H. N. TILHARI, J. ( 1 ) THIS revision under Section 115 of Code of Civil Procedure arises out of the judgment and order dated August 22, 1995, whereby the learned i additional civil judge, bijapur, rejected the application la. 18 and has also rejected la. 19 as it did not survive. ( 2 ) THE brief facts of the case are that, plaintiffs-applicants have moved an application under order 16, Rule 2 of Code of Civil Procedure seeking to summon defendant 2-Smt. Rukmini bai and for a direction from the court to her to appear in witness-box to be cross-examined by the plaintiff. This application la. 18 was moved on 20-7-1995. On 31-7-1995 plaintiffs have presented la. 19 with identical prayer. The application was opposed by the defendants who filed objections to the same. The court below mentioned the disputed facts that plaintiff 1 was the father of plaintiffs 2 to 5. Plaintiff 1 having died, the widow and daughters are brought on record. Plaintiffs have sought for declaration to the effect that they are the owners of the suit properties mentioned in paragraph-1 of the plaint and the sale deed dated 7-7-1978 was nominal and they also sought injunction seeking to restrain the defendants from interfering with the peaceful possession and enjoyment. The plaintiff contended that the deed dated 7-7-1978 was a nominal sale deed and was not intended to be a deed of sale. Really it was in the nature of a security of mortgage for the loan that has been advanced and as the loan sums its entirety has already been paid with interest and defendants who had agreed to reconvey the property vide agreement dated 8-7-1978 have refused to reconvey the property, so the suit was filed on the basis of title for the relief. When the application for summoning was made, the impression was given to the court that the transaction was all along between plaintiff and defendant 2 and not defendant 1. The court below after having referred to this circumstance of the case opined that the circumstance of the case did not warrant the summoning of the defendant or issue of direction to defendant 1 to appear in witness box for being cross-examined. The court further observed that, it may be open to plaintiff applicant at later stage to argue the plea of adverse inference. The court further observed that, it may be open to plaintiff applicant at later stage to argue the plea of adverse inference. With these observations, the court rejected those applications. Having felt aggrieved from the order impugned dated 22-8-1995 the plaintiffs have come up in revision under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. ( 3 ) I have heard Sri m. Ram bhat, learned counsel for the petitioners and Smt. Sona vakkund, counsel for respondents. Sri bhat, submitted before me that the court below acted illegally in rejecting the application for summoning defendant 2 and depriving the plaintiff of his right to bring out evidence by cross-examination of defendant 1. To the effect that really, defendant 1 was not the purchaser of the property and real purchaser was defendant 2 who is the husband of defendant 1, as well as to show that the transaction in question was the transaction of loan. The learned counsel submitted that, the court below illegally refused to exercise jurisdiction vested in it when it refused to summon the defendant 1 and that may adversely affect the revision applicant in the course of the trial of the suit, which injury may not be compensable. On behalf of the respondents, the contentions raised on behalf of the applicants have been hotly contested by Smt. Sona vakkund. The learned counsel for respondents submitted that, only relevant material evidence can be produced, which is admissible. Smt. Sona vakkund submitted that, firstly, there is no specific plea of benami transaction, taken by the plaintiff either in the plaint or by way of filing any reapplication and when such plea has not been taken, no issue has been pressed. Therefore such evidence could not have been admissible and therefore, court below rightly rejected that application for summoning defendant 1-Smt. Rukmini bai. Smt. Sona vakkund further submitted that, in the present case the transaction in question which is alleged to be mortgage cannot be said to be mortgage and cannot be investigated in view of the language of Section 58 (c) of the Transfer Of Property Act. Smt. Sona vakkund submitted that, in this case the transaction is contained in two separate documents. One is the sale-deed and other is agreement to reconvey and the two transactions are separate and the condition to repurchase is not contained in one single document. Smt. Sona vakkund submitted that, in this case the transaction is contained in two separate documents. One is the sale-deed and other is agreement to reconvey and the two transactions are separate and the condition to repurchase is not contained in one single document. That in cases where it is contained in one deed, then deed has to be construed as per its own terms keeping in view the Provisions of Section 58 of the Transfer Of Property Act. Smt. Vakkund submitted that, as such, no evidence can be produced to prove the external circumstance or something like that, to say that the transaction is a mortgage transaction. She submitted that the evidence on that point was also not admissible on record. Smt. Sona vakkund further submitted that, if the circumstances so become available to the plaintiff to urge that defendant failed to appear in witness box and his appearance was necessary, then it may be argued by them that adverse presumption may be drawn and the court may decide that question as may appear proper to be. Smt. Vakkund submitted that, in such circumstances, the court below neither did commit any error of law or of jurisdiction in rejecting the application for summoning the witnesses. She submitted that, she does not contend that the order impugned cannot be said to be decided, but here the court below did not commit any error of law or of jurisdiction within the four corners of Section 115 of Code of Civil Procedure. ( 4 ) I have applied my mind to the contentions made by the learned counsel for the parties respectively. The jurisdiction of this court is circumscribed by the conditions mentioned and prescribed by Section 115. It is only jurisdictional error. In other words in case where the jurisdictional error is found to be covered either by clause (a), clause (b) or clause (c) of Section 115, this court may consider if there is a case for interference in case whether the impugned order should be interfered with or set aside or reversed in the light of proviso to Section 115 (1) C. P. C. so far as the case of mortgage is concerned, whether the transaction was of a mortgage or a sale, in the circumstances of the ease, i do not express any opinion for the present. But, as per Section 58 (c) of Transfer Of Property Act as has been interpretted by their lordships of Supreme Court in the case of Chunchun Jha v Ebadat Ali and another , that, if the transaction of sale and agreement to purchase, these two transactions are contained in two separate documents even though those documents might have been executed at one and same time, the transaction cannot be considered or deemed to be a mortgage. Apart from that, it is also one of the well settled principle of law that if the terms of the transaction and the documents are express and clear, this court has to gather the intention from the documents itself. Even in those cases where the agreement of sale and agreement to sell are contained in one and single document and the extraneous enquiry regarding the same is ruled out. Their, the lordships of Supreme Court have held that, "if the words are express and clear, effect must be given to them and any extraneous enquiry into what was thought or intended is ruled out". That being the position of law, the documents have to be looked into and if the documents are very clear in their terms, then definitely, extraneous enquiry has to be ruled out. It has been submitted before me that, there are two separate transactions. One is the sale deed and the other is the agreement. That being the position, there was no question of any extraneous enquiry or extraneous evidence being allowed to be produced either by way of producing certain witnesses or deriving something from the cross-examination of d. w. 1. That evidence could be said to be not admissible. If the evidence of defendant is necessary to throw light on point in issue and the defendant concern does not appear in witness box, definitely, then in that case, it may be urged that, such circumstances may be taken adversely to said defendant and the court may consider the question whether the presumption could be raised because of the defendant's not coming before the witness box, in the circumstances of the present case. Apart from that, I may mention that the plaint has been produced. Apart from that, I may mention that the plaint has been produced. On being questioned, the learned counsel also indicated, there is no such allegation to the effect directly that the transaction was a benami in nature and when there was no such case, definitely no evidence could be brought on record with respect to the plea which is not taken at any stage. No jurisdictional error in either of the clauses under Section 115 of Code of Civil Procedure has been made out. The revision application as such, is without merits and is liable to be dismissed and as such is hereby dismissed. The costs of revision are to be borne by parties themselves. --- *** --- .