JUDGMENT 1. - This is a second round of litigation by filing this writ petition again in this court challenging the acquisition proceedings in respect of land comprising in khasra No. 294 and 295 of village Chak Sudarshanpura, Jaipur, on which Rajasthan Legislative Assembly Building is being constructed now. A notification under Section 4 of the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act was issued on 13.5.60 and the said notification was published on 9.6.60. The declaration under Section 6 was issued on 3.5.61 and published in the Gazette on 11.7.61. The award was passed on 19.1.1964 in favour of Kalyan, Keshar Lal and Banwarilal. In the award besides the compensation right of 1000 sq. yard land was also given which matter now stands concluded by the decision of the Apex Court in the case of JDA v. Radhey Shyam 1994(4) SCC 370 and for that reason this point is not pressed in the present writ petition. The grievance of the petitioners is for the acquisition of the land on the ground that the possession of the land has not been taken and there is no payment of compensation and therefore the acquisition of the land should be declared ineffective on account of inordinate delay. 2. The petitioner purchased the said land by registered sale deed on 25.2.1970 and thereafter the petitioner has filed a writ petition which was decided on 31.3.1971. The writ petition was dismissed on the ground of delay. The special appeal was also dismissed on 12.4.73 and the case is reported in Surajmal and others v. State of kajasthan, AIR 1974 Raj. 116 . The petitioner had gone to the Supreme Court and the order of the Apex Court is reported in AIR 1974 SC 2085 , where the judgment of this court was upheld and it was held that the writ petition has rightly been dismissed on the ground of delay. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that now after the judgment of the Supreme Court the respondents were bound to make the payment in terms of rule 27 of the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Rules, 1956 wherein it has been provided that as soon as the award has been announced the Collector shall proceed to pay compensation awarded to those who are present and who accept the award. The attention has been drawn to the provisions of Section 31 of the Act wherein it is provided that on making the award under Section 11 the Collector shall tender payment of the compensation and costs if any awarded by him to the persons interested and entitled thereto according to the award and shall pay it' to them unless prevented by some one or more of the contingencies mentioned in sub-section (2). It is submitted that reference was made under Section 18 of the Act and it has been said that the land has already been sold to the petitioners and therefore the compensation has to be paid to the petitioners. It is submitted that the.civil court in its order has directed the JDA to make the payment in terms of the award, but the payment of compensation has not been made till date. So far as this contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is concerned, learned counsel has not filed a copy of the submissions made under Section 18 by the awardee or the order passed by the Civil Court in the proceedings under Section 18 of the Act. Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on the case of Satyendra Kumar v. Union of India, 53(1994) Delhi Law Times-181 were the acquisition proceedings were quashed on account of delay in making the payment and also on taking possession. The Court came to the conclusion that since the compensation was not paid nor the possession was taken over 20 years in making the award, the acquisition proceedings cannot be said to have been completed and on that ground the notification under Section 4 and declaration under Section 6 were quashed. In the present case possession has been taken on 6.4.71. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that this is a forged document. It appears that this is only an after thought inasmuch as this point was available to the petitioners at the time when the earlier writ petition was filed or atleast when the contempt proceedings were taken against the respondents and in that case specific point was raised that possession has already been taken. In any case, whether the document is false or forged or not is disputed question of facts and no finding can be recorded thereon. In any case, whether the document is false or forged or not is disputed question of facts and no finding can be recorded thereon. Since the possession has already been taken before filing the earlier writ petition wherein the acquisition proceedings were challenged, it was open to the petitioners to challenge the acquisition proceedings on that ground and no such fact was brought to the notice of this court. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that purchaser of the land has right to challenge the validity of the notifications and for that purpose decision in the case of Smt. Gunwant Kaur and Ann v. Municipal Committee Bhatinda and Ors., (1989)3 SCC 769 has been relied. So far as this judgment is concerned, from the law laid down by the Apex Court the only thing which can be said is that the purchaser has a right to challenge the notification regarding the validity of Section 5A proceedings. In that case the land was purchased on 4.4.61 and 5.11.62 respectively by first and second appellant. The notification under Section 4 was issued on 26.6.59 and declaration under Section 6 was issued on 6.1.60. This judgment is not applicable because no award was passed in the case before the Supreme Court and before the award the purchase was made. In the present case the purchase has been made after about 6 years of the award and therefore the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court is not applicable to this case. There can be a dispute as to who are the persons entitled for compensation and who can claim a right to make a reference within the time provided under Section 18, a procedure has been laid down under Section 18 and bypassing that remedy the claim cannot be made in this court. It may also be observed that there was another round of litigation before the Apex Court and ultimately the matter was dismissed. The contention of the learned counsel for the respondents is that the petitioner has no locus standi to file the writ petition at such a belated stage and once the writ petition has been dismissed the second writ petition is not maintainable. This point is also considered by me in accordance with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The award of the Collector is final under Section 2. This point is also considered by me in accordance with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The award of the Collector is final under Section 2. It is the date of award on which any person could claim to be interested. The petitioner was not interested person on that date and therefore the award which was passed in 1964 is final between the Collector and Khatedar from whom the petitioner purchased the land. The petitioner purchased the land after the award was made and therefore it was his own risk and on that basis he cannot claim the right. Even the writ was filed by them out of 5 alleged purchasers of the land of undivided khata which portion has been sold is also disputed. If the order under Section 18 was passed in his favour as alleged then either the order should have been placed, or should have been challenged or otherwise action should have been taken. But once the award was passed, the award is identified on unless the award is modified. The question that compensation has not been paid or the possession has not been taken (which is not considered to be the correct position) the point could have been taken by the petitioner when the earlier writ petition was filed and the petitioner cannot be permitted to challenge the proceedings now after 30 year's of the award, the earlier writ petition having already been dismissed as stated above. The land not only vested with the respondents, but the construction of Rajasthan Legislative Assembly building is going on and therefore I do not find any justification to quash the acquisition proceedings. There is no justification for re-considering the matter-again. 4. Consequently, the writ petition has no force. It is hereby dismissed.Writ Petition dismissed. *******