S. R. SINGH, J. Petitioner Awadh Narain Tripathi was appointed as permanent lecturer in Sri Nehru Inter College, Othersiya, Etawah on 30-8-1974. In a mishap in the year 1985, Sri Ram Autar Tripathi, the confirmed Principal of the College sustained acid burns allegedly impairing his vision. White he was undergoing treatment, the petitioner supplanted him as officiat ing Principal and his signatures as such are said to have been attested too by the District Inspector of Schools on 19-9-1985. 2. As alleged in the petition, the petitioner was placed under suspension, vide order dated 15-3-1989, as officiating Principal of the College and served with a charge sheet on 17-4-1989. From a perusal of the record, it would transpire that the petitioner was taxed with the charges of: (1) unauthorised absence from duty from 26-12-1988 to 17-3-1989; (ii) Removal of certain records from the College ; (iii) Avoidance to receive postal communications/ letters from the Manager and thereby causing obstructions in the administra tion of the affairs of the institution ; (iv) attempt to take charge as officiating principal by falsifying documents exhibiting disability on the part of the permanent principal; and (v) Unauthorised operation of development funds account of the College and non-submission of statement of account thereof. 3. It transpires from a perusal of the period of the record that the disciplinary proceedings proceeded ex parte and climaxed with the guilt brought home to the petitioner as per inquiry report dated 6-10-1989. The Enquiry Sub-Committee climaxed its report dated 6-10-1989 with the findings that the petitioner was guilty of aforestated charges. The sub-committee, however, oscillated to indict the petitioner on the count of misappropriation of Rs. 4,000 out of the development funds in the absence of any evidence. 4. By means of resolution dated 27-10-1989, the Committee of Manage ment headed by Sri R. K. Chaturvedi resolved to terminate the services of the petitioner, Papers were transmitted to the Secondary Education Services Commission in short the Commission) for approval under Section 21 of the U. P. Secondary Education Services Commission Act, 1982 which stimulated the Commission to issue a show cause notice served on the petitioner on 10-2-1991. The petitioner submitted his written reply dated 11-3-1991. A single member sub-committee of the Commission heard separately the repre sentative of the Management on 5-6-1991 and the petitioner on 6-6-1991. The petitioner submitted his written reply dated 11-3-1991. A single member sub-committee of the Commission heard separately the repre sentative of the Management on 5-6-1991 and the petitioner on 6-6-1991. The single member sub-committee of the Commission concurred with the report submitted by the Enquiry sub-committee and the Commission in its meeting dated 5-7-1991 approved the managements proposal to terminate the petitioners services. 5. The Commission in its meeting held on 3-7-1991 gave imprimatur to the resolution of the committee of management for termination of peti tioners services and the decision so taken was communicated to the petitioner vide letter dated 25-7-1991, which has been impugned in this petition. 6. The learned counsel for the petitioner canvassed that the charges against the petitioner were non existent and that entire enquiry proceeding was violative of regulations 35, 36 and 37 of Chapter HI of the Regulations framed under the U. P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921 and natural justice and that the committee of management which passed the resolution for terminating the petitioners cervices lacked in validity and the dispute in respect thereof having been referred by the District Inspector of Schools to the Regional Deputy Director of Education under Section J 6-A (7) of the U. P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921, the latter had vide letter dated 16-1-1989 clearly directed that no faction should be recognised during the pendency of the dispute and therefore, proceeded the submission of the learned counsel, the enquiry as well as decision taken by the committee were liable to be discount ed. Indubitably the dispute as to validity of the committee of management constituted in December, 1988 was pending adjudication before the Regional Deputy Director of Education who had vide letter dated 16-1-1989 directed that no faction should be recognised during the pendency of the dispute pursuant to which the District Inspector of Schools, vide communication letter dated 25-1-1989, had informed Sri R. K. Chaturvedi that it was not possible to recognise any of the rival committees of management not even the old one. But the operation of the orders contained in letter dated 16-1-1989 and 25-1-1989 was stayed by the High Court vide interim order dated 13-2-1989 passed in writ petition No. 1946 of 1989 and it is admitted to the petitioner that Sri Radba Krishna Chaturvedi started functioning on the basis of the said interim order dated 13-2-1989 passed in writ petition No. 1946 of 1989 as per paragraph 11 of the writ petition and further that in compliance with the interim order dated 13-2-1989 the District Inspector of Schools accepted Sri Radha Krishna Chaturvedi as Manager of the institution vide letter dated 16-2-1989, as would be evident from the reply to the show cause notice sub mitted by the petitioner. That being the position, the committee of manage ment headed by Sri Chaturuedi would have to be taken as defacto committee of management entitled to perform duties of the committee of management under colour of title and such performance of duties would be saved by the defacto doctrine in that the committee of management headed by Sri Radha Krishna Chaturvedi was acting under a colour of title on account of the order of the District Inspector of Schools contained in the letter dated 16-2. 1989 and not as a rank trespasser. This doctrine is founded on the sound principle of public policy and justice. See State of U. P. v. Rafiquddin, AIR 1988 SC 162 , (para 20) at p. 179-80. Disciplinary actions taken by the Committee of Management recognised by the District Inspector of Schools vide letter dated 16-2-1989 cannot, therefore, be invalidated merely because the dispute regarding validity of committee of management of the College was pending adjudica tion before the Regional Deputy Director of Education under Section 16-A (7) of the U. P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921. 7. The next question to be examined is whether the disciplinary pro ceedings culminating into resolution dated 27-10-1989 by the Committee of Management and approval thereto given by the Commission are vitiated due to the reason of violation of regulations 35, 36 and 37 of Chapter 111 of the Regulations made under the U. P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921 and the rules of natural justice. In this connection, it may be stated at the very out set that in exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution what this Court is concerned with is to see whether the decision making process was in any manner vitiated and not to sit "on the correctness of the decision itself". But, as held by the Supreme Court in State of U. P. v. Dharmander Prasad Singh, AIR 1989 SC 997 at p. 1010 ; "when the issue raised in judicial review is whether a decision is vitiated by taking into account irrelevant or neglecting of taking into account of relevant, factors or so manifestly unreasonable that no reasonable authority entrusted with the power in question could reasonably have made such a decision, judicial review of the decision making process includes an examination, as a matter of law, of the relevance of the factors". The proposition of law laid down in Dharmander Prasad Singh (supra) is Vide enough to include non-application of mind to the pleas explanation given by the petitioner in rely to show cause notice in that it goes to the very root of the decision making process itself. 8. In the present case disciplinary proceeding was conducted exparte and the Commission failed to direct itself to the pleas raised by the petitioner in his reply to show cause notice served on him by the Commission. The "expression after due consideration" occurring in regulation 8 of U. P. Secondary Education Services Commission (Procedure for Approval of Punish ment), Regulations, 1983 enjoined a duty upon the Commission to approve or disapprove the punishment proposed by the committee of management only on proper self-direction to the pleas raised in the reply to show cause notice. A perusal of the impugned order communicated to the petitioner vide letter dated 26-7-1991 would indicate that the single member sub-committee (punishment) constituted by the Commission for preliminary review after examining the matter had recommended approval being according to the termination of petitioners services as proposed by the committee of management without properly examining t ie matter and adverting itself to the pleas raised by the petitioner in the reply to show cause notice. The task of making a preliminary review of the managements proposal, assigned by the Commission to one of its members under Regulation 5, is in reality, the task of the Commission to be performed though the member entrusted with the role of the preliminary review of the matter. Of course, with the rider that the decision taken by the member shall be "subject to approval of the Commission. " The Commission have just approved of the recommendation made by the single member sub-committee (punishment) without disclosing any reason for not accepting the pleas set up by the petitioner in his reply to the show cause notice. The Commission ought to have addressed itself to the pleas taken by the petitioner as also to the quantum of punishment having regard to the nature of charges before expressing agreement with the single member sub-committee. In my opinion, therefore, the decision taken by the Commission cannot be sustained in law. 9. There is yet another ground on which the impugned decision taken by the Commission has to be quashed. It is not disputed that the sub committee (punishment) constituted by the Commission had heard separately the representative of the management on 5-0-1991 and the petitioner 006-6-1991. This procedure of hearing, in my opinion, was violative of the principles of natural justice Though it was not necessary for the Commas ion to give an oral hearing to the parties but, "if there is oral hearing, the parties must be heard together in each others presence" see Drew v Drew (1855) Mach 13. An oral hearing given to the parties separately would be illusory and deprive each of the parties of a fair and reasonable opportunity to comment any adverse statement submitted by its adversary during the course of separate oral hearing given m absence of each other. Since the Commission have to take a decision either of approval or of disapproval, on the question of punish ment proposed by the committee of management, "after due consideration" they must be careful to give the parties a fair opportunity to comment on any adverse statement submitted during the course of oral hearing. The impugned decision taken by the Commission has to be demolished by means of a writ of certiorari. 10. The impugned decision taken by the Commission has to be demolished by means of a writ of certiorari. 10. In view of the above discussion, it is unnecessary to express any opinion on merits of the charges, for it would be for the Commission to take appropriate decision in the matter after "due consideration" in accordance with law. " 11. Accordingly the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The im pugned order contained in the communication dated 25-7-19991 is quashed Petition allowed. .