Judgment :- The fourth defendant, auction purchaser in O.S.No.132 of 1973 of the Additional Sub Court, Parur is the revision petitioner. This revision is against the order passed on E.P.No. 533 of 1990 in the above suit. The petitioner purchased properties in Sy.Nos. 247/16, 247/14 and 247/13 having an extent of one acre and 89 cents of Vadakkekara Village in court auction on 21-7-1981. The sale was confirmed and he was granted sale certificate. Subsequently by E.P.No. 296 of 1982 filed on 13-10-1992 he got delivery of the properties in Sy.Nos. 247/13 and 247/14 having an extent of 1 acre and 34 cents. According to him an extent of 53 cents in Sy.No. 247/16 remained to be delivered, for which he filed E.A.No. 63 of 1984 in E.P.296 of 1982, which was closed on 13-10-1988 with an observation that he may file a fresh execution petition for delivery. E.P.296 of 1982 was also closed reserving his right to file a fresh execution petition. He challenged the correctness of the order in C.R.P.No.1363 of 1989 before this Court, which was dismissed on the ground that the court below had reserved to him in the impugned order his right to file a fresh execution petition and agitate his complaint as to short delivery. It was specifically stated that "the dismissal of the C.R.P. will not preclude the petitioner from filing a fresh application. Accordingly he filed E.P.533 of 1990 seeking delivery of 53 cents in Sy.No. 247/16 but it was dismissed by the court below by the impugned order, which, it is submitted, is illegal and therefore has to be set aside. 2. Heard. 3. According to the petitioner there was a short delivery of the property purchased by him in court auction and covered by the sale certificate he had obtained. Pursuant to E.P.296 of 1982 filed on 13-10-1982 he got delivery of only 1 acre 34 cents. He filed E.A.63 of 1984 in the above E.P. which and the E.P. were "closed" without adjudication, reserving his right to make a fresh execution petition. Indeed the "closure" was not by way of a judicial disposal. Indeed this court also had in C.R.P.No.1363 of 1989 filed against the above order observed that he will not be precluded from making a fresh application. Indeed the "closure" was not by way of a judicial disposal. Indeed this court also had in C.R.P.No.1363 of 1989 filed against the above order observed that he will not be precluded from making a fresh application. In my view, E.P.533 of 1990 filed in the context of the orders of the execution court and of this court in the C.R.P. was in fact a continuation of the E.P. filed earlier and not made afresh for a contention as to limitation, as urged, to have any relevance or force. Indeed it is the duty of the execution court to see mat the properties sold and purchased by the petitioner are delivered to him in execution and consider whether his allegation as to short delivery is justified or not. The said allegation raised before the execution court was left undecided and to that extent it had failed to discharge its duty. It may not be correct to say that the present application ought to have been filed within one year of the date of disposal of the revision petition on 13-7-1989.1 fail to understand how that date was at all relevant for computing the period of limitation under Art.134. I agree as submitted that the present execution petition filed on 9-11-1990 was in continuation of or a step in aid of E.P.296 of 1982 that was closed on 13-10-1988. 4. No doubt this court in Antony v. Antony (1987 KLJ 489) had held that: "Where an auction purchaser's application for delivery happens to be dismissed for his default, the effect of such a judicial disposal-could not be got over by equating it to "striking off the application for statistical purposes, If the dismissal of an application for non-payment of batta is judicial disposal foreclosing "revival" of the same on the filing of another application employing suitable words of camouflage, the position must be more so where the first application is dismissed, as in the present case as "not pressed". It will be improper to allow auction purchasers to file delivery applications in time and get it dismissed, and then to approach the court again, years later, with pleas of "revival", "step-in-aid", "in continuation of and the like." 5. It will be improper to allow auction purchasers to file delivery applications in time and get it dismissed, and then to approach the court again, years later, with pleas of "revival", "step-in-aid", "in continuation of and the like." 5. Obviously this is not a case where the earlier execution petition was dismissed or "struck off for the sole default of the petitioner and that he sought to revive it by a fresh execution petition under the label of a step-in-aid. We have to see to the substance of the matter and not its form. It was observed in Pentapati China Venkanna v. Pentapati Bangararaju (AIR 1964 SC 1454) that: "It is true that courts have condemned the practice of executing courts using expressions like "closed', "closed for statistical purposes", "struck off, "recorded" etc. and they also pointed out that there was no provision in the Code of Civil Procedure for making such orders; but assuming that the Court has no such power, the passing of such an order cannot tantamount to an order of dismissal, for the intention of the court in making an order "closed" for statistical purposes is manifest. It is intended not to finally dispose of the application but to keep it pending. Whether the order was without jurisdiction or whether it was valid, the legal position would be the same, in one case it would be ignored and in the other, it would mean what it stated. In either case the execution petition would be pending on the file of the court. That apart, it is not the phraseology used by the executing court that really matters, but it is really the substance of the order that is material. Whatever terminology may be used, it is for the court to ascertain, having regard to His circumstances under which the said order was made, whether the court intended to finally terminate the execution proceedings. If it did not intend to do so, it must be held that the execution proceedings were pending on the file of the court." Indeed the execution petition could have been termed as fresh if relief had been asked for against parties or properties different from those proceeded against in the previous execution petition or a relief substantially different from that asked for earlier had been claimed, which is indeed not the case here. 6. 6. The earlier execution petition was filed within time, but was closed not by way of judicial disposal, but apparently for statistical purposes. In other words, the execution petition was not closed after its merits had been judicially assessed. Indeed the decree holder had taken all the necessary steps to get delivery of the property. There was no default on his part, and the court indeed was not justified to close it without securing him the fruits of the decree in their entirety; Obviously that execution petition must be held to be pending and the present petition was only to remind the court that its job had not been entirely done. As observed in Mutha Pukhraj Ratanjee v. Ganesh Mull Adaji (1983 (1) MLJ 443): "The effect of such closure of applications in execution for statistical purpose is well-settled. To "close" an application on account of an inability to immediately carry out the order owing to an obstruction, for instance, tantamount s to the postponement of the carrying out of the order and this can be equated to a dismissal of the application. The Court treats the proceedings as closed only for statistical purposes. The earlier application must be still deemed to be pending and the subsequent application filed by the petitioner was only in the nature of a reminder to the Court drawing its attention to the pendency of the earlier application and requesting the Court to make the necessary steps to deliver effective possession of the properly. For making such an application, there is no question of applicability of Art.134 or any other Article of the Limitation Act." 7. I am not inclined to agree with the correctness of the impugned order, which is accordingly set aside. The execution petition is not barred by limitation. I direct the court below to restore it to file for fresh disposal in accordance with law. The revision is allowed as above.