drastic situations. They cannot be applied in the case of individual dispute unless such a dispute threatens to disturb public peace, safety and tranquillity of the public at large, or when there is threat of disturbance of public order. Section 33 gives drastic powers to the DCP and their use is meant for drastic situations. They cannot be applied in the case of individual dispute unless such a dispute threatens to disturb public peace, safety and tranquillity of the public at large, or when there is threat of disturbance of public order. ( 9 ) IN the counter-affidavit filed by the DCP himself, while referring to the report of ASI Nar Singh he said that the situation was so grave that even proceedings under section 107/150 of the Code of Criminal Procedure were initiated in the court of the Executive Magistrate, New Delhi, against the parties and that since both the parties were fighting over possession of the property, each one saying that it was in possession, in order to prevent grave disturbance of peace in the area it was decided to temporarily close the shop/premises. It is then stated that such types of orders are passed to prevent disturbance in the area and aggrieved parties can go to the court of law and obtain favourable orders and in case any court directs the possession to be given to any one of the parties to the exclusion of the others, that order will be strictly complied with. There is nothing on record to justify the statement of the DCP. Ms. Ahlawat, learned counsel for respondents 1 to 3, was unable to explain to us as to why action under sections 145 and 146 of the Code of Criminal Procedure could not have been taken. There is also no record to show as to why these provisions could not have been resorted to. Under section 145 of the Code, whenever an Executive Magistrate is satisfied from a report of a police officer or upon other information that a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace exists concerning any building, he shall make an order in writing, stating the grounds of his being so satisfied, and requiring the parties concerned in such dispute to attend his court in person or by pleader, on a specified date and time, and to put in written statements of their respective claims as respects the fact of actual possession of the subject of dispute. Then the Magistrate, without reference to the merits or the claims of the parties, is to decide whether any and which of the parties was, at the date of the order made by him. in possession of the subject of dispute. The Magistrate is then to put that party in possession of the property and leave the parties to have their disputes decided by a civil court. The provisions of section 145 are not in derogation of the powers of the Magistrate to proceed under section 107 of the Code. Under section 146, the Magistrate has power, in case of emergency, to attach the property until a competent court had determined the rights of the parties thereto with regard to the person entitled to the possession thereof. Property is then in custodia legis . It is not necessary for us to detail the time tested provisions of sections 145 and 146 of the Code and if there was any apprehension of breach of peace as apprehended by the police, these provisions could well have been resorted to. We are, thus, of the opinion that the DCP was not correct in his approach in invoking the provisions of section 33 of the Act in the present case. Section 33 can be resorted to in order to prevent or suppress any riot or when there is a serious threat to disturbance of peace The consequences which flow from resorting to section 33 are quite serious and, as noted above section 33 is not meant for situation arising out of ordinary and local breaches of peace. Provisions as contained in section 107 of the Code also exist which can be invoked so that a person does not commit breach of peace or disturb the public tranquillity or do any wrongful act that may probably occasion a breach of the peace, etc The impugned order, therefore, has to be set aside. We order accordingly. However, we do not wish to create any vacuum and we continue this order upto 9 August 1995 so that the parties may. if they so choose, resort to any other remedy as is permissible under law and on the facts of the case. Petition is. thus, allowed.