Judgment B. L. Yadav, J. 1. Whether removal of the plaintiff-appellant from his service was in violation of Article 311 of the Constitution of India, in other words was he removed by an authority subordinate to the appointing authority is the short but significant substantial question of law that falls for determination in this plaintiffs second Appeal preferred under Sec.100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short the Code), in a suit for declaration that the order of discharge of the plaintiff from service is illegal, void and without jurisdiction and that the plaintiff is entitled to reinstatement with full salary and other benefits up to date till the disposal of the suit. 2. This appeal has got a chequered history. The suit was filed with me averments that plaintiff was Ticket collector in Bihar Bakhtiarpur Light railway Company Limited in the year 1949. In 1962, the said B. B. Light Rilway Company Limited merged in the eastern Railways and he was appointed by the General Manager, in the service of Eastern Railways and the condition in respect of the employees was that the employees of the B. B. Light Railway Company limited were re-appointed by the eastern Railway in their respective capacity subject to qualifying the test and training. The plaintiff appeared before the Eastern Railway Service commission, Calcutta and he was finally selected and on completion of the theoretical and practical training, he was posted at Patna Junction to work as Ticket Collector. In view of rule 1702 (2) (b) of Discipline and Appeal Rules for Non-Gazetted rail Servants (enforced from Ist August, 1961, corrected and modified up to 30-9-1962, published from Eastern Railway press, Calcutta, Page 6), General manager was the appointing authority, but order of appointment was issued under the signature of Divisional Personal Officer, Eastern Railway. But he was removed from the service by the divisional Commercial Superintendent, danapur. It appears that certain charges, pertaining to the irregularities committed by the plaintiff-appellant in connection with realisation of the tickets from the passengers were levelled. The enquiry officer found charges proved and the plaintiff was removed from services by the Divisional Commercial Superintendent, Danapur, by his letter dated 4th December, 1964. 3. It appears that certain charges, pertaining to the irregularities committed by the plaintiff-appellant in connection with realisation of the tickets from the passengers were levelled. The enquiry officer found charges proved and the plaintiff was removed from services by the Divisional Commercial Superintendent, Danapur, by his letter dated 4th December, 1964. 3. Thereafter the plaintiff preferred a Departmental Appeal before the Divisional Superintendent, danapur (Defendant No.2) but the same failed and his Revision before the General Manager, Eastern Railway, Calcutta, also met the same fate. Ultimately the application for review was moved on Ist October, 1965 before the General Manager for review of the said order but the same also did not succeed. Thereafter the present suit was filed. 4. The defendants-respondents contested the suit, inter alia, that the suit was not maintainable and the same was time-barred and that the suit was bad as notice udner Sec.80 of the Code was not properly served. The suit was also bad for non-joinder of necessary parties and that the same was barred by estoppel, waiver and acquiescence and that removal of the plaintiff from services was also valid. 5. The suit was decreed by the judgment and decree dated 31st january, 1976, rendered by the 2nd additional Munsif, Patna and against that First Appeal was preferred which was allowed and the suit was dismissed by the judgment and decree dated 8th august, 1979. 6. Against the decree dated 8th august, rendered by the 2nd Additional District Judge, Patna Second Appeal no.695 of 1979 was filed by the plaintiff-appellant before this Court and the same was dismissed by judgment and decree dated 11th November, 1983 holding that the suit was barred by limitation. The plaintiff thereafter preferred S. L. P. before the Apex Court bearing Civil Appeal No.2819 of 1984, which was allowed holding that the suit was within time and the matter was remanded back for decision afresh by this Court. This is how this Second appeal again has come up for hearing. 7. The plaintiff thereafter preferred S. L. P. before the Apex Court bearing Civil Appeal No.2819 of 1984, which was allowed holding that the suit was within time and the matter was remanded back for decision afresh by this Court. This is how this Second appeal again has come up for hearing. 7. Sri Chandra Shekhar, learned senior Counsel for the appellant, contended that after merger of the Bihar bakhtiarpur Light Railway Company limited in the Eastern Railway and after having passed the qualifying tests and training the plaintiff was appointed by the General Manager, hence his appointing authority was the general Manager, as is manifest by rule 1702 (2) (b) of the Discipline and appeal Rules for Non-Gazetted government Servants (compendiously the Rules) and hence he cannot be removed from services by any other authority subordinate to the General manager. This argument cannot be said to be made for the first time rather it has been noted in para 12 of the first appellate courts judgment dated 8th August, 1979, but actually after enquiry it was detected that the plaintiff was removed from services not by the General Manager but by the divisional Commercial Superintendent which was in violation of Article 311 (1) of the Constitution. He placed reliance on Krishna Kumar V/s. The divisional Assistant Electrical Engineer, central Railway and others, A. I. R.1979 s. C.1912 (paras 5, 6 and 7); The management of D. T. U. V/s. Shri B. B. L. Hajelay and another, (1972) 2 S. C. C.744 (para 12 ). 8. Sri A. B. Ojha, learned counsel for the defendants-respondents, on the other hand, refuted the submissions of the learned counsel for the appellant and urged that in view of Circular No. E- 308/0/4, dated 9th April, 1964 the general Manager delegated the authority to make appointment or promotion in substantive officiating capacity of Class III staff except in the scale of pay of Rs.335-425 and above, officers in senior scales of pay, and further it was held that the order of removal was passed by the Divisional commercial Superintendent, Danapur, who was an officer in the senior scale of pay. Reliance was placed on Scientific Adviser to the Ministry of Defence and Ors. V/s. S. Daniel and ors. , 1990 (2)S. L. R.724. It was also urged that the order of removal was correct and the appeal deserved to be dismissed. Reliance was placed on Scientific Adviser to the Ministry of Defence and Ors. V/s. S. Daniel and ors. , 1990 (2)S. L. R.724. It was also urged that the order of removal was correct and the appeal deserved to be dismissed. It was further urged that it was the burden of the plaintiff-appellant to prove that he was removed from services by the authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed. This plea was not taken in the plaint. Reliance was also placed on State of U. P. V/s. Om Prakash gupta, AI. R.1970 S. C.679. 9. Having scrutinised the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties the question is about interpretation of Article 311 (1) of the constitution and as to whether the appellant has been removed from service by an authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed. 10. Before embarking upon the interpretation of Article 311 (1) of the constitution, I am reminded that the constitution of our country is a fundamental law, and a living document cannot be interpreted in a narrow or pedantic sense. Abroad and liberal spirit should inspire those who are called upon to interpret the Constitution. This does not mean that language employed can be stretched to any extent. The broad purpose and general scheme of the provision must be kept in view. (See S. P. Gupta V/s. Union of india, AIR 1982 S. C.149 ). Even about the interpretation of the American constitution, it has been said that there need not be miserly interpretation. The provision requiring high duties and powers must be interpreted in a manner, so that it may prove beneficial to the people (See Hand delivery V/s. U. S. Postal Service, 439 U. S.1345 : 58 LEd 2nd 51 ). The object behind Article 311 (1) appears to be that in case an authority subordinate to the appointing authority is permitted or empowered to remove a civil servant, that would create a chaotic conditions and removal would become very easy and at the same time not beneficial to the civil servants. 11. As regards next point, in view of rule 1702 (2) (b) of the Rules the appointing authority of the plaintiff-appellant was the General Manager. 11. As regards next point, in view of rule 1702 (2) (b) of the Rules the appointing authority of the plaintiff-appellant was the General Manager. The case of the defendants-respondents was that the General Manager has delegated the authority to make appointment or promotion in substantive officiating capacity of Class-III staff except in the scale of pay of Rs.335-425 and above, officers in senior scales of pay (Circular No. E-308/0/4 dated 9th April, 1964 ). The question is whether the authority of the General manager delegating the power to make appointment or promotion in substantive officiating capacity of Class-Ill staff could be taken to delegate the rank and authority of the General manager to remove from the services. Nothing has been shown that by any circular the power to remove the plaintiff was also delegated. It is just by an implication that it has been inferred and argued by the defendants-respondents that once the authority to make appointment or promotion in substantive officiating of Class-III Staff was delegated to the Divisional Commercial Superintendent, it would be assumed by implication that authority and rank to remove the plaintiff was also delegated. There is no dispute that the Divisional Commercial Superintendent was subordinate to the general Manager. The appellant was removed from service by an Authority subordinate to the Appointing authority. The question, therefore, is as to whether subsequent delegation of the power to the subordinate authority to make appointment to the post in question would also confer by the implication the authority and rank to pass an order of removal. This question was squarely answered by the apex Court in Krishna Kumar V/s. The divisional Assistant Electrical Engineer, air 1979 S. C.1912 (supra ). In that case, the appellant was appointed in the Railway by the Chief Electrical Engineer, but was removed by the divisional Assistant Electrical Engineer and the same was challenged on the plea of violation of Article 311 (1)of the Constitution. The matter was ultimately taken to Apex Court and it was ruled under para-5 that subsequent delegation of power to the divisional Assistant Electrical Engineer to make appointments to the post by the appellant would not confer upon him the power to remove him, as on the date of appointment of the appellant, the Divisional Assistant electrical Engineer had no power to make that appointment. 12. 12. The Management of D. T. U. V/s. Shri B. B. L. Hajelay and another, (1972) 2 S. C. C.744 (supra) was a case in which the General Manager, transport, was the appointing authority and later on the power to make appointments was delegated to the Assistant General Manager. The question was whether the Assistant general Manager was competent to remove the employees appointed by the General Manager and if so would not be in violation of Article 311 (1) of the Constitution. The Apex Court rules that once protection was given to an employee by statute, the same cannot be nullified by rules or Regulations authorised by the statute itself. In other words, as the Corporation, in that case, authorised the Assistant general Manager to remove respondent No.2 from services but it was held that the Corporation itself by regulation cannot destroy the protection given under Article 311 (1) of the constitution. What was emphasised by the Apex Court was that power to make appointments could be delegated but that would not mean the authorisation of the delegation of the rank. 13. In the instant appeal also, even though the power of General manager to make appointment or promotion in substantive officiating capacity of Class III staff, except in the scale of pay of Rs.335-425 and above, officers in senior scale of pay, could have been delegated to the Divisional commercial Superintendent, but that itself would not suggest that the power in rank has also been delegated. In my opinion, it is only the status, power and rank, that gives protection to the employees under Article 311 (1) of the constitution. Scientific Adviser to the ministry of Defence and ors v.5. Daniel and ors. , 1990 (2) S. L. R.724 (supra)was a case relied upon by the respondents in respect of the competent authority to initiate disciplinary proceedings but that aspect is entirely different. The power in certain circumstances could be delegated to the authority to initiate disciplinary proceedings, but that shall remain subject to the approval by the appointing authority. In that case the question of compulsory retirement, removal and dismissal from services of Grade C and d staff of the Railways was being considered. The power in certain circumstances could be delegated to the authority to initiate disciplinary proceedings, but that shall remain subject to the approval by the appointing authority. In that case the question of compulsory retirement, removal and dismissal from services of Grade C and d staff of the Railways was being considered. Para 13 is set out : "the appointing authority under the schedule is a high-ranking authority and, in an organisation like the Railways for instance, it will be virtually impossible for him to consider each and every case of appointment of, or disciplinary action against all the Class III or class IV employees in the organisation. It is indeed this realisation that has rendered necessary delegation of reasons, in the matter of disciplinary powers". Therefore, in that case also the disciplinary action even after delegation of power, the rank and authority at the time of appointment of the appointing authority cannot be ignored. That case stands on different fact sitution. There is, however, no quarrel with the principles indicated. 14 As regards the plea of removal by an authority subordinate to that by which appellant was appointed, issue No. VII framed by trial court does indicate that the order of removal was challenged being void and illegal and this was the question of law. It appears that the same was raised in the plaint. Otherwise also in view of Order vi, Rule 2 of the Code the question of law need not be pleaded and only the facts are concisely pleaded in the pleadings. Under Order VI rule 2 of the Code it has been provided that every pleadings shall contain, and contain only, a statement in a concise form of the material facts on which the party pleading relies for his claim or defence, as the case may be, but not the evidence by which they are to be proved. In the instant case, it appears that this was the material point and issue No. VII was framed on this point. Defendants-respondents have got full opportunity to lead evidence to negative the claim of the plaintiff as is clear from the statement of facts and argument contained in para 12 of the lower court judgment that this plea was taken and argued. Defendants-respondents have got full opportunity to lead evidence to negative the claim of the plaintiff as is clear from the statement of facts and argument contained in para 12 of the lower court judgment that this plea was taken and argued. Sec.100 of the Code has been drastically amended after Amendment Act 1976 and it was provided that nothing in this sub-section shall be deemed to take away or abridge the power of the court to hear for reasons to be recorded, the appeal on any other substantial question of law, not formulated by it, if it is satisfied that the case involves such question. In the instant case ends of justice require that even though this question was not pleaded, since it was involved, consequently it was permitted to be argued. 15. After the Amendment Act, 1976 amending section 100 of the code unless the appeal involves substantial question or law the same cannot be entertained or allowed. Expression involves means the point must emanate from the pleadings of the parties and judgments of courts below, and at the same time it must be incorrectly decided. Whether the order of discharge was in violation of Article 311 (1) of the Constitution, was a substantial question of law, which emanates from the pleadings and judgments of the courts below ana the same has not been correctly decided. In this view of the matter the decree of lower appellate court cannot be sustained. 16. In view of the premises aforesaid the Second Appeal succeeds and the same is allowed and the judgment and decree of the lower appellate court is set aside and the suit of the plaintiff-appellant is decreed with cost throughout. Appeal Allowed.