JUDGMENT Gulab C. Gupta, C.J.—The petitioner claims to be a wine-contractor engaged in the business of selling liquor in the State of Himachal Pradesh. He claims to have participated in the auction of vends of Rampur Bushar group for the year 1994 95 held on 16-3-1994 and further claim that his bid in the said auction-sale was highest, i.e. Rs. 190 crores. According to him, his bid was accepted and consequently he deposited 5% of the said amount as security which was accepted. He further claims that 8.5% of the said amount was required to be deposited within ten days of the auction or by 31-3-1994, whichever be earlier. He, therefore, deposited the said amount on 28-3-1994. He was also prepared to deposit the balance amount and got a bank draft prepared for the purpose and went with the said draft to the office of the respondent Excise and Taxation Commissioner on 25-3-1994. The said Commissioner refused to accept the deposit and instead informed him that his bid was rejected. The letter rejecting his bid is dated 28-3-1994 (Annexure P-9) and said to have been received by the petitioner on 30th March, 1994. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid, the petitioner has preferred this writ petition challenging legal validity thereof and praying that the aforesaid order Annexure P-9 be quashed by a writ of certiorari and further that the respondents be directed to allot vends to the petitioner. In the alternative, it is prayed that Rampur Bushar Group be re-auctioned in the interest of justice and fair play. The respondents No. 1 to 5 admit that the auction of Rampur Bushar Group of vends was held on 16-3-1994 and the bid of the petitioner of 1,90 crores was the highest. It is also admitted that the petitioner had deposited 5% of the said amount as security and further amount of 8 5% as per Clause 20 (i) (b) of the Auction Conditions. It is also admitted that the petitioners bid was not confirmed by the competent authority and the said decision was communicated to the petitioner by letter dated 28th March, 1994 (Annexure P-9). It is submitted that vends of not only Rampur Bushar but also Shimla-I, Shimla-II groups besides all other parts of the District were put to auction on 16th March 1994. Though there were purchasers of all groups but there was no purchaser of Shimla-I and Shimla-II groups. It is submitted that vends of not only Rampur Bushar but also Shimla-I, Shimla-II groups besides all other parts of the District were put to auction on 16th March 1994. Though there were purchasers of all groups but there was no purchaser of Shimla-I and Shimla-II groups. Consequently auction of Shimla-I and Shimla-II was postponed (Annexure R-4). Lateron the Financial Commissioner exercising his power under Rule 34 of the H P. Liquor Licence Rules, 1986 read with conditions No. 1 and 2 of the Auction Conditions, decided on 22-3-1994 to sell licences of Shimla I and Shimla-II group by negotiation (Annexure R-5). Pursuance to the aforesaid decision, notice for negotiations were sent to all the bidders including the petitioner, to appear before the Negotiating Committee on 25-3-1994 and participate in the negotiation for Shimla-I and Shimla-II. Pursuance to the aforesaid, several bidders including the petitioner appeared before the Negotiating Committee in the morning of 25-3-1994 and offered their bids. The petitioner also offered 6.15 crores as his bid for the aforesaid two groups. The two other participants, namely, respondent No. 6 and one Madan Lal and Co. offered their bids of 8.50 crores and 8 25 crores respectively, on the condition that their bid was composite for Shimla-I and Shimla-II and Rampur Bushar group and they are not prepared to offer any bid for Shimla-I and Shimla-II only. Proceedings Annexure R-10 indicate that these offers were not accepted The Negotiating Committee, however, suggested that since Shimla-I and Shimla II are not being sold, "it would be appropriate to obtain by negotiations composite offers from all the parties for Shimla Unit I, Shimla Unit II and Rampur Unit." For this purpose the negotiations were postponed and the parties were called for negotiation again at 3.30 p. m. These proceedings of the Negotiating Committee were brought to the notice of the competent authority who by his order dated 25-3-1994 (Annexure P-22) decided not to confirm the result of auction in respect of Rampur Bushar group and ordered negotiation of Rampur Bushar group alongwith Shimla-I and II. Bids of all other Units i.e., Chopal, Rohru, Jubbal and Kotkhai were confirmed. The Negotiating Committee again met at 3.30 p.m. and requested composite offers of all the participants to the three units now grouped as one. Respondent No. 6 maintained his morning offer of Rs. 8.50 crores. Bids of all other Units i.e., Chopal, Rohru, Jubbal and Kotkhai were confirmed. The Negotiating Committee again met at 3.30 p.m. and requested composite offers of all the participants to the three units now grouped as one. Respondent No. 6 maintained his morning offer of Rs. 8.50 crores. The other two, namely, Ashwani Kumar Joginder Pal and Co. offered Rs. 8 crores and Madan Lal and Company offered Rs 8.25 crores for the aforesaid. Since these offers were the same as offered in the morning, two bidders namely, respondent No. 6 and Madan Lal and Co. were individually called to improve their offers. Madan Lal and Co. did not improve his offer of Rs. 8.25 crores but respondent No 6 improved it to Rs. 8.55 crores. In this process the offer of respondent No. 6 was found to be highest and accepted and vends given to him. The submission of the respondent is that the aforesaid action was taken in the wider interest of the State revenue and is otherwise just and fair, needing no intervention of this Court. 2. The aforesaid narration of events would clearly establish that liquor vends in the State of Himachal Pradesh were divided into several identifiable groups and put to auction. It is also apparent that so far as Rampur Bushar group is concerned, the auction was fully participated and fetched a proper price of Rs. 1.90 crores. In this connection, it deserves notice that this grouping has existed even in 1993-94 and Rampur Bushar Unit has fetched 1.50 crores during that year. The petitioner s bid of Rs l.90 crores was, therefore, a clear improvement m the last year s revenue. There is no illegality alleged in this auction sale. On the contrary report of the Deputy Commissioner (Annexure R-5) would indicate that a recommendation was made by him to pass further necessary orders in relation to the auction already held and to decide further course of action in relation to Shimla Unit I and II. As regards Shimla Units I and II it appears that it was decided to sell them by negotiations and hence invitation Annexure R-8 were sent to 32 parties whose names are a appearing in the above said annexure. Out of these 32, only seven parties appeared on 25-3-1994 and participated in the negotiations. As regards Shimla Units I and II it appears that it was decided to sell them by negotiations and hence invitation Annexure R-8 were sent to 32 parties whose names are a appearing in the above said annexure. Out of these 32, only seven parties appeared on 25-3-1994 and participated in the negotiations. It is also apparent that no order for re-grouping these vends was either made or published for general information of others. Indeed, the order was passed at the instance of respondent No. 6 who made his offer only if the three groups were integrated into one and sold as such. It is also clear that only seven invitees participated in the negotiations and only two offered their bids It is further clear that but for the suggestion of respondent No.6 the three groups would not have been combined into one and given to respondent No.6. The question requiring our consideration is whether the aforesaid procedure is in accordance with law ? 3. A perusal of auction notices Annexure R-2 and Annexure R-3 would indicate that the respondent Deputy Commissioner had before issuing a these notices grouped various vends and notified the same for information of air concerned. Entire Shimla District was divided into six groups namely, Chopal. Rohru, Jubbal, Kotkhai and Shimla Unit I and Shimla Unit II Auction conditions were notified at the time of auction as per Annexure P-l. Condition No. 1, (ii) provides that the Excise and Taxation Commissioner reserves the right to sell all or any of the licences by auction or by private contract or by allotment or by calling tenders or by any other arrangement which he may consider expedient in the interest f revenue Condition No. 2 provides that the highest bids shall be subject to confirmation by the Excise and Taxation Commissioner, Himachal Pradesh, who reserves the right to reject any bid without assigning any reasons for doing so. Condition No. 4 which deals with fee fixed h auction provides that the Financial Commissioner may, if no bid is forthcoming in respect of a vend or a group of vends or if the situation therwise warrants or if it is expedient to do so, grant these licenses by contract through negotiations. This document provides for detailed procure for holding auction, acceptance of bid, deposits of money etc. This document provides for detailed procure for holding auction, acceptance of bid, deposits of money etc. There is however, no specific provision in these conditions that groups once formed may be changed. We have, however, noticed Clause 4 of this auction condition which is said to be the source of authority of the respondent Financial Commissioner for re-grouping shops. This provison being important deserves re-production for convenience : "The competent authority may, if no bid is forthcoming in respect of a vend or a group of vends or if the situation otherwise warrants or if it is expedient to do so, grant these licenses by contract through negotiations". 4. It is common ground that the matter is regulated by H.P. Liquor Licence Rules, 1986, made in exercise of powers conferred on the respondent State Government under section 59 of the Punjab Excise Act, 1914, as applicable to the State of Himachal Pradesh. Rule 34 of these Rules confer a special power on the respondent Financial Commissioner to grant all or any of the licences mentioned in Rule], other than the licences granted on fixed fee, assessed fee or both, by auction or by negotiation or by private contract or by allotment or by calling tenders or by any other arrangement which he may consider expedient." Sub-rule (b) of this Rule permits the respondent Financial Commissioner to change the mode of granting the licences prior to the grant of such licences in a Financial Year and by an order in writing on record. Rule 36 of the Rules provides that licences in Form L-2 and L-10 shall be granted by auction to be held by the Collector on the date fixed by the Excise Commissioner. Sub-rule 5 (b) of Rule 36 provides that the Presiding Officer of the auction will put each vend to auction after carefully explaining its locality. It also provides that "the auctio7 shall normally be of each vend separately but the Presiding Officer, may auction even more than one vend in a group keeping the exigencies of a particular situation and Government interest in view". There is no provision in these Rules for re-grouping of vends by respondent Financial Commissioner and that too after grouping has been done by the Presiding Officer of the auction under the aforesaid Rules and bid for the group obtained by him. There is no provision in these Rules for re-grouping of vends by respondent Financial Commissioner and that too after grouping has been done by the Presiding Officer of the auction under the aforesaid Rules and bid for the group obtained by him. Rule 36 (22) of this Rule however, provides that all sales are open to revision by the Financial Commissioner. Sub-rule (23) of this Rule further provides that at the conclusion of every auction the Collector or the Presiding Officer shall refund to all persons, whose bids have not been accepted, the amount deposited by them. Sub-rule (24) provides that the Collector sh ill forward to the Financial Commissioner statements in Forms M-14 and M-14-A s lowing the details contained therein and if no intimation to the contrary is. received within three weeks or by 31st March, whichever is earlier, the Collector may assume that the Financial Commissioner has accepted his proposal. Sub-rule (25) provides that if a sale is set aside by the Financial Commissioner on revision or the same is not confirmed, the Financial Commissioner may himself or otherwise specifically direct the Collector to re-sell the licence by auction or by private contract or negotiation or by tender There seems to be nothing in these Rules except Rule 34 permitting the Financial Commissioner to interfere with the process of auction Since Rule 34 is relevant for our purpose, it deserves n -production for the sake of convenience, which reads as under : "34 (a) The Financial Commissioner reserves the right to grant all or any of the licences mentioned in Rule 1, other than the licences granted on fixed fee, assessed fee or both, by auction or by negotiation or by private contract or by allotment or by calling tenders or by any other arrangement which he may consider expedient. (b) The Financial Commissioner further reserves the right to change the mode of granting the licences mentioned in Clause (a) of this rule, prior to the grant of such licences in a Financial year, and by an order in writing on record." A perusal of these Rules would indicate that normally each individual vend is required to be auctioned and said auction is to be done by issuing public notice thereof and fixing a date for the purpose. Rule 36 (5) (b) is the only rule permitting grouping of vends by the Presiding Officer of the auction. Rule 36 (5) (b) is the only rule permitting grouping of vends by the Presiding Officer of the auction. It does not confer any power on the Financial Commissioner to change the group or otherwise disturb the grouping done by the Presiding Officer. Rule 34 of these Rules, quoted above, does not deal with grouping of vends nor does it authorises the Financial Commissioner to disturb the grouping made by the Presiding Officer under Rule 36 (5) (b) of the Rules This Rule only permits the Financial Commissioner to change the mode of granting licence and that too by an order in writing The aforesaid analysis would indicate that the Rules do not give any power to the respondent Financial Commissioner or any one else except the Presiding Officer of the auction to auction vends in a group. The respondent Financial Commissioner does not, therefore, have power to order re-grouping under these Rules. The auction-condition No.4, however, permits the competent authority who is admittedly the Financial Commissioner in the instant case to grant these licences, namely L-2, L-10, L-14 and L-20-B by contract through negotiations and that too if no bid is forthcoming in respect of vend or a group of vends. This auction condition also does not in term authorise the respondent Financial Commissioner to direct regrouping or otherwise change the mode of granting licence in a case where proper bid has been offered and accepted. Apparently, therefore, action of the respondent Financial Commissioner in directing re-grouping of Shimla-I and Shimla-II and Rampur Bushar into one composite group is neither supported by any provision in the Rule nor by any condition of the auction. The question requiring consideration is whether re-grouping as done by him is otherwise sustainable in law? The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondents is that the re-grouping being necessary to auction Shimla-I and Shimla-II groups and otherwise being financially beneficial to the State, cannot be said to be illegal and unjust. Assuming that the action is financially beneficial to the State, yet the important question is whether respondent No. 2 who is admittedly the Financial Commissioner under Rule 34 of the Rules can be permitted to act in violation of statutory rules and auction conditions for securing the better revenue for the State ? This Court is not able to answer the aforesaid in favour of the respondents. This Court is not able to answer the aforesaid in favour of the respondents. Earning good revenue is, without doubt, the intention of the respondent State in putting the vends to auction and yet it is not possible to permit the respondent State to act as a scrupulous money earner. It is true that State has the monopoly with regard to liquor and no one can claim any fundamental rights to deal in liquor. But that by itself is not enough to hold that the respondent State can set aside all constitutional norms and sell the privilege in any manner it likes. Article 14 of the Constitution is all pervasive and covers even liquor licences auctioned by the State. This Constitutional guarantee, as is by now well settled, is both substantive as well as procedural. As far as procedural laws are concerned this Article means that all litigants who are similarly situated are able to avail themselves of the same procedural rights for relief and for defence. [See Antulay v. Nayak, AIR 1988 SC 153]. In order to find out whether there has been a substantial departure from the normal procedure, the test to be applied is not the degree of inequality, but the reality of it. Thus even a financially beneficial act is required to be done in a manner so as to ensure equality before law to all. That is why it has been held in Trilochan v. State of Orissa, AIR 1971 SC 733 that even though Government has a right to enter into a contract with anybody of its choice and even though such a person may not be the highest bidder, it has no right to discriminate between the parties and make its offers to a limited class of persons, excluding others, similarly situated. In this connection the decision in Rasbehari v. State of Orissa, AIR 1969 SC 1081, also deserves notice. As regards the privileges of selling intoxicant liquors, it was held in State of Orissa v. Harinarayan, AIR 19-72 SC 1816, that though it is legitimate to empower the Executive to settle this privilege in any manner at its discretion, the same must not be arbitrary. Clearly, therefore, provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution are also attracted in a situation like the present one. Clearly, therefore, provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution are also attracted in a situation like the present one. The respondents cannot be claim any unfettered right to deal with the licences in question and sell it in violation of Rules and auction-conditions Violation of Rules and auction conditions would attract Article 14 of the Constitution and make the action arbitrary and un-constitutional In this view of the matter, it must be held that the order dated 25-3-1994 passed by the respondent Financial Commissioner (Annexure 22) so far as it re-groups Shimla I and Shimla II and Rampur Bushar into one composite group must be held to be without authority and otherwise arbitrary and in clear and specific violation of Rule 36 (5) (b) of the said Rules. 5. It may, therefore, be examined if the decision of the Financial Commissioner to sell these vends by private negotiations is in accordance with law ? The submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that vends having been put to auction and his bid being highest, the respondent Financial Commissioner was not within his authority to direct sale of these vends by private negotiation. It is particularly submitted that private negotiation was to be held for Shimla I and II because no offer for these groups had been made during auction, but the same would not apply to Rampur Bushar group and hence decision to change the mode of sale would be misuse of the authority of the respondent Financial Corporation. It is also submitted that the negotiation was not fair inasmuch as those who were invited to participate in the negotiation were required to do so only for Shimla I and II and not for Rampur Bushar. Rampur Bushar was sold by private negotiation only to satisfy the requirement of respondent No. 6. This is not only contrary to the provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution but otherwise misuse of the powers vested i i the respondent Financial Commissioner. The respondents, however, submitted that the change has been made with a view to secure revenue of the State and is, therefore, fully justified. In State of Haryana v. Jage Ram and others, (1983) 4 SCC 556, the Supreme Court was faced with somewhat similar problem. The respondents, however, submitted that the change has been made with a view to secure revenue of the State and is, therefore, fully justified. In State of Haryana v. Jage Ram and others, (1983) 4 SCC 556, the Supreme Court was faced with somewhat similar problem. In the said case also the shop was sold in an open auction to the highest bidder but the said highest bidder defaulted in the payment of instalments and hence his licence was cancelled. The vend was ordered to be sold by re-auction under Rule 36 (24) of the Punjab Liquor Licence Rules. The authorities gave no notice of the re-auction to the public at all but only sent telegrams to the Excise Officers of five districts with a request that they should give publicity to the re-auction There was no evidence to indicate that these officers gave publicity. The authorities also sent letters to five private licensees informing them of the date of re-auction The question requiring decision of the Supreme Court was whether the same was in accordance with law. The Supreme Court on examination of its earlier decisions held that the re-auction was not in accordance with law. According to the Supreme Court the Rule requires "publicity" to be given to an auction sale which is possible only when sufficiently advance intimation of the intended sale is given to the members of the Public or, atleast, to that section of the public which normally engages in the kind of business which is the subject-matter of the auction sale. The Supreme Court was of the opinion that the excise authorities should not have picked and chosen a few persons only as the recipients of the notice of re-auction The conduct of the authorities in this behalf was held not satisfying the basic requirement of law. The conduct of authorities, according to the Supreme Court, must be above suspicion. It appears that after the re-auction has commenced, the authorities changed their mind and decided without reason to withdraw the re-auction and to grant fresh licences by private negotiations on the spot. This, according to the Supreme Court, was violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. The decision smacks of arbitrariness, is unfair and un-reason-able and cannot be allowed to stand. This, according to the Supreme Court, was violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. The decision smacks of arbitrariness, is unfair and un-reason-able and cannot be allowed to stand. While dealing with such a situation, the Supreme Court make the following observations :— "Public auction has to be the normal mode of selling public property. It is open to public gaze and eschews many temptations to which private contracts are subject. It is only when a public auction is not feasible or has failed to attract bidders after due publicity, that a private contract can be negotiated for disposing of public property or rights in such property. Not only is no reason forthcoming why the intention to hold a public auction was abandoned after the auction had commenced but the proceedings were not adjourned even for a few days in order to publicise the intention to resell the vends by private contract. The Excise authorities could not have abruptly decided to jettison the original intention of holding a public auction and grant licences by private negotiations on the spur of the moment, that very day and at that very hour The decision smacks of arbitrariness, is unfair and unreasonable, and cannot be allowed to stand". 6. If the facts of the present case are to be judged in the context of ratio of the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court, it will have to be held that the decision to abruptly cancel the auction of Rampur Bushar group and sell the same by private negotiations was arbitrary and unfair and for that reason, cannot be allowed to stand. This very law has been applied to sale of other public property by the State in Ram and Shyam Company v. State of Haryana and others, (1985) 3 SCC 267. This was a case relating to Mines and Minerals Quarries which were sold by public auction under the Haryana Minor Minerals (Vesting of Rights) Act, 1973 read with Punjab Minor and Mineral Concessions Rules, but the highest bid of the said auction was not confirmed One of the respondents in the said appeal then offered his bid on the condition that the contract be made for a period of five years. This mode of grant of lease was held to be illegal and set aside by the Supreme Court. This mode of grant of lease was held to be illegal and set aside by the Supreme Court. The Court while setting aside the said contract held that even in an administrative action, the authority must act fairly which means in accordance with the principles of natural justice variously described as "fair play in action". Commenting on the manner in which the highest bid was not accepted and the bid of the respondent was accepted, the Supreme Court observed that "this method is open to the abuse of favouritism and nepotism". The Court was of the opinion that disposal of public property partakes the character of a trust. So disposal of the State property in public interest must be by such method as would grant an opportunity to the public at large to participate in it, the State reserving to itself the right to dispose it of as best subserve the public weal. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, relied upon the Supreme Court decision in Chingleput Bottlers v. Majestic Bottling Company, (1984) 3 SCC 258, and submitted that in case where grant of licence is subject to confirmation of the State Government, the High Court has no jurisdiction to issue a writ of Mandamus ordering the grant of licence to any particular person. The learned Counsel submitted that the matter being within the discretion of the respondent Financial Commissioner who had the absolute discretion to reject the highest offer, this Court would not issue a writ of Mandamus against the aforesaid authority. This case, without doubt, is the authority for the proposition that in order that a writ of Mandamus may issue to compel the authority to grant the licence, it must be shown that under the Act and the Rules framed thereunder, there was a legal duty imposed on the authority to issue a licence. It also lays down that no Mandamus will lie where the duty sought to be enforced is of a discretionary nature unless the exercise of discretion is made with oblique motives or extraneous purposes or upon extraneous considerations. Nor will a Mandamus issue to compel the performance by such public body or authority of an act contrary to law. This decision, however, cannot be read as laying down the broad proposition that even arbitrary exercise of power is not open to judicial review. Nor will a Mandamus issue to compel the performance by such public body or authority of an act contrary to law. This decision, however, cannot be read as laying down the broad proposition that even arbitrary exercise of power is not open to judicial review. The Court has in this very judgment noticed the relevant considerations in the matter and held that the Executive has to reach its decision by taking into account the relevant considerations. They should not refuse to consider relevant matter nor should they take into account wholly irrelevant or extraneous consideration. They should not misdirect them on the point of law. Only such a decision will be lawful. The Courts have power to see that Executive acts lawfully. It is no answer to the exercise of that power to say that the Executive acted bona fide nor they have bestowed painstaking consideration. They cannot avoid scrutiny by Courts by failing to give reasons. If they give reasons and they are not good reasons, the Court can direct them to reconsider the matter in the light of relevant matters, though the propriety, adequacy or satisfactory character of those reasons may not be open to judicial scrutiny. This case, therefore, lays down that if the Executive had acted in accordance with law, this Court will not substitute its judgment for their judgment only because the aforesaid judgment is also possible on the facts and circumstances of the case. We do not read this judgment as laying down that even an arbitrary exercise of discretion is not open to judicial scrutiny. Some subsequent judgments of the Supreme Court would support the aforesaid conclusion. In Sterling Computers Ltd. v M/s. M&N Publications Limited and others, (1993) 1 SCC 445, the Supreme Court considered this question . and observed as under :— "At times it is said that public authorities must have the same liberty as they have in framing the policies, even while entering into contracts because many contracts amount to implementation or projection of policies of the Government. But it cannot be overlooked that unlike policies, contracts are legally binding commitments and they commit the authority which may be held to be a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution in many cases for years. That is why the Courts have impressed that even in contractual matters the public authority should not have unfettered discretion. But it cannot be overlooked that unlike policies, contracts are legally binding commitments and they commit the authority which may be held to be a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution in many cases for years. That is why the Courts have impressed that even in contractual matters the public authority should not have unfettered discretion. In contracts having commercial element, some more discretion has to be conceded to the authorities so that they may enter into contracts with persons, keeping an eye on the argumentation of the revenue. But even in such matters they have to follow the norms recognised by Courts while dealing with public property. It is not possible for Courts to question and adjudicate every decision taken by an authority, because many of the Government undertaking which in due course have acquired the monopolist position in matters of sale and purchase of products and with so many ventures in hand, they can come out with a plea that it is not always possible to act like a quasi-judicial authority while awarding contracts. Under some special circumstances a discretion has to be conceded to the authorities who have to enter into contract giving them liberty to assess the overall situation for purpose of taking a decision as to whom the contract be awarded and at what terms. If the decisions have been taken in bonafide manner although not strictly following the norms laid down by the courts, such decisions are upheld on the principle laid down by Justice Holmes, that courts while judging the constitutional validity of executive decision must grant certain measure of freedom of "play in the joints" to the executive." This judgment also relies upon the decision in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Nandlal Jaiswal, (1986) 4 SCC 566, which was given in the: context of sale of liquor which was held to be the exclusive privilege of the State. It was in that case laid down that no one can claim fundamental right to carry on trade and business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But when the State decides to grant such right or privilege to others, it cannot escape the rigour or Article 14. But when the State decides to grant such right or privilege to others, it cannot escape the rigour or Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will, It must comply with the equality clause while selling the privilege and submit itself to the discipline of Article 14 Clearly, therefore, the respondent State even while having the exclusive privilege of carrying on business in liquor, is bound to follow the discipline under Article 14 of the Constitution if it decides to sell the said exclusive privilege to others 7. The learned Counsel for the respondent also brought to our notice the decision of the Supreme Court in Excise Commissioner U.P., Allahabad and others v. Prem Jeet Singh Gujrat and others, (1984)1 SCC 270, to submit that the Financial Commissioner being the final authority to decide the particular course of action, this Court should not interfere with the same particularly when the adequate price was the consideration in this regard. This was also a case where exclusive privilege of selling country liquor was put to auction and the highest bid was provisionally accepted. The said bid, however, was not accepted by the Excise Commissioner because it was likely to cause financial loss to the State. It was in that context (hat the Supreme Court held that it is for the Government to decide whether the "price offered at auction is adequate or not and whether the bid should be accepted or rejected. The mere offer of a bid does not create any vested right in the bidder. Since the Court accepted that the Government had not accepted the highest bid because the same was likely to cause financial loss to the Corporation, it held that adequate price being the principal factor, the Court should have accepted the decision as just and fair. This case is again not the authority for the proposition that the judicial review of exercise of discretion is also barred. Indeed in para-8 of the judgment the Supreme Court has observed that if the High Court thought that the Excise Commissioners approach to the problem was wrong or that he had applied incorrect criteria or taken into account irrelevant considerations, the proper thing to do was to indicate the rightful approach, the correct criteria and the relevant considerations and to direct the Excise Commissioner to reconsider the matter in proper perspective. These observations would indicate that the Court did not hold that the exercise of discretion is beyond the purview of judicial review. Under the circumstances, this court does not find any decision contrary to decision in State of Haryana and others v. Jage Ram and others (supra). It must consequently be held that the action of the respondent Financial Commissioner in so far as it rejects the bid of the petitioner and directs its sale by private negotiations is not a valid exercise of power. It smacks of favouritism and is arbitrary and for that reason cannot be allowed to stand. 8. There is yet another reason why the exercise of powers by the respondent Financial Commissioner cannot be held to be legal and justified. Rule 36 (25) of the said Rules deals with the situation where the Financial Commissioner does not confirm the highest bid and directs the Collector to re-sale the licence by private contract or negotiations or by tender. This Rule provides that if the re-sale is by tender, these Rules shall apply as far as may be, meaning thereby that wide publicity should be given of this changed mode so that all those who may be interested may participate. In the instant case, negotiations was invited only for Shimla-I and II. No one was informed that there has been re-grouping and, therefore, no one except the two, had the opportunity of making their offers. Public property like the exclusive privilege in vending liquor cannot be sold in such a manner. Due publicity is not only the requirement of the Rules but also otherwise an important aspect of fair play in action. In this view of the matter, this Court is of the view that the decision of the respondent Financial Commissioner to sell Rampur Bushar Group of vends by private negotiation is also illegal and unconstitutional. 9. The aforesaid would be sufficient to hold that allotment of vends to respondent No. 6 was illegal and unconstitutional. The allotment is made only for a period of one year and nine months of the said year have already expired. 9. The aforesaid would be sufficient to hold that allotment of vends to respondent No. 6 was illegal and unconstitutional. The allotment is made only for a period of one year and nine months of the said year have already expired. Even if this Court directs the respondent Financial Commissioner to re-consider the matter of confirmation of the petitioners bid, it will take some time for the said Commissioner to give his decision., If eventually the petitioner is granted licence he would hardly have two months to work the said licence. Clearly this course will not be beneficial to the petitioner. Even quashing the grant in favour of respondent No. 6 would not be in public interest as the same will require alternative arrangements to be made which may be difficult. Under the circumstances this Court would not consider it in the interest of justice to either quash the grant in favour of respondent No. 6 or direct re-consideration of confirmation of petitioners bid. The petitioner was in fact entering into a business contract only for making profit The injustice done to him can be un-done by suitably awarding compensation for loss suffered by him. Compensatory justice is now a part of administration of justice and can be resorted to in suitable cases. The decision of the Supreme Court in Rudul Shah v. State of Bihar, AIR 1983 SC 1086 ; Bhim Singh v. State of Jammu and Kashmir, AIR 1986 SC 494 and Peoples Union for Democratic Rights v. State of Bihar, AIR 1987 SC 355, are the leading cases laying down the aforesaid law. It is true that these cases deal with the situation covered under Article 21 of the Constitution But there is no reason to limit the application of this law to cases of violation of Article 21 only. The facts of the present case would justify the application of the aforesaid law in this case which deals with Article 14 of the Constitution. We would, therefore, think that awarding just and fair compensation to the petitioner would meet the ends of justice in the instant case. The facts of the present case would justify the application of the aforesaid law in this case which deals with Article 14 of the Constitution. We would, therefore, think that awarding just and fair compensation to the petitioner would meet the ends of justice in the instant case. Taking into consideration the fact that he was purchasing the privilege of vending liquor for 1.90 crores, we would award a sum of rupees one lac as compensation for the injustice done to him and would direct the respondents No.1 to 5 to pay the petitioner the said amount within a period of four weeks from today. Failure to pay the said amount will carry interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the date of this order till the date of payment. The petitioner is also held entitled to costs from respondents No.1 to 5. Counsels fee Rs. 5,000, only. Decided accordingly.