M. F. SALDANHA, J. ( 1 ) IN this writ petition; the first of them being with regard to the ambit and scope of the powers that are vested in the authorities belonging to the education department of the state government and the second aspect of the matter is with regard to the enforceability of orders or directions that may be issued by those authorities. In essence, these two questions are somewhat interrelated but having regard to the fact that they concern a very important field namely the management of primary and secondary educational institutions in the State of karnataka, it is very necessary that there should be a clear pronouncement in this regard. The background to the dispute is being briefly summarised only to the extent that it is relevant. ( 2 ) THE petitioner-society, which is the shivaji education society is a registered co-operative society and runs three educational institutions in the district of uttara kannada. These are private schools and they are also aided institutions and therefore, the grant-in-aid code applies to these institutions. Though they are private educational institutions it is not disputed that by virtue of the fact that they are aided and more importantly by virtue of the fact that they are recognised institutions, they do come under the general supervisory control of the education department. According to the petitioners, One Prakash V. Naik Who was an assistant teacher working at their school at hankon was required to be kept under suspension with effect from 12-11-1990 and this created a vacancy in the school which affected the students. They therefore transferred the fourth respondent who was at that time attached as a teacher at the high school at baad to hankon by an order dated 29-6-1991. Respondent 4 joined the school on 3-7-1991. The d. d. p. i. , karwar in the course of communications dated 11-10-1991, 15-11-1991 and 3-12-1991 disapproved of the transfer of respondent 4 to the hankon school and consequently his salary bills in respect of that institution were not honoured. The petitioners thereupon approached the chief secretary, zilla parishad, karwar who gave his approval for the transfer dated 16-12-1991. By a subsequent order dated 8-1-1992 he withheld the earlier approval and the acting chief secretary thereafter passed an order dated 6-3-1992 withdrawing the earlier approval granted on 16-12-1991. The petitioners thereupon approached the chief secretary, zilla parishad, karwar who gave his approval for the transfer dated 16-12-1991. By a subsequent order dated 8-1-1992 he withheld the earlier approval and the acting chief secretary thereafter passed an order dated 6-3-1992 withdrawing the earlier approval granted on 16-12-1991. The petitioners contend that this action was taken on the basis of communications from the d. d. p. i. , that the facts had been misrepresented to the zilla parishad and further more that the order dated 6-3-1992 ought not to have been passed without hearing them. ( 3 ) THE commissioner of public instructions by a circular dated 15-1-1990 has issued instructions that if a teacher is to be transferred from one aided institution to another aided institution under the same management, that the management would have to seek the permission or prior approval of the secretary, zilla parishad before transferring the teacher. It is on the basis of this circular that the d. d. p. i. , karwar addressed two letters dated 19-8-1992 and 2-9-1992 to the petitioners directing them to relieve respondent 4 from the hankon high school. The d. d. p. i. thereafter passed another order dated 15-9-1992 where under he deputed his education officer to relieve respondent 4 from the assignment at hankon. The petitioners have attacked the validity of the circular dated 15-1-1990 because it is their contention that by virtue of the Provisions of Rule 59 of the grant-in-aid code, that the prior sanction of the authorities is only necessary in those cases where a teacher is being transferred from one institution to another institution under different managements. They contend that on a clear reading of Rule 59 that if the two institutions are managed by the same authority, that then the transfer is an internal affair and that it therefore does not require the prior sanction of the authorities concerned. Apart from this, what is also contended is that the d. d. p. i. , karwar had no authority in the aforesaid background to direct that respondent 4 should be relieved from the school at hankon and that he should be repatriated to the institution at baad. Apart from this, what is also contended is that the d. d. p. i. , karwar had no authority in the aforesaid background to direct that respondent 4 should be relieved from the school at hankon and that he should be repatriated to the institution at baad. More importantly, the petitioners have seriously assailed the exercise of power both by the d. d. p. i. and by his education officer in relieving the teacher from the institution at hankon and directing the management to allow him to work at baad. The petitioners did not permit the respondent 4 to rejoin his duties at baad as a result of which, having been relieved from the institute at hankon he has not been able to work at either of the two institutions. A serious grievance was made on his behalf by his learned Advocate that as a result of this dispute, that the respondent 4 is not able to either attend to his duties on the one hand and that on the other hand, he is not receiving his salary and this court by an interim order directed that the teacher should be paid his salary for part of that period. ( 4 ) I need to dispose of a preliminary objection that has been canvassed with regard to the maintainability of this petition. On behalf of the society the petition has been presented by the hon'rary secretary and a serious dispute has arisen in the course of the pleadings with regard to his authority to do so. References have been made to the bye-laws etc. But i do not consider is essential to go into that aspect of the matter because I am satisfied that the petition has been validly presented and that therefore, there is no infirmity with regard to its maintainability. ( 5 ) THE principal contention raised by the petitioners' learned Advocate is with regard to the power that has been exercised by the officers of the respondent-department in the circumstances indicated by me above. He has contended that under the grant-in-aid code, the department by virtue of the fact that certain financial assistance is rendered to the institutions, is entitled to lay down certain conditions or guidelines which are synonymous with the financial aid that is extended. He has contended that under the grant-in-aid code, the department by virtue of the fact that certain financial assistance is rendered to the institutions, is entitled to lay down certain conditions or guidelines which are synonymous with the financial aid that is extended. Learned Advocate submits that this does not invest the authorities with the jurisdiction to pass orders with regard to the conditions of service of the employees. He states that the employees of a private institution are governed by the relationship of master and servant between the management and themselves and that therefore, the department's officers have no right to interfere with regard to the inter se relationships between the two parties. He submits that whatever conditions or directions the department may seek to convey to a private management of an aided institution, that undoubtedly there is an obligation on the part of the institution to follow these but the real thrust of the argument is insofar as if there is a difference of opinion between the department and the management in a given instance and if the management contends bona fide that it is not obliged to comply with any such condition or direction that the only consequence can be financial insofar as the grant can be withdrawn. Learned Advocate submits that the authorities have no right conferred by statute and that consequently, they cannot insist on enforcing their directions. The submission proceeds to the extent that the learned Advocate contends that even assuming various powers have been transferred to the zilla parishad under the Act, that even those authorities cannot exercise a jurisdiction which was not vested originally in the department itself. ( 6 ) IN this context, the petitioners learned Advocate has proceeded to advance the second limb of his argument whereby he points out to the court that a clear distinction will have to be made between administrative functions and the redressal of service disputes. In this regard, he contends that as far as administrative instructions are concerned, that the same are unenforceable and that on the other hand, if there is a dispute in relation to anything that has happened within the broad framework of service matters under the Karnataka private educational institutions (discipline and control) Act, 1995 that the only judicial authority competent to adjudicate on the dispute to enforce its orders is the tribunal. Consequently, what the learned Advocate submits is that in the present case if the teacher was in any way aggrieved by the action that it was open to him to have approached the tribunal for redressal of the service dispute and that the authority concerned would have passed appropriate orders. According to the learned advocate, the action on the part of the departmental authorities was wholly and completely without jurisdiction and that therefore, the petitioners, were not obliged to comply with those orders and if the authorities have wrongly enforced those orders, that as a necessary consequences of the reliefs to which the petitioners are entitled to, that a direction be issued to reverse that action. ( 7 ) THE petitioners learned Advocate has relied on a few decisions in support of his submissions which i shall deal with. In the first instance, he relies on a division bench decision of this court in P. Pundalika Shenoy v Canara High School Association, mangalore and others. The division bench of this court laid down that in matters pertaining to discipline and control in connection with employees of private educational institutions the field is completely occupied by the act and the rules and that the grant-in-aid code rules which earlier occupied this field virtually stand displaced. Petitioners learned Advocate has submitted on the basis of this ruling that even assuming, under the old set up that the departmental authorities could exercise certain powers that this could not have been done by them in the present case. The dispute was in relation to a transfer and that it comes within the ambit of service dispute in respect of which, only the tribunal would have had jurisdiction. The next decision relied on by the petitioners learned Advocate is in the case of State of Assam and another v Ajit kumar sharma and others , wherein the court had occasion to observe, in the case of an aided college in the State of assam, that the rules in question are in the nature of administrative instructions without any statutory force. He therefore submitted that it is within the discretion of the management to either observe those instructions or not to observe them and that it is permissible according to the learned Advocate in cases where wrong instructions are issued or where the instructions are issued without authority of law for a management to resist those instructions. ( 8 ) THE petitioners learned Advocate has drawn my attention to another decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Kum. Regina v St. Alosyus higher elementary school and another , as also another decision of the Supreme Court in the case of cyril E. Fernandes v Sr. Myria Lydia and others , in support of his contention that the law of master and servant that exists between the management of a private aided institution and a teacher remains unchanged and that the conditions of the grant-in-aid code are mere executive directions. What the learned Advocate is basically striving at is the fact that the mere financial assistance which such an educational institution receives does not change the character of the relationship between the employer and employee, that the instructions if any are an issue between the management and the department and that in the event of a dispute arising, that the same is required to be resolved by a separate authority namely the tribunal. In support of this submission, he has relied on an earlier decision of this court in the case of Lakshmikanthan v Commissioner for Public Instructions , wherein this court was dealing with the right to appoint principals of junior colleges and the court held that in the event of a dispute, the only remedy for the person aggrieved was to approach the educational appellate tribunal. The court did not approve of an order passed by the joint director of public instructions directing the management to replace the petitioner by the 4th respondent. The court did not approve of an order passed by the joint director of public instructions directing the management to replace the petitioner by the 4th respondent. The last decision relied on by the learned Advocate is also an earlier decision of a division bench of this court in the case of L. Maruthi v State of Karnataka and others , wherein this court pointed out that while exercising jurisdiction under article 226 of the constitution, it is duty bound that this court ensures that the authorities functioning within its jurisdiction keep themselves within the bounds of rules and regulations and that they do not exceed their authority nor act in violation thereof. On the basis of these principles, it has been contended that the circular in question is liable to be struck down and further more, that this court ought to also quash the action of the respondents who have sought to enforce their directions. ( 9 ) THE learned government Advocate who appears on behalf of the authorities as also the zilla parishad, has contended that the general condition under which grants are made available to aided institution require that they must abide by all rules and regulations that have been promulgated by the government. He further goes on to illustrate that under Rule 11 (7), the institution is subject to inspection and that the supervisory jurisdiction of the department is clearly provided for. In particular, the learned government Advocate relies on Rule 16 (7) where under there is an obligation on the part of the authorities to report and obtain approval of the inspecting officer for all appointments and changes made in the staff. Coming to the facts of the present case, the learned government Advocate adds that when a grant is given by the department, that it is virtually a grant in personam insofar as the grant in question is the reimbursement of the salary of that particular teacher. He has also drawn my attention to the fact that under the scheme that governs the general power of supervision of the department, that there are various rules and regulations whereby the manner in which the institutions are run and managed is regulated by the department. He has also drawn my attention to the fact that under the scheme that governs the general power of supervision of the department, that there are various rules and regulations whereby the manner in which the institutions are run and managed is regulated by the department. He submits that in this background, since the Constitution of the teachers of a particular school cannot be unilaterally changed without the department approving of the same that it is erroneous to paraphrase Rule 59 and contend that a private management can alter the staff pattern without sanction of the department. The learned government Advocate submits that Rule 59 has no application in this case because according to him, that contingency arises only where a teacher is transferred to an institution under a different management and it is therefore essential to obtain permission in respect of that category of cases. It is his submission that the general Provisions still apply in respect of all staff members and that it is therefore wrong to assume that the management is within its authority to transfer the teacher from one institution to the other without obtaining the sanction of the department. He submits, with the assistance of a practical illustration that as far as the salary bills are concerned, that these are sanctioned teacherwise and institutionwise and that therefore, the department has every right to be kept informed with regard to the changes if any even if the institutions are under the same management because it affects the structure of financial aid of that particular institution. ( 10 ) DEALING with the scheme of the Karnataka zilla parishads, taluk panchayats samithis, mandal panchayats and nyaya panchayat Act, 1983 (hereinafter referred to as the Zilla Parishad Act), specific reliance is placed on Section 182 and in particular xi (b) and (c) thereof whereunder the zilla parishad has been invested with the functions of survey of education and maintenance of primary and secondary schools. Under Section 184 of the Act, the transfer of all these functions has been affected from the education department to the zilla parishad. He also points out that by a gazette notification dated 3-4-1987, all matters in relation to secondary education have been specifically made over to the zilla parishad. Under Section 184 of the Act, the transfer of all these functions has been affected from the education department to the zilla parishad. He also points out that by a gazette notification dated 3-4-1987, all matters in relation to secondary education have been specifically made over to the zilla parishad. It is in this background, that the learned government Advocate submits that the circular dated 15-1-1990 which has been assailed in the present petition has validly been issued because it is his submission that the power to oversee the management of the primary and secondary schools and the power to grant sanction in respect of transfer of teachers vests in the zilla parishad by virtue of the Provisions of Section 184 of the act and that consequently, there is no legal infirmity whatsoever with regard to this circular. ( 11 ) DEALING with the facts of this case, the learned government Advocate has come down heavily on the petitioners' conduct insofar as he submits, that it unthinkable to conceive of a situation whereunder the management of a private school be permitted to act in defiance of orders or directions either by the department or by the zilla parishad, as the case may be and he submits, therefore that in those cases where the department issues directions or instructions that it is absolutely obligatory on the part of the authorities to follow these. The learned government Advocate submits that perhaps the only very minor error what was committed in the present case arose from the fact that the officers of the education department enforced their directions overlooking the fact that these powers as far as the petitioners institutions were concerned in fact vested in the zilla parishad authorities. The learned government Advocate submits that perhaps the only very minor error what was committed in the present case arose from the fact that the officers of the education department enforced their directions overlooking the fact that these powers as far as the petitioners institutions were concerned in fact vested in the zilla parishad authorities. He submits that this aspect of the matter is really technical and he points out to the court that in the present instance the teacher had complained that he was wrongly transferred; that this was an act of harassment and victimisation; that he was a senior specially qualified teacher to look after n. c. c. functions; that there are specific directions of the government that such a teacher should be posted in schools where these functions are available and where the same can be put to good use; that the transfer to hankon was unjustified as it was due to certain other extraneous reasons and more importantly that the institution at hankon did not have the n. c. c. facilities at all. The learned government Advocate submitted that the non-observance of the directions by the petitioner-institution was an act of defiance and that the department's officer therefore genuinely and in good faith believed that in the interest of this teacher, that the order must be enforced. He points out to the court one very serious circumstance namely that there was a widespread agitation by all the teachers in support of respondent 4 and that there was also a widespread strike, that as an initial measure, the grant to the petitioners was withdrawn but that it was pointed out to the department that this step only punished all the remaining innocent teachers whose salaries could not be paid to them and that therefore such a course of action was inadvisable. He strongly submitted that on the facts and in the circumstances of this case, no interference is warranted. ( 12 ) LEARNED advocates who represent respondent 4 have reiterated these submissions and contended that Rule 59 would not be the Rule that governs the situation in this case. It is their contention that the powers validly vest in the zilla parishad by virtue of sections 182 and 184 of the act and that consequently, the circular has been validly issued. It is their contention that the powers validly vest in the zilla parishad by virtue of sections 182 and 184 of the act and that consequently, the circular has been validly issued. Dealing with the facts of the present case, learned advocates contended that the respondent 4 is not at all at fault and that he is a victim of the dispute between the management, department and the various authorities; that he was perfectly willing to continue with his teaching activity and that he has been wrongly prevented and that therefore regardless of what view is taken in this matter, that his full salary for the entire period must be paid to him. It has also been pointed out to me that annexure-r8 is the joining report dated 16-9-1992 and that the respondent 4 has not committed the least impropriety and that this court should therefore direct that he should not in any way be affected by the present dispute. ( 13 ) ON a careful consideration of the submissions canvassed on behalf of the three contesting parties, the various Provisions of the grant-in-aid code, the Zilla Parishad Act and other relevant Provisions as also the law on the point that has been very lucidly illustrated in the aforesaid decisions, the position that emerges is that after the promulgation of the Zilla Parishad Act, that there can be no dispute about the fact that the overall jurisdiction and control in respect of even the private aided institutions does vet with the zilla parishad. Under these circumstances, the departmental authorities were fully justified in issuing the circular dated 15-9-1990 pointing out that even in respect of transfers from one institution to the other, that it is necessary to obtain the approval of the zilla parishad. I do not dispute the fact that the basic relationship between the management of such an institution and the teacher is one of master and servant. The petitioners' learned Advocate has vehemently submitted that the power to appoint and the power to remove should also include the power to transfer. He is right with regard to this submission but what is overlooked in his argument that the exercise of that power is necessarily required to be regulated for very good reasons. The petitioners' learned Advocate has vehemently submitted that the power to appoint and the power to remove should also include the power to transfer. He is right with regard to this submission but what is overlooked in his argument that the exercise of that power is necessarily required to be regulated for very good reasons. Undoubtedly, in appropriate cases where exigencies so require the management can certainly transfer an employee from one institution to another provided the various norms have been observed. One cannot loose sight of the fact that the power to transfer is a power that is often misused and that power can ruin an employee as far as his career and his peace of mind. If that power is exercised arbitrarily or improperly and resulted in an untimely transfer or a transfer that seriously damages an employee's career or a transfer under such circumstances that can be regarded as oppressive or capricious it is required to be prevented because once the damage is done, corrective action is not easy. Even though it is argued that the teacher must go to a judicial authority or to a tribunal for redressal, the court needs to take a correct balanced view of the situation whereunder the scheme of the administrative control is to the effect that such damage should be avoided as far as possible instead of allowing the damage to take place and then making an aggrieved party run from one forum to another for corrective action. It is in this situation to my mind, that the authorities have directed that in cases where transfers are being effected from one institution to the other, that the approval of the authorities must be obtained. Where the transfer is genuine and bona fide, there can be no difficulty in making such a transfer but in such cases where the transfer appears to be oppressive or unjustified, there can be no two opinions about the fact that some supervisory authority must look into the matter and ensure that a wrong order is not implemented. Where the transfer is genuine and bona fide, there can be no difficulty in making such a transfer but in such cases where the transfer appears to be oppressive or unjustified, there can be no two opinions about the fact that some supervisory authority must look into the matter and ensure that a wrong order is not implemented. It is this aspect of the matter that is paramount and in this background to my mind the learned government Advocate and the learned Advocate who represents respondent 4 are fully justified in their submission that the power to transfer in respect of all institutions whether between the same management or different, must be supervised and controlled by the appropriate authority. To my mind, the submission canvassed by the petitioners' learned Advocate with regard to whether the directions under the grant-in-aid code or directions issued in exercise of the powers that flow from the provision of the Zilla Parishad Act can be enforced or not is really academic. Under the General Clauses Act, the power to make an order includes the power to vary that order and the power to rescind that order. To my mind, it would be far-fetched for anybody to argue that where a power to make an order exits, that there is no power to enforce that order. If this were to be upheld, then the power itself would rendered nugatory. I do not dispute that while interpreting the Provisions of the grant-in-aid code, the courts have had occasion to observe that the directions are not statutory directions and that therefore, the only remedy in the case of disobedience or defiance would be to withdraw the grant or the recommendation. That remedy, as has been demonstrated by the facts in this case, is a totally innocuous remedy and a remedy which would lead both the students and teachers to suffer. Under these circumstances to my mind the correct view would be to hold that where a power to issue direction or orders exists, that it is implicit that the authority is invested with the power to enforce those directions or orders. To my mind, that is the only correct interpretation in situations of this type and it is very important because the present case has demonstrated a rather disturbing situation. To my mind, that is the only correct interpretation in situations of this type and it is very important because the present case has demonstrated a rather disturbing situation. I do concede that in the present instance, since the petitioners have contended that they genuinely and bona fide believed that the orders were without jurisdiction, that they were entitled to challenge them and therefore since that issue which was yet to be resolved had arisen, one cannot really hold what has happened against the present petitioners. However, once the position has been clarified it would be an act of rank indiscipline on the part of a management to disregard or defy the directions coming from the department or from any other appropriate authority. One does realise that there may be situations whereunder such a direction may be unreasonable or incorrect but the law provides remedies for the correction of that situation. That would not however justify a situation being pleaded whereby the argument is that the instructions are merely administrative and therefore the management is within its right to defy any such directive. I am in agreement with the argument put forward by the learned government Advocate that the aspect of propriety is paramount. If the managements themselves do not act with a sense of propriety and do not conform to administrative orders, it would be impossible to expect any degree or discipline from the staff and students of those institutions. In this background, I am firmly of the view that once it is demonstrated that the power to issue directions exists, then it will have to be held that the authorities do have the power to enforce those directions. ( 14 ) COMING to the facts of the present case, the position that emerges is that the petitioners have contended that on their understanding of the Provisions of Rule 59, that they were not required to obtain prior permission. That has now been clarified. However, at the point of time when the Present Action took place, the petitioners contend that they went by the letter of Rule 59. I do concede that Rule 59 is not very well worded and therefore there was sufficient scope for the petitioners to have proceeded on that basis. That has now been clarified. However, at the point of time when the Present Action took place, the petitioners contend that they went by the letter of Rule 59. I do concede that Rule 59 is not very well worded and therefore there was sufficient scope for the petitioners to have proceeded on that basis. Under these circumstances, i do not propose to uphold the view that the respondents have projected that the petitioners have acted in defiance of the orders because if one sees the scheme of the submissions, the plea was taken up that it was their understanding of the Provisions that entitled them to that course of action. In this background therefore, even though the petition fails and the validity of the circular is upheld, i need to clarify that the last part of the action namely that the orders were enforced by the education officer was perhaps incorrect. However that aspect of the matter is rendered completely academic because the very order which was enforced by him would otherwise have been enforced by the zilla parishad authorities. The mere fact that the orders were enforced by the wrong forum will not make any difference to the order because one needs to take cognizance of the fact that since the prior permission or the sanction of the zilla parishad was not forthcoming in this case, that the transfer order itself was bad and therefore that respondent 4 would have had to be restored to his original position at the high school at baad. ( 15 ) IT is in this background that the petitioners are directed to permit the respondent 4 to rejoin his duties at the school at baad with effect from 15-12-1995. The respondent 4 has received his salary for some months under the interim orders of this court. The petitioners shall prepare and submit to the department within a period of thirty days of the petitioner rejoining his duties the salary bills for the entire period for which the teacher has not received his salary namely from the month of July 1992. This is a case in which, thanks mainly to the various misunderstandings of the Provisions that some erroneous actions have resulted. This is a case in which, thanks mainly to the various misunderstandings of the Provisions that some erroneous actions have resulted. Now that the legal position has been clarified, the department shall ensure that the salary bills that are submitted by the petitioners as far as respondent 4 is concerned are approved and that he receives payments within a period of two months from the date on which the salary bills are submitted to the department. ( 16 ) I need to clarify, that under normal circumstances the petitioner who is a regular teacher would have been paid his salary for this entire period of time regardless of whether he was in the first or the second of the institutions. It is because of the various conflicting Provisions and the ambiguity that has arisen that respondent 4 should not be made to suffer for the same. Under these circumstances, the direction to pay him his salary for the entire period is only a direction to pay him what he would have normally been entitled to receive. ( 17 ) IN the light of the above, the petition fails and stands disposed of. Interim orders if any to stand vacated. No order as to costs. --- *** --- .