ORDER : Dr. A.S. Anand, J. - The appellants along with other accused were tried, convicted and sentenced for various offences under Sections 3(1), 3(3) and Section 5 of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 (TADA for short) by the Additional Designated Court at Ahmedabad in Terrorist Crime Case No. 116 of 1993. They have challenged their conviction and sentence through this appeal under Section 19 of the TADA. Since, the point argued before us is only a short legal point, we are relieved of the necessity of detailing the prosecution case and analysing the evidence on the record. 2. It is submitted by learned counsel for the appellants that the charge-sheet was filed by the Investigating Agency in the Court of the Additional Designated Court at Ahmedabad on 25-5-1993. Thereafter, cognizance was taken by the learned Designated Court and charges came to be framed on 20-8-1993. Learned counsel submits that the trial before the Designated Court was vitiated for non-compliance with the provisions of Section 20-A(2) of TADA because no previous sanction of the Inspector General of Police/Commissioner of Police had been obtained. 3. Section 20-A(2) TADA provides as follows : "20-A. (2) No court shall take cognizance of any offence under this Act without the previous sanction of the Inspector General of Police, or as the case may be, the Commissioner of Police." 4. Learned counsel for the State has conceded that no previous sanction, as required by the aforesaid provision had been obtained. Even on the record our attention has not been drawn to the existence of such a sanction. Obviously, therefore, the cognizance taken by the learned Judge of the Designated Court was without jurisdiction and the trial conducted by her stands vitiated ab initio. The judgment rendered by the Designated Court in respect of an offence of which it could take no cognizance, in the absence of previous sanction by the prescribed authority, is totally vitiated. We are surprised that before proceeding with the trial, the learned Judge failed to see this fatal flaw which has rendered the entire exercise a futility and the order a nullity. We are surprised that before proceeding with the trial, the learned Judge failed to see this fatal flaw which has rendered the entire exercise a futility and the order a nullity. We, therefore, without going into any other aspect of the case, set aside the judgment of the Designated Court and with a view to avoid the avoidable delay, we after taking note of the provisions of Section 16 of TADA, remand the case to the Court of the Sessions Judge, Ahmedabad for its fresh trial in accordance with law. The learned Sessions Judge may either try the case himself or assign it to any other competent court under his jurisdiction. The case shall be put up for trial treating it as if it has been lawfully committed to the Court of Session for trial. The trial court to which the case is assigned by the Sessions Judge shall dispose of the trial expeditiously and as far as possible within six months from the date of communication of a copy of this order. While setting aside the judgment of the trial court and remanding the case for a fresh trial by the ordinary criminal courts, we have not considered it expedient to release the appellants on bail. The appellants shall, however, be at liberty to approach the trial court for grant of bail, which application as and when filed shall be considered, keeping in view all the facts and circumstances of the case including the period during which the appellants had suffered the earlier trial.