Judgment :- Kanakaraj, J. The petitioner is the mother of one A.B. Mehta against whom an order of detention was passed on 112. 1993 under the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974, hereinafter referred to as the COFEPOSA Act. But it transpires that the said Mehta has not been apprehended in the sense that the order of detention has not been implemented. The petitioner’s son Mehta is having a company at Bombay dealing in electronic goods. He purchased a special import licence from M/s. Deccan Enterprises and under the said licence, he is entitled to import goods to the tune of Rupees Eighty Lakhs. At the relevant time the entire entitlement enabling the holder of the licence to import up to Rupees Eighty lakhs was unutilised. In respect of an import of goods under a Bill of Entry, dated 8. 1993, certain irregularities were found between the actual consignment and the Bill of Entry. There were also disputes regarding the valuation of the goods. It is on he above irregularity in the import of the goods and certain other materials gathered by the respondent that the order of detention was passed. In March, 1994. In respect of the import of the goods under Bill of Entry, dated 8. 1993, the petitioner was arrested and later enlarged on bail. An order of adjudication was also passed on 211. 1994 permitting the said Mehta to redeem the goods on payment of redemption fine of Rupees Thirty lakhs. 2. In this writ petition, we are mainly concerned with two representations sent by the petitioner herself on 25. 1994 and another representation by her son Mehta on 212. 1994. Under both the representations, the petitioner and her son sought for revocation of the order of detention under Sec. 11 of the COFEPOSA Act. It is the case of the petitioner that the respondent is bound by the statue to consider the representations and pass orders under Sec. 11 of the COFEPOSA Act, notwithstanding the fact that the order of detention is implemented or not. It is the further case of the petitioner that the order of detention itself could not have been passed for any valid reason because the petitioner’s son had a special import licence. In other words, the power under the COFEPOSA Act had been misused of abused. It is the further case of the petitioner that the order of detention itself could not have been passed for any valid reason because the petitioner’s son had a special import licence. In other words, the power under the COFEPOSA Act had been misused of abused. The petitioner therefore prays for the issue of a writ of mandamus or any other writ, to forbear the respondent from implementing the order of detention. 3. While arguing the case, Mr. B. Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioner, has restricted his claim only for a direction to the respondent to pass orders on the representations, dated 25. 1994 and 212. 1994, under Sec.11 of the COFEPOSA Act, giving up the prayer to restrain the respondents from implementing the detention order. 4. The respondent has filed a detailed counter-affidavit stating that the writ petition itself is not maintainable at the pre-detention stage. The grounds on which a pre-detention writ petition can be entertained are set out in Alkasubhash Gadia’s case, 1992 S.C.C. (Crl.) 301. Inasmuch as the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition, does not disclose any of the grounds, the writ petition itself cannot be entertained. On the merits, it is stated that the petitioner’s son was ordered to be detained under the COFEPOSA Act for smuggling goods clandestinely and evading customs duty to the tune of Rs.42.90 lakhs. It was also found that there had been mis-declaration and non-declaration of goods liable for confiscation under th Customs Act, 1962 and the order of detention was passed with a view to prevent the said Mehta from indulging in such smuggling activities in future. It is pointed out that diligent steps had been taken to apprehend the said Mehta pursuant to the order of detention, but the said Mehta was evading arrest. A specific stand is taken that it is not incumbent upon the Detaining Authority to consider any representation unless and until the order of detention is executed. It is the case of the respondent that the right to make a representation arises only after the order of detention is served on the detenu. 5. Mr. B.Kumar, learned counsel tor the petitioner, has primarily relied on the judgment of the Delhi High Court in Criminal Writ Petition No.222 of 1994, dated 11. 1994, reported in Mansukh Chhagan Lal Bhat v. Union of India, 1995 Crl.L.J. 1097: (1994)4 D.L.T. 657. 5. Mr. B.Kumar, learned counsel tor the petitioner, has primarily relied on the judgment of the Delhi High Court in Criminal Writ Petition No.222 of 1994, dated 11. 1994, reported in Mansukh Chhagan Lal Bhat v. Union of India, 1995 Crl.L.J. 1097: (1994)4 D.L.T. 657. The Division Bench was considering a case after the Full Bench of the Delhi High Court in Mansukh Chhagan Lal Bhat v. Union of India, 1995 Crl.L.J. 1097: (1994)4 D.L.T. 657, expressed its opinion on 20th October, 1994, reiterating the grounds on which a relief can be given at the pre-detention stage as found in Alkasubhash Gadia’s case, 1992 S.C.C (Crl.) 301, earlier referred to, and that mere delays in the passing of the detention order cannot be considered to be of the “some species” as found in Alkasubhash Gadia’s case. The Division Bench was only concerned with two points, which were taken as additional points after the opinion of the Full Bench. In that case also an order of detention under the COFEPOSA Act was passed on 37. 1989, but remained unexecuted till the judgment of the writ petition (1. 1994). A similar representation was made for revocation of the order of detention on 28. 1992. A second representation was made on 5. 1993. An order of rejection was passed on 26. 1993. A fresh representation was made on 19. 1993, which was rejected on 110. 1993. The writ petition was to quash the said order, dated 110. 1993. The first additional point, which was raised before the Division Bench was whether person, not under detention, can file an application seeking to revoke the order of detention under Sec. 11 of the COFEPOSA Act, and whether pending disposal of such an application, can seek a direction not to implement the order of detention. The second additional point was whether no smuggling was involved as per the order of the Adjudicating Authority and whether therefore the case came within the exception in Alka Subhash Gadia’s case. The second additional point was whether no smuggling was involved as per the order of the Adjudicating Authority and whether therefore the case came within the exception in Alka Subhash Gadia’s case. The Division Bench of th Delhi High Court, interpreting Sec. 11 of the COFEPOSA Act, observed, "It may be asked whether after the recent decision of the Supreme Court in Subhash Muljimal Gandhi, 1994 S.C.C. (Crl.) 580, decided by Sawahant and Mukherje, JJ., is there any question of the contingency of the pendency of Sec. 11 application and falling within the same species’ as the five contingencies referred to in Alka Subhash Gadia case, in our opinion, not. We have explained the meaning of the words same species’ occurring in Subhash Muljimal Gandhi’s case and we hold, on that basis, that the contingency of pendency of Sec. 11 application’ cannot be assimilated into the "same species’ rule adumbrated by the Supreme Court in Subhash Muljimal Gandhi’s case". The Delhi High Court also proceeded to say, "The words "at any time used in Sec. 11 do not mean "at any time’ after the execution’, but mean at any time after the passing of the detention order’. But the fundamental right under Art.21 does not include a further right not to be detained till the application for revocation filed under Sec. 11 of the COFEPOSA Act is disposed of." Consequently, the Delhi High Court quashed the order, Sec. 11 of the COFEPOSA Act, refusing the revoke to the order of detention and remitted the case back to the Authority for fresh disposal under Sec. 11 of the COFEPOSA Act. However, they made it very clear that the pendency of an application under Sec. 11 of the COFEPOSA Act did not entitle the petitioner to the grant of any injunction that the order of detention shall nor be implemented. They further made it clear that even during the pendency of Sec. 11, it was open to the Authorities to execute the order of detention. 6. We are in respectful agreement with the above views expressed by the Delhi High Court. Irrespective of the order of detention being executed and the other procedures under the COFEPOSA Act being followed, the power under Sec. 11 has to be independently exercised it the necessary grounds are made out. 7. Mr. 6. We are in respectful agreement with the above views expressed by the Delhi High Court. Irrespective of the order of detention being executed and the other procedures under the COFEPOSA Act being followed, the power under Sec. 11 has to be independently exercised it the necessary grounds are made out. 7. Mr. I.Subramaniam, learned Additional Public Prosecutor, has projected the case of the respondent on the basis of the Judgment in Alka Subhash Gadia’s case, 1992 S.C.C. (Crl.) 30 earlier referred to, and two other subsequent judgments and contends that unless any one of the five grounds set out by the Supreme Court of India are shown to exist, the writ petition itself cannot be entertained. Taking first the judgment in Alka Subhash Gadia’s case, it has to be remembered that in that case the questions that fell for consideration were framed as follows: "The next question of law that falls for consideration is whether the detenu or anyone on his behalf is entitled to challenge the detention order without the detenu submitting or surrendering to it. As a corollary to this question, the incidental question that has to be answered is whether the detenu or the petitioner on his behalf, as the case may be, is entitled to the detention order and the grounds on which the detention order is made before the detenu submits to the order". It is only in that context the Supreme Court observed: "Thirdly, and this is more important, it is not correct to say that the courts have no power to entertain grievances against any detention order prior to its execution. The courts have the necessary power and they have used it in proper cases as has been pointed out above, although such cases have been few and the grounds on which the courts have interfered with them at the pre-execution stage are necessarily very limited in scope and number." The Apex Court then proceeded to lay down five grounds on which relief can be granted at the pre-detention stage. It is the argument of learned Public Prosecutor that unless those five grounds are available no writ petition can be entertained at the pre-detention stage. He projects his arguments on the basis of Art.22 of the Constitution of India. According to him, the protection given under Art.21 is governed and conditioned by Art.22 of the Constitution of India. It is the argument of learned Public Prosecutor that unless those five grounds are available no writ petition can be entertained at the pre-detention stage. He projects his arguments on the basis of Art.22 of the Constitution of India. According to him, the protection given under Art.21 is governed and conditioned by Art.22 of the Constitution of India. It is only under Art.22(5) of the Constitution of India that a detenu gets the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order. In other words, unless and until the order of detention is served on the detenu there is no question of making any representation. Consequently, there is no question of considering the representations of the petitioner and her son in this case. .8. We are clearly of the opinion that the Delhi High Court was fully aware of the legal position when they granted a limited prayer that an application under Sec. 11 of the COFEPOSA Act should be disposed of independently in accordance with law. They hastened to add that such a direction will not entitle the prospective detenu to the grant of any injunction that the detention order cannot be served on him or executed, to be more specific they made it clear that even during the pendency of an under Sec. 11 of the COFEPOSA Act, it is always open to the authorities to execute the order of detention. The above statement of law, in our opinion, lays down the correct legal position. Sec. 11 of the COFEPOSA Act provides for a contingency where an order had been made under mistake or the order is vitiated on any of the grounds similar to those mentioned by the Supreme Court in Alka Subhash Gadia’s case, 1992 S.C.C. (Crl.) 301, the power under Sec. 11 of the COFEPOSA Act can be exercised whether the order of detention is executed or not. It may even enable the authority to correct a clerical error which might have affected the validity of the order and this is precisely the reason why Sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 11 of the COFEPOSA Act provides that the revocation of a detention order shall not bar the making of another order under Sec.3 against the same person. It may even enable the authority to correct a clerical error which might have affected the validity of the order and this is precisely the reason why Sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 11 of the COFEPOSA Act provides that the revocation of a detention order shall not bar the making of another order under Sec.3 against the same person. Once the scope of power under Sec. 11 of the COFEPOSA Act is thus understood, it goes without saying that the power under Sec. 11 of the COFEPOSA Act has to be exercised and it is not an idle power. Where therefore, a person calls upon the authority to exercise the power under Sec. 11, the authority should pass an order one way or the other. Though the word used is ‘may’ and discretion vests with the authority to pass an order or not, when the persons concerned pray for an order, it is always proper for the authority to pass an order one way or the other, so that justice is not only done but seen to be done. An order passed on merits under Sec. 11 of the COFEPOSA Act is not a justiciable order’ and no person can question the same in a court of law. But when the authority refused to pass an order under Sec. 11 of the COFEPOSA Act, it is always open to the person aggrieved to approach the High Court for the relief of mandamus to direct the authority to pass an order under Sec. 11 of the COFEPOSA Act. This is precisely what is now asked for by the petitioner though he had prayed for a larger relief to restrain the respondent from implementing the order of detention. 9. The other judgments relied on by learned Public Prosecutor do not in any way advance the case of the respondent in this regard. All of them relate only to the issue of a writ at the pre-detention stage restraining the authorities from implementing an order of detention. In some of the cases, the prospective detenu sought to add more grounds to the enumerated five grounds mentioned by the Supreme Court in Alka Subhash Gadia’s case, 1992 S.C.C. (Crl.) 301. All of them relate only to the issue of a writ at the pre-detention stage restraining the authorities from implementing an order of detention. In some of the cases, the prospective detenu sought to add more grounds to the enumerated five grounds mentioned by the Supreme Court in Alka Subhash Gadia’s case, 1992 S.C.C. (Crl.) 301. For instance in N.K.Bapna v. Union of India, (1992)3 S.C.C. 512 , a question was argued whether removing or abetting removal of the goods from the bonded warehouse by prospective detenu without permission of die authority would amount to smuggling or not. The Apex Court held that the clandestine removal of the goods from the warehouse would constitute smuggling and the goods were liable for confiscation under Sec. 111(j) of the Customs Act. So also in State of Tamil Nadu v. P.K. Shamsudeen, (1992)3 S.C.C. 523 , an attempt was made to suggest that the delay in execution of an order of detention would give a right to the prospective detenu to move the court even prior to his detention for invalidating the order of detention. The Apex Court rejected that contention also. This is also the view taken by the Delhi High Court in Mansukh Chhagan Lal Bhat v. Union of India, 1995 Crl.L.J. 1097: (1994)4 D.L.T. 657 to which we have already made a reference. Similarly, in Subha Muljimal Gandhi v. L. Himinglinna, 1994 S.C.C. (Crl.) 580, the Apex Court held that neither the delay in arresting the detenu caused by the prospective detenu himself, nor an allegation of assault, extortion and illegal detention, even if true, can vitiate an order of detention enabling the prospective detenu to move the court prior to the actual detention. .10. Having thus understood the law on the point visa-vis, the power under Sec. 11 of the COFEPOSA Act, we would have normally granted the prayer made at the Bar for a direction to the authorities to consider the representation of the petitioner dated 25. 1994 and her son dated 212. 1994. Even now we make it clear that any observation made by us hereafter in his judgment should not be considered as an impediment for the authorities to pass an order Sec. 11 of the COFEPOSA Act, one way or the other because such an order is independent of the execution of the order of detention. 1994. Even now we make it clear that any observation made by us hereafter in his judgment should not be considered as an impediment for the authorities to pass an order Sec. 11 of the COFEPOSA Act, one way or the other because such an order is independent of the execution of the order of detention. In other words, we make it clear that it is always open to the authorities to pass an order under Sec. 11 of the COFEPOSA Act one way or the other. An argument was advanced on the part of the respondents that this Court may examine the representation of the petitioner dated 25. 1994 and her son dated 212. 1994 to find out whether any if the grounds referred to in Alka Subhash Gadia’s case, 1992 S.C.C. (Crl.) 301 are found to coexist. In other words, the contention of the respondent is that none of the grounds referred to in Alka Subhash Gadia’s case, is available for the petitioner to seek any relief in this writ petition. We do not propose to go into the representations and find out whether a case is made out for revocation or modification of the order of detention. We do not also propose to say whether the power under Sec. 11 can be exercised only if the grounds referred to in Alka Subhash Gadia’s case, are made out. In our opinion, that is beyond the scope of the writ petition. It is for the authorities to exercise their power under Sec. 11 and it is not for this court to usurp the power of the authority under Sec. 11 of the COFEPOSA Act. 11. We are however, refusing to grant any relief to the petitioner even by way of a direction to the authorities because of certain disturbing factors which we noticed ion this case. An order of detention was passed as early as on 112. 1993. Learned Public Prosecutor was fair enough to show the grounds of detention only for the perusal of the Court. We have carefully gone through the grounds of detention and prima facie we are unable to say that the said order of detention is illegal or an order passed on “no materials”. 1993. Learned Public Prosecutor was fair enough to show the grounds of detention only for the perusal of the Court. We have carefully gone through the grounds of detention and prima facie we are unable to say that the said order of detention is illegal or an order passed on “no materials”. We do not purport to say that the order of detention is a valid order and cannot be challenged in a manner known to law by the petitioner or her son. We are only pointing out that it is an order of detention passed in the normal course like many other orders of detention. While so, we are at a loss to understand how the respondent-Government have not been able to execute the said order of detention and apprehend the petitioner’s son. To satisfy the court about the innumerable steps taken by the respondents, learned Public Prosecutor has placed before us the correspondence between them and the authorities in Bombay who have to execute the order of detention. This is only for the purpose of finding out whether the respondent-Government have been inactive in trying to apprehend the petitioner’s son. It is only to show that they have been placed in a helpless position by their counter-parts in Bombay. On 112. 1993 itself the order of detention was sent of the Chief Secretary to Government, Government of Maharashtra, seeking to arrange for the immediate apprehension of the individual and for service of the order in the individual. On 11. 1994, the respondent had written to the Joint Commissioner of Police (Crime), Greater Bombay, seeking information on the arrest of the petitioner’s son. The correspondence goes on and we find that there are only letters and letters from the respondent addressed to the counterparts in Bombay and there are very few letters written in reply and they are not helpful in any manner. For instance on 3. 1994 the Assistant Commissioner of Police, Crime Branch, C.I.D., Bombay, writes back to say that they visited the residential premises of the wanted detenu, but that he was not found that the parents of the detenu including the petitioner herein, were present and they informed the police that the wanted detenu and his wife had gone on vacation and exact location was not known to them. Again a series of letters are written by the respondent to their counterparts emphasising the need to apprehend the wanted detenu at the earliest point of time. In the meanwhile a notification was made under Sec.7(1)(b) of the COFEPOSA Act on 8. 1994 requiring the wanted detenu to surrender within 15 days from the date of publication. On 9. 1994, the Assistant Commissioner, Crime Branch, Bombay, again wrote a letter and it only says that they visited place of residence and found only the parents and they could not get any information regarding the location of the wanted detenu. The Assistant Commissioner also wanted to return the grounds of detention back to the respondent unexecuted. A radio message was given by the respondent not to return the order of detention and to make further efforts to locate the individual. A telex message was given by the respondent informing their counterparts in Bombay that the wanted detenu had given a representation from the very same address. It is mentioned in the order of detention, thus proving that the wanted detenu was still available at the said address. On 3. 1995, Home Department, Bombay had written a letter saying that tremendous efforts have been made by the Bombay Police to apprehend the wanted detenu, but it proved unsuccessful. They wanted an All India alert to be given for the apprehension of the wanted detenu. The last of the correspondence rests with a letter dated 7. 1995 written by the Secretary to Government, Government of Tamil Nadu, to the Secretary to the Government, Home Department, Bombay, informing latter that the wanted detenu was reported to be doing business in Bombay and efforts may be taken to apprehend him. 12. We have referred to the correspondence in detail to show that a fugitive from law can safely remain absconding in this country and how the police personnel are helpless. There is no difficulty for the court to draw the necessary inferences from the said State of affairs. On our part we do not want to be a privy to the above situation and allow such fugitive to get relief from court even though he does not want to come to the surface. It is well known courts will come to the rescue of a person who approaches the court with clean hands. On our part we do not want to be a privy to the above situation and allow such fugitive to get relief from court even though he does not want to come to the surface. It is well known courts will come to the rescue of a person who approaches the court with clean hands. The fountain of justice is not meant for the people who do not believe in the rule of law and take pride in circumventing the provisions of law. We have always been holding that it is not only the statutory authorities or Government officials who should act in accordance with law, but that such an obligation equally fastens on every citizen of this Country. The relief under Art.226 of the Constitution of India is well known to be a discretionary relief extended one equitable grounds. Two well known maxims of equity are catalogued by P.G.Osborn in Concise Law Dictionary. “(1) He who comes into equity must come with clean hands. (2) Equity will not permit a statute to be a clak for fraud.” One can see with advantage the decision of the Supreme Court in S.B. Noronah (Smt.) v. Union of India, (1994)1 S.C.C. 372 . The following passage is apposite: “Existence of constitutional right cannot be disputed. But one of the well-established principles of invoking extraordinary jurisdiction is to approach the court with clean hands and honest conscience. One cannot abuse the process of court and yet claim its protection. Since the Bench revoking the leave, found that the petitioner had obtained interim order by suppression of facts, it would not be proper on our part to grant any indulgence to such a litigant. We therefore, refuse to entertain this petition and dismiss it in limine.” 13. For all the above reasons while we accept the proposition of law as projected by learned counsel for the petitioner to the limited extent of seeking a direction to pass an order under Sec. 11 of the COFEPOSA Act, we do not agree that on the facts and circumstances the petitioner is entitled to get such a relief. In this view of the matter the writ petition fails and is dismissed. There will however, be no order as to costs.